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CONTENTS

JACOB NEUSNER, The phenomenon of the Rabbi in Late Anti- quity	I
DAVID BRUDNOY, Militant Sainthood: Nichiren	19
ISLWYN BLYTHIN, Magic and Methodology	45
A. RUPP, Gedanken zu einer religionsgeschichtlichen Anthro- pologie	60
GEORGES WECKMAN, Primitive secret Societies as religious Organizations	83
WINSTON L. KING, Śūnyatā as a Master-symbol	95
C. E. BOSWORTH, A Dramatisation of the Prophet Muhammad's Life: Henri de Bornier's <i>Mahomet</i>	105
BRIAN E. COLLESS, Divine Education	118
GANESH UMAKANT THITE, Animal-sacrifice in the Brāhmaṇa- texts	143
FRANKLIN PEASE, The Andean Creator God	161
DON E. MARIETTA Jr., Conscience in Greek Stoicism	176
H. C. SNAPE, After the Crucifixion of "The Great Forty Days"	188
J. Y. LEE, Some reflections on the Authorship of the I Ching	200
HANS G. KIPPENBERG, Versuch einer soziologischen Verortung des antiken Gnostizismus	211
GEORGE W. SPENCER, The Sacred Geography of the Tamil Shaivite Hymns	232
Short Note	245
Publications Received	159, 248

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THE PHENOMENON OF THE RABBI IN LATE ANTIQUITY

II. The Ritual of 'Being a Rabbi' in Later Sasanian Babylonia

BY

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The rabbi functioned in the Babylonian Jewish community as judge and administrator, for into his hands the exilarch had much earlier committed the court-system of the *millet*-community.¹⁾ But the sage lived in a society in some ways quite separate from that of Jewry as a whole, the school. The rabbinical academy was, to be sure, a law-school, and some of its graduates did indeed serve as judges and administrators of the law. We should err, however, by regarding the rabbinical school as a center for merely legal study. It was, like the contemporary monastery,²⁾ the locus for a peculiar kind of religious living, only one of whose functions concerned those parts of the Torah to be applied in everyday life through the judiciary. The school was a holy community. In it men learned to live a holy life, to become saints. When they left, sages continued to live by the discipline of the school, and they invested great efforts in teaching that discipline by example and precept to ordinary folk. It was through the school that Pharisaic-Rabbinic Judaism proposed to transform the Jewish people into a true replica of revelation as Pharisaic-Rabbinic Judaism understood and expounded that revelation.

i. THE TORAH-MYTH

The rabbinical school, not merely a social force, but especially a

1) The data pertaining to the years 226 to 379 A.D. are summarized in my *History of the Jews in Babylonia*, II. *The Early Sasanian Period* (Leiden, 1966), pp. 126-140; III. *From Shapur I to Shapur II* (Leiden, 1968), pp. 95-194; and IV. *The Age of Shapur II* (Leiden, 1969), pp. 279-402. All sayings and stories cited here derive from the fifth, sixth, and last generations of Babylonian Amoraim, ca. 380 to 500 A.D. My "Phenomenon of the Rabbi in Late Antiquity," *Numen* 16, 1, 1969, pp. 1-20 reviews some of the earlier fourth-century materials.

2) See vol. III, pp. 195-202.

religious phenomenon, embodied the central myth of Pharisaic-Rabbinic Judaism, namely the belief that the ancient Scriptures constituted divine revelation, but only a part of it. At Sinai God had handed down a dual revelation, the written part known to one and all, but also the oral part preserved by the great scriptural heroes, passed on by prophets to various ancestors in the obscure past of Pharisaism, finally and most openly handed down to the rabbis of the Palestinian, and now, the Babylonian schools as well. The "whole Torah" thus consisted of both written and oral parts. That "whole Torah" was studied by David, augmented by Ezekiel, legislated by Ezra, and embodied in the schools and by the sages of every period in Israelite history from Moses to the present. It was a singular, linear conception of a revelation, preserved only by the few, but pertaining to the many, and in time capable of bringing salvation to all.

The Torah-myth further regarded Moses as "our rabbi," the first and prototypical figure of the schools. It held that whoever embodied the teachings of Moses "our rabbi" would thereby conform to the will of God—and not to God's will alone, but also to his *way*. The schools believed that in heaven God and the angels studied Torah just as rabbis did on earth. God donned phylacteries like a rabbi. He prayed in the rabbinic mode. He carried out the acts of compassion called for by the rabbinic ethics. He guided the affairs of the world according to the rules of Torah, like the rabbi in his court. One exegesis of the Creation-legend taught that God had looked into the Torah and therefrom had created the world. Moreover, heaven was aware above of what the rabbis in particular thought, said, and did below. The myth of Torah was many-dimensional. It included the striking detail that whatever the most recent rabbi was destined to discover through proper exegesis of the tradition was as much a part of the *way* revealed to Moses as was a sentence of Scripture itself. It was therefore possible to participate in the giving of the law, as it were, by appropriate, logical inquiry into the law. God himself, studying and living by Torah, was believed to subject himself to these same rules of logical inquiry, so if an earthly court overruled the testimony, delivered through natural miracles, of the heavenly one, God would rejoice, crying out, "My sons have conquered me! My sons have conquered me!"

In a word, we are considering a religious-mythical system in which

earth and heaven corresponded to one another, with the Torah as the nexus and model of both. The heavenly paradigm was embodied upon earth. Moses "our rabbi" was the pattern for the ordinary sage of the streets of Pumbedita or Sura. And God himself participated in the system, for it was his image which, in the end, formed that cosmic paradigm. The rabbi constituted the projection of the divine on earth. Honor was due him more than to the scroll of the Torah, for through his learning and logic he might alter the very content of Mosaic revelation. He *was* Torah, not merely because he lived by it, but because at his best he constituted as compelling an embodiment of the heavenly model as did a Torah scroll itself.

The schools, like other holy communities, imposed their own particular rituals, intended, in the first instance, for the disciples and masters. Later, it was hoped, all Israel would conform to those rituals and so join the circle of master and disciples. The schools' discipline transformed ordinary, natural actions, gestures, and functions into rituals—the rituals of "being a rabbi." Everyone ate. Rabbis did so in a "rabbinic" manner. That is to say, what others may have regarded as matters of mere etiquette, formalities and conventions intended to render eating aesthetically agreeable, rabbis regarded as matters of "Torah," something to be learned. It was "Torah" to do things one way, and it was equally "ignorance" to do them another (though not 'heresy,' for theology was no issue). The master of Torah, whether disciple or teacher, would demonstrate his mastery not merely through what he said in the discussion of legal traditions or what he did in court. He would do so by how he sat at the table, by what ritual formulae he recited before eating one or another kind of fruit or vegetable, by how he washed his hands. Everyone had to relieve himself. The sage would do so according to "Torah." The personality traits of men might vary. Those expected of, and inculcated into, a sage were of a single fabric.

One must continually stress, however, the fundamental difference between the way of Torah and ways to salvation explored by other holy men and sacred communities. The rabbi at no point would admit that his particular rites were imposed upon him alone, apart from all Israel. He ardently "spread Torah" among the Jews at large. He believed he had to, because Torah was revealed to all Israel at Sinai and required of all Israel afterward. Hence if he was right that Moses

was "our rabbi" and God kept the commandments, he had to ask of everyone what he demanded of himself, conformity to the way of Torah. His task was facilitated by the widespread belief that Moses had indeed revealed "the Torah" and that some sort of interpretation quite naturally was required to apply it to everyday affairs. The written part of Torah generally shaped the life of ordinary pious folk. What the rabbi had to accomplish was to persuade the outsider that that written part of the Torah was partial and incomplete, requiring further elaboration through the oral traditions he alone possessed and embodied.

The final element in the rabbinic Torah-myth concerned salvation. It took many forms. One salvific teaching held that had Israel not sinned—that is, disobeyed the Torah—the Scriptures would have closed with the story of the conquest of the land. From that eschatological time forward, the sacred community would have lived in eternal peace under the divine law. Keeping the Torah was therefore the guarantee of salvation. The opposite was said in many forms as well. Israel had sinned, therefore God had called the Assyrians, Babylonians, and Romans to destroy the Temple of Jerusalem. But in his mercy he would be equally faithful to restore the fortunes of the people when they through their suffering and repentance had expiated the result and the cause of their sin. So in both negative and positive forms, the Torah myth told of a necessary connection between the salvation of the people and of the world and the state of "Torah" among them.

For example, if all Israel would properly keep a single Sabbath, the Messiah would come. Of special interest here is the saying of R. Papa that the rule of the pagans depended upon the sin of Israel. If Israel would constitute a full and complete replication of "Torah," that is, of heaven, then pagan rule would come to an end. It would end because all Israel then, like some few rabbis even now, would attain to the creative, theurgical powers inherent in Torah. Just as God had created the world through "Torah," so saintly rabbis could now create animals and men. Rabbis quite practically asserted their magical power, by holding that they should not pay for the building of walls around their cities, "because rabbis do not require protection." This assertion was part of the broader salvific pattern revealed long ago and supposed to come to fruition when Israel had made itself worthy

through its embodiment of Torah, that is, as I said, through its perfect replication of heaven.

ii. TORAH, THE SUPERNATURAL, AND MAGIC

The supernatural environment in which the rabbis lived produced the widespread expectation that some men would enjoy divine favor and even exercise superhuman powers. People generally believed in a supernatural God, who had not only made the world and directed the destinies of men, but also directly or through angels, demons, and others forces and powers affected the lives of individual men. But that God could be served through appropriate cultic and, in the case of Judaism, Christianity, and Mazdaism, moral actions. For Jews, God was conceived essentially according to the model of man,³⁾ though much greater in dimensions, to be sure, and he responded pretty much as did men to those who pleased or displeased him. One way of achieving divine favor was through appropriate humility before him, demonstrated through constant, humble obedience, in the Jewish instance, to his commandments. Another was to beseech divine blessing in prayer and to hasten to acknowledge divine grace through the same medium. Those men who were believed, or at least believed themselves, especially adept in divine service would thus be assumed to enjoy exceptional divine favor. The puissance of some such men could be relied upon in times of crisis or in situations of great need. They were supposed to enjoy powers most men did not have, first of all exercised through prayer. But, as I have pointed out,⁴⁾ it was possible for such men to exercise quite independently of the divinity some of the powers of the divinity and of the cultic sancta, in the Jewish case, of the Torah.

3) The profound anthropomorphisms of both the rabbis and ordinary Jews generally have embarrassed philosophical theologians of medieval and modern Judaism. Stories representing God in the form of a man — to take one of many instances at random, the opening passage of b. *ʿAvodah Zarah*, where God takes a scroll of the law to his bosom, or b. *Pesahim* 94a-b, an example of Shiʿur Qomah speculation, in which the dimensions of God are described — are mostly explained away. Yet as Gershom Scholem has emphasized on the basis of mystical materials, we err by dismissing as mere conceits what the rabbis took very seriously indeed and preserved in their traditions. Obviously, what we refer to as seeing God as a cosmic man would have been corrected by the sages, who would have cited the Scriptures in Genesis, Ezekiel, and elsewhere to describe man as in the image of God. But for the purposes of the history of religions, it hardly matters.

4) Vol. IV, pp. 353-362.

For the schools and for the communities accessible to rabbinical influence, the rabbi was such a man. The rabbi was the expert on theology, the nature of the supernatural world, the names of God. He was the authority on the time and form of prayer. His prayers were more effective than those of others because of his sanctity and merits, derived from his knowledge of Torah and peculiar observances. His prayers both in general and for particular purposes were believed effective. He could bless and curse. Angels visited him. Demons sometimes served him, either willingly or coerced by the power of his Torah. He was an authority on the meaning of dreams and omens, could avert witchcraft and prepare amulets.

Among the central supernatural beliefs of the schools was that their affairs were directly supervised from heaven. It was said, for example, that when Rava died, R. Ashi was born. While the chronology is highly dubious, the conviction is significant: Heaven arranged things so that great leadership would not cease from the schools. Of greater interest is the following story, which can easily be duplicated many times:

[Abaye had ridiculed the view that one may cut palm-branches during the festival week.] R. Ashi had a forest in Shelania⁵. He went to cut it down during the festival week. R. Shila⁶ of Shelania⁷ said to R. Ashi, "What is your opinion? . . . [Do you rely on an opinion contrary to Abaye? But Abaye ridiculed that opinion.] . . . He said to him, "I have not heard it." [That is to say, it is not reasonable to me.] The hatchet then slipped [from the heft] as if to cut off his leg. He left off his task and returned [after the festival week]. (b. Mo'ed Qatan 12b)

While stories were told of how earlier sages had rejected the testimony of the natural world, ⁵) the later schools had no such compunction. They fully expected that the forces of nature would conspire to reveal, then enforce the correct view of the law. They felt certain of a close correspondence between the fate of man and his moral character, also between the doings of nature and the needs of men. R. Nahman b. Isaac, of the preceding generation, had said, for instance, that one who rejoices on the Sabbath will be saved from the subjugation of exile, citing Deut. 33 : 29, ⁶) and that if a man gives his dues to the priest, he will get rich, citing Numbers 5 : 10. ⁷) Mar Zuṭra or

⁵) The most famous concerns R. Eliezer b. Hyrcanus, see b. Bava Me'zi'a² 59b-60a.

⁶) b. Shabbat 118b.

⁷) b. Berakhot 63a.

R. Ashi held that saying the *Shema*^c would similarly protect in bed the person who said it.⁸⁾ Hence saying the prayer acted as a kind of prophylactic incantation, against demons or liliths. At the same time, few expected too exact a correspondence between deeds and destiny. Mar Zuṭra explicitly stated that heaven does not behave like a store-keeper, adding up merits and balancing them against sins.⁹⁾

iii. THE RABBINICAL WAY OF LIFE

In the normal course of events, sages would have eaten mostly with one another, since they spent most of their time while at the school sessions in one another's company. These meals began and ended with appropriate blessings and grace.¹⁰⁾ The discussion of what blessings were to be said over particular foods was central to the schools' legal inquiry. Similarly, the saying of the grace after meals produced numerous knotty legal problems. In my view, both rites probably were peculiar to rabbis. The very many difficulties met by rabbis in learning the law pertaining to them suggest so. Further, not a single instance of an outsider's saying the grace or asking the sages about laws about blessings or grace exists in later Babylonian traditions. By contrast, we have many examples of sages' eating together and saying grace with one another, including both legal dicta and stories. I therefore suppose that while ordinary people might have expressed their gratitude to the divinity for food they ate, they would not regularly have done so in the form prescribed by the schools. Hence among the singular rites signifying whether a man was part of the rabbinical estate must have been those connected with eating. Since sacred meals of various kinds usually marked the existence of a holy community or brotherhood in ancient religions, one can hardly think otherwise. What is remarkable here as elsewhere, on the contrary, is the rabbis' insistence that everyone was supposed to do just as they did. But as I said, I doubt that outsiders did so at this time.

Grace after meals, now as before, remained a rite unique to the sages and their circles. Some of the stories pertain to special situations, such as grace at the home of a mourner or at a wedding banquet, as follows:

8) b. Berakhot 5a, as an exegesis of Ps. 149:6.

9) b. Qiddushin 40a.

10) On blessings over food, see vol. II, pp. 170-6; III, pp. 158-178; and IV, pp. 329-330. I doubt that the blessings were widely known outside of the schools.

R. Assi came to the house of R. Ashi on the occasion of the wedding-feast of Mar his son, and said six benedictions.... R. Ashi came to the house of R. Kahana [on the occasion of a wedding banquet]. The first day he said all the [wedding] benedictions. Afterward, if there were new guests, he repeated them, but if not, he [said only some of them...]. (b. Ketuvot 6a)

Mar Zutra visited R. Ashi when R. Ashi had suffered a bereavement [lit.: something happened to him]. In the grace after the meal he said the blessing, "Who is good and does good. God of truth, true judge, who judges in righteousness and takes away injustice, who rules over his world to do as he pleases in it, for all his ways are justice. All is his, and we are his people and his servants. For all [things] we are obliged to thank and bless him. He who fences in the breaches of Israel will close up this breach in Israel for life." (b. Berakhot 46b)

The behavior of R. Ashi thus was cited as evidence of how one is supposed to say the grace at the wedding feast. Rabbinic behavior in this circumstance as in others was regarded as authoritative revelation of correct law. The blessing of Mar Zutra may have been his own composition of scriptural and rabbinic sayings. From that time onward, though, it would have become the accepted form for his disciples, and still later, for disciples of those masters who accepted their authority.

The mode and manner of dressing oneself certainly entered into the "ritual of being a rabbi." Covering one's head was regarded as a sign of piety, therefore required of the sage above all:

R. Huna b. R. Joshua would not walk four cubits bareheaded. He said, "The *Shekhinah* is above my head." (b. Qiddushin 31a)

Similarly, R. Ashi pointed out that a *gavra² rabbah*, one expert at legal dialectic, required a *sudarium*, or kerchief, for his head.¹¹⁾ How rabbis donned various articles of clothing on the Sabbath similarly would be observed and carefully recorded.¹²⁾

Since some of the sages were regarded as "living Torahs," their deeds, as much as their words, constituted a source of law. Thus the recollections not merely of schoolmen, but also of members of the family of a particularly reliable sage would serve as satisfactory precedent:

11) b. Qiddushin 8a. On *gavra rabbah*, see vol. III, p. 134. As to peculiar garments for rabbis, see S. Kraus, "Talitam shel Talmidē Ḥakhamim," *Bloch Jubilee Volume* (Budapest, 1905), pp. 83-97. There Krauss argues against the supposition that such a characteristic cloak or garment was worn by rabbis.

12) b. Shabbat 61a, how Mar b. Rabina put on shoes on the Sabbath.

The wife of R. Ashi sifted flour on the topside of a table [on a festival]. R. Ashi said, "This [wife] of ours is the daughter of Rami b. Ḥama, and Rami b. Ḥama was a master of deeds, so if she did not see [this] in the house of parents she would not have done [it]." (b. Beḥa 29b)

Reports by a master of what he himself had done were equally satisfactory evidence.¹³⁾ Further, deeds were constantly measured against the teaching of earlier masters:

[Rav Judah said that if a person saying the Prayer wished to spit, he should do so into his robe or scarf]. Rabina once was standing [in Prayer] behind R. Ashi and wanted to spit. He spat behind himself. R. Ashi said to him, "Do you not accept the teaching of Rav Judah that one should cover it with his scarf?" Rabina replied, "I am squeamish." (b. Berakhot 24b)

In such a circumstance, it was not likely that disciples would ignore the precedents of early masters. Just as in the courts these precedents were binding, so in the schools, homes, synagogues, and elsewhere the words of the ancients echoed with authority in the minds of the disciples. In time, a profoundly conservative impact would make itself felt on the personality of the disciple. He would first consciously, then unconsciously, shape himself into the mold of the former generations, and later on would produce the same impact upon his own disciples.

That impact affected not only customs of dress, speech, or eating, but also the formation of the disciple's personality. The schools debated about the traits most desirable in a rabbi. The issues were characteristically academic: Should a master be harsh or merciful? Should a disciple show modesty or pride? The following exemplifies the range of discussion in the later period:

R. Ashi said, "A disciple of the sages who is not as hard as iron is not disciple of the sages [quoting Jeremiah 23 : 29]" ... Rabina said, "Even so, a man should train himself to be gentle [quoting Qoheleth 11 : 10]." (b. Ta'anit 4a)

On the other hand, R. Yosi b. Abin explained to R. Ashi that he had abandoned his studies with R. Yosi of Derokeret because the latter had showed no mercy to his children. He had cursed his son and daughter, the former for misusing the magical powers in prayer which he had mastered, the latter for being so beautiful as to become a source

¹³⁾ b. Beḥa 25b, R. Naḥman b. Isaac said he had carried Mar Samuel from the sun to the shade.

of distraction for men.¹⁴⁾ R. Ashi taught that arrogance is a blemish.¹⁵⁾

Naturally rabbis supposed there was a direct causal relationship between personal virtues and worldly events. R. Papa was unable to make rain, for instance, until he showed himself truly humble. Then rain fell in buckets.¹⁶⁾ The belief in an intrinsic relationship between events in the natural world and the moral virtues of sages was also illustrated by R. Papa's belief that he had met an accident because he had failed to help a beggar.¹⁷⁾ Reinforced by the expectation that heaven would reward virtuous character as well as right conduct, the school's effort to reshape the disciple's personality would have achieved considerable success. Yet "being a rabbi" did not consist merely of exhibiting the traits of pride or humility, harshness or gentility any more than it amounted to sporting peculiar clothing and performing natural functions in a singularly "rabbinical" fashion.

iv. STUDY OF TORAH AS RITUAL

The central ritual of "being a rabbi" was study. Study as a *natural* action entails learning of traditions and executing them—in this context, in school or in court. Study becomes a ritual action when it is endowed with values *extrinsic* to its ordinary character, such as when set into the highly mythic context I have already described. When a disciple memorized his master's traditions and actions, carrying out the former where appropriate and imitating the latter when possible, he participated in that myth. His study was thereby endowed with the sanctity which ordinarily pertained to prayer or other cultic matters. Study lost its referent in intellectual attainment. The act of study itself became holy, so that its original purpose, which was mastery of particular information, ceased to matter much. What mattered was piety, — piety expressed through the rites of studying. Repeating the words of the oral revelation, even without comprehending them, produced reward, just as imitating the master mattered, even without really being able to explain the reasons for his actions. The separation of the value, or sanctity, of the act of study from the natural, cognitive result of learning

14) b. Ta'anit 24a.

15) b. Megillah 29a.

16) b. Ta'anit 24b.

17) b. Bava Batra 10a.

therefore transformed studying from a natural to a ritual action. That separation was accomplished in part by myth, as I said, and in part by the powerful impact of the academic environment itself. A striking illustration of the distinction between mere learning and learning as part of ritual life derives from Mar Zuṭra's comment on Is. 14:5, "The Lord has broken the staff of the wicked, the scepter of rulers":

Mar Zutra said, "These are disciples of the sages who teach public laws to uncultivated judges."

(b. Shabbat 139a)

The fact that the uncultivated judge would *know* the law did not matter, for he still was what he had been, uncultivated. Mere knowledge of the laws did not transform an ordinary person, however powerful, into a sage. That learning carried with it more than naturalistic valence is further seen in the saying of Amemar:

"A sage is better than [or, superior to] a prophet, as Scripture, says, *And a prophet has a heart of wisdom*. (Ps. 90:12)"

(b. Bava² Batra² 12a)

What characterized the prophet was, Amemar said, sagacity. Since the prophet was supposed to reveal the divine will, it was not inconsequential that his revelation depended not upon gifts of the spirit but upon learning — learning of a peculiar sort.

One way in which that peculiarity found form was in the schools' stress on "learning" and deed." The uncultivated judge could be relied upon to learn and apply part of the law, to be sure, but no one expected that he would also embody all of it. On the other hand, the following saying shows the rabbis' stress on shaping one's way of life in all respects through "Torah":

R. Papa said, "Scripture said, *That you may learn them and observe to do them* (Deut. 5:1), [meaning] Whoever participates in the [merit for] doing participates in the [merit for] studying, and whoever does not [do the one] does not [enjoy the other]."

(b. Yevamot 109b)

R. Papa's saying reflects an earlier viewpoint, that the purpose of "Torah" lay in the creation of a new personality, a new man, not merely in the acquisition of learning, however sacred its origin. Here we must underline the rabbis' perspective. They studied "Torah" because they

believed it was revealed at Sinai, therefore holy. But they expected that their studies would produce a profound transformation of themselves and their little community. Further sayings on studying include the following:

R. Zevid said, "He [who studies Scripture and Mishnah] is worthy of inheriting two worlds, this one and the one to come..."

(b. *Hullin* 44b)

R. Mesharsheya said to his sons, "When you wish to come before your teacher to learn, first revise your Mishnah and then go your teacher. When you are sitting before your teacher look at the mouth of your teacher, as it is written, *But thine eyes shall see thy teacher* (Is. 30 : 20); and when you study any teaching, do so by the side of water, for as the water is drawn out [= MŠKY], so your learning may be prolonged. Be on the dustheaps of Mata Mehasia rather than in the palaces [ʔPDNY] of Pumbedita. Eat a stinking fish rather than *cutha* which breaks rocks."

(b. *Keritot* 6a) ¹⁸⁾

The rabbis generally shared R. Zevid's certainty of great rewards now and in eternity on account of their study of Torah.

My earlier remarks ought not to obscure the rabbis' high expectations of actual accomplishment in learning. While, as I said, they stressed the act of study without reference to its achievement, if any, at the same time they possessed very old traditions on how best to pursue their task. This tradition included much practical advice on how to acquire and preserve learning. R. Mesharsheya's advice to his sons exemplifies this rich source of distilled experience. Part of that experience was perfectly reasonable. Reviewing before classes, concentrating on the teacher, staying near the great schools — these things would make sense in any circumstance. On the other hand, the advice to study by a body of water "so that your learning may be prolonged" has little to do with the practical problems of memorizing and reasoning. It rather relates to the rabbis' view of a correspondence between their own study and those aspects of nature which the rabbis looked upon as symbolic of their activities — and they many times compared Torah to living waters. Rabina advised that those who make their studies accessible to the public will retain their learning. ¹⁹⁾ R. Ashi warned that one who is stubborn in a quarrel or unyielding in a dispute deserved to be smitten

¹⁸⁾ Trans. I. Porusch (London, 1948), p. 38.

¹⁹⁾ b. *Eruvin* 53a.

with leprosy. ²⁰⁾ While his saying was a general one, it would apply with special force to the argumentative life of the academies.

No role whatever was assigned to women. They did not study in the Babylonian schools, and the life of "Torah" effectively was closed to them. On the other hand, mothers would encourage their sons to study Torah. Mar b. Rabina's mother would prepare seven garments for seven days of the week to facilitate his learning. ²¹⁾ Rabina explained how the merit of study of the Torah applied to womenfolk. Women acquire merit when they arrange for their sons' education in Scripture and Mishnah, and when they wait for their husbands to return from the schools. ²²⁾ Since that return was often postponed by months or even years, it was no small sacrifice. But the schools were entirely male institutions, and no equivalent religious communities existed for women. The disciples lived not only an ascetic life, but, in the months at school, a celibate one as well. It was, therefore, a kind of temporary monastic community, especially for the students from distant places. From the wives it also demanded celibacy.

V. DISCIPLESHIP AS RITUAL

The central human relationship in the schools was that between the disciple and master. Long ago it was taught that the master took the place of the father. The father brought the son into this world, but the master would lead him into the world to come. Whatever honor was due the father was all the more so owing to the master. But the master did not merely replace the father. He also required the veneration and reverence owing to the Torah. The extreme forms of respect which evolved over the centuries constitute the most striking rituals attached to "being a rabbi." If study was an act of piety, then the master to some extent was its object. That is not to suggest that the master was regarded as in any sense divine. But the forms of respect reserved for the divinity or for the Torah were not too different, in appropriate circumstances, from those owing to the master. In any event, the forms of respect for the master constituted part of the "ritual of being a rabbi," and I think a most important one.

It was the service of the disciples of the sage [*shimush talmidé*

²⁰⁾ b. Sanhedrin 110a.

²¹⁾ b. ^cEruvin 65a.

²²⁾ b. Sotah 21a.

hakhamim] which separated the true sage from the merely learned man. It had earlier been taught that if one had studied Scripture and Mishnah but did not attend upon disciples of the sages, he was regarded as a Samaritan, a boor, an *‘am ha‘arez*. To these epithets, R. Aḥa b. Jacob added:

“Behold, such a one is a Magus [MGWŠ] !”

(b. Soṭah 22a)

The discussion continued by citing a popular saying that the Magus mumbles and does not know what he is saying, just as the Tanna who has not attended on the sages recites and does not know what he is saying. R. Aḥa claimed to see no difference between a learned Jew and a learned Mazdean except that the former attended the sages. That attendance — meaning not merely service but imitation, study of the master as much as of the Torah — constituted a vital part of “Torah,” because the master exemplified the “whole Torah,” including the oral part of it. Scripture and Mishnah, written and oral Torah, without observation *and* imitation of the sage meant little. The whole Torah was not in books nor in words to be memorized, but to be found in whole and complete form only in the master. That is why the forms of respect for the master were both so vital and so unique to the mythic life of the schools.

Ordinary folk could reasonably be expected to carry out most of the rites characteristic of the rabbinical estate, but one — discipleship. True, common people were supposed to honor all rabbis, but that honor was quite different from the perpetual humility displayed by disciple before his particular master. The real difference was not the depth of submission but the constant attendance and attention. On the rare occasions when a great rabbi appeared in public the ordinary people could be just as humble as his private entourage, or more so. But the one thing they could not do was keep it up, wait on him constantly, and so learn all his little ways. They just did not have the time — or the interest. Of all human relationships open to rabbis, therefore, it was the one between master and disciple which was most thoroughly ritualized, most utterly divorced from natural forms of human intercourse. The basis for the rite is best summarized thus: If the master is a living Torah, source of revelation of the oral tradition given at Sinai and embodied now in the master himself, then the disciple had best humbly imitate each and

every gesture of that living Torah and so prepare himself as the nexus of the transmission of this same oral tradition to the coming generation.

Submission to the master produced several sorts of tensions. First the master's knowledge, so much greater than the disciple's, must have intimidated the latter, and as this phenomenon reproduced itself one generation after the other, it led to exaggerating the attainments of the ancients and denigrating one's own:

Rava said, "We are like a finger in wax as regards reasoning." R. Ashi said. "We are like a finger in the well as regards forgetting."

(b. *ḤEruvin* 53a)

That is to say, "just as a finger cannot penetrate wax, so we cannot penetrate reasoning; just as a finger cannot bring up water from a well, so easily do we forget what we have learned." Both similes come at the end of a long line of sayings on the glories of the ancients and the limitations of the moderns. It was an attitude inculcated by the schools, inherent in the belief that perfection had been revealed at Sinai, only to be slowly but inevitably forgotten, stage by stage to suffer attrition through the ages. Master's and disciple's relationships must have been embittered, moreover, by the hardness fostered in the sage, who had to maintain his point with vigor in his quest for truth. Thus the master's arrogance, produced by pride in his very real achievements, would have troubled his relationships with children and disciples alike:

Why is it not common for disciples of the sages to produce sons who are disciples of the sages? . . . Mar Zutra said, "Because they [high-handedly] overrule the community." R. Ashi said, "Because they call men *asses*."

(b. *Nedarim* 81a)

R. Ashi and Mar Zutra certainly condemned the qualities they cited to account for the sages' failure in raising their own sons in the tradition, but they also must have found it common for sages to behave arrogantly and to call people disrespectful names. A current example of ritualistic behavior between master and disciple is as follows:

It has been taught [in Tannaitic tradition], "A man should not drink water and hand [the cup] to his disciple unless he first pours some out." It happened once that a man drank some water and without pouring any out gave [the cup] to his disciple. The disciple was squeamish and did not like to drink, and he

died of thirst. There and then they laid down a rule that a man should not drink and give [the cup] to his disciple without pouring some out. R. Ashi said, "Consequently if a disciple pours out in front of his teacher, this shows no disrespect." Do not spit anything out in front of your teacher except pumpkin and leek, for they are like a wick of lead.

(b. Tamid 27a) ²³)

Many other forms of respect were long ago established, and the strata of sayings of late fourth- and fifth-century masters is not especially rich in new rites or teachings; we have no reason whatever to doubt that the ancient patterns varied much.

While the masters encouraged large numbers of disciples to attend the schools, relations between disciple and master proved stormy. For example, R. Papa cursed students who acted disrespectfully:

R. Huna b. Manoah, R. Samuel b. Idi, and R. Hiyya of Vestania had studied with Rava. When he died, they came to R. Papa. Whenever he said to them a saying which did not seem reasonable to them, they would gesture [mockingly] at one another. R. Papa's heart grew faint [but in a dream, he was encouraged to believe they would die]. The next day when they parted from him, he said to them, "May the rabbis go *in* peace [a greeting paid to the deceased]."

(b. Ta'anit 9a-b)

But usually the sage did not have to rely either on prayers or on divine intervention to keep the students in line. Social pressures in the school, a small and closely-knit society, must have been tremendous. Further, the master could excommunicate the disciple, thus cutting him off from normal intercourse within his community. Banning a disciple would invariably have proved effective so long as the disciple chose to remain within the rabbinical estate. Since he would have been indoctrinated in its values for a long time, he would have been more susceptible than ordinary folk to the power of the ban.

vi. CONCLUSION

This survey of late fourth and fifth-century data on the singular rituals of "being a rabbi" by no means constitutes a complete or full account of rabbinical in-group rites. Many earlier sayings and stories, not germane to this historical period, would be required to fill out this portrait. I have said nothing, for example, about particular rabbinical modes of speech, though we know the rabbis had their "own" words for

²³) Trans. Maurice Simon (London, 1948), p. 9.

some objects, and little enough about rabbinical styles of dress, carrying out natural functions, etiquette at table, behavior with peers and superiors, and the like. What is important is that all of these matters were "Torah," required learning, properly done exhibited sagacity and led to holiness. One recalls the story of Rav's student who hid under the master's bed to observe how Rav and his wife carried on their sex life. When the master discovered the disciple, the latter explained, "Rabbi, it is Torah, and I need to learn." Whether or not this ingenious excuse for voyeurism persuaded Rav is unimportant.

What is important is that within "Torah" were included numerous aspects of ordinary life which other Jews did not likely consider of religious consequence at all. Because of their belief that the school on earth corresponded to the school in heaven, the rabbis endowed with ritualistic value their particular ways of doing everyday tasks and of carrying out natural functions and relationships. For the same reason they held, as I have stressed, that following the rabbinical mode constituted both the demonstration of wisdom and the authentication of true sanctity. Yet this was only one such means of authentication, for the rabbis, like Jewish society as a whole, believed in both worldly and supernatural recognition of their worth.

It would be a grave misjudgment to regard the master-disciple relationship as sterile and stifling, or to assess the inner life of the schools as did Gibbon the men of Byzantium who

held in their lifeless hands the riches of their fathers, without inheriting the spirit which had created and improved that sacred patrimony; they read, they praised, they compiled, but their languid souls seemed alike incapable of thought and action. . . . Not a single idea has been added to the speculative systems of antiquity, and a succession of patient disciples became in their turn the dogmatic teachers of the next servile generation . . . ²⁴⁾

The master taught the disciple, but did not seek intimidate him. The disciple revered the master, sought to imitate his virtues, attain his holy way of living, transmit his heritage. But he was not expected to, and did not, surrender his own personality or give up his own critical judgment. If relations proved stormy, the reason was that the disciples preserved the freedom to judge and regarded reason and accurate traditions as holier than the opinion even of a beloved teacher. The master

24) Quoted by Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment* (New York, 1968), p. 213.

was a "living Torah," but not God. Servility was not confused with respect. Honor did not demand self-abnegation. On the contrary, the creative faculties of the disciples must have been carefully nurtured and enhanced, for the legacy of each generation greatly differs from that of the former one. After several centuries of scholastic discipline, servile students and dogmatic teachers ought to have creating nothing; as Gibbon said of the Byzantine schools:

Not a single composition of history, philosophy, or literature has been saved from oblivion by the intrinsic beauties of style, or sentiment, or original fancy, or even of successful imitation.

The contrary was the case. What testifies to the vivid and original intellects of the rabbinical schools is the Babylonian Talmud itself, the product not of servility, on the one side, or dogmatism, on the other, but of keen minds, an exceptionally critical imagination, and an utterly independent spirit. We must, therefore, not lose sight of the deeply mythic-religious foundations for the ritual of "being a rabbi." If we ignore the vitality of the Torah-myth that permeated and vivified the schools, we shall not perceive the very source of their creative life and achievement. The schools gave pedantry a cool welcome, for mere learning was insufficient. The masters and disciples took the opinions and knowledge of the early generations into their care, respectfully learning them, reverently handing them on. But these they digested and made their own. Their minds were filled with the learning of other, earlier men, but their wisdom was their own, for, conforming to the Torah, they too became vehicles of revelation, modes of sanctity, and mediators of salvation.

MILITANT SAINTHOOD: NICHIREN

BY

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If the Buddha-word is not wrong, the country is already full of the enemies of truth. Is the Buddha-word empty that there are no followers of the Lotus of the Excellent Law today? What else can I think? What else can I think? Who are blamed? Who are the priests beaten with stick and sword? Who are the priests who are slandered in the presence of the nobles and the warriors for the sake of the Lotus? Who are the priests suffering in exile in accordance with the teaching of scriptures which say, "They will be frequently exiled"? There is no such priest in Japan except Nichiren.

Nichiren, *Kaimokushō*, 1272)

Since the publication of the late Professor Anesaki's masterful study in 1916,¹⁾ Western interest in Nichiren and in his important sect of Japanese Buddhism has grown considerably. Despite the addition to the Western languages bibliography of many of Nichiren's previously untranslated works and of several more personal, even enchanting, studies by Nichiren adherants, Anesaki's study stands preëminent to this day. The past half-century has also witnessed the production of significant studies of Nichiren's time, Japan's early feudal period, in various Western languages, primarily English. We have, lastly, had ample opportunity to study the lives of modern leaders who temporized, who compromised their faith, for whom Nichiren, a man of an entirely

1) Masaharu Anesaki. *Nichiren, The Buddhist Prophet*, Harvard Univ. Press. Cambridge. 1916. Several interesting Western language studies, not cited elsewhere below, are: Satomi, Kishio, *Nichiren's Revival of Idealism and his Philosophy*, London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1924; N. R. M. Ehara, *Letters of Nichiren*, Nagasaki, 1935; Werner Kohler, *Die Lotus-Lehre und die moderne Religionen in Japan*, Zurich, Atlantis, 1962; Nissatsu Arai, *Outline of the Doctrines of the Nichiren Sect*, Tokyo, 1893; and Tamako Inouye, "Life of St. Nichiren," *Young East*, VIII, 4, 1941. A good selected bibliography is found in Donald Holzman et al., *Japanese Religion and Philosophy*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1959, pp. 44-45.

opposite type, would have felt only scorn. The life of Nichiren was devoted to "combatting the prejudices of the age" ²⁾ and to trying to warn his people of the dangers of their ways. Embodying both an almost ferocious militancy and a gentle, loving concern for humanity, this unique man's personality still, perhaps more than ever, compels an admiration, a fascination, for a rare breed of moral inspiration and saintly conviction.

The present study is not intended as a program for a radically revised thesis of Nichiren's life and beliefs. Rather, I wish only to bring together certain material which might augment Anesaki's superlative work and to suggest, implicitly at least, some areas from which fruitful new studies could proceed. This century's foremost Japanologist, the late Sir George Sansom, saw Nichiren as the "most remarkable figure in his country's religious history," a man who ranks certainly "among the first dozen of her great men." ³⁾ Sansom, too, I think, would have admitted that in the study of Nichiren, a *sui generis*, the master on whose shoulders we stand is Anesaki. And Anesaki surely would have been delighted to see the interest his pioneering study has incited in others.

I. AWAKENING 1222-1253

If it may be said that there are a few "typical" boyhood lives of men who become great moral examples, devoted ascetics and impassioned, intractable religious leaders, then the childhood of young Zen-nichimaro is illustrative of such a life. Born in the fishing village of Kominato ⁴⁾ in the Southeastern coastal prefecture of Awa, he spent his childhood as a sensitive, intense, lonely, sweet-natured son in a family shunned by the neighbours because it was in disgrace (having

2) Anesaki, *Nichiren, Buddhist Prophet*, page 2.

3) George Sansom, *A History of Japan to 1334*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1958, page 428.

4) E. Steinilber-Oberlin, avec la collaboration de Kuni Matsu, etc., *Les Sectes bouddhiques japonaises*, G. Crès et Cie., Paris, 1930, along with many writers on Nichiren, romanticizes: of this locale and its influence, he writes: "La vue de l'Océan incite au mysticisme, apporte à l'âme des visions prodigeuses; Nichiren fut un mystique et un visionnaire," page 262. Actually, it is not entirely clear whether Steinilber-Oberlin speaks here for himself or for an informant, a priest of the sect, M. Nichisho. Steinilber-Oberlin does provide a translated version of an undated text of Nichiren, *Durée de la vie du Tathagata*, and a partial translation of the Lotus Sutra; he mentions also a work by a Mr. Umada, *La Philosophie et la religion de Nichiren* (no other information given) which I have not located.

been banished for some reason).⁵⁾ He was, it seems, a quiet, serious student, no doubt perceptive enough even at an early age to realize somewhat the difference in his own position from that of the boys playing near him, but seldom with him. We gather from his writings that he was closest to his mother; about his relations with his father we know little. It is perhaps not too much to postulate that even in his first decade there were developing in him the contradictory forces that characterized his later life, a life in which, as his most noteworthy biographer tells us, "were harmonized the fervour of a prophet and the sweetness of a saint, the wisdom of a learned doctor and the enthusiasm of an ardent reformer."⁶⁾

At age eleven (1233) he went off to study as a novice at the temple of Kiyozumi near his home, adopting the name *Yakuomaro*. There, in 1237, he was ordained and received the new name *Renchō* (Lotus Eternal). At Kiyozumi, doubts grew in his mind about many of the current problems in religion; we are told that his distress was of such intensity that he once fell into a swoon following a fit of spitting blood. Even before his ordination, when he had first gone to Kiyozumi, he was tormented by two questions: the first concerned Buddhism itself, for he felt that there *must* be a *oneness* in Buddha's teaching in contrast to the multiplicity of sects he saw around him. The second question concerned the Shokyū War which was caused by Hōjō Yoshitoki the year before Nichiren's birth. Like many religious zealots, Nichiren had a passion for order, stability, and uniformity, and he felt certain that Japan's recent confused state had been caused by a "mere subject daring to exile the Sovereign!"⁷⁾

From the time of his ordination in 1237 until 1243, Nichiren — that is, *Renchō* — studied Amidism and other religious currents in Kamakura, the military capital. Still concerned, but not yet sure of his vocation, he went up to the renowned Mt. Hiei Temple and underwent rigorous training. He worked to find the *true* form of Buddhism, the *one*

5) See Arthur Lloyd, *Creed of Half Japan*, Smith, Elder, and Co, London, 1911, page 288.

6) Anesaki, *History of Japanese Religion*, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Company, Ltd., London, 1930, page 191.

7) Kishio Satomi, *Discovery of Japanese Idealism*, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., London, 1924, page 124. See also Rev. Chikei Tsunoda, *The Gospel of St. Nichiren* (pamphlet, n.d., no place of publication, etc.) a loving, partisan tract.

form he intuitively “knew” existed. His short, frenzied travels away from Hiei during those years dramatized the search. Eventually he came to believe that a revival of Tendai was necessary to arrive at the truth of Buddhism. As the Tendai sect was based on the *Lotus Sutra*, Nichiren became convinced that this was the essential book of the Buddha. (See Part III below). After arriving at this notion, Renchō left Hiei and returned to his old temple, Kiyozumi. He was welcomed back by his fellow monks as a son returned home; they were unaware at first of what was to come. Following the custom of the day, Nichiren went out to the forest for a week of purification and meditation. The Countess Mutsu tells us in her florid way:

At daybreak on the morning of the eighth day the first rays of the rising sun pierced the mists of dawn, gilding with its radiance the lonely figure kneeling in spiritual ecstasy upon the wooded peak. The saint arose and saluted the flood of golden light illuminating the world as a symbol of his creed — ejaculating with passionate fervour the formula and watch-word of his sect: ...“Namu Myōhō Renge-kyō” [I devote myself to the Sutra of the Lotus of the Wonderful Law] ⁸⁾.

That day, 17 May 1253, in his thirty-first year, may be considered as the time of birth of the *Hokke-shū*, or Nichiren Sect. He soon took his fourth and final name, *Nichiren*, meaning “Sun-Lotus,” ⁹⁾ explaining his choice of the new name in a letter to a friend:

There is nothing so clear and serene as the sun and the moon, and nothing purer than the lotus flowers. The Lotus of the Perfect Truth is like the sun and the moon and the lotus flower. This Nichiren is incessantly emulating the sun and the moon and the lotus flower. ¹⁰⁾

II. TURMOIL AND IMPENDING CATASTROPHE

Sir George Sansom has, of all Western scholars, best described the times in capsule:

Some historians describe a prevailing mood of pessimism in this age and are inclined to suggest that it was the spread of the concept of a degenerate era that brought about the rise of the new sects. There is no very good

⁸⁾ Iso Mutsu, *Kamakura Fact and Legend*, Times Publishing Co., Ltd., Tokyo, 1930, page 243.

⁹⁾ The characters might also be interpreted as standing for “Japanese Buddhism.” See John K. Fairbank and Edwin O. Reischauer, *East Asia, the Great Tradition*, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1958, page 547.

¹⁰⁾ Quoted by Shobun Kubota, “Nichiren Buddhism,” in Kenneth W. Morgan, *The Path of the Buddha*, Ronald Press Co., New York, 1956, page 352.

evidence for this view. It is true that there was much misery in the capital, as a result of misgovernment and epidemics of sickness. But such conditions were by no means unusual. In the rest of the country, and especially in the Eastern provinces, there was a mood of confidence and a vigorous creative spirit among the leaders.

It would seem mistaken, therefore, to attach too much importance to the prophecy of a last degenerate phase of religion. It was a symptom rather than a cause of the desire for new ... creeds, and their appearance at this stage of Japanese history is of singular interest in the history of religion.¹¹⁾

The Kamakura Shogunate had been established by Minamoto Yoritomo in 1185 (1192) as a result of his victory over the Taira family. It was established as a reaction against the decadence of the preceding Heian period (9th-12th centuries); Yoritomo hoped that it would be a tough, soldierly régime in the East away from the seductions of court life at Kyôto. But the Minamoto line was soon destroyed through the machinations of Yoritomo's wife, Masako, and her family, the Hôjô (a side branch of the Taira). In 1222, Yoritomo's scion Sanetomo, the third shogun, was liquidated by Tokimasa, Masako's father. Hôjô Tokimasa and his daughter then consolidated the power which they had held in effect during the "reigns" of the second shogun, Yoriie, and the luckless Sanetomo. The Hôjô were to rule Japan in everything but title for the next one hundred and eleven years.

At first, the Hôjô government, though a usurper régime, was efficient and scrupulously honest. Tokimasa passed over the control of power to his son Yoshitoko (he of the 1221 Shokyû War), and after this regent's tenure (1205-1224), Yasutoki, later famous for his promulgation of the Jôei Code in 1232, and one of Japan's most able administrators, assumed control. But conditions began to change during the years after Yasutoki's death, and eventually a decay like that at the Imperial capital, Kyôto, was noticeable. By the time of Nichiren's most active days, during the periods of Tokiyori (1246-1256, ruled *in camera* until 1263) and Tokimune (1256-1284), conditions in the empire — if "empire" it could be called — had begun a downturn. The Mongol invasions of 1274 and 1281 were to give the final thrust to the end of the regency. By 1333, the Hôjô were walking spectres of their former selves, and the collapse came — with a whimper.

When Nichiren returned to Kamakura soon after his declaration to

11) Sansom, *op cit.*, pp. 426-7. Another deft picture is that of A. L. Sadler, *A Short History of Japan*, Angus and Robertson, Sydney and London, 1946.

the world in 1253, the military capital was a city visited by calamities of all types — earthquakes, pestilences, famines. Nichiren had only to point to the city in which he preached to give weight and colour to his admonitions that false beliefs would lead — had already led — to sad days for Japan. The period was filled with intrigues and strife, and into this environment Nichiren tried to reintroduce a type, *his* type, of peace and order. The authority of the old Tendai and Shingon schools was on the wane, the new schools were not yet influential politically, and the Hōjō feudal establishment had reached its zenith and was beginning a decline in power. The people of Japan were prepared to listen to a new gospel.¹²⁾

Into this breach came the three forms of Buddhism which were to be most influential during the warring age of the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries. The first was Amidism, the second, Zen, and the third, Nichiren. The Buddhism of Nichiren's day was a lethargic coexistence of the ten Buddhist sects, each placidly claiming to know the true interpretation of the Buddha's teachings. Elements of almost all the current beliefs were taught at the temple where Nichiren studied — a psychic dramatization of the fragmentation of the nation as a whole. Amidism, faith sects resembling some of the tendencies in Christian feudal and early post-feudal Europe, was developed first by Hōnen and then fully by Shinran. Though the appeal of Amidism was limited mainly to commoners, its influence was nonetheless beginning to be felt in higher circles.¹³⁾ Zen, the best known sect of the late Kamakura period, was gaining in political influence, and though not yet at its height in this regard, was still one of the major new religious forces with which Nichiren had to contend. Anesaki states Nichiren's analysis of the situation he faced thus:

The chief cause of the degeneration of the Buddhist church lay, as Nichiren thought, in its promiscuous adoption of Shingon mysticism... It was this admixture that appealed to the Court nobles... It was this secularization, or vulgarization, of religion that had obscured the high ideals of Dengyō and had reduced his institution on Hiei to instruments of greed and vice... There-

12) Sansom, *op cit.*, page 426.

13) See Reischauer and Fairbank, *op. cit.*, page 547; Tucker N. Calloway, *Japanese Buddhism and Christianity*, Protestant Publishing Company, Tokyo, 1957; Yejitsu Okusa, *Principal Teachings of the True Sect of Pure Land*, Tokyo, 1910; Alfred Bloom, "Life of Shinran Shonin," *Numen*, XV, 1, February, 1968; and D. Brudnoy, "Pure Land in Japan," unpublished study, New Haven, 1962.

fore Nichiren's bitterest attack was directed against this corrupt religion and its center, Hiei. He firmly believed that the sole way to restore Dengyō's religion consisted in adhering faithfully and exclusively to the scripture, the Lotus of Truth.¹⁴⁾

III. THE ORIGIN OF INSPIRATION

What then is this sutra, containing its famous prophesy of religious persecution to those who would dare spread its teaching during the degenerate days, around which Nichiren revolved his preaching?¹⁵⁾ As our main inquiry is into the social and political significance of his teachings rather than into the theological significance of them, a detailed treatment of the *Lotus* is impossible here. Of the Sutra itself much has been written. Since it was translated and commented upon by Kumārajīva (in China, 383-406), it has been one of the main Buddhist texts. The *Saddharma-Pundarika* (*Hokkekyō* in Japanese) or *Lotus of the Wonderful Law*, considered by most Buddhists to be composed of the final teachings of the Master, has for its essence the personality of the Buddha himself, merging inseparably the universal (Dainichi), the eternal (Amida), and the historical (Sakyamuni) Buddhas. Its object is to exalt the historic Buddha and identify him with the cosmic Truth (Dharma). Nichiren believed that in the last stage of the Buddha's teaching, he revealed the one truth, the one Buddha vehicle. In the *Lotus*, Sakyamuni's personality becomes transformed until he becomes the Immortal Buddha.

As used by Nichiren, the *Lotus* was composed of twenty-eight sections, revised from its original twenty-one. (This is the text translation used widely in Japan.) The first half explains the real nature of all existence, including *man's* original nature, which is seen as containing unlimited possibilities for evil or for good; man can go all the way to the deepest hell or attain to the highest paradise. In the second half, the *Lotus* treats of the Buddha, showing that the historical Gautama is by nature the same as the eternal, immortal, enlightened Buddha-nature. Enlightenment is thus equated with a realization of the true aspect of things; as an adherent puts it, with some emotion:

14) Anesaki, *Nichiren*, page 8.

15) A full translation of the *Lotus* is available in H. Kern, tr., *The Saddharma-Pundarika*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1884.

The truth of the Lotus text is not an impersonal death truth; it is the ideal, the Truth blooming, fragrant and bearing fruits as the lotus, the Truth active, the Truth embodied in the Buddha, the Truth-body, the Enlightenment itself... So the real Buddha of the text is not that corporeal Buddha who got enlightened under the *bodhi* tree... He is the Buddha of immeasurable ages past, ever acting as the Enlightener. By enlightening all beings he exercises benevolence to all. Out of his mercy he teaches the doctrine of expediency.¹⁶⁾

The *Lotus* has often been compared to the *Gospel of St. John* — both show the supernatural side of an apparently human teacher. But it actually resembles more the Christian *Apocalypse*; and it was in such light that Nichiren saw the Sutra — as a forecast of things to come after Buddha's death. Nichiren followed the prophesy of the three Buddhist ages: the 1000 years from 949 B.C. to 51 A.D. (949 was the supposed — and quite inaccurate — year of Buddha's death) was an age of Perfect Law, with the Dharma observed. With other reformist Buddhist leaders, Nichiren looked back nostalgically to this better past age. The second one thousand years was one of Copied Law, when faith and morals declined, though piety was retained somewhat. Nichiren saw in the next age, from 1051 on, an age of the Latter Law, one of sin run rife, evil incarnate, war glorified. This was the age in which he lived, and for it, the last of the seven great calamities, foreign invasion, was predicted.¹⁷⁾ Only a unification of all Buddhists by the *Lotus* could forestall such a calamity.

Nichiren's religious activities aimed at a revival of Buddhism based on the *Lotus* teachings. His five principles (reasons) for choosing this Sutra were: 1) its *doctrine*, considered the best; 2) its *gift to man* (to bring people to a full understanding of life's meaning, they must understand the *Lotus* doctrine); 3) the *time* (the present age was the final decay of the law; 4) the *country* (Nichiren saw Japan as a foundation on which to build); and finally, 5) because of the *evolution of Buddhism* (which goes from any form, to Hinayana, and then to Mahayana, and in the end, in its most perfect form, to the highest form, that of the *Lotus* Sutra.)

16) Junjiro Takakusu, *The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy*, ed. by Wing-tsit Chan and Charles Moore, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1947, page 192.

17) See A Bloom, "The Sense of Sin and Guilt and the Last Age [Mappo] in Chinese and Japanese Buddhism," *Numen*, XIV, 2, July, 1967.

Nichiren wished to restore Sakyamuni—more as a metaphysical concept than in his historical person—to his rightful place as the chief Buddha, and to revive the *Lotus* teachings. The *Lotus* had first been brought to Japan from China in an organized form by Dengyō who, in 804, had founded the Tendai school (or T'ien T'ai in China, from the name of the hill where the Chinese philosopher Chih-kai, promulgator of the *Lotus* there, had lived). As Nichiren came to believe when he studied at Hiei, Dengyō's dream of the unification of Buddhism had been obscured and corrupted by the Hiei monks, who had brought in degenerate elements of other systems. Hence, Nichiren's zealous efforts to restore genuine Buddhism, Dengyō's Buddhism, and therefore "orthodox" Tendai.¹⁸⁾

Though it is beyond the scope of this study to delve into minute points differentiating Dengyō's teachings and those of Nichiren in matters such as the *five periods* and *eight doctrines*,¹⁹⁾ we must note certain essentials. First, Dengyō applied the *Lotus* doctrine to the national cult and desired the subordination of all Buddhist schools to his. In furtherance of this aim, he added elements of Shingon, early Amidism and Zen, and Vinaya. "To him these were subordinate doctrines of the *Lotus* or at any rate concurrent systems to complete the central doctrine."²⁰⁾ Second, these developments in time led to a Buddhist transformation in the national life of the Heian period in which Dengyō's school originated and developed. Corruption at the end of the Heian period, and the crises of the Kamakura times which followed, led to a state of affairs in which the fundamental truths of the *Lotus* doctrine were shelved by Dengyō's subsequent followers. Third, Nichiren took to mean by Tendai philosophy not what he found in practice but what he thought Dengyō had taught. He summed up his studies convinced that only homage to the *Lotus alone* could lead to salvation. Fourth, though Nichiren agreed with Dengyō's interpretations of the differences between the two halves of the *Lotus*, he asserted (and this is the critical point) that only the latter sections were the essential doctrines of the original Buddha.²¹⁾ He felt the Tendai school to be too attached to the theoretical side of the truth,

18) See Anesaki, *Nichiren*, page 17.

19) For this, see Takakusu, *op. cit.*

20) Takakusu, *op. cit.*, page 186.

21) *Ibid.*, page 193.

neglecting the practical. He attacked Tendai for having allowed the pure *Lotus* to be contaminated with the foul weeds of the other sects' inferior teachings. It must be remembered, however, that unlike most religious reform leaders of his age, Nichiren founded his faith not by turning away from Tendai, but by turning back and trying to breathe new life into it. In this, too, as Sansom suggested, Nichiren completed the long process whereby Buddhism was assimilated and made Japanese. 22)

IV. THE PROPHET'S EMERGENCE: 1253-1264

The aim of the Nichiren Sect is to pray to the Original Buddha in the heart, to repeat the name of the Lotus Sutra in the mouth, to carry on the religious practice in the body; and by thus promoting the three practices of Body, Mouth and Heart, to pray for the universal submission to the One and same Buddha and united by endeavor to propagate His laws till all shall... realize Heaven here and now. 23)

Nichiren returned from the hilltop on which he had made his declaration and forthwith began to preach. He immediately alienated his old master and the other monks and incensed the feudal lord of the area, a man who later became a chief foe. Convinced of Nichiren's madness, the abbot helped him escape to safety. From Kiyozumi, the monk went down to Kamakura and preached there. In the military capital, Nichiren developed four main strands in his teachings of these early years. In the seventeenth through the twenty-eighth chapters of the *Lotus*, the second half, Nichiren found a guide for living. His first strand, thus, was *ethical*, and soon he established five principles for his disciples to follow in ordering their lives:

1. careful study of Gautama's life as expounded in the *Lotus* — a basis for living;
2. absolute faith and devotion to the eternal, fully-enlightened Sakya-muni, an almost monotheistic concentration on that Buddha; 24)
3. the straight Path to enlightenment is to be found in the practice of repeating the "Namu Myōhō Renge Kyō";

22) G. B. Sansom, *Japan: A Short Cultural History*, Appleton, Century, Crofts, New York, 1931 (Rev. Ed., 1943) page 332.

23) K. Watanabe, "History and Doctrines of the Nichiren Sect," in *Hawaiian Buddhist Annual*, International Buddhist Institute, Honolulu, 1932.

24) See Reischauer and Fairbank, *op. cit.*, page 547.

4. development and improvement of the Buddha-nature in all things, to establish a world of Buddha on the earth;
5. as we all possess the potential for Buddhahood, we must all strive to lead a righteous life.

In Nichiren's view, a man following this "five-fold path" could live a good, ethically sound life. "Faith ought to be actualized in life through ethical actions, chief of which are . . . reverence for sovereign, teacher, and parent"; ²⁵) or, as Nichiren wrote in one of his writings, *Recompense of Indebtedness*, from the "recompense of indebtedness or grace" the "true orders of human society will be born." ²⁶)

His second strand was the *philosophical*. Nichiren contributed little philosophically, except his insistence on one essential: that everyone has within him the Buddha Nature, or in other words, Buddha is everywhere, everything, eternal. Nichiren's chief energies were directed to making the *Lotus* truth live in the hearts of his followers. Today, we see in the sect an insistence on history rather than myth, anti-pessimism, and an emphasis on the social and national aspects of religion. The rites (such as that in which the priest touches the infant's head with the scripture), the objects of worship (such as the sacred *mandala*), the frantic drum beating as an aid to worship, and other such elements, do not properly concern us here. But we can say in review of them and of the philosophical, spiritual, and ritualistic aspects of Nichirenism, that the founder departed little from traditional Buddhism as he found it. His special feature lay in emphasis on the *Lotus* and in his efforts to purify the teaching of it.

The third strand was that *militant denunciation of other sects* for which Nichiren is often remembered. His favorite formula was: "Nembutsu mugens Zen tama, Shingon bōkuku, Ritsu Kokuzoku" (The invocation of Amida is a phantasm, Zen is devil's doctrine, Shingon steals from the nation, and Ritsu — [discipline school] — is trai-

²⁵) Robert N. Bellah, *Tokugawa Religion*, Falcon's Wing Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1957, page 68.

²⁶) Satomi, *op. cit.*, page 181, quoted in Bellah, *Ibid.*, page 71. Professor Bellah further quotes Satomi, page 108, Nichiren to a samurai disciple: "Consider your daily works in your Lord's service as being the practice of the Hokkekyō," page 79. In Nichiren's *Kaimokushō*, full citation given below, page 61, we find in addition: "When a father opposes the sovereign, dutiful children desert their parents and follow the sovereign. This is filial piety at its highest." (Bellah, *Ibid.*)

trous).²⁷⁾ He said that the regent Tokiyori was in hell and Tokimune would join him there. Nichiren was an early street-corner hell-fire-and-damnation revivalist, cursing the other sects for “sapping the vitality of the people and corrupting the state,”²⁸⁾ his methods resembling those of “the modern salvation army.”²⁹⁾ “When rebuked that street propaganda was derogatory to the priesthood, he retorted that it was necessary for the soldier to take his food standing.”³⁰⁾

The fourth strand in his early teachings was the *nationalistic*, and there are some who feel that the germ of Japanese nationalism can be found in Nichiren’s writings. (Previously, what elements of “nationalism” could be found in Japan were embodied in Shintō thought, while Buddhism had been the more cosmopolitan force.) Whatever may be said for that argument, it is certainly not the case that Nichiren was solely a nationalist. We shall see later his universalist thinking — something quite new in Japan. In the State, nonetheless, Nichiren found the “fundamental civilisation.” He felt that to build an ideal world, Japan, which had forgotten its national principles, the first of which is the cultivation of righteousness, must “transfer the unit of moral training and instruction from the individual to the State.”³¹⁾ So Nichiren praised the “Ideal Japan” — the Japan of filial piety and loyalty — and at the same time warned her of the danger of invasion if she failed to mend her ways. He felt that *State* and *righteousness* must be internally related and inexorably bound together.

In 1260, after preaching in Kamakura and in various parts of the country, Nichiren wrote an essay entitled *Rishō Ankoku Ron* (Establishment of Righteousness and the Security of the Country) in the form of a dialogue, and presented it to Hōjō regent. It is mainly an argument against Amidism and secondarily against Zen, in which Nichiren calls on the government to wipe out heresy even by the sword.

27) Anesaki, *Religious Life of the Japanese People*, has this to say in comparing Nichiren and his enemies, the Pure-Landers: “In short, Nichiren’s Buddhism was a religion of Buddhas-to-be, whereas Shinran’s was for common mortals whose nature is admittedly weak.” page 59.

28) Sansom, *Short Cultural History*, page 332.

29) Capt. F. Brinkley, *A History of the Japanese People*, Encyclopaedia Britannica Co., New York, 1915, page 372. See also Reischauer and Fairbank, *op. cit.*, pp. 546-547.

30) Mutsu, *op. cit.*, page 245.

31) Satomi, *op. cit.*, page 130.

He identifies religion with national life throughout the work. The Hōjō were adherents of Zen by this time, and in this grating fact Nichiren found a particular danger to internal security. The national calamities under Tokiyori's administration — 1257, earthquake; 1258, hurricane; 1259, famines, pestilence, people praying to die — led Nichiren to write in *Risshō Ankoku Ron*: "God is sending the great Mongol invasion to punish corrupt Japan... How can I, Nichiren, be afraid of the ruler of such a tiny island!"³²) This dire prediction in 1260 was realized in 1274.

The essay infuriated the regent Tokimune; Nichiren's temple was burned, his adherents were mobbed, and he was banished to the cape of Ito on the island of Izu. When in exile, he found shelter with a fisherman and his wife, people to whom he later wrote endearing letters. Here he formulated his five theses and further developed his theory that he was fulfilling the prophecies of persecution to those who perceived the truth and dared expound it. His writings show a strengthened confidence in the *Lotus* and a further step in the direction of conviction in his Heaven-ordained mission.

For some reason as yet unknown to history, Nichiren was released from banishment in April of 1263 and allowed to return home. His followers reverently welcomed him, some of them hoping he would modify his virulent attacks on the other sects, if only for his own safety. This he obstinately would not do; his attacks grew stronger and more bitter. There is some merit in the well-known description of Nichiren in James Murdoch's familiar *History of Japan* (Vol. I): "a strange compound of Hebrew prophet, Dominican friar, and John Knox." As Takakusu notes, the nature of the sect reflects Nichiren's own nature, and the common-usage naming of the school after the founder (it is officially known as the *Lotus Sect*, *Hokkeshū*) is appropriate.

1264 was a significant year for the prophet. He went to visit his mother, who was ill. When he returned home, she appeared to be dead. But, "... with my prayer my loving mother not only was aroused, but

32) Quoted in Nakaba Yamada, *Ghenko, the Mongol Invasion of Japan*, E. P. Dutton and Co., New York, 1916.

lived for four years longer.”³³) In the same year he barely escaped death in a Jōdōist-led ambush in Komatsubara, Pine Forest. Aroused by this and moved by his own salvation, he proclaimed himself for the first time to be the sole practitioner of the *Lotus* in Japan.

V. REVILEMENT AND REBIRTH: 1264-1271

During the four years following his escape of death at Pine Forest, Nichiren was successful in conversions among the warriors and peasants to whom he preached. In these years his religion gained firm roots in Awa and Kazusa provinces. Perhaps it was his years in exile that brought out in him a somewhat softened temper and a greater manifestation of gentleness; he wrote compassionate letters to his disciples urging them to stand firm in the faith, assuring them that he understood the difficulties they encountered.

In China at this time there circulated fantastic tales of the wealth of Japan. To the Mongol leader, Kublai Khan, Emperor of China, came stories of how the roofs of Japan's houses were tiled with gold. In 1268, Kublai made his first attempt to overcome the land of the rising sun about which he had heard so much. In that year and the next he sent envoys to Japan demanding tribute to his suzerainty. Although the people were panicked by the arrival of these envoys, the Hōjō government at Kamakura rejected their proposals and sent them back each of the three times they came. Nichiren returned to the capital to urge once again that the government adopt the *Lotus* teachings and suppress the other sects. He reminded them of his warnings eight years earlier in *Risshō Anaoku Ron*, sent letters to high officials and to the great monasteries.

An example of such was the letter sent to Dōryū, a monk of the Rinzaï sect who had come to Kyoto from China under the name Lan K'i. Nichiren, as was his wont, criticized the other sects and then went on: "All the Japanese, great and humble, will be made prisoners; in the present life they will lose their country; in the future life they will surely fall into everlasting Hell. If they do not do just as I have

33) Kishio Satomi, *Japanese Civilization*, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., London, 1923, page 137, quoting from Nichiren's *Works* (ed., Katō, Tokyo, 1904), page 811. (Satomi's book appeared also in 1924 in New York as *Japanese Civilization: Nichirenism and the Japanese Nationalistic Principles*).

told them, they will rue it.³⁴⁾ He also distributed a circular to his followers and prophesied his own exile or death. He then left Kamakura in 1268 and was evidently engaged either in missionary journeys or in meditative preparation; this period of his life needs further study. In 1271, he returned again to Kamakura where his warnings were ignored, as before. Yet, he was confident that when the Mongol crisis became more serious, the authorities and the people would be more receptive to the truth he expounded.

The issue was resolved on 15 October 1271, as Nichiren was called into court to answer charges of treason brought by his old enemy, the feudal lord mentioned above, Hei no Saemon. As everyone could easily predict, Nichiren was convicted of high treason and sentenced to banishment. As was the custom, his life was placed in the hands of his custodian, Hei no Saemon himself, who chose to dispose of the prophet. When told by Hei that he was to die, he said: "Now I am going to be beheaded this night. It is the very thing for which I have been longing these several years."³⁵⁾ Evidently he saw this as a necessary and desired part of the completion of the *Lotus* prophesy of martyrdom. The ill-treatment of the mob had not daunted his spirit; neither could this sentence of death. Within him had grown such conviction of his rectitude that he had most likely worked himself up to an emotional fervour reminiscent of the state in which the early Christian martyrs walked singing to the lions. He seemed to welcome ill usage and cruel treatment, and ecstatically he gave thanks to the almighty that he was worthy to suffer in the cause of the Buddha. Several of his disciples had died martyr's deaths while protecting him from his assailants.³⁶⁾

As his guardian had employed his prerogative, Nichiren was taken to be executed. He was humiliated by being led through the streets to be jeered at by scoffers. But not everyone along the road hated him, and his many friends came out to weep at seeing their master so treated. The scene is more than a little familiar to Christians. He silently

34) Translated from G. Renondeau, tr., *Le Bouddhisme Japonaise: Textes Fondamentaux*, Éditions Albin Michel, Paris, 1965, page 182. (Renondeau's *La Doctrine de Nichiren*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1953, contains French translations of several Nichiren tracts.)

35) Satomi, *Japanese Civilization*, page 151, from Nichiren's *Works*, page 396.

36) Mutsu, *op. cit.*, page 246.

bid them farewell and offered his consolations to the families of those of his followers who had been imprisoned. Upon arrival at Tatsu-no-Kuchi on 17 October, where he was to be decapitated, a miracle is reported to have taken place. The devoted Countess Mutsu again writes:

Nichiren, incessantly repeating the scriptures, knelt upon the rope-mat and bared his neck to receive the fatal stroke. At the moment the executioner brandished his sword..., a sudden crash of thunder shook the earth, the sky was lit up, and from the black clouds a hissing ball of fire shattered the uplifted sword into three pieces, paralyzing the arm of the executioner, who fell to the ground. This miraculous demonstration being naturally construed as a mark of divine wrath, a messenger hastened at full speed to report to Kamakura what had occurred. However, the previous night, a heavenly being had appeared to the Regent in a dream, warning him not to slay the captive priest; a reprieve had already been despatched...³⁷⁾

Whatever the reason, Nichiren was saved from death. On the spot where he had nearly died, a temple was erected in his honor in 1333, a fitting year for such an undertaking as it also signalled the official end of Hōjō control. This was his third escape from death, as he had barely missed death in two previous mobbings, and it was one he had neither expected nor desired. The regent Tokimune transmuted his sentence to banishment at Sado, and there he went, convinced he was living a second life. Later he wrote of himself that he came in spirit to Sado after having been “beheaded between the hour of the Rat and that of the Ox, on the twelfth day of the ninth month. And the fool in me died then.”³⁸⁾

Thus far we have seen in the life and behaviour of this man many resemblances to the type of person William James, to whom Anesaki acknowledged a debt, described as embodying the qualities of “saintliness.” Though it would go beyond my intention here to extend this at length, perhaps it is at least appropriate to note the four features which James defined as composing the saintly character:

- 1 a feeling of being in a wider life than that of this world's selfish little interests; and a conviction . . . of the existence of an Ideal Power;

37) *Ibid.*, page 248.

38) Nichiren, *Kaimokushō*, translated by N. R. M. Ryozei Ehara, International Buddhist Society, Tokyo, 1941, page 75.

- 2 a sense of the friendly continuity of the Ideal Power with our own life, and a willing self-surrender to its control;
- 3 an immense elation and freedom, as the outlines of the confining selfhood melt down;
- 4 a shifting of the emotional centre towards loving and harmonious affections . . . ³⁹⁾

Surely the first three of these attributes of the saint are seen in Nichiren either at this point, as he went into exile, or in the years to follow. The fourth is a bone of contention among students of Nichiren, but it, too, is seen assuming an ever larger role in his life in the years ahead.

VI. EXILE: 1271-1274

Exiled at Izu, Nichiren became certain that prophecies describing the antagonism and persecution to be endured in a future evil age by those proclaiming the scripture were references to himself. He came to believe that he alone was the predestined teacher, that his troubles were necessary, fore-ordained. ⁴⁰⁾ This conviction was intensified once again by his second exile, this time in remote, barren Sado. He arrived 2 December 1271 and remained there until 16 April 1274. During that time he entered fully the second period of his adult life (the first being the extremely militant stage) — a mystic one. He saw himself as the incarnation of the Bodhisattva Jōgyo, to whom Buddha had entrusted the task of protecting the Truth; here too he devised the *Sacred Mandala*. The days of his intractable stubbornness were by no means over, but he no longer was so concerned with preaching vehemently and insistently.

His writings continued, as before, to scourge the ignorant, as in the *True Object of Worship* (Nyorai Metsugo go gohyakusai shi kanjin honzon sho) written in May 1273 ⁴¹⁾ on Sado. In this work, while teaching his “questioner” that the Buddha and the Buddha-land do indeed exist, and showing how the Buddha is omnipresently and omncompetently manifested, and glorifying the *Lotus*, he concludes:

39) Wm. James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902), Mentor paperback edition cited here, pp. 216-217.

40) See G. B. Sansom, “Nichiren,” in Sir Charles Eliot, *Japanese Buddhism*, Edward Arnold and Co., London, 1935, pp. 416-417.

41) 25th day, 4th month, 10th year of Bunnen.

When one knows the Lotus of the Perfect Truth, he will understand the meaning of the occurrences [of horrible calamities] in the world. For the sake of those who live in the Period of Depravation, those who are too infantile to understand the Lotus of the Perfect Truth... the Buddha, with great compassion, will command the four Great Boddhisatvas to appear in this world in order to hang around their necks the five words, the container of the treasures. ⁴²⁾

We notice in his new attitude a mystic certitude and a type of inward withdrawing. Going into banishment, he wrote: "Birds cry but shed no tears. Nichiren does not cry, but his tears are never dry." ⁴³⁾ His compassion for others was the cause of his tears. Just prior to setting foot on the island, he composed a letter from Teradomari, the port city across from Sado. He describes his situation as resembling some of those mentioned by the Buddha in the Lotus, confident that the wicked would be struck down in time. The "savants of the other sects" have "perverse ideas" and are "attached to the errors of their own masters." Levelling his fiercest critique in the letter at the followers of Shingon, Nichiren speaks of the power of evil in their spirit, and he concludes: "I, Nichiren, have often been pursued. I have been exiled twice, as a consequence of my propagation of the law." ⁴⁴⁾ For himself he felt nothing. "Because of my denunciation great afflictions have been my lot, just as it is with moths which fly into the fire or a rat which unwarily comes into the presence of a cat." ⁴⁵⁾ It was during these years that he wrote most of his essential works and perfected nearly all his theories.

Suffering considerable physical hardships at first, Nichiren gained converts through the example of his life and the power of his spiritual energy. Once, a man approached to kill him. Seeing Nichiren in divine prayer, the intended assassin was transformed and converted. After that, Nichiren was aided by this man, and his physical discomfort was eased. As he was convinced that his own life was embodied in the *Lotus*, he strove to achieve perfect knowledge and in all ways possible

42) Senchu Murano, tr., *The True Object of Worship*, The Young East Assn. Tokyo, 1954, pp. 48-49.

43) Quoted by R. Tsunoda et al., *Sources of Japanese Tradition*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1958, page 200.

44) Renondeau, *op. cit.*, pp. 184-185.

45) Quoted in Ryozui Ehara, "A Brief Sketch of Nichiren's Life," *The Young East*, VI, 3, 1936, Tokyo, pp. 37-38. See also Tamako Inouye, "Life of St. Nichiren," *The Young East*, VIII, 4, 1941.

to reveal great truths. In furtherance of this goal, he devised the graphic representation of his teachings of the *Lotus*, the *Sacred Mandala*. The *mandala*, a miniature cosmos, all beings arranged around the cosmic Lotus, arranged in titles all classes of existence. It is not possible here to examine this cosmological representation in detail, but it is certain that Nichiren considered it of great importance and saw its development as a pivotal point in his life. Today, the *mandala* is the chief object of worship in the sect. 46)

During the years on Sado, he devoted himself to constant study, working out his beliefs, arriving at a systematic philosophy of religion, reaching the certitude which we have noted. As he reflected on the problems of the day, he became aware of the perseverance of one nagging question: "Is there anyone in these days who really practices Buddha's religion?" All he could find were the three prophesied types of persecutors — malicious laymen, perverse monks, and jealous hypocrites, — and a few people who understood what he preached and accepted his wisdom. He composed several essays during the banishment period, the most important of which was the *Kaimokushō* (*The Awakening of the Truth*, or *The Eye Opener*), written March 1272, in which appears his well-known vow: "I will be the pillar of Japan; I will be the eyes of Japan; I will be the vessel of Japan." Thus he considered himself Japan's Saviour, and he once more testified to his conviction that "all the Buddhas other than Buddha Sakyamuni are but manifestations of the latter; they are like a moon reflected on the water contained in various vessels. The scholars who do not know the true teachings of Buddha take the reflection as the real moon." 47)

As *Kaimokushō* is of such importance in showing Nichiren's developed ideas, as well as in illustrating the transparent, dogmatic egoism of his writings, it would be well to notice certain key passages from it; these following give the essentials of his formulated beliefs on many matters:

46) For a discussion of the alterations in Nichirenism immediately following the defeat of 1945 — a temporary turning away from the "political" and a return to more "religious" concerns, see General Headquarters, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, *Religion in Japan*, Tokyo, 1948.

47) Ryozei Ehara, *A Manual of Nichiren Buddhism*, Bikkhuni Myoshin Shimose, Honolulu, 1953, page 44.

If I, Nichiren, were not born in this country, Sakyamuni, who preached the twenty stanzas of the chapter on effort in the *Lotus*, might have become a teacher of untruth. And innumerable bodhisattvas would also have been compromised. ⁴⁸⁾

I, Nichiren, perhaps am the richest man in Japan today, because I offered my life for the *Lotus* Sutra. My name will endure forever. ⁴⁹⁾

I, Nichiren, am the most affectionate parent of the people of Japan. Those of the Tendai sect are their great enemies. ⁵⁰⁾

I do not grieve over my exile, because it is a minor trial of this life. On the contrary, I am joyful because I am sure that happiness awaits me in the next. Verily joyful am I. Verily joyful am I. ⁵¹⁾

Again and again in the *Kaimokushō*, Nichiren documents the “proper” manifestations of devotion to master and to cause; he asserts repeatedly in every conceivable fashion that, come what may, he will “unflinchingly” give up his life for the *Lotus*.

In other writings during his period he further developed his practical moral guidance teachings for the followers and clarified the conception of the inseparable union of church and state. The completion of the *Kaimokushō* and some of his writings brought him recognition from the governor of Sado, who ordered Nichiren’s protection and allowed him to carry on conversions and propaganda as he pleased. He reflected on this new turn of events and came to see the hardships he had gone through as “expiation of the grave sins accumulated from eternity through neglect or abandonment of duty, or through not having always lived as the true Buddhist.” ⁵²⁾ His thoughts on this theme were crystalized in the notion that all, persecutor and persecuted alike, share the same Nature. He wrote in yet another letter:

Therefore, believe in me, and emulate my spirit and work, in the firm faith that the Master is the saviour and leader. Work together, united in the same faith. Then, the expiation of sins will be achieved for ourselves and for all our fellow-beings, because we all share in the common Karma. ⁵³⁾

Eventually, the efforts of his adherants were successful, and the convert Hōjō Tokimori and others effected Nichiren’s release. The edict was issued 23 March 1274 and it reached Sado on 16 April, al-

48) Nichiren, *Kaimokushō*, page 34.

49) *Ibid.*, page 72.

50) *Ibid.*, page 101.

51) *Ibid.*, page 102.

52) Anesaki, *Nichiren*, page 72, from a letter of Nichiren.

53) *Ibid.*, page 75.

most too late, as another attempt had shortly before been made to take his life. This time a priest of another sect had persuaded an influential Hōjō to let him have the nettlesome Nichiren despatched. Permission was granted, but Nichiren was freed before the murder could be accomplished. Nichiren did not encourage the efforts of his disciples; he was determined not to return unless his will should prevail in the Hōjō court. But return he did, on 4 May, and the Kamakura to which he came was one of tense, fearful awaiting for him to help save it — or for the Mongols to come destroy the city.

VII. RETRIBUTION AND RETIREMENT: 1274-1282

They all welcomed me with great courtesy, differing entirely from their former attitude... They were eager to hear of me whither and when an invasion of the Mongols was expected. I replied, "In all likelihood before the close of the year... In that connection, it was a great pity that you did not listen to my warning which I had already declared..."⁵⁴⁾

At age 52, Nichiren had been brought back to Kamakura. The shogunate apparently wanted to use him in a religious and psychological campaign to defend against the expected Mongol invasion. He was offered sanction to continue his preachings and was promised a handsome new temple, if he would direct all his efforts to defeating the Mongols; that is, if he would cease his Jeremiads and his streams of invective against the other sects (or, to use a modern catch-phrase, if he would embrace coexistence and join hands to beat the common enemy). The priest was as firm in his mission as he had been before. Quietly, he affirmed: "I will not give up my preaching against other sects, and I do not need land and temples. My only wish is to establish true Buddhism."⁵⁵⁾ A few days more of futile efforts on both sides — the government dangling its baubles before Nichiren, the saint warning the government of the inevitable Mongol attack and destruction — and finally, 17 June 1274, Nichiren left the city forever and retired to Mt. Minobu in Kōshū.

November brought the expected Mongol armada, comprised of 25,000 Mongols and 15,000 Koreans. This force and the Japanese fought bitterly in the islands of Iki and Tsu(shima) off Northern Kyūshū. Brutally, the Mongols slaughtered the Japanese, "captured

54) Satomi, *Japanese Civilization*, from Nichiren's *Works*, page 405.

55) Ehara, *Manual*, page 38.

women, pierced the centers of their palms with wires and tied them to the side of the ships," as we are told in *Japan in the Chinese Dynastic Histories*. Eventually, the combination of the Mongols' lack of familiarity with the terrain, the superiority of the Japanese samurai in hand-to-hand fighting, and the fortunes of a typhoon (the kamikaze) repelled the Mongols who fled to China. Nichiren had successfully predicted the invasion; his status underwent a dramatic upward change as converts by the thousands embraced the *Lotus* and Nichiren's interpretation of it.⁵⁶⁾

His reflections on the invasion seem to have been mixed. Undoubtedly he saw it as retribution for the nation's religious sickness, and he believed the spread of his gospel necessary for the transformation of the world, perhaps through a catastrophe: "Thus with firm trust in the actual destiny of his religion and country, Nichiren watched the . . . invasion of the Mongols, their devastating of the Western islands, and their final defeat effected by a storm,"⁵⁷⁾ a divine wind. Mixed with this attitude was another, a compassionate regard for the safety of his beloved Japan and a fervent wish that Japan could be great and good and free of any such horrid state of affairs as a Mongol domination. We cannot be sure of anything we say in regard to the exact nature of his prayers at the time. He was, as we have seen, a man whose soul encompassed complete opposites of affection⁵⁸⁾ and temper.

Nichiren was not one of William James' many examples, but he might well have been. Nichiren's personality was one that James described as the "energetic character."

One mode of emotional excitability is exceedingly important in the composition of the energetic character . . . I mean what in its lower form is mere irascibility, susceptibility to wrath, the fighting temper; and what in subtler ways manifests itself as impatience, grimness, earnestness, severity of character. Earnestness means willingness to live with energy, though energy bring pain . . . The sweetest delights are trampled on with a ferocious pleasure the

56) See Mutsu, *op. cit.*, page 250.

57) Anesaki, *History*, page 202.

58) Minoru Kiyota, "Presuppositions to the Understanding of Japanese Buddhist Thought," *Monumenta Nipponica*, XXII, 3-4, 1967, pp. 251-9, emphasizes this aspect: "Nichiren spoke of the people as 'the children of the dharma,' of compassion as 'universal as that of boundless space,' and of the possibility of attaining Buddhahood 'without distinction to priesthood or laity, the rich or the poor, man or woman.'" page 257.

moment they offer themselves as checks to a cause by which our higher indignations are elicited... we take a stern joy in the astringency and desolation.⁵⁹⁾

No student of Wm. James, that I know of, has yet pursued a full study of Nichiren using James' model. Such an examination could perhaps contribute significantly to the Nichiren bibliography.

The following year more messengers came to Japan again demanding tribute to the Khan. This time one was beheaded, at the same spot where years before Nichiren was to have met death — Tatsu-no-Kuchi. Compassionately, the saint wrote: "It is a great pity that the government beheaded the innocent Mongolian messenger,"⁶⁰⁾ but, he continued, less tenderly, "and left untouched the priests of Nembutsu, Shingon, Zen, and Ritsu, who are the enemies of Japan."⁶¹⁾ A few years more of attempts by Kublai to cow the Japanese into submission followed. Meanwhile the Japanese had been feverishly erecting stone ramparts for defense against a new attack. The priests of all religions increased their prayers, intensifying their efforts to dominate the government through the power of fear. Nichiren on Mt. Minobu calmly awaited the second coming of the Mongols. In Kamakura, the Zennist regent Tokimune was likewise calm and impassive in his waiting. The power of belief, though directed toward differing images, produces strikingly similar effects.

The Emperor of China, however, was not waiting so patiently. His rage at hearing of the beheading of his delegate, and his wrath at the continued resistance of the puny "barbarians" to his august majesty, can be imagined. In Japan, with the exception of Nichiren, his adherents, and Tokimune and others unshakeable in *their* faith, the people were growing frantic. *Japan in the Chinese Dynastic Histories* further tells us that the whole country was

trembling with fear. In the markets there was no rice for sale. The Japanese ruler went in person to visit the Hachiman Shrine to make supplication. He also had a royal rescript read at the shrine of the Sun Goddess imploring that the country be saved in exchange for his own life.

59) James, *op. cit.*, page 210.

60) Satomi, *Japanese Civilization*, from Nichiren's *Works*, page 1053; quoted also in Sansom, *Short Cultural History*, page 334.

61) Sansom, *Ibid.*, page 334. Sansom, page 333, sees Nichiren as a militant reformer, and in this earlier book, neglects Nichiren's gentler, or "saintly" side.

Nichiren was firm in his conviction that the false religions were preventing the salvation of the empire. The priests were mesmerizing officials; money went more into feverish temple building than into fortifications.

The second invasion came, in June of 1281, a force four times larger than the first. Once more a typhoon, 16 August, saved the day for Japan. Nichiren viewed the "great victory" as hollow. He knew the people would boast of *their* success and take false pride in what had happened. To him it was all the same: Japan was yet ruled by evil and she would suffer still more disasters.

One result of the second invasion was economic ruin of the nation, due mainly to the fortifications, temple and shrine building, and the subsequent demands for reward from all who could manufacture some reason for deserving one. In 1333, the last remnants of the broken, bankrupt Hōjō vessel were swept away. The three centuries of internal strife which followed may with some justification be seen as an extension of the disaster of which Nichiren had warned.

The saint's retirement on Mt. Minobu was provided for by the generous Lord of Hakii. In his cottage, Nichiren studied scriptures, instructed his disciples and worked more on his theories. He wrote a small tract there in 1275, the *Hokke Shuyoshu* (On the Essentials of the Lotus), glorifying that sutra, proclaiming again his ardent faith in his mission to establish the true law: "I, Nichiren, reject the general and the detail; I love the essential." He did not resist in this writing the urge to predict more woes for Japan because of the evils he had described:

If a clear mirror is held up to Japan today, it will be seen that the nature of the events reflected correspond exactly [to scriptural descriptions of catastrophes]. You, my disciples who have eyes to see, look. Know it well, there are in this country evil monks; it is an age in which the saints are lost.⁶²⁾

Nichiren had come to Minobu for the sake of religious service, to write and study, and to prepare for the establishment of the Holy See, the Kaidan. He saw the centre of this earthly paradise in Japan, and though vague as to when it was to come, of its eventual existence he had no doubt. His retirement was spent in prayer for the establish-

62) Translated from Renondeau, *op. cit.*, pp. 297-315.

ment of this ideal paradise with a universal church. It would be superfluous to mention individually the elements of his thought at this time; they had all, with the exception of the formulation of the plan for the *Kaidan*, been born earlier. He was more than ever intensely convinced of his being "the greatest sage in the world." 63)

Of the 356 epistles and seventy-eight treatises he wrote during his lifetime, ninety-two were written before Sado, fifty on Sado, and 292 after Sado, mainly at Minobu. The most important of these later ones were *The Three Great Mysteries* (27 April 1281) and the *Epistle of the Little Mongols* (13 July 1281) in which he contrasts the insignificant Mongols with the men of Ideal Japan. He also wrote several personal letters of great tenderness. A consolatory letter to the Lady Ueno in 1280 shows the merciful side of his multi-faced personality:

Everyone, wise or unwise, knows that man is mortal. I know it, and let others know it as often as possible. But I cannot imagine how deep your sorrow must be at the sudden death of your beloved son. Although bereft of your parents, brothers, sisters and husband, you were happy with your child... A bud has been blown off by the merciless wind. The moon has suddenly disappeared in the clouds. Alas! Difficult it is to believe it. 64)

His prophecies of strife were partly realized in the invasions and in the fratricide resulting in the rising of Hōjō Tokisuke against his brother, the Regent Tokimune. Nichiren, the saint now possessed of a blissful equanimity, held to the end his assurity in his own convictions. In ethics he was steadfast, in religion, unwavering. Growing ill after some eight years on Minobu, he wrote to the Lord of Haki what was to be his last letter: "... I am very sick. I thank your kind heart which has supported this restive Nichiren for nine years. Wherever I die, let my grave be at Minobu." 65) On 14 November 1282, while on the way to Hitachi hot springs, he died, having appointed the tasks to be completed by his followers. 66)

63) For a late Meiji evaluation, along the same lines, by a Nichiren adherent, see Nitto Kobayashi, *The Doctrines of Nichiren, compiled by the Right Virtuous Abbot Kobayashi*, Kelly and Walsh, Ltd., Tokyo, 1893, wherein we are told: "In a word, we who follow Nichiren offer all men blessings in the present life, and an immunity from suffering hereafter." page 29. See also Foreign Department of the Institute for Research in Living Religions, "The Nichiren Sect," *Footsteps in Japanese Buddhism*, Tokyo, 1936.

64) Ehara, *Manual*, page 47.

65) Quoted in Ehara, "Brief Sketch," page 40.

66) We have few pictures of him. It seems that in his last years, he was heavy-

In reviewing his own life in 1282, Nichiren felt that there were three things for which he considered himself deserving of commendation:

1. He had published *Risshō Ankoku Ron* and presented it to the regent at great personal risk;
2. Some years later, he had dared to tell the regent that the only safety for the State lay in the adoption of his doctrines.
3. He had foretold the exact time when the Mongol invasion would occur.

We may perhaps feel that these three acts “worthy of commendation” are too limited in extent to express fully his merit. In his time, this man was the most distinctive subject of Japan, perhaps her most original religious leader ever. The subsequent history of his sect, its battles with Shinnists in the 1530s, the unprecedented (in earlier Buddhist history) intolerance and persecutions of 1537 and 1586, the “various near-fanatic movements [which] have sprung [from it], most recently the Sokagakkai with its policies of forceful recruitment and political action,”⁶⁷ its present status as the largest single sect in Japan today (with 10,000,000 adherants),⁶⁸ need not concern us here. It is debatable as to how appropriate is Anesaki’s depiction of the Nichirenites — “Buddhist Calvinists.”⁶⁹ In any case, it is best to dispense with facile comparisons of Nichiren and Protestant sects. In Nichirenism’s Kamakura development may be seen the seeds of its perpetual flowering: militancy, nationalism and a parallel universalism, dogmatic conviction, constant prognostication, and mixed in with it all, surprising touches of benevolent love for mankind and faith in the Ideal Japan. These are characteristics of the sect, and of its founder.

set and bushy-browed — a conventional priest image in Japan—; not much can be said with certainty about his appearance.

67) Richard K. Beardsley, “Religion and Philosophy,” in John W. Hall and R. K. Beardsley, *Twelve Doors to Japan*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1965, page 326.

68) Estimates as to the exact number of Nichiren adherants vary widely, and in addition, its recent growth has been remarkable. Sansom, *Short Cultural History*, cites 3,000,000 adherants in the 1943 revised edition of the original 1931 work; Steinilber-Oberlin, *op. cit.*, cites 1,500,000 in 1930.

69) *Religious Life of the Japanese People*, page 49: “Thus the contrast is striking between the velvet gloves of Shinran’s followers and the mailed fists of the Nichirenites. Their mutual enmity has become proverbial. Nichiren, himself, however, directed his fiercest attacks not against Shinran, but against Honen (1133-1212), the master of Shinran. Shinran seems to have been ignored.”

MAGIC AND METHODOLOGY

BY

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This paper has two aims. The first is to offer philosophical considerations which cast doubt upon the widely held view that magic is primarily a technique of manipulation, and the second is to suggest a more adequate methodology which is based on recent anthropological study. It must also be explained that the use of the term 'magic' in this paper differs radically from the use of this word to describe various practices within our contemporary culture which have a dependent reference beyond themselves to Christian rituals and Biblical ideas, and can only be understood in the light of the context upon which they are parasitic. Magic as an indigenous and essential element in a culture is a self-contained system of rationality, and it is this meaning of the term 'magic' which concerns us here. Much of the material will relate to some aspects of Canaanite religion, but I hope to demonstrate that the implications of my approach have a relevance beyond Canaanite studies. In order to give point and clarity to my methodology I have to criticize certain elements in Professor John Gray's approach to Canaanite religion, as this is implemented in his books, *The Legacy of Canaan*²⁾ and *The Canaanites*.³⁾ But first, some preliminary remarks are necessary.

The Baal texts in the Ugaritic complex lack liturgical rubrics, and when we think in terms of mimes or dramas we go beyond the strict evidence of the texts. Walter Baumgartner has indeed argued that the library of the temple at Ugarit contained "cult-legends which, composed in literary style, offer a continuous description and narrative, and which can be understood and enjoyed for their own sake".⁴⁾ If Baum-

1) A paper read to the *Society for Old Testament Study* at St. Andrews, July 1968.

2) Second revised edition, Brill, Leiden, 1965.

3) Thames & Hudson, London, 1964.

4) "Ugaritische Probleme und ihre Tragweite für das Alte Testament", *Theologische Zeitschrift* iii, 1947, p. 89.

gartner is correct in his aesthetic estimate, these mythological texts in their extant form represent an intermediate stage between pure myth and the consciously reflective Biblical use of mythological symbols which have been separated from their matrix in myth. I accept, however, Professor Gray's judgement that although the texts in their advanced literary form have outgrown their origins, at an earlier phase of their transmission they were accompanied by appropriate rituals, and that the content of the Baal-Anat cycle originally referred to an understanding of the cycle of Nature.

In the first chapter of his book, *The Legacy of Canaan*, Professor Gray states the position which I now wish to criticize. After briefly discussing the themes of the Baal texts in which Mot and Anat play prominent roles, he writes, "Myth then among the Canaanites, as elsewhere in the ancient Near East, was creative, the creative word, which, according to the current conception of the operative force of the spoken word cast in regular measure and graphic language and imagery, could double the efficacy of the ritual act. *Both myth and ritual served to actualize the natural order...* They were also *instruments of imitative magic, designed to influence Providence by autosuggestion*. This articulate expression of his aspirations and desires in myth and ritual was deemed by the Syrian peasant to be as vital as *his actual labour on the land*. Such rites of imitative magic, together with an intense sympathy with the powers and processes of nature are features of most primitive agricultural societies, and the Syrian peasants were no exception".⁵) In my criticism I intend to make a temporary separation, purely for the sake of convenience and clarity, between myth and magic, and although allowing for an overlap of meaning between myth and magic to restrict the use of the term 'magic' to ritual. Elsewhere in this book, Professor Gray speaks of magic stimulating fresh vitality in Nature and of magic inducing the rains. In short, Canaanite magic is here regarded solely as a technique of production. This interpretation is succinctly expressed in the concluding sentence to the chapter on "Canaanite Religion" in Professor Gray's other work, *The Canaanites*, which reads, "When all is said, however, it is probably true that in spite of other and more sober aspects of religion, what predominated in Canaan was in fact the fertility-cult relating to the recurrent seasonal

5) *op. cit.*, p. 13 (Italics mine.)

crises in the agricultural year, *man's efforts to enlist Providence in supplying his primary need, his daily food and the propagation of his kind*".⁶⁾ It is my view that this interpretation of magic is wrong, and crucially wrong, and that this misunderstanding rests upon a category-mistake. This misconception also finds expression in the familiar distinction between Magic and Religion in terms of coercion of divine power and submission to the divine will, and in the recurring use of the phrase *ex opere operato*.

The first and strongest objection to this interpretation of magic is one to which Professor Gray himself draws attention when he mentions the actual labour of the Canaanites upon the land. The Canaanites already possessed a true technology, the technology of agriculture, and within the limits of their technical understanding they knew what measures were necessary to ensure that their crops did grow. There was therefore an empirical strain in the thinking of the Canaanites which related to their observation of the seasons and technology of the soil, and they understood the *objective* relationship between cause and effect. It seems wrong therefore to interpret their magic as a further mistaken attempt to make the crops grow. If we consider the cultural context from which this interpretation is offered it may be easier to appreciate the origin and nature of the misunderstanding. Western culture is predominantly technological with notions of function and production well to the forefront of thinking, and it is arguable that essentially moral problems in our society are now being treated as technical problems. The influence of advanced technology creates misunderstanding about the modern as well as the ancient world. This is a theme which has been developed recently by Lewis Mumford.⁷⁾

Our contemporary culture, however, is not exclusively technological. Other and different modes of understanding exist, and co-exist, side by side with the scientific and technological understanding in our culture. One of the best examples, which provides a useful analogy with the situation in the ancient context, is that of a man who is both natural scientist and religious believer. As a scientist he is concerned with a world of objects, an impersonal world which is reflected in the impersonal language he uses to describe his experiments. We can express it by saying that his world is devoid of personal pronouns.

6) *op. cit.*, p. 138 (Italics mine.)

7) Cf. *The Myth of the Machine*, Secker & Warburg, London, 1967.

But as a religious believer another concept 'world' operates in his mind, and if he is an adherent of one of the Semitic Faiths the use of personal pronouns will play a prominent role in the linguistic expression of his religious understanding. As a scientist his world is essentially un-mysterious, one set of events is explained as a logical extension of another set of events in the same series, and the appropriate mental state is not one of passion but cold detachment. As a believer, on the other hand, his world assumes an aspect of mystery, and his cold detachment and calm certitude are replaced by an affirming faith and painful uncertainty. It would be unwise to distinguish too sharply between these two forms of understanding. A man may become a scientist for religious reasons, and having become a scientist his scientific knowledge will doubtless influence his religious understanding. But allowing for these subtle impacts, we can still maintain that we are confronted by distinct modes of understanding with their individual structures and criteria. At a less sophisticated but equally real level the agricultural labourer who hurries home from his work in the fields to attend a religious service becomes another man in terms of attitude and disposition, and the simple act of washing and donning fresh clothing symbolizes the difference for him.

Understanding an ancient religion therefore has reference not merely to the complex of ideas within the particular religion being studied, but also to other forms of understanding in the culture to which the religion belonged. A distinction can be seen between two modes of understanding in the ancient context, the magical and the empirical, and the recognition of this fact of the diversity of ancient understandings and their inter-relationship is facilitated by scrutinizing the terminology which is used with reference to the ancient world. We may agree that the term 'mythopoeic' has a useful role to play, and that ancient man felt himself integrated with Nature which confronted him as a 'Thou' and not an 'It'. But this is only part of the truth. Mythopoeic thought and experience would be clearly framed within ritual situations which in themselves would have been a powerful stimulus to the attitude of mind described by the term 'mythopoeic'. This term refers to one strand of understanding which was of limited conscious duration. Pottery, agriculture, writing and cities are not the results of exclusively mythical or mythopoeic states of mind, but of predominantly practical and empirical thinking. We may agree further

with the Frankforts when they emphasize ideas of causal influence in the ancient world, and write, "the life of man... [is] for mythopoeic thought imbedded in nature..... the natural processes are affected by the acts of man no less than man's life depends on his harmonious integration with nature", ⁸⁾ but the point to notice here is that the verb 'to affect' has more than one sense. Or, to express it in another way, there is more than one concept of causality operative in our society as our language shows. ⁹⁾ We ask, "What made the train crash?", and again, "What made so-and-so become a missionary?". The form of these two questions is similar, but their logical structure and significance are very dissimilar. Not merely is the content of the questions different, but the connexions presupposed by them are different in kind. We may empirically observe the cause of a train crash. The driver has suddenly collapsed or the signals have failed. We do not observe the cause of a man becoming a missionary; what we apprehend is a form of life in which the cause is an integral and constitutive element. In a Judaeo-Christian culture the confession that "God made the heavens and the earth" implies a concept of causality totally unlike any other, if only because every other idea, not merely ideas of causality, is dependent upon the particular concept which is involved in the assertion. Again, mystics of the extravertive type from various cultures and periods who corporately claim to have physically seen the world transfigured into a living Presence, would not say that they had *produced* anything, but rather that something had been *revealed* to them. Such considerations alert us to the possibility that in an ancient society which practised magic there may well have been causal and revelatory concepts which also behaved in a profoundly strange manner.

If the growth of crops and fertility generally depended upon magic, it would seem that the inevitable periodic failure of the crops and other natural calamities would seriously undermine the entire category of magical understanding. But in present-day primitive societies magical rituals continue despite disasters, and of equal importance is the fact that the attitude of primitives to their magic is different from their

8) H. & H. A. Frankfurt, "Myth and Reality" in *Before Philosophy*, ed. H. Frankfurt, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1949, p. 36.

9) In what follows I have received help from reading P. Winch, "*Understanding a Primitive Society*" in *Religion and Understanding*, ed. D. Z. Phillips, Blackwell, Oxford, 1967, p. 34. Cf. also L. Wittgenstein, "Bemerkungen Über Frazers *The Golden Bough*," *Synthese*, xvii, 1967, pp. 233-53.

thinking about their technological labours. Magic has a dogmatic, credal status in the life of the community. Technology is put to the test, this technique works better than that, and is polished and perfected. Magic, like Religion, is not put to the test; it is Magic which provides a test that becomes manifest in a form of life. A quotation from Peter Winch's important article "Understanding a Primitive Society", where he writes about the Azande of the Sudan, is here relevant, "The spirit in which oracles are consulted is very unlike that in which a scientist makes experiments. Oracular revelations are not treated as hypotheses and, since their sense derives from the way they are treated in their context, they therefore *are not* hypotheses. They are not a matter of intellectual interest but the main way in which Azande decide how they should act".¹⁰⁾

The continuance of magic despite natural disasters strongly suggests that the idea of dependence should be turned on its head. Instead of speaking of fertility being dependent upon magical rituals we should rather say that men through their magic realized their independence of the behaviour of natural phenomena. If this interpretation is correct, the belief expressed through nature rituals would operate not on the level of the natural realm but on what we may call a trans-natural plane. The world would be viewed, as it were, from the outside. A telling saying of Ludwig Wittgenstein expresses the distinction, "*Not how the world is, is the mystical, but that the world is*".¹¹⁾ An understanding of the world is involved in magic, but it is not one that seeks to answer the question, How? It is the basic unity of organic life, the wholeness of the world, which is the special discovery of agricultural societies. The numerous and profound analogies between the world of Nature and man's own birth, sexuality and death testify to this, and magic mediates experientially the affinity between the structures of the world and those of man's own being. The familiar distinction between Religion and Magic urgently needs correction. It is not the difference between submission and coercion, but the difference between two forms of submission, or between two forms of coercion and submission. There is no contradiction here for submission implies coercion or constraint.

As technology advances magic diminishes. This is true, but the

10) *loc. cit.*, p. 19. See n. 9.

11) *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, vi: 44.

conclusion that technology is a more efficient *substitute* for magic is false. It is the inimical character of advanced technology and its disruptive influence that cause the decay of magic. The advance of technology also has a considerable, and in some respects similar impact upon Religion, a fact which again points to an organic overlap between Magic and Religion.

In emphasizing that the understanding which constitutes the system of magic included ideas other than those of function and production, I do not wish to imply that there were no individual Canaanites who regarded their magic as an extension and supplement to their technological labours. If we may speak of a perversion of Religion, by which we mean errors within Religion which are disclosed as errors by the criteria provided by Religion, I see no difficulty in speaking of a perversion of Magic. The ancients were no more immune to error than we are today. It is the notion that Magic as a total category involved some form of scientific or technical mistake which is wrong. Nor do I wish to deny the possibility that the Canaanites *hoped* that their rituals would help the crops to grow and assist with child-bearing, but by introducing the idea of hope we have moved beyond the sphere of technical ideas and are on the threshold of Religion.

Both the history of this misconception about magic which I am here seeking to expose, and something akin to the emphasis upon the diversity of understanding in the ancient context which I am urging can be traced to the work of one scholar, W. Robertson Smith. Robertson Smith separated, wrongly in my view, Magic from Morality and Religion, but left the matter there to concentrate upon what he considered to be the life-bearing channels of Religion. In his Introduction to the third edition of *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites*,¹²⁾ S. A. Cook, who clearly saw the complexity of the relationship between Magic and Religion, points to the correlation of the religious and secular aspects of life in his master's work, and declares his own faith in this methodology when he writes, "the really vital problem for modern research is ... the varying relations between the 'religious' and the 'non-religious' phases of life and their mutual interaction".¹³⁾ These constructive sociological implications of Robertson Smith's research were elaborated by Emile Durkheim and the French school

12) Black, London, 1927.

13) *op. cit.*, p. xlvii.

of social anthropology. Robertson Smith's minor and mistaken interest in magic as an isolated erratic phenomenon was developed at prodigious length by Sir James G. Frazer, who dedicated *The Golden Bough* to Robertson Smith, and Frazer's influence upon British scholarship has been considerable, and, in my view, disastrous.

Frazer was under the spell of the evolutionary hypothesis which led him to propound the untenable view that human culture evolves in linear fashion through three ages, Magic, Religion and Science. Instead of comparing distinct types of thought and institutions, and their interaction, within one society with those in another society, he directly compared and confused Magic and Science and argued that Magic was a mistaken technique of crudely manipulating the world. The savage, he said, "may without much difficulty imagine that he himself can annually repeat the work of creation by his charms and incantations".¹⁴⁾ He further writes, "homoeopathic and in general sympathetic magic plays a great part in the measures taken ... to secure an abundant supply of food. On the principle that like produces like, many things are done by him ... in deliberate imitation of the result which he seeks to attain".¹⁵⁾ In Frazer's hands, magic became a paradigm of the irrational. The truth of the matter is that this interpretation was a Procrustean *tour de force*. Frazer's savage was in fact, or rather fiction, a very eccentric scientist. To the best of my knowledge, no field anthropologist has ever met a primitive who believed he could alter the world or objectively renew the cosmos. Living in a harsh environment, as many primitives do, is a powerful corrective to fantasy. A converse argument will show the extent of the error. A primitive would be as mystified by our modern traffic and the complex system of signs which mediate a dialogue between drivers, as we are by his ancient magic which also consists of a complex pattern of (to him) intelligible signs which mediate communication and experience. The objection that this argument might again suggest a misleadingly close analogy with mechanical power is drained of its force when we consider the humanizing power of the social context, which is where the strength of the analogy lies.

Frazer was an arch-functionalist because he lived in a functionalist

14) *Spirits of the Corn and Wild* ii, Third reprinted edition, Macmillan, London, 1936, p. 109.

15) *The Magic Art*, i, Third reprinted edition, Macmillan, London, 1936, p. 85.

society, and reading other societies uncritically in the light of his own he was led into serious error. In his approach to the ancient religions, Frazer applies the same methodology; it is agricultural needs which have profoundly influenced the concepts and practices of Religion. Almost everything he touches turns into a function. Myths bring about desired results, kings exercise a personal influence over the crops, magic promotes and produces. That magic is thought of as a functional technique for ensuring efficacious results, an assumption which is deeply entrenched in Old Testament study, is primarily Frazer's legacy, the legacy of a man who never set eyes on a primitive, but Frazer's influence has gone so deep that in the modern approach to magic a definite process of unlearning is involved. Primitives do not mistake ideal for objective connexions, as Frazer imagined, and in recent anthropological study, which includes specialist field-work, there is a growing interest in the impressive body of sound empirical knowledge possessed by primitive communities. C. Lévi-Strauss draws attention to this fact in his book *La Pensée Sauvage*,¹⁶⁾ and among numerous examples he includes the Aymara Indians of the Bolivian plateau who are practised experts in the science of preserving foodstuffs. He further mentions the direct imitation of their technique of dehydration by the American army during the last war. In the realm of technology, like does *produce* like. Nor do primitives confuse perceptions and conceptions. Their perceptions are like our own; it is on the conceptual level that a problem of unfamiliarity arises. Witchcraft, for example, where it occurs, is an essential and indispensable feature of a primitive society. Witches attract and trap feelings of resentment and revulsion which otherwise would become dangerously dispersed and might disrupt the social structure. This *conceptual* scheme which is dramatically enacted has social ramifications.

In the attempt to maintain an absolute separation between Magic and Religion there are inherent strains which become very apparent in discussions on "Prophetic Symbolism". The presence of similarities between the principles underlying magic and those of prophetic symbolism, notably the imitative principle, involves accounting for these in terms of an association between the two categories. But since magic is thought of as a means of coercion, it also becomes necessary to disso-

16) E. T. *The Savage Mind*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1966. See p. 43.

ciate prophetic action from magic in a radical fashion. In his pioneer article on "Prophetic Symbolism",¹⁷⁾ which shows an acknowledged dependence upon Frazer, H. Wheeler Robinson makes the distinction between form and meaning, the form is magical but the meaning is religious. Johannes Lindblom, writing over thirty years later in *Prophecy in Ancient Israel*,¹⁸⁾ distinguishes between "the inner power" of magic, — I assume that this means *ex opere operato* efficiency, and the power of prophetic action which derived from the will of Yahweh. What such distinctions leave unexplained is how the fundamental and logically contradictory difference between *external* coercion and submission could have taken place within similar forms. If, however, one gives up the idea of magic as mechanistic coercion, and thinks of the power of magical rituals and prophetic symbolism, within their different contexts, as a power not to produce effects in a *quasi*-scientific sense but to create and modify experience, these strains of interpretation disappear.

A possible example of prophetic symbolism is the action of Elijah on Mount Carmel.¹⁹⁾ But to accept this symbolic interpretation of the prophet's crouching posture (*gahar*) does not, in my view, involve accepting Wheeler Robinson's further comment that this was a conscious attempt to produce rain.²⁰⁾ Indeed, Wheeler Robinson's own terminology should have warned him against this approach, for the power of symbolism is distinct from technical power. In the former it is man who is being acted upon, whereas in the latter it is man who consciously wields and manipulates power. Frazer's work of classification on homoeopathic or imitative and contagious magic does no more than to point out that an authentic symbol strives for approximation to that which it symbolizes. To understand the objective connexion between clouds and rain, and to wait for the rain, as Elijah does, means that manipulative influences are foreign to the understanding which is inherent in the prophet's action. The narrative also tells us that Elijah waits until the *seventh* time of looking by his servant, which communicates symbolically about the quality of the waiting.

It will also be apparent that, from my standpoint, some of the contro-

17) *Old Testament Essays*, Griffin, London, 1927, pp. 1-17. See p. 5.

18) Blackwell, Oxford, 1962. See p. 172.

19) I Kings, xviii: 42.

20) *loc. cit.*, p. 4.

versies centred upon the views of Sigmund Mowinckel are wrongly conceived. Mowinckel's critics seized on the magical content of his original presentation of the Enthronement Festival thesis. The ritual was deemed to actualize Yahweh's sovereignty over heaven and earth in the form of rainfall and fertility, and this was felt to be incompatible with the Hebraic emphasis of dependence upon the power of Yahweh. More recently, Mowinckel has modified some of his earlier views, and he now explains that "In Israel all these ancient rites were gradually reinterpreted as symbolical expressions of the prayer to Yahweh to come and create life and fertility and peace and salvation".²¹) Although the crude mechanistic interpretation of agricultural rites has been considerably refined by Mowinckel, he still clings to the view that the old nature rituals were primarily a means of *ensuring* life and blessing. The difference between the Mowinckel of *The Psalms in Israel's Worship* and his earlier *alter ego* of *Psalmenstudien* does not significantly alter our understanding of the relationship between Magic and Religion. The apparently innocuous adjective 'ancient' which recurs with reference to the Canaanite rites shows that the shadow of the evolutionary hypothesis, which led Frazer astray in the first instance, still looms in the background. Moreover the idea of submission can be expressed in forms other than that of prayer, and there is no dearth of evidence for the connexion between primitive magical rituals and symbolical or analogical thinking.

To return to the views of Professor Gray, it must be said that he has gone far in enabling us to understand Canaanite religion from within its own context. My criticism, however, is not merely that further refinements are necessary, but that the attempt to express these refinements poses problems of terminology. Where the Frazerian terminology terminates, "magic induces the rains", "instruments of magic", and another terminology is introduced by Professor Gray, "the Canaanite declaration of faith in Providence", the semantic problem begins to emerge. At this stage of the discussion the relationship between my own views and those of Professor Gray becomes complicated. Professor Gray apparently feels no difficulty in using this term 'Providence', for it occurs several times in his books, and so far as I can see, always without benefit of inverted commas. It seems to me, however, that

21) E. T. *The Psalms in Israel's Worship*, i, Blackwell, Oxford, 1962, p. 131.

this use, — let us call it the *equivalent* use, of a specialized term like 'Providence' with reference to what is manifestly an unfamiliar complex compounds the difficulty of understanding. Nevertheless I do not wish to reject this term out of hand for a conscious *analogical* use of the term may provide a foothold of understanding in Canaanite religion.

In Old Testament religion the conception of the transcendent overruling God is central to this subject of Providence. Because of the centrality of this idea of God in this religion, it is able to disengage itself from complete dependence upon the visible reassuring signs of Providence, so that when providential care is apparently absent faith in God remains. A poignant and positive expression of this faith is to be found in the closing verses of the Psalm in the book of Habakkuk,

"Though the fig tree do not blossom,
nor fruit be on the vines,
the produce of the olive fail
and the fields yield no food,
the flock be cut off from the fold,
and there be no herd in the stalls,
yet I will rejoice in the LORD,
I will joy in the God of my salvation". 22)

The idea of Providence is correlated with the idea of the hidden God, and belief in Providence is liberated from an absolute dependence upon the realm of phenomenal manifestation. The Canaanite gods were not transcendent but immanent in the life of Nature so that the notion of equivalence of meaning is ruled out. But since Nature contained this pantheistic dimension for the Canaanites, it can be suggested that their rituals expressed an understanding that *human* life, as opposed to the life of the gods with its immutable pattern, is subject to contingencies and an acceptance of their unalterability. Another religious response to contingencies is to regard them as signs of divine favour or punishment. The wondrous works of Yahweh go against normal expectation, but their empirical certainty assumes a significance in Hebrew memory which bursts into the miraculous. If I may parody Wittgenstein, "Not *how* the children of Israel were delivered from Egypt, is *Heilsgeschichte*, but *that* they were delivered from Egypt". Conversely, disasters may be regarded as signs of punishment, and Professor Gray

22) Habakkuk iii: 17 f. (RSV)

thinks that there is textual support for this idea in Canaanite religion. ²³⁾

With reference to the difference between Canaanite and Hebrew religion, a possible terminological distinction is that between the naturization of man and the personalization of man. In Magic man is drawn towards and perhaps we should say into and through Nature. He realizes his oneness with Nature. In Religion man withdraws from Nature and reflectively fights his way through to a positive faith. But the point to notice is that in ancient societies this (to us) alien process of naturization does not come within the orbit of science or technology, and therefore should not be evaluated according to technical criteria of understanding. If Professor Gray is correct in asserting that the bulk of the Baal mythology properly related to an autumnal Festival, the time of year when the rains *could be expected*, this too confirms the attitude of submission we have been discussing. In the light of this discussion, it becomes highly questionable whether, in an ancient society which held magical beliefs, there was any phenomenon which could rightly be described as the release of emotional tension at the onset of the rains. This old psychological theory of R. R. Marett has not been found to work in the study of primitive communities, and it reflects the confusion of thinking that sophisticated westerners and primitives have the same feelings in identical situations.

In a community where natural forces assume an absolute significance a man's relationship to those forces is expressive of ideas other than that of production. His social understanding, his ideas of good and evil and his concept of deity may all hinge upon this relationship, and to deprive him of his magic would be to cut away the supports of his life. It would be like depriving a scientist of his laboratory and equipment and then asking him to carry on as before. In particular, ideas of good and evil are not like religious concepts which may or may not exist in a specific religion. We can think of religious systems which lack or deny the idea of a Creator-God, but a religion can no more exist without concepts of good and evil than a language can without containing a distinction between real and unreal. What this distinction comes to differs from one language to the next, and moral concepts also vary from one religion to another. At this point Frazer drove the subject of Magic completely off course, for in maintaining an absolute separation between Magic and Morality he deprived the subject of one

23) *The Canaanites*, pp. 137 f.

of its most significant dimensions. It is noteworthy that the Dinka, another primitive people of the Sudan on whom recent work has been done, are enabled by their rain rituals and understanding of cosmic rhythm to create moral rhythms within themselves.²⁴⁾ The inner structure and significance of their rituals bear a striking affinity with some forms of classical *yoga*, in which the idea of inner conformity with external rhythm is also prominent. And what is rhythm but repetition and imitation?

The themes in the Baal-Anat cycle are agricultural, but they are also personal themes. The alternation between fertility and sterility symbolizes the interaction of life and death. There are natural rhythms, but there are also moral and existential rhythms. The world satisfies needs and creates needs of a different order. The concept of death is a limiting concept and occupies a special commanding place in human thought. A similar concept which stands in a polarized relation to that of death is the concept of birth. From his earliest beginnings man has worried his mind with these limiting ideas, and this concern has a great deal to do with the phenomenon of Religion. The concern has been expressed in a variety of ways and through different institutions. The ancient Hebrews thought of death as life at its lowest ebb. Death is conceived in terms of life. The Buddhists think of life as a progressive disintegration towards dissolution. Life is conceived in terms of death. Some primitive beliefs about life and death are strongly existentialist in character. There is a voluntary physical submission to death by outstanding sacral members of the community in order to affirm life, for the participating and observing community, through the act of choice which robs death of its power to strike at will. What such views have in common is the constant factor of the commanding position of the idea of death. It acts as a compulsion to find or to fail to find meaning in life. The varied and complex struggles of Baal were doubtless interpretative of experience at a number of levels, and one of these may have been man's sense of the tragic and unrepeatable significance of life lived in the face of death. The fact that the Canaanites do not appear to have held a belief in life after death would tend to support this view. What can be said clearly is that these unalterable cosmic themes of life and death and their alternation would have dramatically

24) Cf. G. Lienhardt, *Divinity and Experience*, Clarendon, Oxford, 1961, p. 280.

counter-balanced any tendency in Canaanite religion towards the belief that magic could change the objective scheme of things.

A sound interpretation of magic is heavily dependent on finding adequate answers to two questions. The first concerns the proper scope of the term 'magic'. In this paper the reference of this term has extended beyond a specific class of rituals, and the emphasis has been on magic as ritual which incorporates a comprehensive and co-ordinated pattern of signs or symbols that mediates to the initiated community moral and religious understanding and experience. Following the lead of this broad use of the term 'magic', the laws relating to clean and unclean creatures in Leviticus xi may be regarded as such a pattern of discriminative signs in the natural realm which pointed continuously to the unblemished holiness of God and what we would term the moral realm. In short, the signs would communicate religious learning and the meaning of the injunction, "consecrate yourselves, therefore, and be holy, for I am holy".²⁵) There are indeed connexions in the Hebraic context between the moral and natural realms, for the maintenance of holiness preserves the blessing. But these connexions whether they are called ideal or real are not of the ordinary objective kind, nor is there any confusion between the two realms.

The second question concerns the relationship between Magic and Religion. The conclusion to which my methodology leads me is that they are distinct but not separate, related but not identical. Religion is less esoteric and has a more selfcritical, open character which makes room for the entertaining and resolution of new problems. Religious beliefs have a history of growth, and an adaptability and resilience in the face of changing historical and cultural conditions which perhaps go some way towards explaining the survival of Religion even in advanced technological societies.

²⁵) Leviticus xi: 44. Cf. M. Douglas, *Purity and Danger*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1966, pp. 41-57.

GEDANKEN ZU EINER RELIGIONS- GESCHICHTLICHEN ANTHROPOLOGIE ¹⁾

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Seit die Anthropologie in den 20er Jahren erneut auflebte, ist sie zeitweilig geradezu zu einem Modethema geworden. Das schließt jedoch nicht aus, daß anthropologische Forschung eine Notwendigkeit ist, sei es, daß mit der Frage nach Wesen und Art des Menschen das eigentliche Anliegen einer Gruppe von Disziplinen unmittelbar berührt wird, oder sei es, daß eine andere Gruppe von Disziplinen dringend der Hinwendung zu jener Frage bedarf, um nicht in zynische Mißachtung des Menschseins oder gar in eine Katastrophe hineinzuführen.

Die Beweggründe, welche zum Wiederaufleben der Anthropologie führten, lassen positive und negative Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten offen. Von hervorragender Bedeutung sind einerseits die neuen biologischen und medizinischen Erkenntnisse, welche zunehmend in bisher nicht bekanntem Maße auf die Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte *unmittelbar* Einfluß nehmen und andere als naturwissenschaftliche Gesichtspunkte eingrenzen und teilweise sogar zu verdrängen drohen. Darüber hinaus geht mit diesem Umbruch jener andere zunächst jedenfalls nicht unmittelbar naturwissenschaftlich bestimmte Prozeß der Menschheitsgeschichte Hand in Hand, für dessen Unstetigkeit Probleme wie soziale Unzulänglichkeiten, das Verhältnis von individuellem und Masse, Ideologie und Ethik, Mannigfaltigkeit der religiösen Konzepte, der Geburtenüberschuß oder die jüngsten katastrophalen Erschütterungen in zwei Weltkriegen mit allen damit verbundenen soziologischen Schwierigkeiten der Anlaß sind.

Es ist dieser Situation angemessen, wenn von verschiedenen Fach-

1) Diesem Aufsatz liegt ein Vortrag gleichen Themas zugrunde, welcher am 18.7.1969 auf der Rudolf-Otto-Gedenktagung in Marburg gehalten wurde.

bereichen her die Frage nach dem Verständnis des Menschen aufgenommen wird und neben eine naturwissenschaftlich bzw. medizinisch zu nennende Anthropologie eine philosophische oder theologische tritt. Grundsätzlich muß hier jedoch festgestellt werden, daß „Anthropologie“ sachgemäß nur als Gesamtbezeichnung verstanden werden darf. Ihr Gegenstand ist der Mensch. Um seine zutreffende Erkenntnis geht es. Diese wird jedoch nur verzerrungsfrei und voll sachgemäß sein, wenn der Mensch als Ganzheit, also unter allen sich ergebenden Gesichtspunkten erfaßt wird. Darum haben jene genannten „Teilanthropologien“ immer nur ein relatives Recht. Sie können nur dann Gültigkeit beanspruchen, wenn sie im Miteinander sind unter dem Gesichtspunkt der umgreifenden anthropologischen Ganzheit. Hierin liegt auch die „Anstrengung“ einer jeden anthropologischen Arbeit, die hohe Gefahr der Irrsinnigkeit und das grundsätzliche Risiko des Scheiterns begründet. Wer dieses nicht sehen will, sollte sich besser nicht der Anthropologie zuwenden. Das gleiche gilt von einem solchen, den ein Zittern und resignierende Besorgnis ankommt angesichts der gewaltigen Ausmaße des Feldes der Zusammenhänge, welche vor ihm liegen. Aber auch an das Denkvermögen des Kritikers oder sekundären Benutzers von Ergebnissen wird diese Anforderung gestellt, daß er „Unfälle“ der Forschung von den genannten Schwierigkeiten her und bis zu einem gewissen Grade als heuristische Brücken zu richtigen Erkenntnissen zu verstehen vermag.

Die Bemerkungen zum Ganzheitscharakter der Anthropologie sind Selbstverständlichkeiten, die theoretisch auch anerkannt, in der Praxis törichterweise jedoch zumeist nicht zur Kenntnis genommen werden. Der Anlaß mag fachliche Selbstüberschätzung sein, welche über die Grenzen der eigenen Disziplin hinaus keine Kommunikation zuläßt, oder er mag fachliche Existenzangst sein, welche jenseits des eigenen Bereiches nur lauernde Feinde argwöhnt. Oft genug wird aber auch lediglich fehlende Einsicht in die wahren Zusammenhänge und fehlende Übung für eine fruchtbare Gemeinschaftsarbeit den Blick für notwendige Methoden verdunkeln. Es wäre sehr zu begrüßen, wenn sich in der bedrohlichen Flut der Studienreformen Tendenzen durchsetzen könnten, welche über philanthrope Purzelbäume in wünschenswerter Klarheit hinausführten und dem Mindestmaß an schlechtin sachnotwendigem Universalismus endlich, solange noch etwas zu retten ist, zum Durchbruch verhelfen. Andernfalls wäre in kürzester Zeit in noch stärkerem

Maße als bisher Anlaß zu dem zweifelhaften Vergnügen gegeben, auf das erörterte Problem hinzuweisen.²⁾

Wenn hier nun eine "religionsgeschichtliche Anthropologie" ins Auge gefaßt wird, dann geschieht das nicht im Dienste der Ironie der Geistesgeschichte, sondern im Wissen um den wesentlichen Beitrag zum Verständnis des Menschen, welchen die Religionsforschung zu leisten vermag. Es ist in diesem Zusammenhange vielleicht angebracht, sich daran zu erinnern, daß in deutschen Landen die Erkenntnis über Sinn und Wert der Religionsforschung bei weitem nicht Allgemeingut ist. Die Entwürfe über den künftigen Ausbau von Forschung und Lehre beweisen dies. Umso erfreulicher ist die Ausnahme theologischer Fakultäten und kirchlicher Hochschulen. Trotz allem beabsichtige ich nicht, eine Rechtfertigung für die Religionsforschung zu bieten, weil die Gründe hierfür einem denkenden Menschen jedenfalls nicht erst genannt werden müssen.

Es ist nun auszugehen von der Frage nach dem Anlaß einer religionsgeschichtlichen Anthropologie. Anzuschließen sind Überlegungen zur methodischen Grundlegung. Endlich sollen noch Beispiele zur praktischen Ausführung und Auswertung dieser Bemühungen folgen.

1. *Der Anlaß*

Zum ersten ist der Mensch, bzw. noch umfassender das Personsein ein hervorragendes Thema im Bereiche der Religion. Das gilt unabhängig davon, ob nun im einen Extremfalle das Menschsein sich erfüllt in reiner materieller Diesseitigkeit wie im alten Israel, oder ob diese Erscheinungsweise gerade völlig transzendiert werden soll wie in fernöstlichen Vorstellungen. Aber auch Aussagen, welche den augenscheinlichen unmittelbaren Bezug auf das Personsein vermissen lassen, sind hieraufhin zu befragen. In irgendeiner Weise ist ja jede religiöse Überlieferung auf den Menschen bezogen.

2) Es gehört zur Bürde geschichtlichen Existierens, daß menschliche Entscheidungen, auch wenn sie die harmlose Gestalt organisatorischer Maßnahmen annehmen, in die Zukunft hinein eine Wirksamkeit entfalten, welche zum Schaden jener menschlichen Gemeinschaft werden kann, deren vormalige Repräsentanten ihre Urheber waren. Auch wenn die Menschheitsgeschichte nicht gerade ein überwältigendes Zeugnis des selbstlosen, das eigene Hier und Jetzt transzendierenden Verhaltens ist, so wird die menschliche Würde doch gerade durch jenes Verhalten erfüllt, dessen Voraussetzung man gemeinhin „Verantwortungsbewußtsein“ zu nennen pflegt.

Zum zweiten wird selbstverständlich das jeweilige Religionsverständnis vertieft durch eingehende Kenntnis des Subjektes, welches das Selbst- und Weltverständnis entwirft und entfaltet. Solcher Erkenntnis dient die Bestimmung des Verhältnisses zwischen drei Gegebenheiten: der Gegebenheit der tatsächlichen anthropologischen Daten, welche also dem objektiven, von allem subjektivem Wollen und Vorstellen unabhängigen effektiven Materialzusammenhang³⁾ angehören, der Gegebenheit der "zutreffenden", also objektiv richtigen Erkenntnis jener faktischen Daten und der Gegebenheit der Interpretation jener Erkenntnisse und ihrer Prinzipien im Sinne des subjektiven Seinszusammenhangs⁴⁾, dessen Entfaltung religiösen Normen unterworfen ist. Von besonderer Bedeutung sind hier gerade solche Quellen, welche kaum einen unmittelbaren religiösen Aussagegehalt haben wie z.B. rein anatomisch-chirurgische u.ä. Abhandlungen. Sie sind zusammen mit versprengten Bemerkungen ägyptologischerseits in philologischer Hinsicht in einem mehrbändigen Werk zusammengestellt.⁵⁾ Eine entsprechende Vorarbeit für andere Bereiche ist dringend erforderlich. Es sei in diesem Zusammenhange bemerkt, daß es geradezu erschütternd ist, mit einer welchen Nachlässigkeit und mit welchen hoffnungslos veralteten Methoden der überwiegende Teil

3) Gemeint sind Gegebenheiten naturhafter und anderer Art, welche unabhängig vom subjektiven Denken und Wollen vorhanden und wirksam, also effektiv sind. Auch diese Gegebenheiten stehen in einem Zusammenhang, welcher materieller Art ist. Auf die Frage menschlicher, also subjektiver Einflußnahme auf solche Zusammenhänge und deren Auswirkung muß hier verzichtet werden. Verzichtet werden muß hier auch auf die Grenzfrage geschichtlicher Fakten. Zur Terminologie vgl. vorläufig meinen Aufsatz: Geschichte und Seinszusammenhang, Bibliotheca Orientalis, 1969 S.19-26. Die jetzt gebrauchten Wendungen stehen im engen Zusammenhang mit dem Entwurf einer allgemeinen Methode des religionsgeschichtlichen Vergleiches. Innerhalb dieses Entwurfes hat auch die hier erörterte religionsgeschichtliche Anthropologie ihren Ort. Wenn die gebrauchten Formulierungen im Hinblick auf noch ausstehende Darlegungen (vgl. Anm. 15) auch zu einem guten Teil ein Vorgriff sind, so seien sie dennoch angesichts der hinter ihnen stehenden geschlossenen Konzeption gewagt. Zugleich möge ihr für den Moment u.U. theoretischer Klang unter diesen Voraussetzungen Verständnis finden.

4) Es handelt sich hier um das Welt- und Selbstverständnis, welches die jeweiligen Repräsentanten einer Lebensgemeinschaft entfalten, welches also subjektiver Art ist. Dieses Welt- und Selbstverständnis ist der Ausdruck des gedachten Zusammenhanges des Seins von Mensch und zugehörigen Gegebenheiten.

5) *Grundriß der Medizin der alten Ägypter*. Berlin 1954 ff., versch. Verf.

des außerliterarischen anthropologischen Materiales behandelt wird, wenn man einmal über die engere archäologische oder kunstgeschichtliche Fragestellung hinausgeht.⁶⁾ Unter den mannigfaltigen anderen Themen des täglichen Lebens, welche die ungehemmte, mit Fehlern, Bosheiten und Sorgen behaftete, aber durchaus auch von Zufriedenheit gekennzeichnete personhafte Existenz ausbreiten, möchte ich vor allem den Humor nennen, weil er zum einen besonders intensiv in die jeweiligen Eigenarten des Menschseins Einblick gewährt und weil er zum anderen überraschend eng mit religiösen Vorstellungen verbunden sein kann.⁷⁾

Zum dritten drängt auf eine religionsgeschichtliche Anthropologie der Sachverhalt, daß Religion als Konkretisierung anthropologischer Grundgegebenheiten verstanden werden muß. Unter anthropologischen Grundgegebenheiten möchte ich grundsätzliche physische und psychische Voraussetzungen des Menschseins begreifen, welche allerdings in je besonderer Weise erst noch an jedem Individuum konkretisiert werden müssen. Die Voraussetzungen dieser Konkretisierungen sind einerseits überindividueller Art. Sie sind es insofern, als sie durch die Gegebenheiten einer engen Gemeinschaft oder umfassender menschlicher Gruppen von der Vergangenheit her und in der Gegenwart vorgegeben sind. Sie sind andererseits individuell eigenständiger Art je nach dem Spielraum, welcher im Koordinatensystem des umgreifenden religionsgeschichtlichen Prozesses verbleibt. In jedem Falle aber ist Religion die besondere Konkretisierung der allgemeinen Möglichkeit zum Personsein, welche in jedem einzelnen Angehörigen einer wie auch immer beschaffenen Gemeinschaft angelegt ist. Dieser Sachverhalt trägt erheblich zu dem Konflikt zwischen Gemeinschaft und personalem Recht des einzelnen bei.⁸⁾ Er ist vielleicht sogar schlechthin die Ursache für diese Spannung, denn auch in Stadien unangefochtenen Vorrechtes der Gemeinschaft ist das Faktum des einzelnen nicht eliminiert. Wenn der einzelne auch nicht alsbald als

6) Es sind jedoch erfreuliche Ausnahmen zu nennen wie z.B. K. Gerhardt, Waren die Köpfchen der Erhnaton-Töchter künstlich deformiert? in: ZAS 94 1967, S. 50 ff.

7) Eine Monographie über den Humor unter religionsgeschichtlichem Gesichtspunkt bereite ich vor. Vgl. hierzu einstweilen meine Ausführungen in *Chronique d'Egypte* 40, 1965, S. 292-294.

8) Besonders eindringlich in der Religionsgeschichte Israels. Vgl. in diesem Sinne meine Ausführungen in: *Wege zum Menschen* 20. Jg. 1968, S. 338-340.

solcher volle Anerkennung erlangt, so steht er doch zweifelsohne auch schon hinter den anonymen Impulsen, welche fortlaufende Wandlungen des für verbindlich erklärten Seinszusammenhangs⁹⁾ bewirken. Es ist auch die Aufgabe der religionsgeschichtlichen Anthropologie, hier ins Detail zu gehen und den verborgenen Linien und Schattierungen des Menschseins nachzuspüren.

Wenn im Religionsverständnis grundsätzliche Strukturen des Personseins zum Ausdruck kommen, dann muß von hier aus ein bedeutender Beitrag geleistet werden können, die anthropologischen Grundgegebenheiten als allgemeine Voraussetzungen zur Möglichkeit des Personseins eingehend zu erarbeiten. Natürlich werden auch umgekehrt Arbeiten von anderer Seite zur Erfassung jener allgemeinen Voraussetzungen für die Religionsforschung eine unentbehrliche Hilfe sein. Das Stichwort „Religionspsychologie“ mag hier als Andeutung genügen. Die Religionsforschung wird hier allerdings nicht nur zustimmend aufzunehmen und sich gegebenenfalls auch zur Korrektur eigener Ergebnisse entschließen zu haben. Sie ist vielmehr auf Grund ihrer Erkenntnisse auch zur Kritik an fremden Beiträgen verpflichtet, die durchaus substantielle Voraussetzungen der gebenden Disziplinen betreffen mag.

Die direkte Bedeutung einer religionsgeschichtlichen Anthropologie auch für die Gegenwart liegt damit auf der Hand. Im Sinne der vorausgegangenen Bemerkungen wird sie für die Gegenwart gültige personale Strukturen aufdecken und ihre Konkretisierung nach Prinzipien eines Bereiches feststellen, welcher auch das einschließt, was man im herkömmlichen Sinne unter Religion versteht. Selbst ohne gründliche Analyse kann man innerhalb der gegenwärtigen säkularen Erscheinungen, welche zumeist als ausgewachsene oder werdende Ideologien hervortreten, eine nicht geringe Zahl von Strukturen entdecken, welche solchen klassischer Religionsbereiche mindestens nahestehen. Von der Sache her, aber auch aus heuristischen Gründen, um nämlich ein angemessen weites Arbeitsfeld für die religionsgeschichtliche Forschung zu erschließen, ist es angebracht, den Bedeutungsbereich des Begriffes Religion weit zu fassen. Das Verständnis, daß Religion es mit dem Verhältnis des Menschen zu umgreifender Macht, welche zumeist personhaft vorgestellt werde, zu tun habe, ist auszuweiten in der Richtung,

9) Vgl. Anm. 4.

daß es um Unterwerfung des Menschen unter umgreifende Norm gehe, wovon angemessene Verhaltensweisen und Hoffnungen abgeleitet werden.

Diese Bemerkung ändert jedoch nichts an der grundlegenden Prämisse für die Religionsforschung, daß die detaillierte Definition ihres Gegenstandes selbstverständlich nicht am Anfang ihrer Bemühungen stehen kann, sondern vielmehr ihr Ziel ist, an welches nur asymptotische Annäherung möglich sein dürfte, weil eine grundsätzliche qualitative Erreichbarkeitsgrenze¹⁰⁾ in jedem Falle bestehen bleibt. Im Moment geht es ja auch gerade nicht um Einengung, sondern um die Forderung einer Weite, welche dem zunächst begrenzten Anlaß zu einer religionsgeschichtlichen Anthropologie die angemessene Entfaltungsmöglichkeit gewährt. Es bliebe noch zu ergänzen, daß die Religionsgeschichte als Disziplin in ihrer Freiheit von kerygmatischen bzw. praktisch-theologischen Erwägungen hier eine besonders offene Ausgangsposition hat, welche als Arbeitsprinzip und Zweckbestimmung nichts als reine Objektivität ohne Bindung an vorgegebene, normative Tradition kennt, dieses allerdings in den Grenzen der subjektiven Möglichkeiten. Ein Urteil über den Wert theologischer Arbeiten soll hiermit nicht ausgesprochen sein.¹¹⁾

Die bunte Palette gegenwärtiger Probleme, welche eine religionsgeschichtliche Anthropologie betreffen, kann hier nicht in ihrem vollen Umfange ausgebreitet werden. Je nach dem wie umfassend man das anthropologische Thema aufzunehmen gedenkt, wird man über den Bereich ideologischen Materiales im engsten Sinne hinausgreifen müssen. Wenn Religion die Konkretisierung anthropologischer Grund-

10) Diese Grenze der vollen Erreichbarkeit der religionsgeschichtlichen Gegebenheiten hat ihren Grund letzten Endes in der Nichtidentität des forschenden und des erforschten Subjektes. Die Distanz zwischen beiden kann zwar quantitativ verschieden groß sein, an ihrer qualitativen Grundsätzlichkeit jedoch ändert sich nichts. Im übrigen vgl. hierzu demnächst meine Schrift: *Vergehen und Bleiben, religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zum Personsverständnis in Ägypten und im Alten Testament...*, Cp. 1, III B 3: „Vermittlung zur Überwindung der Distanz zwischen den Subjekten“.

11) Die Ortsbestimmung im Raum der Wissenschaften vorzunehmen ist vor allem Aufgabe der Theologie selbst. Die Reflexion über das Selbstverständnis ist Teil ihrer eigenen wissenschaftlichen Arbeit. Auf völlig anderer Ebene liegt hingegen die Tatsache, daß die religionsgeschichtliche Disziplin dem Bereich der Theologie Material zum Zwecke der Forschung zu entnehmen berechtigt ist.

gegebenheiten ist, dann wird man ihr nicht nur innerhalb fragmentarischer oder abgerundeter Ideologien, sondern auch inmitten jener Konflikte begegnen, in welchen Verständnis und Behauptung des Personseins schlechthin ausgetragen werden. In diesem Sinne tritt vor allem die Frage der Masse und ihrer Eigengesetzlichkeit hervor, weiter die Frage nach den kybernetischen Möglichkeiten in der Hand der Vertreter der Macht, welche das Recht auf eine nicht angetastete persönliche Sphäre in Frage zu stellen drohen, oder die Frage nach der Willensfreiheit angesichts der Reduzierbarkeit geistiger Vorgänge auf physiologisch-chemische Prozesse und schließlich das Verständnis der Person im Lichte der Manipulierbarkeit wesensbestimmender physischer bzw. genetischer Gegebenheiten. Diese Themen lenken den Blick auch in die Zukunft. Nach den vorausgegangenen Andeutungen liegt eine solche Offenheit durchaus in der inneren Konsequenz einer religionsgeschichtlichen Anthropologie, welche brauchbare Ergebnisse zeitigen will.

Mit diesen Erwägungen soll keineswegs einer ahistorischen Religionsforschung das Wort geredet sein. Die Bezeichnung religionsgeschichtliche Anthropologie ist mit Bedacht gewählt. Religion wird zunächst in geschichtlich konkreten Gegebenheiten greifbar und auch aufgefundene allgemein gültige Prinzipien dürfen nicht zur Ausklammerung dieser Tatsache führen. Die Betonung der anthropologischen Grundgegebenheiten darf also nicht als ein Bekenntnis zu ungeschichtlicher archetypischer Interpretation mißverstanden werden. Vielmehr ist hier an Portmanns einschränkende Äußerung gegenüber der archetypischen Konzeption zu denken.¹²⁾ Mit ihr stimmt die eigene Position, daß im einzelnen grundsätzlich vorgegebene Möglichkeiten erst noch der Konkretisierung harren, überein. Andererseits soll jedoch nicht die Tatsache mißachtet sein, daß spezielle oder auch nur allgemeine Vorstellungen gar nicht oder kaum verändert zu beharren vermögen. Auf ganze gesehen ist ein bis in die Gegenwart andauernder Prozeß zu erkennen, welcher teils durch kleine, Mikromutationen zu vergleichende Wandlungen, teils aber auch durch abrupte, einschneidende Änderungen gekennzeichnet ist. Auf keinen Fall aber wird er die Konstruktion der Jasperschen Achsenzeit¹³⁾ bestätigen, weil er nicht einmal, sondern

12) „Das Problem der Urbilder in biologischer Sicht“, in: *Biologie und Geist* Freiburg 1956, S. 110-122.

13) K. Jaspers, *Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte*, Frankfurt 1955, zur Charakteristik S. 14 ff.

immer wieder über die Gesamtzeit seines Andauerns hinweg entscheidende Impulse erhält. Aus diesen können nicht im Jasperschen Sinne einsam überragende und einzigartig wirksame eines begrenzten Zeitraumes ausgesondert werden.

Zum vierten ist für den Anlaß einer religionsgeschichtlichen Anthropologie die bedauerliche Tatsache zu nennen, daß es an der Bereitstellung des einschlägigen Materiales fehlt. Dieser Mangel wirkt sich nicht nur auf spezielle anthropologische Fragen, sondern auch auf die Religionsforschung im allgemeinen aus. Solange keine Materialsammlung wenigstens im allereinfachsten Sinne vorliegt, muß die Auswertung der anthropologischen Belege auf Zufallsfunden beruhen. Weithin herrscht hier eine traurige Genügsamkeit, welche jene Tatsache kaum zu beunruhigen vermag. Es wird in Untersuchungen aufgenommen, was gerade gefunden wird. Es mögen von 100 existierenden Belegen 10, 20, 50 oder gar 80 sein. Unter den nicht berücksichtigten finden sich aber vielleicht gerade die 5 entscheidenden, welche eine scharfsinnige Konstruktion gegenstandslos machen. Das soll nicht heißen, daß ich an das Wunder einer Materialbereitstellung glaube, welches jede Lücke ausschließt. Ich denke lediglich daran, die Lückenhaftigkeit auf das Minimum zu reduzieren, welches mit modernen Mitteln erreichbar ist. Dem Eklektizismus muß mit allen Mitteln begegnet werden, denn er ist keine geeignete Voraussetzung für wissenschaftliches Arbeiten. Natürlich fehlt es auch an einer methodischen Grundlegung für die Erschließung des Materiales und an Strukturkriterien zur Erfassung desselben in übersichtlichen Gruppen.

2. Zur methodischen Grundlegung

Im weiteren Sinne ist hier zunächst folgendes zu bemerken.

1. Oben wurde bereits auf die geschichtliche Fundierung der hier ins Auge gefaßten Anthropologie hingewiesen. Diese steht im Zusammenhang mit der geschichtlichen Fundierung der Religionsforschung überhaupt. Sie folgt daraus, daß Religion im Konkreten in Erscheinung tritt. Aus diesem Grunde sind erhebliche Bedenken gegen J. Wach anzumelden. Seine Ausführungen über Rolle, Wesen und Methode der religionsgeschichtlichen Arbeit sind unzulänglich. An anderer Stelle soll die Kritik an Wach in dieser Frage und in anderen Fragen ausführlich

aufgenommen werden.¹⁴⁾ Aber auch abgesehen von Wach wird keine sachgemäße methodische Grundlegung der religionsgeschichtlichen Forschung geboten. Es ist weitverbreitete Meinung, daß die Religionsgeschichte eine Disziplin sei, welche den allgemeinen Prinzipien der Geschichtsforschung überhaupt folge. Das ist schon deswegen eine unmögliche Vorstellung, weil auch der Historiker verschiedene Quellenarten und diesen angemessene Verfahren zu unterscheiden hat. Vollends ist jene Auffassung aber unhaltbar im Hinblick auf die besondere Beschaffenheit des Materiales der Religionsforschung. Der Sonderfall der religionsgeschichtlichen Anthropologie ist hierfür eine eindeutige Bestätigung. Indessen ist dies nicht der Ort, eine angemessene Methode der religionsgeschichtlichen Forschung zu entfalten. Den Entwurf, den ich erarbeitet habe, werde ich demnächst in einer Monographie vorlegen.¹⁵⁾ Sowohl für die Religionsforschung im allgemeinen als auch für den Sonderfall einer religionsgeschichtlichen Anthropologie ist die Grundlegung einer allgemeinen religionsgeschichtlichen Methode unabdingbare Voraussetzung, wenn nicht ein Dschungel von Linien glücklich-unglücklichen Bemühens zustande kommen soll.

2. Es ist von erheblicher Bedeutung, daß der anthropologische Gesichtspunkt in mehrfacher Weise eine durchgehende Bezugsebene bietet. Dies gilt einmal für die verschiedenen Religionsbereiche. Sie öffnen sich von jener Ebene her leichter der vergleichenden Betrachtung, welche auf Unterschiede und Entsprechungen gerichtet ist. Dies gilt weiter im Hinblick auf die Distanz zwischen vergangenem Religionsverständnis und zugehörigem Subjekt im Verhältnis zum gegenwärtigen forschenden Subjekt und natürlich auch im Verhältnis zu den Problemen der gegenwärtigen Zeit, sofern sie in einen umfassenden religionsgeschichtlichen Vergleich einbezogen werden sollen. Dies gilt schließlich im Hinblick auf die fremden Disziplinen, auf deren Mitarbeit es für eine religionsgeschichtliche Anthropologie ankommt. Unter dem Gesichtspunkt anthropologischer Fragen besteht hier im Grunde genommen ein Verhältnis gegenseitigen Gebens und Nehmens. Wenn diese Disziplinen das Verständnis des Menschen konsequent erörtern, müssen sie sich der Religionsforschung ebenso zwangsläufig zuwenden, wie diese auf jene angewiesen ist. Die durchgehende anthropologische

14) Vgl. vorläufig demnächst meine Schrift, *Vergehen und Bleiben...*, Cp. I III. A.

15) *Vergehen und Bleiben*, Cp. I III. B: „Grundlegung der Methode“.

Bezugsebene wird die Begegnung der ungleichen Partner erheblich erleichtern.

3. Es ist davon auszugehen, daß die Zusammenarbeit als steter lebendiger Austausch innerhalb einer Forschungsgruppe erfolgt. Die bisherigen Erfahrungen anlässlich der regelmäßigen Zusammenkünfte in einem solchen Rahmen sind ermutigend. Für die Publikation der Untersuchungen, welche aus der Arbeit dieser Gruppe hervorgehen, ist ein angemessener Rahmen vorgesehen.¹⁶⁾ Dabei sind die verschiedenen Fachvertreter nicht die Lieferanten von Ideen, welche einer religionsgeschichtlichen Aufbereitung unterzogen werden. Vielmehr haben sie ihre eigenen Publikationsbeiträge zu leisten, welche zusammen mit den rein religionsgeschichtlichen als umfassende Abhandlungen aus der breiten Grundlage der Materialbereitstellung herauswachsen, zum Teil dieser aber auch vorausseilen können.¹⁷⁾ Dies ist insofern sogar erforderlich, als die Richtlinien der Materialsammlung nicht isoliert vom jeweiligen umgreifenden Seinszusammenhang¹⁸⁾ gewonnen werden können, welchem die einzelnen Belege angehören. Der Zugang zum Verständnis dieses Seinszusammenhanges muß deshalb gegebenenfalls zunächst in geeigneter Weise erschlossen werden.

Einerseits soll also gewährleistet sein, daß die verschiedenen Fachbeiträge sachgemäß, in Übereinstimmung mit den Prinzipien der jeweiligen Disziplin geleistet werden. Andererseits ist aber die durchgehende Ausrichtung auf die religionsgeschichtliche Anthropologie als umgreifendes Thema dadurch gesichert, daß im lebendigen Austausch

16) Es handelt sich um eine anthropologisch-religionsgeschichtliche Forschungsreihe. Innerhalb dieser gehört die anthropologische Materialsammlung in eine 1. Abteilung, welche Quellen und Kommentar aufnehmen soll. Eine 2. Abteilung wird die Fülle der anthropologischen Fragen in den einzelnen Religionsbereichen auszubreiten haben. Schließlich dient eine 3. Abteilung der umfassenden Erörterung über die Grenzen jener einzelnen Bereiche hinweg. Hier haben grundsätzliche Fragen nach dem Verhältnis von Mensch und Religion, aber auch Fragen nach dem Wesen des Zusammenhanges zwischen der eigentlichen Disziplin der Religionsforschung und lediglich unter besonderem Gesichtspunkt benachbartem Fachbereich sowie Fragen nach allgemeinen Prinzipien der Forschungsarbeit ihren Platz.

17) Auch aus diesem Grunde wird die Bezeichnung „team“ vermieden. Hiermit verbinden sich häufig wenig erfreuliche Nebenklänge. Zudem trifft dieser Ausdruck vor allem auf naturwissenschaftliche Bereiche zu, in welchen vom Gegenstand her völlig andere Methoden der Zusammenarbeit geboten sind als auf geisteswissenschaftlichem Gebiet. Grenzfälle, wie auch beim vorliegenden Thema, können selbstverständlich nicht ausgeschlossen werden.

18) Vgl. Anm. 4.

regelmäßiger Zusammenkünfte alle Themen im notwendigen Maße sachliche, gründliche Klärung erfahren. Diese wird so umfassend sein, wie zahlreich die einschlägigen fremden Disziplinen vertreten sind. Jedenfalls verhilft diese Methode der Zusammenarbeit zu außerordentlich eingehender Berücksichtigung von Fragen, Problemen und Ergebnissen zu einem gemeinsamen Thema über Grenzen solcher Bereiche hinweg, die zu fruchtbarer Auswertung alle zu beherrschen einem einzelnen nicht möglich ist. Auf diese Weise wird auch der neueste Stand der Forschung in den betreffenden Disziplinen zur Geltung kommen.

4. Die grundlegende Materialbereitstellung muß in einer Form erfolgen, welche an sie anknüpfende Untersuchungen in jeder Richtung offen läßt. Interpretierende systematische Gesichtspunkte sind unter allen Umständen zu vermeiden. Da jedoch der Bezug auf den geschichtlich konkreten Zusammenhang gewahrt werden soll, muß ein Kommentar hinzugefügt werden. Er kann sehr knapp sein und braucht nur eine grundsätzliche Ortsbestimmung im Gesamtbild des Konkreten eines Religionsbereichs zu bieten. Der ganzen Anlage nach drängt dieses Unternehmen selbstverständlich auf umfassende Darstellungen hin. Als größeres Ziel ist eine Anthropologie der einzelnen Religionsbereiche vorgesehen. Diese Darstellungen sollen innerhalb des erwähnten Rahmens einer zweiten Abteilung angehören, welche im wesentlichen Zusammenhänge eines einzelnen Religionsbereiches herauszustellen hat. Eine allgemeine vergleichende Anthropologie soll sich anschließen. Sie gehört zu einer dritten Abteilung, welche die Linien durch eine Vielzahl von Religionsbereichen hindurch auszeichnet und auch grundsätzliche Fragen des Verhältnisses zwischen Religionsverständnis und wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen sowie allgemeinen Fragen menschlicher Existenz aufnimmt.

Im engeren Sinne ist die Frage nach der unmittelbaren Erfassung des Materiales zu bedenken.

1. Neben die chronologische und territoriale Gliederung tritt die selbstverständliche Gruppierung nach beteiligten Disziplinen. Zu nennen ist vor allem eine medizinisch-anthropologische einschließlich einer tiefenpsychologischen, eine ethnologische, eine archäologische, eine kunstgeschichtliche und eine literarisch-philologische Gruppe.

2. Im Bereich der Bildenden Kunst ist ebenso selbstverständlich in Plastik, Relief und Malerei aufzuteilen. Zu berücksichtigen wäre ferner der Verwendungsbereich des jeweiligen Gegenstandes. Sinngemäß ist

das literarische Material nach Gattungen zu ordnen. Die Frage nach dem Sitz im Leben ist wiederum einzubeziehen.

3. Zum Zwecke der Übersichtlichkeit muß noch weiter untergliedert werden. Es kommt eine heuristische Einteilung in Frage, welche zwar auf nachfolgende Interpretationen und umfassende Darstellungen hindrängt, aber in ihrem vorläufigen, eben heuristischen Charakter doch alle Möglichkeiten offen läßt. Gemeint sind „Motivgruppen“, „Grundmodelle“ und „Relationsbereiche“.

Motivgruppen, wie z.B. Geburt, Jenseitsvorstellungen, Jagd usw., fassen einander nahestehende Einzelmotive zusammen. Sie erhalten durch verschiedene Modelle, welche Gemeinsamkeiten aufweisen können, konkrete Gestalt. Es gilt also weiterhin, diese Modelle zu sinnvollen Gruppen zusammenzufassen.

Die Grundmodelle sollen die entscheidenden Merkmale der Einzelbelege, also der konkreten individuellen Modelle festhalten, welche zu einer Gruppe vereint werden können. Im Rahmen der bildenden Kunst ist hier u.U. eine schematische Zeichnung möglich gleichsam als „anschauliche Beschreibung“ der Gestaltprinzipien einer Gruppe. Andernfalls wird zur Klassifizierung ein konkretes Modell herauszugreifen sein, welches in maximaler Weise die Leitmotiv einer Gruppe repräsentiert. Darüber hinaus wird von den individuellen Modellen keines abzubilden sein, es werden höchstens solche darzustellen sein, deren Besonderheit, trotz grundsätzlicher Übereinstimmung mit den Leitmotiven, stärker hervortritt. Abgesehen davon genügt das Zitat der bereits vorliegenden Publikation.

Dem entspricht in den literarischen Quellen die jeweilige Struktur, nach welcher ein anthropologisches Thema gestaltet wird. Es kann sich hierbei um eine gesamte Gattungseinheit, aber auch um den Ausschnitt aus einer solchen handeln.

Die Relationsbereiche¹⁹⁾ führen stärker ins Detail als die Grundmodelle. Aber sie haben gleichzeitig den Vorteil, ein so allgemeines Ord-

19) Eine religionsgeschichtliche Gegebenheit steht im Zusammenhang mit anderen Gegebenheiten. Nur in dieser Verflochtenheit kann sie überhaupt wahrgenommen werden. Deshalb hat als kleinste religionsgeschichtliche Einheit die Relation, die Beziehung zwischen mindestens zwei Gegebenheiten, zu gelten. Es ist aus heuristischen Gründen normalerweise nicht ratsam, den Relationen einer Gegebenheit so nachzugehen, wie man zufällig auf sie stößt. Vielmehr ist es sinnvoll, ihrer zunächst unübersichtlichen Mannigfaltigkeit dadurch zu begegnen, daß sie zu einzelnen Gruppen bzw. Bereichen zusammengefaßt werden.

nungsprinzip zu sein, daß sie auf jeden Religionsbereich übertragen werden können. Ein erster Relationsbereich ist der Kompositionszusammenhang, also der allgemeine Zusammenhang, welcher aus einer Gruppe gleichartiger oder verschiedener, jedenfalls aber thematisch verbundener Gegebenheiten, eines bestimmten räumlichen Rahmens, etwa dem einer Bildebene, oder dem umgreifenden literarischen Rahmen bestehen kann.

Ein zweiter Relationsbereich erfaßt das Verhältnis zu einem anderen Partner oder einer anderen Gemeinschaft. Ein dritter Relationsbereich betrifft *actio* und *passio*, die aktive oder passive Rolle in einem Geschehen, ein vierter die Bindung an Ort und Zeit und ein fünfter physische Gegebenheiten.

4. Die Materialfülle nötigt zu kybernetischen Methoden. Vom methodischen Aufbau von der Relation her, welche dem Zweierprinzip folgt, ist hierfür vorgesorgt. Endgültige Klärung der technische Fragen steht noch aus.

5. Angesichts unvermeidlicher Ergänzungen und Korrekturen auf Grund des verbesserten Erkenntnisstandes ist zu erwägen, ob das Material nicht besser im Loseblattverfahren vorzulegen ist. Dem stehen jedoch Bedenken aus der Sicht des Verlegers gegenüber.

3. *Beispiele zur Ausführung und Auswertung.*

Im folgenden möchte ich einige Hinweise geben, welche Erfassung und religionsgeschichtliche Anwendung des anthropologischen Materials illustrieren. Besonderen Aufschluß über die personhafte Existenz geben die menschlichen Grenzsituationen. Die Frage nach Vernichtung, Bleiben oder Sonderstellung menschlicher Wesen rückt entscheidende Elemente des Personseins ins Licht. Aus diesem Bereich sei ein Beispiel für die bildende Kunst und ein Beispiel für das literarische Material ausgewählt.

Innerhalb der bildenden Kunst habe ich den Zwerg als menschliches Wesen im Grenzbereich in einer Untersuchung mit dem Titel „Der Zwerg in der ägyptischen Gemeinschaft, Studien zur ägyptischen Anthropologie“²⁰⁾ herausgegriffen. Sie ist in kürzester Form und natürlich in vielem verbesserungsbedürftig das, was ich mit einer religionsgeschichtlichen Anthropologie meine. Ich bin ausgegangen von der Erörterung der medizinisch-anthropologischen Gruppen und habe, in

²⁰⁾ *Chronique d'Egypte* 40, Brüssel 1965.

chronologischer und territorialer Ordnung, die Bestimmung der Grundmodelle der Darstellungen angeschlossen und für das Alte Reich in einer Tabelle zusammengestellt. Einbezogen habe ich die Bestimmung der Arm-Rumpf- und Bein-Rumpf-Quotienten, welche sich für die nachfolgende Interpretation als außerordentlich fruchtbar erwiesen. Sie sollten auch bei einer religionsgeschichtlich-anthropologischen Materialsammlung neben anderen Maßangaben berücksichtigt werden.

Dieses Material ist für eine Untersuchung deswegen von besonderem Wert, weil es auch in einem Bereich, welcher gerade für die Bewahrung des Überkommenen bekannt ist, verschiedentlich feine Schwankungen der anthropologischen Gestalt in Übereinstimmung mit Wandlungen des Welt- und Selbstverständnisses offenbar macht. Von Belang ist aber auch, daß zu diesen Belegen fast ganz das direkte literarische Zeugnis fehlt.

Bereits die medizinisch-anatomische Bestimmung der genannten Quotienten trägt in bemerkenswertem Maße zum Verständnis des Materiales bei. Das Menschenbild wird bunter. Es füllt sich mit Leben und tritt heraus aus der grobmaschigen Sicht religionsgeschichtlicher Betrachtung, welche geneigt ist, sich grundlegenden Tendenzen, zeitlich weiten Räumen und größeren menschlichen Verbänden zuzuwenden. Es werden geradezu seismographische Schwankungen sichtbar, welche hinleiten zu den kleinsten, normalerweise nicht wahrgenommenen, aus großflächiger Sicht anonymen Ursachen der Wandlungen. Diese werden ihrerseits allerdings unter allgemeinem religionsgeschichtlichem Gesichtspunkt zumeist nur ein Ausmaß haben, welches Mikromutationen zu vergleichen ist.

Die größere Zahl der Belege fällt in die 5. und 6. Dyn. des Alten Reiches mit zusammen 55 Exemplaren, die allerdings teilweise zu Gruppen kombiniert sind. Dabei fällt zunächst auf, daß die 6. Dyn. den stehenden Typ bevorzugt. Sofern hiermit die Vergrößerung des Bein-Rumpf-Quotienten verbunden ist, wird die Tendenz sichtbar, sich dem Normalwüchsigen als gültiger Norm zuzuwenden, wobei das bisherige, weite Verständnis für die besondere Qualifikation der Zwerghaftigkeit zugleich mindestens eingeengt werden dürfte.

Bemerkenswert ist in diesem Zusammenhange das Beispiel des snb, eines Zwerges, der zu hohen Staatsämtern aufstieg und in Gise sogar

eine eigene Mastabe besaß.²¹⁾ Er gehört ebenfalls der 6. Dyn. an. Ist sein Aufstieg Ausdruck für die Bevorzugung der Gegebenheiten des Normalwüchsigen in dieser Zeit, welche den Zwerg nicht nur in der abbildlichen Darstellung, sondern auch beruflich anders einzuordnen bemüht ist? Die Frage muß einstweilen offen bleiben. Gewiß ist jedenfalls, daß eine Tendenz, wie sie angedeutet wurde, auch wenn sie allgemein zum Durchbruch gelangt, eingebettet ist in abweichende individuelle Sorgen und Bemühungen. Diese werden jeweils auf ihre Weise die neue Vorstellung mit entsprechenden Nuancen versehen. Im Falle des snb wird durch Vergrößerung der genannten Quotienten Angleichung an die allgemeine Tendenz der Zeit erreicht.²²⁾ Offenbar ist es aber auch jetzt noch als etwas Besonderes empfunden worden, wenn ein Zwerg in so hohe Ämter aufrückte. Darum wird zwar mit Zurückhaltung, aber immerhin noch deutlich genug durch Kopfform²³⁾ und trotz allem noch reduzierte Quotienten in diesem Falle Zwerghaftigkeit zum Ausdruck gebracht. Allgemeine Tendenz, persönlicher Stolz und nachwirkende Konvention scheinen sich also zu mischen.²⁴⁾

Diese Tendenz wirkt sich auch noch in den Darstellungen der Krüppelzwerge des Mittleren Reiches in Beni Hasan aus²⁵⁾, wo der Bein-Rumpf-Quotient ebenfalls auffallend groß ist. Die nicht gerade ästhetischen Ursachen des pathologischen Zwergwuchses werden hier überdeutlich herausgestellt. Eine gewichtige Funktionsrelation fehlt. Die kraftvolle Beschreibung der höchst bedeutsamen und im Verhältnis zum Normalwüchsigen qualitativ vollwertigen Funktionsausübung im Rahmen personaler Existenz, wie sie einstmals geläufig war, fehlt in diesen Darstellungen. Jedoch zeugen die tanzenden Pygmäen von Lischt²⁶⁾ davon, daß trotz allem die alte Tradition nicht gänzlich verlorengegangen ist. Inschriftliche Zeugnisse der Spätzeit und die Fülle der Patäken stellen dies sogar für die Länge der ägyptischen Religionsgeschichte sicher. Es ist noch zu ergänzen, daß der stehende, wohl chondrodys-

21) H. Junker, *Giza V* (= Akademie der Wiss. in Wien, philos.-histor. Kl., Denkschriften, Bd. 71, 2. Abt.), Wien 1941.

22) *Giza V*, Abb. 22: Beinquotient = 1, beim Normalwüchsigen ca. 1,25, beim chondrodystrophen Zwerg kleiner als 1.

23) *Giza V*, Abb. 15 im Vergleich mit Abb. 18.

24) Vgl. *Chronique d'Égypte* 40, S. 287.

25) P. E. Newberry, *Beni Hasan II*, London 1893, Taf. 16 u. 32.

26) A. Lansing, *Bulletin of the Metropolitan Museum of Arts*, Suppl. to November 1934, Section II, S. 30-36, Fo.S.32.

trophe Zwergentyp, mit deutlicher Ausprägung der charakteristischen Merkmale sich als Hieroglyphentyp durchsetzt. Die Wurzeln für diese Gestaltform dürften bis in die frühgeschichtliche Zeit hinaufreichen.

Das Schwanken zwischen zwergischer Gestaltung in sitzender Haltung und zwischen einem Modell, welches sich dem stehenden oder dem Normalwüchsigen nähert, ist ein Beleg für jene soeben angedeuteten feinen Abweichungen in der Tiefe der großen religionsgeschichtlichen Linien des allgemeinen Wandels. Hier hat die religionsgeschichtliche Anthropologie die besondere Aufgabe, solche Linien in die Tiefe hinein zu verfolgen. Sie wird dadurch das, was als Religion im Bereiche des Konkreten sichtbar wird, eingehender und sachlich richtiger zu interpretieren helfen, als es im allgemeinen nach der weithin üblichen großflächigen, großzügigen und darum auch ungenauen Betrachtungsweise zu geschehen pflegt. Sie trägt vor allem dazu bei, daß der Zusammenhang zwischen Religion und menschlicher, auch individueller, Existenz, daß Religion als eine gelebte Gegebenheit sichtbar wird. Daß die hier erörterten Gegebenheiten in den Bereich des Religionsverständnisses gehören, steht ja wohl außer Zweifel. Die Aufteilung in „Arbeitswelt“ und „religiösen Bereich“ ist auf der betrachteten frühen Stufe der Menschheitsgeschichte jedenfalls mit Sicherheit nicht haltbar. ²⁷⁾

Möglicherweise steht die Tendenz der Bevorzugung der Gestalt des Normalwüchsigen im Zusammenhange mit jener umgreifenden Wandlung, welche im Neuen Reich den einzelnen deutlich sichtbar aus der Anonymität hervortreten und der Gottheit gegenüber zu einem selbständigen Partner neben dem König und dem Priester werden läßt. ²⁸⁾ Das gleichzeitig gültige Leistungsprinzip dürfte der Anlaß dafür gewesen sein, daß Zwergendarstellungen fast ganz fehlen. Die vor allem bekannten aus El Kab zur Amarnazeit ²⁹⁾ stellen den Unterschied zu den Normalwüchsigen mit allen gegebenen Mitteln überdeutlich heraus. Sie wollen hiermit ein Ausdrucksmittel spöttischer Ablehnung des Ketzers schaffen. Die Zwerggestalt repräsentiert das Ohnmächtige, Lächerliche, ja sogar zu Verachtende, eben nicht das Normgemäße, während das Normgemäße der Gestalt nach vor allem der Normalwüchsige sichtbar werden läßt. ³⁰⁾

27) Vgl. hierzu demnächst in der Schrift *Vergehen und Bleiben* Cp. 2, I A 4: „Gesichtspunkte gegenwärtiger Interpretation“.

28) Vgl. Verf. in *Wege zum Menschen* 1968, S. 342 f. (mit Literaturhinweisen).

29) N. de G. Davies, *The Rock Tombs of El Amarna*, Part II London 1905.

30) *Chronique d'Egypte* 40, S. 295.

Gegenläufig zu dieser ausschließenden Bevorzugung des Normalwüchsigen gewinnt der Anspruch jedes einzelnen auf Partnerschaft gegenüber der Gottheit an Kraft. Er findet wortgewandte Anwälte, die ihm überzeugenden Ausdruck verleihen wie z.B. Amenemope in seiner berühmten Stelle über die Unterordnung alles menschlichen Wollens und aller menschlichen physischen Beschaffenheit unter die autonome Entscheidung der Gottheit, in welchem Zusammenhange den Zwerg eigens zu nennen er sich offenbar genötigt sah.³¹⁾ Die Polemik gegen die Auswüchse des Leistungsprinzips ist offensichtlich.

Im Blick auf die Grundlegung einer religionsgeschichtlichen Anthropologie knüpft das soeben Ausgeführte an die Bestimmung von Grundmodellen, an medizinisch-anthropologische Feststellungen und den Relationsbereich des Physischen an. Dabei wurde gelegentlich die Grenze zum Relationsbereich des Partnerverhältnisses überschritten. Noch tiefer führt jedoch der Relationsbereich von *actio* und *passio* in das Verständnis des Wesens des Zwerges hinein. Es ginge hier um die Funktionsqualifikation, welche vor allem über die krisen-überwindende Rolle des Humors die Wurzeln des Religionsverständnisses berührt. Das noch auszubreiten würde hier jedoch zu weit führen. Statt dessen sei ein flüchtiger Blick auf das literarische Material geworfen.

Ich beziehe mich hier auf Untersuchungen zum Personverständnis im Rahmen ägyptischer Jenseitstexte des Neuen Reiches.³²⁾ Das bereits erwähnte, soeben abgeschlossene Manuskript hat über diese Frage hinaus die methodische Grundlegung des Vergleiches zum Ziel und bezieht zu dem Zweck auch alttestamentliches Material ein. Damit ist neben der ersten Untersuchungsphase, nämlich der Untersuchung innerhalb eines einzelnen Religionsbereiches, auch die zweite Phase aufgenommen. Für beide Fälle sollte das Material bereits angemessen erschlossen sein. Da dieses nicht der Fall war, mußten die Ausführungen auch hierauf ausgedehnt werden. Zwar ist das literarische Material auf ganze gesehen auskunftsfreudiger als die Belege der bildenden Kunst. Jedoch ist es im Hinblick auf die Bestimmung griffiger Modelle sperriger. Die dringlichste Vorarbeit ist deshalb die Gattungsanalyse.

31) H. O. Lange, *Das Weisheitsbuch des Amenemope*, Kopenhagen 1925, S. 119 f. (Text) u. 121 (Übers.)

32) *Vergehen und Bleiben*, Cp. 2, III. Die vorliegenden Ausführungen beziehen sich vor allem auf das Amduat. Veröff.: E. Hornung, *Das Amduat, die Schrift des verborgenen Raumes*, Teil 1-3, Wiesbaden 1963-1967.

Gerade sie aber fehlt weithin. Oft genug ist noch nicht einmal eine geeignete Begriffsbildung vorhanden.

Andererseits zeigt sich gerade beim betrachteten Text, daß bereits die Strukturanalyse der bestimmten Gattungen das Material weitgehend erschließt für die Frage des Personverständnisses. Das liegt im vorliegenden Falle zweifelsohne daran, daß der personale Aussagegehalt besonders intensiv ist. Aber auch für Texte, bei denen es sich nicht so verhält, kann die modellhafte Erfassung des anthropologischen Gehaltes nicht von der Gattungsanalyse absehen. Nur so kann die zur nachfolgenden Interpretation notwendige Erfassung der Relationsbereiche, voran des „Kompositionszusammenhanges“, textgemäß sein.

Im wesentlichen lassen sich vier Grundmodelle personhafter oder diesem Status angenäherter Wesen herausarbeiten. Je zwei gehören dem geordneten und dem chaotischen Bereich an. Das erste Grundmodell repräsentiert der Sonnengott Re und der mit ihm verbundene selige Verstorbene. Die Struktur ist hier gekennzeichnet durch die prozessuale Verwirklichung der grundsätzlichen Möglichkeit zum Personsein. Außerordentlich eindrucksvoll für die normgemäße Existenz ist die Prozession des Sonnengottes am Taghimmel und durch die Unterwelt, an welcher normgemäße Wesen in der Gestalt des b^3 teilnehmen. Die positiven Höhepunkte sind die Vereinigung mit dem h^3t , dem Leichnam, in der Unterwelt und die Wiedergeburt in der 12. Stunde am Morgen als Voraussetzung für die diesseitige Existenz im Tageslicht. Für die Etappen dieses Prozesses sind je besondere Einzelmodelle normativ. Von Belang für diese Struktur der Personhaftigkeit ist also auch die Einbeziehung diesseitiger Elemente des Personseins durch direkte Teilhabe am Diesseits und durch Verwirklichung ganzheitlicher diesseitiger Existenz im Augenblick der nächtlichen Vereinigung aller konstitutiven Elemente des Personseins.

Auch die einzelnen Gegebenheiten der Durchgangsphasen werden von einem umgreifenden Ganzen der Personhaftigkeit her gesehen, welches die Bedeutung personhafter Eigentlichkeit hat. Dies wird vor allem durch entsprechende pronominale Ausdrucksweise festgehalten. Hierbei ist die Selbstigkeit der Person durch ihre je besonderen, unverwechselbaren physischen Gegebenheiten gesetzt. Wenn diese alle vereint sind, ist auch die Eigentlichkeit der Person im umfassenden Sinne

verwirklicht. 33) Die Struktur personaler Existenzweise dieser Gruppe wäre in knappster Form: noch nicht volle Verwirklichung normgemäßer Personhaftigkeit (das gilt im Hinblick auf den Verstorbenen, der erstmals vom Diesseits her in die unterweltlichen Gefilde eintritt) — prozessuale volle Verwirklichung, d.h. kritische Situation und Erwartung der Erfüllung.

Das zweite Grundmodell betrifft orts- und funktionsgebundene, jenseitige normgemäße Wesen. Mit dem dritten wird Apophis als Urtyp des Feindes erfaßt, welcher vom Chaos her, mit personhaften Merkmalen versehen, den Bereich der Schöpfung mit den personhaften Repräsentanten bedroht. Zum vierten Grundmodell schließlich gehören jene feindlichen Wesen, welche als unselige Verstorbene aus dem normgemäßen Bereich ausgetilgt werden, indem ihre materiellen Voraussetzungen zu personhafter Existenz vernichtet werden.

Die Struktur des 1. Grundmodells ist diese 34) :

1. normgemäße Vorgeschichte im Diesseits
2. befindlichkeitswirksame Statusbestimmung 35) auch explizit als Jenseitsgericht dargestellt
3. umgreifende Eigentlichkeit
4. physische Voraussetzungen als Möglichkeit zur Verwirklichung voller Personhaftigkeit
5. Förderungsbedürftigkeit und förderliches Partnerverhältnis
6. trotzdem wenigstens begrenzte Aktionsfähigkeit zur Bewirkung des förderlichen Prozesses
7. erneute Förderungsbedürftigkeit.

Das Grundmodell der unseligen Verstorbenen hat folgende Struktur:

1. normwidrige Vorgeschichte
2. befindlichkeitswirksame Statusbestimmung 35) als Verurteilung, d.h.

33) Das erreicht nach dem Zeugnis des Amduat der Sonnengott in der 6. nächtlichen Stunde. Über diesen Moment der Vereinigung hinaus ist aber die Eigentlichkeit der Person niemals gänzlich aufgehoben. Über die besondere Rolle, welche der *b²* dabei spielt, werde ich mich an anderer Stelle, auch in kritischer Auseinandersetzung mit C. V. Zabkar, A study of the *ba* concept in ancient Egyptian texts, Chicago 1968, äußern; außerdem verweise ich auf meine zu erwartende Monographie *Vergehen und Bleiben*, Cp. 2 III.

34) Hierzu ausführlich in *Vergehen und Bleiben*, Cp. 2, III.

35) Ich meine hiermit die autorisierte, irreversible Bestimmung des normgemäßen oder normwidrigen Status eines Wesens. Diese Bestimmung des Status bildet eine untrennbare Einheit mit dem unmittelbar nachfolgenden, in gewissem Sinne bewirkten, normgemäßen bzw. normwidrigen Ergehen bzw. Befinden.

als irreversible Bestimmung ihrer normwidrigen Qualität

3. keine normgemäße Eigentlichkeit
4. Ausführung des Urteiles, d.h. Vernichtung materieller Voraussetzungen zur Verwirklichung der Personhaftigkeit und Verstoßen in das Chaos als einen Bereich, welcher der Normwidrigkeit angemessen ist
5. erneute Vernichtungsnotwendigkeit.

Hiervon weicht das Grundmodell für den Apophis, das klassische Vorbild des chaotischen Feindes, ab:

1. Auf Normwidrigkeit gerichteter Wille
2. Aufnahme personhafter Gegebenheiten bzw. Gegebenheiten des normgemäßen Bereiches
3. normwidrige actio mit negativem Partnerverhältnis
4. Vernichtungsstrafe als passio
5. erneutes in Erscheinung treten.

Die Glieder dieser Strukturen werden präzisiert durch die Daten, welche im Rahmen der Relationsbereiche aufzuzählen sind. Diese Angaben, welche dem literarischen Material entnommen sind, führen natürlich mit größerer Eindeutigkeit in die Tiefe des Seinszusammenhangs des jeweiligen Relationsbereiches als jene Aussagen, welche aus dem Bereich der bildenden Kunst stammen. So fällt im vorliegenden Falle z.B. vom Relationsbereich "Ort und Zeit" aus vor allem ein Licht auf jene Vorgänge, welche man pauschal und nicht selten mit falschem Klange als mythisches Kreislaufdenken klassifiziert. Von der personalen Analyse her werden statt dessen differenzierte prozessuale Strukturen aufgedeckt. In Verbindung mit den anderen Relationsbereichen werden Prinzipien der Vereinigung von diesseitigem und jenseitigem Bereich und damit zugleich grundsätzliche Strukturen der Normgemäßheit im umfassenden Sinne herausgestellt.

Die verheißungsvollen Ergebnisse, welche vom literarischen Material zu erhoffen sind, können jedoch nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, auf welche Schwierigkeiten die Materialbereitstellung hier stößt. Es ist darum empfehlenswert, mit den Belegen der bildenden Kunst zu beginnen. Zudem wird ein gut Teil der dort gewonnenen Kriterien auf die inschriftlichen Quellen übertragbar sein.

Die Sammlung des Materiales, welche für nachfolgende religions-

geschichtlich-anthropologische Untersuchungen von Bedeutung ist, habe ich zunächst für den vorderorientalischen Bereich vorgenommen. Dies geschah teils in europäischen Museen, teils, wie auch im letzten Jahr, an Ort und Stelle selbst.³⁶⁾

Vor allem im letzten Jahr habe ich mich Gruppen recht eigener Prägung aus prähistorischer syrisch-palästinensischer Zeit zugewandt. An neuen Darstellungsmitteln wurden Rollsiegel einbezogen. Aber auch die Berücksichtigung von Münzen scheint wegen des Beharrens religiöser Motive fruchtbar zu sein. Auf jeden Fall hat sich schon auf dieser Anfangsstufe die Tragfähigkeit des skizzierten Konzeptes erwiesen. Schon bald möchte ich parallel zu den laufenden Arbeiten überseeische Bereiche erfassen. Es sollen von Anfang an möglichst unterschiedliche Gestaltgruppen berücksichtigt werden, um alsbald brauchbare Einteilungsprinzipien für das heterogene Material zu gewinnen. Indessen liegt die eigentliche Schwierigkeit nicht beim Material selber, sondern bei solchen Gegebenheiten, welche im Hinblick auf dieses zwar sekundär sind, aber nichts destoweniger den Zugang versperren können.

Die angedeutete Einteilung, welche in diesem Rahmen selbstverständlich nicht bis ins Detail ausgeführt werden konnte, ist wie ein mehrfaches, fortlaufend sich verengendes Raster über das Material gelegt. Nach diesem Prinzip sollen die konkreten Gegebenheiten wie in einer biologischen Bestimmungstabelle von der allgemeinsten bis zur engsten Beschreibung erfaßt werden. Obwohl die Interpretation im engen Sinne für die Materialbereitstellung vermieden werden soll, ergeben sich so, unter vertikalem Gesichtspunkt, durch Summierung der Zuordnungsangaben bereits aufschlußreiche Beschreibungen. Sie sollen, so weit nötig, durch einen minimalen Kommentar ergänzt werden. In vielen Fällen genügen sicher Literaturhinweise.

Abgesehen von der methodischen Frage und abgesehen von der notwendigen Mitwirkung fremder Disziplinen ist im engeren Sinne die Ausgangsbasis für die Erarbeitung einer religionsgeschichtlichen Anthropologie eine ethnologische bzw. anthropologische, eine archäologische bzw. kunstgeschichtliche und eine philologische Fundierung. Das gilt zugleich auch für die Religionsforschung überhaupt. Es erü-

36) Für die Mitwirkung bei der Erhebung medizinischer Befunde habe ich meiner Frau Dr. med. Erika Rupp-Gissel zu danken.

brigt sich die Feststellung, daß eine solche Ausgangsbasis nicht in allen Religionsbereichen erworben werden kann. Sie muß aber wenigstens in einem Bereich erarbeitet sein.

Unter diesen Voraussetzungen dürfte eine religionsgeschichtliche Anthropologie das leisten können, was ihr Name verspricht. Sie wird auf ihre Weise dazu beitragen, daß die religionsgeschichtliche Forschung im Rahmen der wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen die ihr zukommende bedeutende Rolle spielen kann und daß sie ihre verantwortungsreiche Aufgabe inmitten der gegenwärtigen Zeitgeschichte wahrnimmt. Jedenfalls wird Präzisierung der Religionsforschung innerhalb einzelner Spezialbereiche auf die Qualität der religionsgeschichtlichen Arbeiten eine günstige Wirkung ausüben. Voraussetzung ist allerdings, daß weder innerhalb des eigenen Fachbereiches noch zu fremden Disziplinen hin ausschließende Grenzen aufgerichtet werden. Das wäre das Ende einer sinnvollen und verantwortbaren Religionsforschung.

PRIMITIVE SECRET SOCIETIES AS RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

BY

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Among the institutions which modern man discovered in the primitive societies that came to his attention in the last few centuries the so-called secret society has been one of the most fascinating. Even as most of the examples have disappeared or been radically transformed, articles and books continue to raise questions about the significance of this primitive behavior for an understanding of man at every level of cultural complexity. What does the widespread (but not universal) occurrence of these closed groups among primitive peoples tell us about the social and intellectual nature of man?

Two types of problems plague the literature which attempts to answer this question. First, there is some difficulty separating the secret society from closely related aspects of primitive culture. Phenomena like the men's house and puberty initiation certainly share many characteristics with the secret society but it is possible to be precise in distinguishing between them. The second area of confusion arises as the primitive secret society, identified and defined by one notion or another, is seen to be the nascent stage or *Urform* of some modern institution. The very use of the term *secret society* for these primitive associations has disposed many students, without further reflection, to group them with everything from subversive organizations and outlaw bands to mystery cults and masons. To establish a useful comparison with institutions from other levels of culture, I suggest that one turn instead to the monastic order.

In these paragraphs, therefore, I shall attempt to define the primitive secret society by distinguishing it from closely related phenomena and participatory but secondary aspects. Then I shall use the comparison with monasticism to suggest that there is a religious meaning to secret society organization that does indeed say something about the way man pictures and arranges his life.

Three geographical areas of ethnological study have exhibited numerous associations of the secret society type: North America, Africa, and Melanesia. This article is based on the Melanesian examples and the scholarship concerning them, plus general sociological and religious interpretations.

Identification of the Secret Society

In order to define the secret society, even as a religious phenomenon, it is necessary to define it in social or organizational terms. Some schools of investigation subordinate such factors, however, because they are more concerned with the history or economic functions of the societies. Many German students of Melanesian secret societies focus on "secret cult" as the primary factor.¹⁾ *Geheimkult* refers to any cultic performance which is held within a self-consciously closed group and space. Usually this means that the initiated men celebrate the cult apart from the women and children. Australia and Melanesia, including New Guinea, offer many examples of such ceremonial association.

From the perspective of social structure, however, the secret society is not quite the same thing. The secret cult is usually open to all the adult men of the village (all of whom were initiated as boys) but the secret society is characteristically selective in its membership. There are many indications of this departure from the more general secret cult pattern: Children far below the age of puberty or the age of its usual celebration may join a secret society.²⁾ Likewise, adult males can be initiated into a secret society at an age at which puberty initiation would be considered impossible. It is also possible that an adult male in the village will never become a member at all. Finally, it is occasionally recorded that old women can become members of a society, albeit with special status unlike that of the male members.³⁾

1) Hans Nevermann, *Masken und Geheimbünde in Melanesien* (Berlin: Reimer Hobbing, 1933); Will-Erich Peuckert, *Geheimkulte* (Heidelberg: C. Pfeffer Verlag, 1951); Erhard Schlesier, *Die Melanesischen Geheimkulte* (Göttingen: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1958).

2) R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1891), pp. 81, 87; Hubert Kroll, "Der Iniet," *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*, LXIX (1937), p. 208.

3) Edwin Meyer Loeb, *Tribal Initiation and Secret Societies*, University of California Publications in American Archeology and Ethnology, XXV, 3 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1929), p. 256.

Richard Thurnwald and Erhard Schlesier recognize this difference by using the term *Männerbund* for the entire adult male population as a functioning group (whether in cultic, economic, or military activity), and *Geheimbund* is reserved for the secret society.⁴⁾ It should be noted, however, that these distinctions are only sociological for Schlesier and do not affect the religious meaning of the ritual.

Robert Lowie, following the important work of Heinrich Schurtz, emphasizes the difference between kinship organizations and "associations."⁵⁾ When all the men are included in the operative group the basis of the group is to be found in the natural factors of age and sex and is thus closely related to social differentiation based on family and clan ties. An "association," by contrast, is at least technically voluntary or optional.⁶⁾ Georg Simmel makes the same point in emphasizing that the secret society is not organic, but neither is it a casual or naive grouping; instead we recognize a self-conscious separation of a group of men from the rest of their social world producing an identity independent of blood ties.⁷⁾

It should be clear then that the secret society involves relationships within its membership and attitudes toward its surrounding social world which are not the same as institutions which appear very similar. One such institution is the men's house. Schurtz made it the basic form of all men's organizations. He supposed that it began as a place for initiated but yet unmarried men to congregate, with the married men continuing to return for its camaraderie.⁸⁾ There are many forms of male association which Schurtz's theoretical evolution can produce. Sometimes nothing more than a social club without economic or

4) Richard Thurnwald, *Die Menschliche Gesellschaft in ihren ethno-soziologischen Grundlagen* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1931-35), II, pp. 279-82; Erhard Schlesier, "Männerbund und Geheimbund in Melanesien," *Von fremden Völkern und Kulturen, Hans Plischke zum 65. Geburtslage* (Düsseldorf: Droste-Verlag, 1955), pp. 237-43.

5) Robert H. Lowie, *Primitive Society* (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1920), p. 257; Lowie, *The Origin of the State* (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1927), pp. 75f; Heinrich Schurtz, *Altersklassen und Männerbünde* (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1902).

6) Camilla H. Wedgewood, "The Nature and Functions of Secret Societies," *Oceania*, L (1930), p. 135; Ralph Piddington, *An Introduction to Social Anthropology* (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1950), I, p. 206.

7) Georg Simmel, *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, translated and edited by Kurt H. Wolff (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1950), p. 361.

8) Schurtz, *Altersklassen*, pp. 203-205.

religious functions is apparent, for example the Vale of Guadalcanar or the Sukwe of the Banks Islands.⁹⁾

The secret society is not sufficiently explained as a variation of the men's house pattern. In comparison with the usual location of the men's house in the center of the village, the secret society house is in a special area in the bush or jungle. Lionel Tiger, whose theories resemble those of Schurtz but with a biological rather than psychological explanation, has emphasized once more the social effects of male gregariousness. He illustrates the bonding tendency of men at many levels of culture. He compares bonding to mere aggregation as something that must be achieved and not just ascribed to a person,¹⁰⁾ a distinction which adds a notion of motivation to the "association" structure. We must look further, however, for the criteria which will distinguish the secret society from other associations.

Therefore, while the secret societies in primitive cultures share many characteristics with other social phenomena of these cultures, they can be distinguished from them. The secret society membership is not based on age, sex, or kinship alone and thus cannot be completely understood by reference to the men's house or the men as a cult group. Its existence as a group is determined, however, by something other than a general gregariousness or casual grouping. In light of this conclusion many have turned to an analysis of the functions of secret societies in order to account for their special character.

Functions of the Secret Society

Early observers of the Melanesian secret societies were understandably impressed by their propensity to frighten and intimidate non-members. The pleasure of power which this gave the members, whether it was practiced in defense of the secret society, the village, or the whole culture, seemed to be reason enough for the existence of the societies and their closed membership.¹¹⁾

The offensive posture of the societies was experienced primarily

9) Erhard Schlesier, *Die Erscheinungsformen des Männerhauses und das Klubwesen in Mikronesien* (The Hague: Mouton, 1953); Wedgewood, "Nature and Functions," pp. 133, 139.

10) Lionel Tiger, *Men in Groups* (New York: Random House, 1969).

11) J. Pfeil, "Duk duk and other customs as forms of expression of the Melanesians' intellectual life," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, XXVIII (1898), p. 184.

by the women of the village since they were the largest group of non-members. This fact is the basis for Wilhelm Schmidt's theory of the origin and fundamental purpose of the secret society. This theory assumes that the discovery of agriculture by women led to matriarchy and that men took up the secret society as a weapon for regaining their social power. Puberty initiations which were formerly open for boys and girls were restricted to boys and made secret.¹²⁾ The secret society is understood in this theory as an even more violent and effective application of the male reaction first evident in the secret cult pattern. Much in the secret society supports this theory including the persistent myth that men stole the secrets of the societies from a woman.¹³⁾ Sexual identity and antagonism definitely seem to be involved in the secret society, and we will have to return to this aspect presently. Schmidt's theory says more than can be demonstrated historically, however, and does not explain why the societies persist when women are put back in "their place."

An even more speculative theory concerning the origin and basic purpose of secret societies is suggested by Georg Simmel. The fact that the subject for him includes all the modern organizations which go under the name leads him to concentrate on secrecy and its preservation. In order to have a secret society there must be a secret, some infant idea which is being protected from dilution or destruction. Simmel is confused when he examines the primitive secret societies, however, because he cannot find out their secret, i.e. what they are protecting.¹⁴⁾ Bishop Codrington permitted converted Christian natives to be members of some of the societies because he could not find any special belief or even a practice which he could call worship.¹⁵⁾ Schurtz thought he knew what the secret, delicate item was: the nascent social rather than familial basis for human organization.¹⁶⁾ The fact that the men had formed an organization apart from the family structure was hardly a secret, however. Membership in a primi-

12) Wilhelm Schmidt, "Initiations tribales et sociétés secrètes. Notions générales," *Semaine D'Ethnologie Religieuse, IIIe session* (Enghien, Belgium: Maison St. Augustin, 1923), pp. 329-40; Wilhelm Schmidt and Wilhelm Koppers, *Völker und Kulturen* (Regensburg: Joseph Gahhel, 1924), pp. 275-81.

13) Codrington, *Melanesians*, pp. 76, 80.

14) Simmel, *Sociology*, pp. 345-47, 364.

15) Codrington, *Melanesians*, pp. 71-74.

16) Schurtz, *Altersklassen*, pp. 348-50.

tive secret society is not secret; members are proud of their badges and signs of rank in the society. Simmel wants to include such groups within a classification that applies mainly to underground movements. Secrecy, especially of the fact of membership or even the existence of the group, is indeed essential for outlaw or subversive societies, but the secrecy practiced by the primitive groups is related to their religious activities.

Other suggestions concerning the possible root function of primitive secret societies assume an even more pragmatic awareness than revenge on the women or the defence of a secret truth. Hutton Webster felt that the secret society was an answer to the political or governing needs of the village and represented the situation in which political power was held by a limited group.¹⁷⁾

Another function with which the secret society is accredited is more precisely associated with its initiation rites. This is its function in reinforcing sexual identity, a function also recognized in general puberty rites. It is argued that the initiation procedure removes the young boy from the family world dominated by women and gives him the social and psychological patterns by which he can be a man. The question here is whether the secret society can be defined in terms of a special application of this aspect of initiation. There is little doubt that the secret societies are primarily male organizations, but some old women are permitted to join the Duk-duk society.¹⁸⁾ Women may join many of the societies in North America, e.g. the Tobacco society among the Crow Indians.¹⁹⁾ It seems to me that such scattered but well-attested facts put into question all of those theories which are based on the centrality of male identity. It may well be that the puberty rite and the resulting Männerbünde (see Schlesier's distinction from "Geheimbünde") do revolve to a great extent around the sacrality of maleness, and function to reinforce male sexual identity. But it would seem probable that this aspect is weakened and may have only vestigial place in the secret society and its initiation. This is part of the argument of the most recent book on Melanesian initiation patterns, written by M. R. Allen. After relating initiation rites of various types

17) Hutton Webster, *Primitive Secret Societies* (New York: Macmillan, 1908, p. 35.

18) Loeb, *Tribal Initiation*, p. 256.

19) Lowie, *Primitive Society*, pp. 304ff.

to variations in social structure, he concludes that the secret society indicates a "weakness of male ritual unity."²⁰) It is not valid to assume therefore that the usual exclusion of women and intimidation of them is due to their sex. The secret society is marked off from *all* outsiders, including children and uninitiated men,.

In her very helpful article Camilla Wedgewood analyzed many of the functions actually performed by the Melanesian secret societies. These functions include the establishment of peace among the tribes during the periodic initiation festivals celebrated by the whole secret society, the incentive to work which high initiation expenditures produce, and the break in the monotony of life achieved through the rites and their attendant excitement. Wedgewood notes that all these functions are latent, in that primitive thought rarely recognizes ostensible purpose. In addition none of these functions are peculiar to the secret society and therefore do not help us establish its special character.

However, two other functions which Wedgewood lists have more significance than she admits. She insists that the violent aspects of secret society activity are not sufficiently understood when they are seen as crass deception and terrorizing. The masks or figures and rites elicit real reverence, and as holy things they must be protected from profanation. Furthermore, membership in the societies and the ranks within them create a system of prestige and status within the village. When this ritual concern and the desire for prestige are adequately explicated, they do provide a basis for interpreting the secret society more basic than the latent and secondary functions mentioned above.

It is the defensive posture of the secret societies that has produced a further theory concerning its root meaning, one which is not immediately related to specific functions. It is assumed that external pressure or serious social disturbance has forced the "occultation" of previously public rite and religion. This is similar to the notion which sees modern secret societies as reactions to oppressive government and restrictive social life.²¹) In Melanesia it is the cargo cults which illustrate this principle. The secret societies were definitely in existence

20) M. R. Allen, *Male Cults and Secret Initiations in Melanesia* (London: Melbourne University Press, 1967), p. 94.

21) Mircea Eliade, *Myths, Dreams, and Mysteries* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 203; Peuckert, *Geheimkulte*, p. 7; Simmel, *Sociology*, pp. 359-360.

before the advent of Western influence and government. Unless we create a history for which we have no real evidence (as W. H. R. Rivers has done ²²) the source of oppression can only be the women (thus we return to Schmidt).

All these functional analyses fail to provide the clarity and adequacy which a good definition should have. Instead of searching for functions which satisfy a modern sense of utility, we should determine what is the primary function of the secret society for its native members. Most of the functions which the modern observer perceives the secret society itself does not recognize. Perhaps the best example of this is one last suggestion which has been made concerning the many secret societies on the Banks Islands. Since each member is protected by his group from the inroads of non-members on his property and talents, but not from other members of the same group; it becomes wise to join so many groups that one has protection against every neighbor by membership in at least one society which does not include him. ²³) Such an "insurance" theory, more than any other, illustrates how devious man's mind would have to be in order to come up with the elaborate secret society structure just to perform such a function.

Admittedly, however, there are many problems in trying to determine the true purpose with which a native joins one of the societies. He is not usually self-conscious about it and the societies do not need to publish a defence or prospectus. Nevertheless, if we are sensitive to concerns which the native culture emphasizes it is not too difficult to perceive the general direction of aspiration to membership in the groups. If economic advantage, political revolution, education, revenge, or any other of the supposed motives were strong in these cultures we could assume that such concerns were the heart of the society and its activity. Evidence for all of this is lacking, however. What we find instead are the two concerns, religion and status, which dominate both these cultures and those in which monasticism thrives.

This leads me to an analysis of the primitive secret society in comparison with the monastery. In the monastery, as in the secret society,

²²) W. H. R. Rivers, *The History of Melanesian Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1914), II, 210. Rivers theorizes that the secret society is the perpetuation of rites and association of an invading party of men; they joined the village in most ways but preserved their foreign religion in secrecy.

²³) Lowie, *Primitive Society*, pp. 297f.

religious goals and status are closely related to produce a form of religious association with a structure and a set of dynamics which are distinguishable from all other associations.

The Monastery and the Primitive Secret Society

The similarity between the monastery and the secret society has been recognized before.²⁴⁾ It is necessary here to spell out the terms of this similarity more carefully. There is no generally recognized term which refers to this type of association and includes both primitive and modern examples. While admitting its broader usage, it may be sufficient to adopt the term "fraternity" for this typical situation. It should be understood that it is a distinctly religious fraternity which is being defined here, and one that can have female members or counterpart women's organizations.

The "fraternity" type of religious association can be identified by two major characteristics. These characteristics are shared by secret societies and the monastic communities in the classical and modern religions of the world, and not by any other religious or secular groups. The first is the structural relationship between the fraternity and a larger religious society, and involves a religious transaction between the fraternity and that matrix.

It is not difficult to see that the secret society is the core religious group in its world. The women and uninitiated share a common symbol system and belief with the society but depend on it to exercise the activities ordained by this religious worldview. Likewise monasteries recognize a "laity" who affirm the same religious convictions but who do not participate as intimately or obviously in its practice. The existence of this wider group distinguishes the fraternity from the Utopian or separatist community or sect.

Such core fraternity within a religious group is not to be confused with religious functionaries, even though these may and do band together. A priest or prophet is essentially an individual servant of the deity, his cult, or the needs of his devotees; a shaman or medicine man is again an individual practitioner in the sacred realm. Fraternity members do perform religious functions, however. Theravadin Buddhist practice, like the primitive secret society, for example, replaces

²⁴⁾ Alfred Bertholet, "Religious Orders," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, ed. Edwin R. A. Seligman (New York: Macmillan, 1930-35), XIII, 276-78.

the puberty initiation with full or partial entrance into the fraternity. However, it is the group which is the operative force in the rite.

The mutual dependence of the inner and outer circles is illustrated in other ways. Although the offerings given to a secret society seem to be more extortions than gifts the pattern persists: that the fraternity receives ordinary value and gives religious value in return.²⁵⁾ This is especially evident in the embarrassment of riches which occurs in many monastic situations.

The second characteristic of the fraternity as a particular form of religious association is already apparent. The nature of its relationship with a surrounding laity is dependent on its recognition as a locus of holiness. The fraternity does not primarily administer holy things, nor does it merely cultivate a private, interior holiness; the fraternity, through its membership, is itself the epiphany or sacred element. Very important in religious fraternities is the role of clothing, habits or masks.²⁶⁾ They mark the member off from normal humanity and indicate his manifestation as a holy figure. The initiation or profession rite is crucial because the new holiness is received or achieved in it. Without doing a thing, the monk or secret society member is holy by virtue of his participation in the group.

The higher and sacred status which the fraternity manifests is characteristically understood by reference to the next level of power as conceived in that culture. Thus the monk sees himself as a participant in the angelic life.²⁷⁾ The secret society represents the ancestors on earth and associates with them.²⁸⁾ The close association of monks with the dead forms another link in this chain of reference.²⁹⁾ Angels, ancestors, and the general realm of the dead are not usually

25) E. M. Mendelson, "Initiation and the Paradox of Power. A Sociological Approach," *Initiation*, ed. by C. J. Bleeker (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965), pp. 214-221; S. J. Tambiah, "The Ideology of Merit and the Social Correlates of Buddhism in a Thai Village," *Dialectic in Practical Religion*, ed. by E. R. Leach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968).

26) Philippus Oppenheim, *Das Mönchskleid im Christlichen Altertum* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder & Co., 1931); Loeb, *Tribal Initiation*, p. 255.

27) Ute Ranke-Heinemann, *Das Frühe Mönchtum* (Essen: Hans Driewer, 1964), pp. 65-82.

28) Codrington, *Melanesians*, p. 70.

29) Gerd Tellenbach, *Church, State and Christian Society* (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1940), p. 78; Holmes Welch, *The Practice of Chinese Buddhism 1900-1950* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967), chapter 7.

equated, to be sure; but they do all participate in the conception of states of being beyond man and his present life.

Objections to this typological grouping of the monastery and the primitive secret society take many forms. Most, however, emphasize the difference in the manifestation of the structural pattern which is necessitated by the difference in culture and its complexity. The secret society, for example, is not a permanent group and does not preclude its members' participation in other social structures, especially marriage. This is to be expected within an economic framework which cannot support a completely separated and non-procreative group of men. Furthermore, this objection displays a confusion of the admittedly very pervasive monastic practice of celibacy with the basic monastic structure; this approach also stumbles over the Sufi "orders" and their exception from the celibate pattern.

The dispensability of celibacy as a practice of the fraternity points to a consideration which meets other objections. The actual activity or work of a fraternity, aside from its ritual of initiation and contact with the higher realm, also varies from situation to situation. One secret society in Melanesia is very much involved in the practice of healing magic,³⁰⁾ while others seem to have no activity beyond the rituals. Buddhist and Christian monasteries are known for intellectual or academic activities, as well as hospitable and charitable works. The practice of properly "priestly" activities is also a particular function which is not essential but which has produced much confusion. The monastification of the clergy and clericalization of the monks in Western Christianity early in the Middle Ages exhibits both the distinction and its obliteration.

The piety and ethics of each religious tradition is bound to be variable but the place and relationship pattern of the fraternity persists. Since the fraternity members wish to embody the ideals or forms of a higher religious status they adopt for their special emphasis those activities which are most highly respected and/or associated with religious value. Another way of understanding the choice of an appropriate activity is to see it as an imitation or embodiment of the role of angels or the ancestors, be that praise, service, magical power, or dance.

30) Kroll, "Der Iniet," p. 204.

The basic function of the secret society as a type of social formation does not lie in incidental factors, even though they may predominate in a particular situation. What relates these organizations and their varying activities is the exercise of one of the religious possibilities of man. Mircea Eliade, in discussing the secret societies commented: "If the sacred is accessible to every human being, including women, it is not exhausted in its first revelations."³¹ It is not necessarily the special mystery of the sexes which is further elaborated, however, but whatever is seen to be more intense and valuable a realization of holiness.

The recognition of this structure within the religions of the primitive and modern worlds should enable the historian of religions to distinguish more clearly between the common elements and the specific influences in any instance of a fraternity.

³¹) Mircea Eliade, *Rites and Symbols of Initiation* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 38.

ŚŪNYATĀ AS A MASTER-SYMBOL

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I.

Specifications for a Master-Symbol

Let me first define what I intend by the term “master-symbol.” A master-symbol does of course belong to the species symbol. And in so saying it is taken for granted that certain generic symbolic essences are to be found even here. Thus: a symbol has the quality of an honest-intentioned alias, or an alias in reverse if you will; it is trying to discover the identity of its meaning to us but finds the forms it must use to be literally misleading. Further, the evocative or connotative aura of the symbol rather than its informational or denotative content is its major thrust toward significance. So also it is a device or stratagem by which its user hopes to orient himself to a reality that otherwise eludes his grasp. But to qualify as a *master*-symbol a symbolic entity must also possess three other qualities that are always present to some degree in every symbol, but are here maximized: 1) natural inevitability, 2) indeterminate concreteness, and 3) multi-valence.

Now all “successful”, i.e. functioning, symbols have some degree of natural inevitability about them. They usually spring up spontaneously out of the historical-cultural environment and catch on because they seem so aptly and adequately to express a significant aspect of experience or tradition. In the now somewhat distant past in a predominantly natural environment, it was the features and entities of that environment that provided man’s symbolic forms. Because such symbols had a solid and tangible basis in the world of everyday sense experience, they were therefore familiar to every man. Thus when they were picked up by culture and/or religion as symbolic of *its* transcendental meanings, they seemed to be almost self-explanatory, carrying their universal-natural significance on their faces as it were. How could any better or more universal vehicles be found for the desired meanings? Such symbols are the following: “light” and “darkness”, as signifying

knowledge, goodness, illumination and their opposites; “up” and “down”, as signifying the heavenly, the divine, the superior and *their* opposites; water as purifying and life-giving; food as life-sustaining; the seasonal cycle, symbolic of life and death and suggestive of reincarnation.

With regard to the second quality, indeterminateness-cum-concreteness, it may be noted that this has been basic to all of the *major* symbols and mythical structures of mankind. They have had an initial, foundational concretion in the sense-world. And though this basic sense-component may be diluted, rarefied, verbalized, and even be present by implication only, it is importantly and functionally present in any operative symbolical-mythical entity. However abstract the symbolic expression may be, its sensitive user inevitably gains the feeling of a direct, physical, experiential participation in its meaning. A striking example of this is the prophet’s and mystic’s claim to “see” their super-sensible realities, or to experience them “immediately” as though by a literal touch-contact. But, of course, these are only the most intensive and specialized expressions of this constitutive quality of *all* functioning symbols. On the other hand the very fact that the concreteness of a primordial sense experience can be so flexibly diluted and given many forms—i.e., its indeterminate, amorphous quality—this prevents the symbolic essence itself from being too specifically tied to, and limited by, any one traditional or historical form.

The third quality of the master symbol, here named multi-valence, may in some sense be merely the maximization of the first two. But the term has a value in its own right. It calls attention to the capacity of the master-symbol successively, or even simultaneously, to evoke a wide range of connotations and emotional responses and thus, by annexing the devotees of each separate connotation, to gain an extensive following. The master symbol, in other words, is a true *coincidentia oppositorum* of ideas, connotations, and values—along with their emotional overtones. It becomes an organic unity in which the “opposing” elements do not destroy each other or cancel each other out in a resultingly bland pabulum of compromised essences, but stand in organic tension with each other, actually adding to each other’s functional strength. Of course it is the case that perhaps only one, or one set, of values or connotations may be dominant at one time or for a given “user” of the symbol. Thus in Rudolf Otto’s exposition of religious awe,

it is now the fear, now the fascination, motif that is dominant. But in either case the latent factor, even though latent, is functioning as a loyal opposition that lends its own strength to the total symbolic organism. The very fact that one component or more *is* latent, a little below the level of explicit consciousness, or of contemporary experience, or of direct emotional response, or perhaps just outside the center of the immediate symbolic focus, gives a plus flavor of mystery and potency to the symbolic totality now functioning in its dominant mode. For the symbolic whole is always more potent than any of its visibly functioning parts, and of greater stature than their sum total.

In summary, a *master*-symbol may be defined as a symbol which possesses not only all of the basic characteristics of a symbol as such, but possesses them in such maximum degree that it can include, nourish, and harmonize a multitude of varied experiences, values, and emotions. Such master symbols, though acquiring some additional richness of content and variant interpretation from each culture they penetrate, have often survived the specific cultural matrix that gave them birth, have spread far beyond their original locale, and have outlived by centuries the rise and fall of those nations and civilizational modalities that temporarily gave them house room.

II.

With a working definition of a master-symbol in hand we may now proceed to apply it to a concrete instance, in this case the great Mahayana Buddhist entity, Śūnyatā, which is variously translated The Void, Emptiness, or Nothingness. In the centuries since Śūnyatā was definitively expounded by Nagarjuna, the Indian Buddhist philosopher of the second century of our era, it has become a major religious essence of the Buddhism of China and Japan. True, it has not always been in the visible forefront of Mahayana symbolism, especially on the popular level, for it is *uncommonly* difficult to represent Emptiness in any tangible manner. Indeed it is by definition utterly beyond all specification, definition, or direct symbolization: to deal with it by concept or representation of any sort is to falsify or limit it. Even to speak of it as a master-symbol as I am now doing is against its nature as some sort of Absolute Immanent-Transcendent Reality. Yet even if one accepts this believer's view, it can also be said that historically it both *has* had and *does* have a most potent and pervasive symbolic function.

It may be seen as matrix or ground of symbolic being in which all of the other Mahayanist Buddhist symbols live, move, and have *their* being. Its intangible essence permeates their more explicit and tangible forms with its values; ambivalently it both undermines and yet strengthens the particularity of every other symbol. From Śūnyatā all other symbols proceed into being; from it they gain their particular significance; and to its vast non-symbolic super-essence they again yield their own particular essences as the waves recede into the mother ocean.

But how then does Śūnyatā function in this its master symbolhood? Its functioning in general is manifest in its two major roles: of infinity symbolism and absolute reality symbolism. I shall begin with, and spend the major part of my time on, the consideration on Śūnyatā as an infinity symbol. It must be understood at the outset, however, that Śūnyatā infinity is of a special and radical sort. As already noted it is by definition beyond all distinction, attribution, description, or dichotomy of any sort, hence basically negative in *statement*. The great significance of Nagarjuna's work was his demonstration (to at least his own complete satisfaction) that all categories and distinctions used in the space-time world, from those of cause-effect to the supreme Nirvana-Samsara, are totally relativistic by virtue of their mutual dependence upon each other for their meaning. They do not, they can not, describe Reality. For this latter the only possible term—or non-term—is Śūnyatā, pure conceptual negativity. (Or, if one wishes a somethingness instead of a nothingness he may say *tathatā*, i.e. "thatness" or "suchness".) But though originally, with Nagarjuna, the term may have been nothing more than an agnostic negation, increasingly it came to signify the Ultimately Real.

Now this too is significant. For the emptiness of Śūnyatā is not to be taken as one member of the Emptiness-Fullness, non-being-being dichotomy. It is not *over against* anything else at all in opposition to it. Its essence is its all-pervasive all-receptive infinity. Or to put the situation in the terminology of Rudolf Otto: Śūnyatā is conceptually nil (infinite emptiness) but mystically positive (Absolute Reality).

But now turning directly to Śūnyatā's infinity role we may note that Śūnyatā, as an absolute, or multiple-dimensional infinity, precisely *because* it has no specifiable particular qualities, can attract to itself and include in itself, several merely *one*-dimensional infinities. Such

one-dimensional infinities are never spoken of as the “attributes” of Śūnyatā—for Śūnyatā, be it again recalled, is beyond all attribution. (This is perhaps only another way of saying that I have never heard Buddhists describe Śūnyatā thus.) But I am here suggesting that I believe in its actual religious-symbolic functioning these one-dimensional infinities are constitutive of Śūnyatā. In their aspect of *infinity* they are, so to speak, magnetically attracted to Śūnyatā, the absolute infinity, and participate in its essence; but in their *particularity* (i.e., as less than *absolutely* infinite) they are apprehensible or appropriable by means of certain time-space experiences. And as befits a master-symbol, Śūnyatā is able to contain a variety of these one-dimensional infinities which contribute their varied essences and experiential values to the symbolic whole. Three of these one-dimensional infinities that belong to the Śūnyatā complex are of special interest and experiential importance. We may call them modes of the participation of Śūnyatā in the world of experience and I will deal with each in turn.

It should be noted in advance that each mode of infinity is present in Śūnyatā in a double manner, representing perhaps a double and mutually fortifying mode of historical arrival and experiential function. On the one hand each embodies a logical-esthetic projection of a particular experience-born concept to its ideal limit; and this ideal limit inevitably finds its logical locus in the absolute limitlessness of Śūnyatā. On the other hand there is that flavor of concreteness and specificity, *so* essential to a functioning symbol, remaining from its rootage in specific sensory experiences. Without seeking to decide whether the sense-experience or logical construct was primary, we may note their mutual confirmation and the final result.

The first of these one-dimensional infinity-modes of Śūnyatā’s symbolic functioning is that of *infinite space*. As ākāśa it was the paradigmatic Indian philosophical symbol of infinity in its several modes and may be considered to be the conceptual root-component of the later Buddhist Śūnyatā development. For if space, on the ākāśa-model, be conceived as unlimited emptiness, and as also unlimitedly but non-determinately pervasive, its natural affinity for Śūnyatā is obvious. As limitless, ākāśa can include *anything* and *everything*; as passively receptive, non-determinate, and ubiquitous, it “contains” all particular items or qualities in all of their particularistic integrity. It has no character of nature of its *own* to force on them: thus each item,

though contained and permeated by space, can at the same time be its own true self. It is both involved with and participated in, by space, yet without integral loss to its particularity. And such pervasive "containment" may, and did, easily thicken into universal but non-coercive-supportiveness.

But unlimited space has two other important aspects which are likewise essential to its *symbolic* potency. Physically, space per se was most manifest in the sky. As such it was naturally-inevitably the region of the gods, the blessed "up" direction of religious tradition, implicitly the locus of all divine values. Hence, though only invisible and intangibly participating in that space and even seemingly denied by the emptiness of that "space" as later conceived, these religious-reverential or divine values still implicitly infused this new reality-symbol with a sublimated, even diluted, yet genuine presence. Of particular *direct* symbolic importance is the second factor—the spatial sense-experience component. For space-contrast experiences are universal to man, and by their inherent progression from small to great, inevitably suggest space-infinity, both in thought and sense-awareness. Thus the contrast of the narrow claustrophobic space of a cell or small room with the width of a rolling plain or the panoramic view from a mountain top or plane window, and the smallness of even these as contrasted to the boundless overarching sky, can easily give rise to the *concept* of infinite space, and even to a sense of actually *experiencing* space-infinity as one looks out from the earth's surface. Small wonder then that ākāśa (empty space) was the Indic proto-symbol of Śūnyatā and that its sensuous resonances remain effectively implicit in Śūnyatā to the very present.

Somewhat the same may be said of *infinite time*, the second mode of Śūnyatā's infinity function. Again, as with space, there are two complementary aspects or routes of the logical-imaginative and of the experiential way of arriving at time-infinity. With regard to the logical-imaginative: there are the primordial, natural units of time that are marked out by daily, seasonal and human-life changes. Civilized man has further organized time into a full set of units of measurement from seconds to centuries; and aided by a growing historical awareness he has ventured out conceptually into millennia of millennia, both past and future. But as with space, so with time; where shall one call a halt in *either* chronological direction this side of everlastingness?

But even everlastingness, or unending time as time's ideal limit, has conceptual difficulties as pointed out by Kant. How easy-tempting then to go one step further over the edge even of the ideal limit of everlasting-time into "eternity", eternity of the non-time or timeless sort, completely above and beyond the relativities of ordinary measured time—even though this latter be indulged in great gulps called *kalpas* or light years.

But far more basic to the religious sense of timeless eternity than its attempted imaginative conceptualization are certain *experiences* of "timelessness". Though these may be termed mystical, and therefore for some "supersensible", they are *rooted* in the universal experience of inner subjective time-sense as contrasted to outer measured time. Each of us has had experiences of this contrast: when bored, minutes seem like hours; in times of emotional crisis a few seconds may seem as we say, like an "eternity"; and contrastingly in times of deep concentration long stretches of time may pass unnoticed. Of course this inner-versus-outer time contrast climaxes in the mystical experience when the boundaries of self-hood and self-consciousness become obscured in a unitive awareness; from such experiences we have had repeatedly the report of "timelessness" or "eternity." I am persuaded that such experiences, more frequent in the East than in the West, were basic to the growth of Śūnyatā as a *religious* entity; out of the Indian yogic timeless-spaceless trance-awareness came the conviction that such experiences were direct encounters with the Absolute Reality—that Reality which can only be slightly indicated by such a term as Śūnyatā.

The third mode of the infinity-function of Śūnyatā is *absolute silence*. As with space and time so here too there are involved some factors of contrast which theoretically might lead on to the concept of absolute silence as an ideal limit. In the contemporary world, for example, one can think of a range of less and less sound reaching from sonic booms on downward to the sound-proof chamber where only the sound of one's breathing and pulse remain. One might ideally conceive of a situation in which even that defect is remedied—perhaps the world of a stone-deaf man. But for obvious reasons, whatever the experiential interest, the imaginative-logical drive to the ideal limit of absolute soundlessness has been relatively unimportant; for audial concepts are not as basically structural of thought-forms as are time

and space concepts. Speculative attention on absolute silence therefore has seemed philosophically pointless.

Religiously and experientially, however, the reverse has been the case. Even in the West silence has been an important if under-indulged religious symbolic component. "Be still and know that I am God", "the silence of eternity," "the still small voice" or "a voice of silence" and other like phrases come to mind. But what has been a relatively minor theme in the West is in the Buddhist-Hindu tradition a matter of prime importance. The central meditative discipline has as its main drive the achievement of ever more intensive and internalized silence. Meditation is begun in physical solitude, body movement is brought to a standstill, pulse and breathing are slowed, ordinary scattering thought processes are progressively eliminated by intensive concentration on a single non-conceptual item in order that "one-pointedness of mind" or attention can be achieved at will. And some of the ensuing states leave the entranced person in such a condition of suspended animation that he appears as though dead to the observer.

III

Such then are the three infinity modes of the Śūnyatā symbolism. Their complementary affinities for each other are obvious; each either suggests the other, or naturally harmonizes with it. Thus if one thinks-feels infinite-empty space, there should be nothing in it to make noise or measure time intervals. Not even thought-events so to speak. In a perfectly timeless awareness there can be no audible (or other tangible) events to mark divisions; even spatial determinations seem somehow contradictory of it. Finally, utter silence is obviously the natural companion of *both* infinite space and eternity. And what better expression of them all together than Śūnyatā? Indeed what other expression is *possible*, save Voidness, which is beyond all determinations, limits, and specifications?

But one major question remains. How can such a complex of *negatively* stated *indeterminate* infinities—even though they have sensuous resonances diffused throughout—become a supreme *religious* or *existentially* prime symbol? It is because, as noted earlier, that Śūnyatā also functions as a *reality* mode. As such it is sometimes non-committally designated as Tathatā, i.e., suchness, thatness. With

regard, then, to this seemingly alchemistic transformation of sheer empty negative infinities into positive religious substance, it may be stated thus: When Emptiness (*Śūnyatā*) in all its negative infinity modes is also Reality (a reality vouched for by direct mystical apprehension of it in its infinity modes) then its very emptiness of all conceptual characteristics becomes the sign of the *Absolute*. Emptiness means no longer Zero, but unlimitedness, overflowing reality that cannot be expressed, contained, or limited in any specifiable way; as *Śūnyatā* it overflows all inhibiting distinctions, and abides by no rules made by human understanding. "Emptiness" means only that we cannot grasp it at all by our intellectual devices or embody it in our rituals and institutions; as *Śūnyatā* it is Absolute Transcendence, best apprehended intuitively and felt in the diffused sense resonances of limitless space and time, and in absolute silence, rather than grasped by definition.

But secondly, and of basic importance for its symbolic function, *Śūnyatā* as the ground of all reality, *participates integrally* in all of the limited reality-forms which our limited apprehensions project upon It. It can so participate, as noted earlier, by its very empty indeterminateness; like primordial space it can contain and permeate each item within it without doing damage to that item's particularity. Indeed, as *Reality*, it sustains and nourishes whatever limited reality there may be in particularity. So too its unlimited emptiness becomes Grace, Grace that ever and ever again flows out of its own indeterminate infinity into all limited forms without partiality or distinction. The sunlight and rain of *Śūnyatā*'s being and blessing descend into all entities alike. Tangibly expressed in the Bodhisattva doctrine of the perfected being who refuses to enter into his own Nirvanic release in order to save others, one often finds in Japanese Buddhist shrines the figure of Manjusri the Bodhisattva of Emptiness-perceiving wisdom flanking the Buddha image on one side, and Kwanyin (Kwanon) of infinite mercy and healing flanking it on the other. They do not cancel each other out, Emptiness and Compassion, but each fulfills and empowers the other.

It may be observed in conclusion that such an arrangement is almost infinitely flexible and expansible into a near infinity of interpretation and symbolical specification. For, since Emptiness has no determinate character of its own, *every* existent form may be said to

participate in its reality and somehow to express it. Thus even the most tangible representations in the form of elaborate rituals and images may be revered in their particularity and tangibility by those who have no abstractive or mystical capacity. Nor are these tangible symbols to be despised, for they *are* participative in Emptiness, they uniquely embody its outflowing in Grace and may become instruments of its realization. Yet at the same time they are *limited* forms of that Ultimate Empty-Fullness, Śūnyatā, and as essentially emptiness or mere suchness they may be so viewed and experienced that the tyranny of their individuality, i.e., their "idolatrous" use, is escaped by the awareness of that essential emptiness.

Such then are the role and forms of the Buddhist Master-Symbol, Śūnyatā. It gives birth to and sustains a multitude of lesser symbolizations of its own Supreme Reality and as the Ground of their being is the guarantor of their reality and of the sacramental participation of their devotees in the *ultimately* real. But at the same time the sacramental experiencing of Śūnyatā in the very use of these limited symbolic forms, so easily available to human awareness, if *coupled* with Śūnyatā awareness, leads to their *religious* transcendence by means of the simultaneous apprehension of the fleeting reality of the limited symbol. And as one set of waves subsides again into the infinite ocean to make way for another set of waves, so particular symbols of Śūnyatā will give way to new and different ones, which in *their* turn will be both nourished and destroyed by that same Śūnyatā.

A DRAMATISATION OF THE PROPHET
MUHAMMAD'S LIFE:
HENRI DE BORNIER'S *MAHOMET*

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I

Henri, Vicomte de Bornier (1825-1901), is a dramatist held in no great esteem by modern critics of French literature, but one who achieved a considerable reputation in his own time. Of a family whose roots were in the Huguenot nobility of Languedoc but which had made a timely conversion to Catholicism when the Edict of Nantes was revoked, his life was an even progress in official library positions (punctuated by a spell of excitement when he defended the Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal, where he eventually became Chief Librarian, against Communard incendiaryists), and latterly, a string of successes in the literary and theatrical world. His romantic, heroic dramas, such as *La fille de Roland* (in which Sarah Bernhardt created the title rôle in 1874), *Dmitri* (on the theme, familiar from Mussorgsky's opera *Boris Gudunov*, of the pretended heir to Tsar Ivan IV and his brief elevation to power on the death of Boris), *Les noces d'Attila* (concerned with the Hunnish leader's marriage to Hildiga, daughter of the king of the Burgundians) and *France ... d'abord* (set in the 13th century and dealing with the regency in France of Louis VIII's widow Blanche of Castile for her son Louis XI), were especially attuned to the mood of patriotism and national fervour engendered under the Second Empire and by the traumatic experiences of 1870-1. In 1883 Bornier's career was crowned by the ultimate honour of election to the Académie Française.¹⁾

1) For general biographical information, see the relevant article in *Dictionnaire de biographie française* (M. Prevost), and for a detailed account of Bornier's literary production, Nancy Stewart, *La vie et l'oeuvre d'Henri de Bornier* (Paris 1935).

Bornier was also affected by the atmosphere of critical speculation on the origins of monotheistic religion, on the rôle of founders of religions, and on the nature of the inspiration, divine or otherwise, impelling the great men of religion in their missions, the atmosphere which was being invoked by Renan, Strauss and others of the new higher critics. In 1881 Bornier produced a poetic drama on a theme which combined his favourite heroic motif with a religious one, sc. the journeys of St. Paul and his Apostleship to the Gentiles. *L'Apôtre* is built firstly around the dynamic character of St. Paul, with its change from zealous persecutor to enthusiastic proselytiser, and secondly round the clash of three faiths: the new, universalist religion of Christ; the sectarian particularism of Judaism; and the sceptical, hedonistic polytheism of traditional Roman religion.

A few years later, in 1889, he completed another poetic drama on the same theme of the religiously-inspired figure and the interaction of the higher religions, his subjects this time being the Prophet Muhammad and the relationship of the nascent religion of Islam to Christianity. In his *Mahomet* he adopted a basically sympathetic attitude, but he depicted Christianity as superior to Islam, and he portrayed Muhammad as consciously aware of this. In his own words,

J'ai représenté Mahomet comme un illuminé de génie, un être à la fois formidable et doux, un dompteur des peuples, mais un pasteur des âmes, un des premiers gentilhommes du monde, comme l'appelle un historien amer. Il est vrai que j'ai donné à Mahomet la conscience de cette supériorité du Dieu des Chrétiens; il est vrai qu'avant de mourir, il lance vers le Ciel ce cri d'inquiétude, de respect et d'admiration jalouse: Jésus-Christ! ²⁾

II

The first act of the play is set in Mecca, at the time when Muhammad first began his preaching to the pagan Meccans.³⁾ The grossness and barbarism of the pre-Islamic Arabs are displayed by the passing of a procession which is about to bury alive a female child, a practice denounced by the onlooking Christian monk Georgios and the Jewish merchant Jonas. Also expressed at the outset is the Arabs'

2) "L'héroïsme au théâtre", in *Le Correspondant* of 10th February 1890, cited in Stewart, *op. cit.*, 159.

3) This first act, which forms something of a prologue to the main action of the play and which sets forth the basic themes of potential conflict within Muhammad, is absent from the first draft and first manuscript of the play.

desire for a strong man who will bring a firm and just hand to the anarchy and spoliation prevalent in the Arabian peninsula:

... Parmi nous, il peut surgir un homme,
 Quelque rude guerrier qui nous mette d'accord,
 Et nous fasse, au besoin, trembler tous, moi d'abord!
 Nous en avons besoin tous, Chrétiens, Juifs, Arabes...
 Cependant, le désordre est dans chaque tribu,
 Lepillage, le vol, le meurtre, l'incendie,
 La bassesse, la haine avec la perfidie,
 Les immondes plaisirs, le mal fait ou rêvé,
 Les crimes dont le nom n'est pas encor trouvé!
 Notre courage meurt en ces honteuses tâches,
 Les aigles du désert disent: ou vont ces lâches?
 Nos fils vaudront encor moins que nous ne valions,
 Et le mépris de l'homme est dans l'œil des lions!⁴⁾

When Muhammad appears, he describes the revelations he has received from God on Mount Hirā' and his prophetic charge to abolish all false idols and unite all the tribes of Arabia under one God. But Muhammad is also confronted by the monk Georgios, who has in earlier days brought up Muhammad and taught him the Torah and Gospels; the character of Georgios is clearly modelled on that of Bahīrā, the legendary hermit of Bosra, whom Muhammad is said to have encountered during a youthful trading expedition to Syria and who is said to have discerned between Muhammad's shoulder blades the mark of divine favour, the seal of the prophets. Georgios ask Muhammad outright, will he now establish Christianity in Arabia, as he had previously promised? However, Muhammad asserts that he has now had a superior revelation, and that whilst continuing to recognise the greatness of Christ, the people of Arabia need a different law from that of Christianity. In terms reminiscent of Faust's declaration,

Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach! in meiner Brust...

Georgios analyses the conflict within Muhammad's soul, discerning as uppermost in it an overweening pride and a desire to surpass Christ.

4) Act I, Scene 1, p. 260 of the text of *Mahomet* in *Oeuvres choisies de Henri de Bornier de l'Académie Française* (Paris 1913). The play was actually first printed in 1889, but this edition has not been available to me. A copy of the appropriate section of the *Oeuvres choisies* was procured for me through the kindness of Mr R. W. Ferrier.

Deux hommes sont en toi : l'un bon, fidèle, amant ;
 L'autre, géant d'orgueil qui cherchait le moment
 De bondir sur la proie et de toucher son rêve.
 C'est ce dernier, mon fils, qui maintenant se lève !
 — Tu ne veux pas du Christ ? C'est que ta vanité
 T'inspire je ne sais quelle rivalité.
 Tu l'admires, dis-tu ; mais par un stratagème,
 De ton orgueil, en lui tu admires toi-même,
 Car tu crois égaler quelque jour sa vertu,
 Sa gloire, son triomphe ; eh bien — l'oserais-tu ?

He also repeats the warning of Muhammad's first wife Khadīja, that Muhammad should beware of the lure of sensuality and of becoming enthralled by a woman; and finally, he adjures Muhammad to remember in his heart, when he becomes a great man and the apostle of the Arabs, the name of Christ.⁵⁾

The remaining four acts of the play are set in Medina fifteen years later, when the Prophet is at the peak of his triumphs. The Jews are being expelled from their last fortresses and massacred; the Byzantines and Persians have been defeated, and all Arabia secured for the new religion of Islam; Muhammad has married Ayesha, the daughter of Abū Bakr, chief of Mecca; only the Jews and Christians, as possessors of a superior revelation and faith, refuse to recognise him. But he has not resolved the conflicts within his own soul. The new religion of Islam has decisively propounded the inferiority of women, and has made them mere slaves and chattels of man. Muhammad denies that women have any attraction for him:

Le Prophète, créé pour les divins combats,
 Doit briser sans effort les liens d'ici-bas :
 Au palmier du désert il doit être semblable :
 La tête dans le ciel et les pieds dans le sable !
 Pour les hommes pareils à moi, sachez-le bien,
 Le péril c'est d'aimer, le reste ce n'est rien !
 Dieu m'a donné le droit, au gré de mon envie,
 De rapprocher ma mort ou d'allonger ma vie ;
 Je mourais donc avant de m'abaisser ! L'amour
 M'abaisserait. La femme est le plaisir d'un jour ;
 Mais l'homme qui lui laisse usurper dans son âme
 La place des devoirs austères, Dieu le blâme !⁶⁾

5) Act I, Scene 4 = *Oeuvres choisies*, 266-7.

6) Act II, Scene 4 = *Oeuvres choisies*, 281.

But to himself, he later admits that Ayesha, alone of all women, excites his heart.

In this soliloquy, spoken before an icon of Christ, in a Christian monastery which he has encountered in the desert, Muhammad expresses his inward feeling of inferiority at the side of Jesus. Despite the temporal might and dominion which he has attained, there is one glory to which he can never aspire, sc. that of the Cross:

— O fils de Myriam, martyr mystérieux,
Pourquoi donc devant toi baisserais-je les yeux?
Pourquoi? mon édifice immense touche au faite;
Jésus de Nazareth était aussi prophète;
Mais le ciel me fit naître après Moïse et lui
Pour achever leur oeuvre et pour l'agrandir, oui!
Je suis cela! ce peuple, incliné sous mes règles,
A pour seul horizon l'ombre que font mes aigles!
Je marche de splendeur et d'effroi revêtu;
Je suis donc ton égal! — Mahomet, qu'en sais-tu?
— Je le sais! Entre tous les êtres, dans les âges,
Qu'ils aient été cléments, forts, terribles ou sages,
Qu'ils se nomment César, Zoroastre, Attila,
Aucun ne fut plus grand que moi! — Mais celui-là?
— Comme lui, cependant, j'ai refait ma patrie,
J'en ai chassé ce monstre impur, l'idolâtrie;
Chamelier, comme lui fils du charpentier,
J'ai suivi le céleste et lumineux sentier;
Je n'ai jamais été de clartés économe;
Mon reflet restera sur la face de l'homme,
Je suis grand, je serai plus grand! Oui, je crois;
Voilà mon sceptre à moi, le sabre! — Mais la croix?

Yet he further observes that, being a man, he is necessarily subject to the emotions of man:

O pouvoir qui mêlas au plaisir le remord,
Les sources de la vie aux sources de la mort,
Jamais rien de ta dure et douce tyrannie,
Rien ne nous défendra, non, rien, ni le génie,
Ni l'orgueil, ni la peur du regard effrayant
De la femme qui, même à ses pieds nous voyant
Semble cacher, au fond de sa vague prunelle,
Un secret et peut-être une plainte éternelle!
— Puisqu'il en est ainsi, moine, la volupté
Est un loi du monde et de l'humanité;
Tout homme peut céder à ce souffle de flamme
Pourvu qu'à mon exemple il en garde son âme! 7)

7) Act II, Scene 6 = *Oeuvres choisies*, 287-90.

We now approach the dramatic core of the play: the plot of Sofia to secure Muhammad's downfall. Sofia, described as a Jewish prophetess, deliberately lets herself fall into the Muslims' hands, explicitly intending to encompass Muhammad's ruin, as did Judith that of Holofernes, but in a more subtle way than by direct assassination: Instead, she allies with Hafsa, the repudiated wife of Muhammad, to poison Muhammad's mind against his favourite wife Ayesha, by insinuating that Ayesha is still in culpable relations with her first love, Safwān, who had loyally renounced his claim on her when the Prophet wanted her for his own wife. Bornier seems here to have conflated, for his own dramatic purposes, two episodes in the life of Muhammad. In the year 626, four years after the *hijra* or migration to Medina, Zainab bint Jahsh, wife of Muhammad's adopted son Zaid b. Hāritha, was seen by Muhammad. The latter was struck by her, and Zaid was persuaded to divorce her so that she could marry Muhammad. These manoeuvrings caused some criticism amongst contemporaries (not, it seems, because Muhammad was considered lascivious and overbearing, but because his marrying Zainab was viewed as incestuous⁸), and the whole affair was retroactively justified by a Qur'ānic revelation.⁹) The second episode is the so-called "Affair of the Lie" (*Hadīth al-Ifk*). After the expedition of 627 against the Hijazi tribe of the Banū l-Mustaliq, Muhammad's wife Ayesha had got left behind in the desert and had eventually returned to Medina in company with a young warrior, Safwān b. al-Mu'attal. Muhammad's enemies among the Medians seized this as a pretext for discrediting Ayesha, and, by implication, the Prophet's whole family; but the accusation was shown to be baseless and the calumniators were punished, a Qur'ānic revelation eventually laying down what was to become the legal procedure for bringing a charge of adultery and at the same time fixing the punishment for those guilty of uttering a false accusation.¹⁰) Bornier takes over the name of Safwān for Ayesha's secret beloved, and makes him a commander of the expedition sent out to defend Medina against

8) Adopted and ordinary sons were considered to be so close as to be in the same position in regard to marriage; hence Muhammad's marriage to Zainab could be interpreted as marriage with one's daughter-in-law. See W. Montgomery Watt, *Muhammad at Medina* (Oxford 1956), 329-30.

9) Qur'ān, XXXIII, 37-40.

10) Qur'ān, XXIV, 2 ff., cf. Nabia Abbott, *Aishah, the beloved of Mohammed* (Chicago 1942), 29-38.

an invading Byzantine army (the historical former husband of Zainab, Zaid b. Hāritha, commanded the Muslim expedition to Muṣṭa, on the Byzantine frontiers, in 629, and there met his death). He also brings in the Medinan poet Hassān b. Thābit—who in the historical “Affair of the Lie” was one of Ayesha’s calumniators—as one of the plotters with Sofia and Hafsa to denounce to the Prophet Ayesha’s continuing love for Safwān.

Muhammad for a time rejects their accusation, and condemns Hassān and Hafsa to death as perjurers;¹¹⁾ but in the end, Safwān confesses that Ayesha has given him her heart, although in a platonic and not in an adulterous sense. Ayesha now in turn accuses Muhammad of never having lover, of having rejected all human feeling and emotion, and of being deliberately anti-feminine:

Toi, tu ne vois que l'homme ici-bas, le seigneur,
Le maître, le gardien sombre de notre honneur,
Le pasteur du troupeau! Ta loi dure proclame,
Respire à chaque mot le mépris de la femme;
Servante du plaisir et de l'amour brutal,
Dans ce monde elle va portant ce joug fatal,
Et, pour en faire encor la victime éternelle,
Ton paradis lui-même est un affront pour elle!

She compares him unfavourably to Christ, whose gospel of love accords an honourable place to woman:

— Lui, Jésus, il a mis au lieu d'un joug infâme,
L'étoile du matin sur le front de la femme!
Il a fait d'elle, au lieu de l'esclave dompté,
L'éternelle vertu, l'immortelle bonté.
Et, pour forcer partout l'homme injuste à se taire,
A celui dont l'orgueil la courbait jusqu'à terre
Il dit: «Au haut du ciel, dans l'ombre du saint lieu,
« Regarde, c'est ta mère à côte de ton Dieu! »¹²⁾

This accusation is the last straw for Muhammad’s agonised and tortured mind. For the first time, he is racked by doubts over his mission and over his own personality. Renouncing his prophethood and his leadership of the Muslim community in favour of Abū Bakr, he confesses that he has in fact loved Ayesha all the time, but as holy

¹¹⁾ The actual punishment prescribed for this in the Qurʾān and later Islamic law is only flogging, cf. *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 1st edn., s.v. “Kadhf”.

¹²⁾ Act V, Scene 2 = *Oeuvres choisies*, 337-8.

man and war leader, had felt bound to conceal this weakness. The only way out for him, as he sees it, is to drink the cup of poison which Sofia had prepared for herself. In his dying speech, Muhammad pardons Ayesha, Safwān and even Sofia, and his thoughts now revert obsessively to Christ:

Tout à l'heure quelqu'un me reprochait Jésus...
 Ton calme, ta bonté, je ne les ai pas eus,
 Et je suis l'envieux de ta vertu sévère;
 O Christ! Je veux du moins imiter ton calvaire!

and his final words are, like those of Julian the Apostate, an invocation of the Galilean and his ultimate victory.¹³⁾

III

As remarked above, Bornier's view of Muhammad and his prophethood was at bottom a sympathetic one, within the intellectual framework of his own personal Catholic faith and seminary upbringing.¹⁴⁾ It is well-known that the Christians of the Middle Ages regarded Muhammad not merely as a false prophet but as a veritable Anti-Christ or incarnation in Arab form of the Devil himself.¹⁵⁾ Until the last years of the 17th century the political and military threat to Christendom from the Islamic world appeared menacing. With Muslim powers holding the whole of North Africa, with the Ottoman empire occupying the Balkans and most of Hungary and raiding into Austria, and with the Tatars still controlling much of southern Russia, Christian Europe felt hemmed in by the infidels. With the advantage of hindsight, we can see that by the 17th century the Ottoman empire had passed the peak of its power, and that towards the end of that century, the tide of Turkish conquest had definitely turned; but for the Christians of Europe at this time, old fears were still strong.

Only in the 18th century can we discern the beginnings of attempts to view Muhammad and his faith with understanding and dispassionateness. In large measure this was a reflection of philosophical

13) Act V, Scene 5 = *Oeuvres choisies*, 345, 347.

14) He had been educated at the seminaries of Versailles and of St. Pons at Montpellier.

15) The mediaeval Christian image of Muhammad and his faith has been traced in a masterly fashion by Norman A. Daniel in his *Islam and the West, the making of an image* (Edinburgh 1960).

rationalism in France and Protestant latitudinarianism in England, and it contained a good measure of revulsion against Catholicism: a feeling that the object of so much mediaeval Catholic execration could not be so bad after all. The attitude of the French philosophes is seen in the Comte de Boulainvilliers' *Histoire des Arabes* and *Vie de Mahomet* (1730), in which he depicted Muhammad as a man of genius, a great legislator and military conqueror, whose mission was to spread justice and civilisation amongst the barbarous Arabs of the 7th century. Voltaire's drama *Le Fanatisme ou Mahomet le Prophète* (1742) seems to mark a reaction in this process of gradual rehabilitation of Muhammad, and a reversion to earlier, crudely anti-Muslim attitudes. The play was dedicated to Pope Benedict XIV and depicts Muhammad as a complete impostor and immoral monster, swayed only by ambition, desire for power, lust and sexual jealousy. In fact, Voltaire probably wrote with his tongue in his cheek, hoping that the play's treatment of Muhammad's character, and the papal blessing, would ensure a favourable reception for the work. But he did have a philosophical intention, sc. to point out the effects of religious fanaticism, with its not infrequent consequence of crimes against humanity. When the play was staged again in 1751,¹⁶ Voltaire confessed in a letter to a friend, "J'ai fait Mahomet un peu plus méchant qu'il n'était". He was at this very time making amends in his *Essai sur les mœurs*, in which eastern religions had a large part. Although Voltaire the rationalist could not but regard the founder of a new religion as something of a mountebank, Muhammad was at least "un hardi et sublime charlatan", a military leader and justiciar comparable to Cromwell, and an apostle of tolerance and brotherhood.¹⁷)

With the 19th century comes the birth in France and Germany of scientific orientalism. In the second quarter of the century, such scholars as the Frenchman A.-P. Caussin de Perceval and the German Jewish one Gustav Weil brought to the consideration of Muhammad's career as a prophet the canons of the newly-developing historical-

16) It had been suspended after only its third performance in Paris in 1742.

17) See Pierre Martino, "Mahomet en France au XVII^e et au XVIII^e siècle", in *Actes du XIV^e Congrès International des Orientalistes, Alger 1905, Troisième partie, langues musulmanes* (Paris 1907), 220 ff.; Gustav Pfannmüller, *Handbuch der Islam-Literatur* (Berlin and Leipzig 1923), 116 ff.; N. A. Daniel, *Islam, Europe and empire* (Edinburgh 1966), ch. I, "The developing image".

critical method.¹⁸) Whilst the sources available to them at that time were inadequate for a clearly-defined picture of Muhammad to emerge, their books did propound the basic view that he had been a completely sincere figure, convinced of his mission to bring his people the Arabs out of their abysmal ignorance and gross materialism.

During this same period the Scotsman Thomas Carlyle delivered his series of lectures on *Heroes, hero-worship and the hero in history* (1840). In the second lecture he dealt with the Hero as Prophet, using Muhammad as his example. He proclaimed at the outset that "Our current hypothesis about Mahomet, that he was a scheming Impostor, a Falsehood incarnate, that his religion is a mere mass of quackery and fatuity, begins really to be now untenable to any one". Untenable, on the particular ground that it was impossible that hundreds of millions of people should have been deluded over a period of 1200 years, and on the general ground that all Great Men are *ipso facto* sincere: "I should say *sincerity*, a deep, great, genuine sincerity, is the first characteristic of all men in any way heroic... The Great Man... cannot help being sincere". Muhammad's message was thus a genuine one: "The rude message he delivered was a real one withall; an earnest, confused voice from the unknown Deep". Compared with this salient fact, his faults were of less importance. Thus too much had been made of the alleged sensuality of his religion, yet Muhammad himself had lived frugally. Carlyle admired above all the absence of cant and mealy-mouthedness in Muhammad, and his pressing, categorical concern with the crucial questions of Salvation and Condemnation. His final conclusion was that "On the whole, we will repeat that this religion of Mahomet's is a kind of Christianity; has a genuine element of what is spiritually highest looking through it, not to be hidden by all its imperfections".¹⁹)

Bornier was an explicit admirer of Carlyle's presentation of Muhammad. In contrast to Voltaire's characterisation of the Prophet as a rogue, Bornier regards him as undoubtedly sincere in his conviction that he was God's chosen apostle to a barbarous and benighted people,

18) In their respective books, *Essai sur l'histoire des Arabes avant l'islamisme* (Paris 1847-8), the third volume of which deals with the career of Muhammad, and *Mohammed der Prophet, sein Leben und seine Lehre* (Stuttgart 1843).

19) See on the general topic of Carlyle's appraisal of the Prophet, W. Montgomery Watt, "Carlyle on Muhammad", *The Hibbert Journal*, LIII (1954-5), 247-54.

and he depicts him, when his second act opens, as triumphant over the forces of anarchy and violence—what the Qurʾān denounces as the *hamiyyat-al-jāhiliyya*, the ferocity of the time of barbarism. In the last two or three years of his life, Muhammad could look back on a mission well-accomplished, the formation of a Muslim community in Medina which was ready to expand into an Islamic state. Where Bornier diverges from historical reality is, of course, in his portrayal of Muhammad's last days and his manner of death. By involving Muhammad in an emotional entanglement with the womenfolk Ayesha, Sofia and Hafsa, and by making Muhammad kill himself after the realisation of his failure to alleviate the lot of the female half of the race, Bornier was able to show the tortured mind of a man attempting, but ultimately failing, to master his own weaknesses, weaknesses which in an ordinary man would have been part of the common stock of his humanity, but which in a prophet were impediments to the full realisation of his mission.

Muhammad's love-hate relationship with Christ and Christianity was introduced by Bornier to place an element of intellectual and moral conflict at the side of the emotional one. We know of nothing which would substantiate Bornier's idea that Muhammad realised all along, in his heart of hearts, his moral inferiority to Jesus Christ. If we discount the legendary meeting with the monk Bahīrā, we must assume that Muhammad in his native Hījjāz had little contact with any Christians and only a confused, third-hand knowledge of Christian doctrine and practice. In the Qurʾān, Christ appears as a miracle-worker, and in this wise superior to Muhammad, but He is not acknowledged as the Son of God and the Second Person of the Trinity. He is merely one person in the line of prophets preceeding Muhammad; His divine revelation, the Gospel, was adequate for the Christians of His time, but was speedily corrupted by succeeding generations, and has now been superseded by the Qurʾān revealed by God to Muhammad, which is the full and exact version of the eternal scripture laid up in heaven on the Preserved Tablet. The dominant influences on the development of the Islamic cult and its law seem to have been Jewish rather than Christian, although Bornier takes no account of the Jewish contribution to Islam; only Muhammad's relentless harrying of the Jews of Arabia is made the background to the second act and the ultimate cause of Muhammad's own ruin.

Yet Bornier's picture of Muhammad is justified from the dramatist's point of view, if not from that of the serious orientalist. He knew how to give his scenes an authentic Arab flavour, and had obviously read with care translations of the Qur'ān and of the Prophet's *Sīra* or life-story as composed by Arab historians: he brings in things like Arab foodstuffs (*talbīna*, *bāqillā*, the wine *qarqaf*), the pagan Arab gods and goddesses (Wadd, Hubal, Allāt), Muhammad's personal weapons, his sword Dhū l-Faḳār, his helmet al-Muwashshā and his lance al-Muntawī, and so forth. This Hugoesque use of local colour much impressed contemporary critics of *Mahomet*, although they remarked on the play's *longueurs*, attributable to the extensive set speeches and soliloquies. On the whole, Bornier's play was a bold attempt to build a drama round one of the great heroic themes of human history, the rise of Islam. This was a subject which Christian Europe had not previously been able seriously to utilise before his time, because of sectarian prejudice; whilst Islamic religious views on representation of the person of the Prophet still make it virtually a forbidden topic of the drama and cinema in the modern Islamic world.²⁰)

Bornier himself was the victim of blind and unreasoning Muslim prejudice in regard to his *Mahomet*. The play was being rehearsed in 1889 when a Turkish newspaper reproduced from a French journal the news of its forthcoming production. The French Foreign Ministry assured the Turkish ambassador in Paris, Es'at Pasha, that the play did not constitute an attack on the Prophet and on the cherished beliefs of the Muslims. Bornier pointed out that the Persian *ta'ziyas* or passion plays regularly depicted the death of Muhammad as well as those of the Shi'ite martyrs, and he offered to accept prohibition of his work's being played in Algeria and Tunisia. These arguments still failed to satisfy the Turkish authorities, and in 1890 the head of the government, Freycinet, banned the production of *Mahomet* in

20) Jacob M. Landau cites recent instances where pressure from conservative elements in the orthodox religious institution has been exerted against dramatic or cinematic representation. In 1926-7 the ulema of al-Azhar in Cairo raised an outcry against the introduction of the cinema into Egypt, fearing that the Prophet might be irreverently portrayed on the screen; and in 1930 there were protests to the Egyptian government about a foreign film company's proposal to film in Egypt the story of the life of Muhammad and the first four Caliphs (*Studies in the Arab theater and cinema* [Philadelphia 1958], 163-4).

France, a prohibition which, it was reported, gave much pleasure to the Sultan ʿAbd al-Hamīd II. It must be admitted that Muslims would undeniably find offensive a play in which their Prophet killed himself because of a woman and because of inferiority feelings *vis-à-vis* Christianity, but there is no evidence that either the Turkish ambassador or the Sultan had seen the play, much less read it, when they first objected to it. The French government's surrender to this Turkish pressure was plausibly attributed by Martino to the contemporary political situation, for in 1889 the German Emperor William II was beginning his journey to Istanbul and the Near East, and France feared to do anything which might drive Turkey further into Germany's arms; the susceptibilities of France's numerous Muslim subjects in North Africa must also have been a consideration. Not till 1896 were excerpts from *Mahomet* presented to the public in a special arrangement for theatrical declamation.²¹)

Since Bornier's time, no major European dramatist seems to have essayed a play on the life of the Prophet. One should, however, note the Egyptian author Taufiq al-Hakīm's historical play *Muhammad* (1936), characterised by Landau as the first Arabic play treating exclusively of the Prophet's life and mission. Its great length makes it unsuitable for actual production, and probably it was never intended for such; it is accordingly impossible to gauge what contemporary Egyptian reaction would have been to a theatrical presentation of the work.²²)

21) Stewart, *La vie et l'œuvre d'Henri de Bornier*, 165-9 (citing Martino, *L'Interdiction du Mahomet de M. Henri de Bornier* [Algiers 1932], 8), 202-3. Bornier suffered more than his fair share of trouble over the staging of his dramas. His early play *Le Mariage de Luther* (1845) was accepted by the Comédie-Française but never staged or published, apparently because it raised the delicate question of clerical marriage at a time when the revolutionary murmurs preceeding 1848 were already discernible. His *Dante et Béatrice* (1853) suffered because of its political allusions and the comparison which people made between Dante's exile and the retreat of Victor Hugo to Guernsey after the advent of "Napoléon le Petit". Finally, his *Le Chemin de Saint-Jacques* (1865), set in the age of Charlemagne, was refused by the Théâtre-Français because it depicted a defeated France and a humiliated emperor.

22) Landau, *op cit.*, 143.

DIVINE EDUCATION

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It is a common idea in world religions that the skills employed by men are so mysterious and wonderful that only the gods could have devised them. It follows from this that at some time in the past the gods must have instructed men in such arts as the use of fire, metals, seeds, tools, and weapons. The same is of course true of the mysteries, myths, and rituals associated with the religions of men. Thus the ancient Egyptian goddess Isis, whose mysteries were much celebrated in the Hellenistic world from the fourth century B.C.E. onwards, reputedly declared, "I taught the mysteries to men", though Timotheus of Eleusis and the Egyptian Manetho at the court of King Ptolemy I acted as her assistants in this instruction.¹⁾ This example illustrates the point that the gods chose a number of human beings to act as their educational agents in the imparting of divine instruction in the arts associated with peace and war and the rituals relating to life and death. As she appears in the ancient Egyptian passion-play of Osiris, Isis is seen to possess the secrets of the course of life, that is to say, in a word, wisdom.

In this study we shall consider various instances of the concept of Divine Education in some of the major religious writings of the past. We shall turn our attention firstly to the idea of Divine Teachers, either gods themselves playing a pedagogic role or men endowed with wisdom from on high acting as teaching assistants to the gods and in some cases actually attaining deification themselves. Secondly, we shall examine the question of Divine Wisdom and some of the means whereby it is supposed to have been imparted to men. Thirdly, we shall look at the idea of Divine Knowledge and the types of things presumed to be involved in it.

1) C. J. Bleeker, *The Sacred Bridge* (Leiden 1963), 97f.

A. DIVINE TEACHERS

1. *Religious Teachers*

Religions are maintained through the activities of their priests, prophets, and preachers, but the religious teacher seems to stand somewhat in the background. The teacher is accustomed to speak about salvation rather than to proclaim it or impart it. His method is usually to attract to himself a number of disciples, whom he attempts to lead by his doctrine to a wiser way of life. G. van der Leeuw cites India as the best place for finding religious teachers in the strictest sense, with Gautama Buddha as the guru par excellence. As a religion Buddhism is in its purest manifestation sheer doctrine. Admittedly this includes a proclamation of salvation, but the salvation is achieved not through a divine act of grace in history but through the doctrine itself. 2) Buddha is reported as saying to Ananda: "It may be, Ananda, that ye shall say, 'The word has lost its master, we have a master no more'. Ye must not think thus, Ananda. The law, Ananda, and the ordinance, which I have taught and preached unto you, these are your master when I am gone hence". 3)

Van der Leeuw contrasts the Jewish-Christian kind of doctrine. The Jew learned in Scripture is "our teacher" and the doctrine that he teaches is likewise independent of its historical author, but its content differs from Buddhist doctrine in that it involves proclamation of event and personal relationship between God and man. The same is true of the teaching of Christian instructors like Saint Paul.

The idea of the teaching deity can also be found in India. The Hindu god Siva is often depicted as an ascetic guru. In the well-known "Aphorisms of Yoga" (Yogasutras, 1: 24-26), we read that "The Lord... is the guru even of the ancients since he is not limited by time". 4) It is in ancient Israel, however, that we find the clearest picture of God as the Divine Teacher (*moreh*):

Behold, God is exalted in his power;
who is a teacher like him? (Job 36 : 22)

Yahweh's instruction is concerned with and operates through his

2) G. van der Leeuw, *Religion in Essence and Manifestation* (English translation of *Phänomenologie der Religion*), 658f.

3) Van der Leeuw, 228f.

4) Cited by R. C. Zaehner, *Hindu and Muslim Mysticism* (London 1960), 34.

gracious acts of power performed within the context of his covenant relationship with his son and pupil Israel:

Yahweh performs acts of justice
and acts of judgment for all who are oppressed.
He made known his ways to Moses,
His doings to the sons of Israel. (Psalm 103 : 7)

Here we see Yahweh as the Divine Educator of Israel with Moses as his teaching assistant. Moreover Moses is the ideal prototype of the main religious functionaries of Israel, namely rulers, priests, prophets, scribes, and sages, and in fact these are represented as educating Israel under Yahweh's direction.⁵⁾

2. *Deified Teachers*

The figure of Moses is also a good example to commence our collection of cases of teachers who eventually assumed the status of gods. Hellenistic-Jewish historiographers and apologists like Eupolemus and Artapanus, in their efforts to show that the world was indebted to the Hebrews for all the components of civilization, made Moses the first sage and philosopher. Artapanus in particular claimed that Moses stood behind the figure of the Greek Musaeus, the Egyptian Hermes-Thoth, and this is tantamount to making Moses into one of the gods of Egypt and even the institutor of the worship of Isis!⁶⁾

Jesus is of course the outstanding example of "a teacher come from God" (John 3 : 2) in the Jewish world, though the Jewish people have rejected the claim of his disciples that he was divine. Yet the Rabbi has come to be as God to his particular synagogue congregation. This veneration accorded to the Jewish Rabbi may be compared with the case of the Hindu guru, who is very often revered as divine by even the most free-thinking sects or actually worshipped in some instances as *Dev-guru*.⁷⁾

An example from ancient Egyptian religion is Imhotep, the famous scribe, architect, and vizier of King Djoser, who was eventually elevated

5) For an outline of the theme of Divine Education as presented in the Bible see B. E. Colless, "The Divine Teacher Figure in Biblical Theology", *Journal of Christian Education*, 10 (1967), 24-38, 112-123, 151-162.

6) E. Schürer, *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi* (Leipzig 1907), III, 474-478.

7) Van der Leeuw, 228f.

to the position of god of medicine and identified with the Greek Asklepios; but, more significantly, as early as the New Kingdom he was deified as a divine patron of scribes, who were in the habit of pouring out a libation to him before commencing their work.⁸⁾

In the ancient Mesopotamian scribal schools the headmaster was treated with due reverence.⁹⁾ The title of the headmaster (Sumerian *umma*, Akkadian *ummanu*) was once thought by some scholars to be the word from which the name Oannes was derived. Oannes was known from the Greek-Babylonian author Berossus as the fish-man who taught the arts of civilization to men, and he has now been located in the cuneiform texts. It now transpires that Oannes is the proper name of the mythical figure who was previously known only by his epithet Adapa, "the wise one". We can now call him by his Sumerian name, *Uman* or *Umanna*, but apparently we have to set aside the idea of a connection between this name and the title *ummanu*, which is the Akkadian equivalent of Sumerian *umma*.¹⁰⁾

The scribal academies has as their patron deities *Nisaba*, or *Nidaba*, roughly in the period of the second millennium B.C.E., and *Nabu*, in the Assyrian period. Thus we find the kings of the Third Ur Dynasty boasting of the scribal prowess endowed on them by the goddess Nisaba on the one hand, and on the other hand a comparable claim being made by Assurbanipal on behalf of the god Nabu.¹¹⁾ We cannot claim these Mesopotamian kings as examples of deified teachers, but it is interesting to note that the cult of Nabu, Biblical Nebo, persisted in this region, and the Syrian Christian writer Theodore bar Koni of the eighth century relates that *Nebu* was adored in Mabbug after a strange happening that led to the deification of the city's old schoolmaster.¹²⁾

8) J. Černý, *Ancient Egyptian Religion* (London 1952), 49f.

9) C. J. Gadd, *Teachers and Students in the Oldest Schools* (London 1956), 13-16, where the following extract is cited, though the Sumerian can be made to yield a quite different sense: "Master, god who (shapes?) humanity, my god you (verily) are".

10) W. G. Lambert "A Catalogue of Texts and Authors", *Journal of Cuneiform Studies*, 16 (1962), 59-77. For further bibliography see *Journal of Semitic Studies*, 10 (1965), 85. On Oannes and the fact that in the incantation scenes depicted by the Assyrians the *apkallu*-priest assumes the guise of the fish-man see J. J. A. van Dijk, *La Sagesse suméro-accadienne* (Leiden 1953), 19-21.

11) Giovanni Rinaldi, *Storia delle letterature della antica Mesopotamia* (Milano 1957), 82f., 224f.

12) See Addai Scher's edition of Bar Koni's *Liber Scholiorum* (Leiden 1910-12), 2 Vols., I, 369.

In the religion of Islam we find that one of the ninety-nine names of Allah is "God our first teacher", and in the Quran (Sura 18, "The Cave") we meet a mysterious servant of Allah, who had been taught knowledge by Allah and was asked by Moses, accompanied by Joshua, whether he would impart this teaching to him. The context includes the mention of the sea and a fish, and this immediately suggests a connection with Oannes, especially when we see that the commentators of the Quran identify this servant of Allah with El-Khadr, "the Green One", "the teacher and counsellor of pious men, wise in divine knowledge, the immortal". Probably we should see here a connection with Glaucus, surnamed Pontius, rather than with Oannes. Glaucus was originally a fisherman who dived into the sea and became a god, to be worshipped by fishermen and sailors. At any rate it is significant for our purposes that El-Khadr has been exalted to divine status in Sufic circles.¹³⁾

B. DIVINE WISDOM

1. *Human Wisdom Teachers*

The cultivation of wisdom was an international phenomenon of the Near East, "wisdom literature" being anciently and universally produced there among the learned circles of the scribes. That borrowing occurred from one culture to another is evident from the fact that Mesopotamian myths such as that of Adapa (Oannes) have been found in the ruins of El-Amarna in Egypt, or the fact that there are connections between the Egyptian Wisdom of Amenemope and the twenty-second chapter of the Biblical book of Proverbs. The quality of wisdom was conceived in this literature as a practical sagacity that enabled a man to succeed in life and at the same time to give counsel to others concerning the way to success; but above this human wisdom was also Divine Wisdom, which existed with God or the gods and which might sometimes be revealed to men.

Throughout this international wisdom movement we find the convention of the teacher addressing his pupil as "my son", though sometimes the expression has a literal allusion to parents imparting teaching to their offspring, as for example in the Book of Proverbs and the Story of Aḥiqar. This Aḥiqar, "the wise scribe and man of good

¹³⁾ On El-Khadr or Al-Khadir see Wensinck and Kramers, *Handwörterbuch des Islam* (Leiden 1941), 286-290.

counsel, who was a righteous man and by whose counsel and words all Assyria was guided”, and who sought to impart wisdom to his son Nadan (or Nadin), is an admirable example of the wisdom-endowed man and of the wisdom-teacher instructing his son with counsels of wisdom.¹⁴⁾ Other examples of this type are found in the clay tablets of Sumer and Akkad.

On various Akkadian tablets we meet “Counsels of Wisdom”, similar to those of Ahiqar, apparently delivered by an *ummanu* to his “son”.¹⁵⁾ In Sumerian we have the Instructions of the antediluvian Shuruppak to his son Ziusudra:

Shuruppak offered instructions to his son,
 Shuruppak, the son of Ubartutu,
 Offered instructions to his son Ziusudra:
 “O my son, instruction I offer thee, take my instruction,
 O Ziusudra, a word I would speak to thee, give ear to my word...¹⁶⁾

A similar collection of precepts has been found in a private dwelling in the ancient city of Ugarit, and a short prologue of eight lines presents the counsels as having been given by a person beloved of the god of wisdom:

Hear... the wise counsel of Shubeawilim(?) ... From his mouth issued the eternal rules for poor humanity, (from his mouth) issued counsel for Zuran-ku(?), his eldest son, (to whom) he gave this solemn admonition: My son...¹⁷⁾

A number of examples of this genre of wisdom literature have survived from ancient Egypt, including the Instruction for Meri-ka-Re, and those of King Amen-em-het, of Prince Hor-dedef, of Ani, and the famous Instruction of Amen-em-Opet. One of the earliest of these compilations purports to come from Ptah-hotep, the vizier of King Izezi of the Fifth Dynasty, in the middle of the third millennium B.C., from which the following extract may be cited as an illustration:

The beginning of the expression of good speech, spoken by the Hereditary Prince and Count, God's Father and God's Beloved, eldest son of the king, of his body, the Mayor and Vizier, Ptah-hotep, in instructing the ignorant about wisdom and about the rules for good speech, as of advantage to him who will hearken and of disadvantage to him who may neglect them..

Then he said to his son:

14) *Ancient Near Eastern Texts (ANET)*, 1955 edition, 427-430.

15) W. G. Lambert, *Babylonian Wisdom Literature* (Oxford 1960), 96-107.

16) Lambert, 92-95.

17) Cited by J. Malfroy in *Vetus Testamentum*, 15 (1965), 57f.

Let not thy heart be puffed-up because of thy knowledge; be not confident because thou art a wise man. Take counsel with the ignorant as well as the wise.¹⁸⁾

That human beings or demigods were believed to be capable of equaling or even excelling the gods in wisdom is shown by a number of Mesopotamian cases: *Adapa*, "the sage... the capable, the most wise among the Anunnaki", whom Ea created as the model to be followed by men,¹⁹⁾ and who is now known to be the Umanna or Oannes mentioned by Berossus as the bringer of civilization; *Atrahasis*, "the most wise", for whom Ea drew the design of a boat on the ground as the time for the Flood approached;²⁰⁾ *Lugalbanda*, King of Uruk and father of Gilgamesh, who in one version of the myth of the Anzu bird devised a plan for restoring the Tablets of Fate to the gods;²¹⁾ *Gilgamesh* himself, who received his wisdom from his mother, the goddess "Ninsun, the wise who is versed in all knowledge"; and the *Seven Sages* mentioned at the beginning of the Epic of Gilgamesh, who brought civilization to seven of the most ancient cities in Babylonia.²²⁾

2. Divine Wisdom Teachers

Under this heading we shall consider a number of cases of gods imparting wisdom. In the first instance we shall be concerned with the mother-goddess as teacher of wisdom. The belief that mother-goddesses are givers of wisdom, counsel, and instruction to gods and men is readily understandable in the light of the fact that the first important education of a child in the family is given by the mother.

Mother Earth is regularly regarded as the source of wisdom. Thus Gaea was thought to give instruction to men in her capacity of oracle-goddess to several Greek cities. It was Gaea the earth-goddess who gave oracles from the abyss at the temple of Delphi, before Apollo seized power there. Gaea was responsible for the suckling of Zeus and she was also said to have given birth to Erichthonios when, according to one legend, Athena disappeared from the embrace of her husband Hephaestes on the night of her enforced marriage, so that his

18) Translated by J. A. Wilson in *ANET*, 412ff.

19) Translation by E. A. Speiser in *ANET*, 101-103.

20) *ANET*, 104-106; W. G. Lambert, "New Light on the Babylonian Flood", *Journal of Semitic Studies*, 5 (1960), 113-123.

21) *ANET*, 111-113.

22) *ANET*, 72ff.

seed impregnated the earth-goddess Gaea or Chthon. It was Athena, however, who undertook the education of the young hero. Athena, or Pallas Athene, was likewise renowned among the Greeks for her wisdom, but not so much the philosophy of the sage as intuitive knowledge of the mysteries of life. She had the ability to solve the knottiest problems as well as the willingness to reveal the solutions to men, so that in the Homeric epics her stratagems are sought in the matters of warfare in the field and of government in the city.²³⁾

In ancient Egypt we find a female deity named *Renenut*, concerning whom Bleeker reaches the conclusion that "sie ist die Amme, die Erzieherin. Deshalb wird sie abgebildet mit einem Kind, das sie säugt". This nursing role attributed to Renenut stands alongside a connection with weaving, a favourite old-world symbol for cosmic order, in which case Renenut would be "die weise Göttin, die den Weltgang fortbewegt und das Wohlergehen der Menschen bestimmt, wozu sie als Ernäherin und Getreidegöttin die Macht hat".²⁴⁾ She is presented as fixing good fortune for scribes from their birth in the Egyptian school-text known as the Instruction of Khety.²⁵⁾ The recurring theme of the goddess who gives suck is also found in connection with *Isis*, whom we have already mentioned as a teaching deity. The Egyptian name of *Isis* (*s. t*), meaning "seat" or "throne", is highly significant: she actually made the king, being both throne and mother to him, as shown in the relief depicting King Seti I sitting in the lap of Isis seated on the royal throne, and also in the reliefs portraying Horus or the pharaoh being suckled by Isis.²⁶⁾

Similar features are found in the chief mother-goddess of the ancient Mesopotamian pantheon, Sumerian *Inanna*, Akkadian *Ishtar*. Connected with the fertility of the earth, patroness of love and war, playing a role in chthonic mythology by her descent into the underworld, and enamoured of Tammuz the vegetation deity, she was invoked by her votaries as the merciful mother. Moreover her wisdom earned her the title *malikatu*, "counsellor". Ishtar also appears in the familiar role of divine nurse, in this case to the great Assyrian king Ashurbanipal,

23) C. J. Bleeker, "The Divine Lady", in *The Sacred Bridge*, 83-111; C. Kerenyi, *The Gods of the Greeks* (London 1951).

24) Bleeker, 125f.

25) *ANET*, 434.

26) Bleeker, 97f.; H. Frankfort, *Kingship and the Gods* (Chicago 1948), 43f.

a fact of which the king was reminded on one occasion by the scribal god Nabu, who was supposed to have entrusted the infant prince to Ishtar to be suckled and nurtured.²⁷⁾

Another Sumerian goddess exhibiting a number of the features under discussion here is *Nisaba* or *Nidaba*, who was considered to be a grain goddess and also a heavenly scribe. Thus in the cylinders of Gudea of Lagash in which the king's dream experienced after incubation is recounted, the goddess is described as follows:

She held in her hand a stylus of gleaming metal. She held a heavenly star-tablet on her knees. She took counsel thereby".

In the Sumerian epic work "Enmerkar and the Lord of Aratta" King Enmerkar, before embarking on a strategic enterprise, takes counsel with Nidaba, whom S. N. Kramer describes as "the Sumerian goddess of wisdom".²⁸⁾ At one time she was patron deity of the Tablet House (*edubba*) or scribal academy at Nippur, and a hymn to Iddin-dagan of Isin includes the devout wish that the great wisdom accruing to this scribe-king from the study of Nisaba's tablets might continue and that she herself might guide the king's hand till he reached the zenith of the scribal art.²⁹⁾ Nidaba's name also occurs in the royal titles adopted by the rulers of the Early Dynastic period in Mesopotamia. Thus Lugalzagesi, who is most lavish in his use of these, describes himself as "priest of Anu, the preeminent man of Nidaba... child born of Nidaba, milk-nourished one of Ninhursag".³⁰⁾ Ninhursag was the Sumerian earth-goddess, and King Eannatum likewise claimed to have been nursed by her. Gudea and Entemena may be cited as additional examples of Mesopotamian kings who claimed to have been suckled by the mother-goddess.

The same motif is known from the Ugaritic texts: El prophesies concerning Yassib the son of King Keret that he is to be "one that shall suck the milk of Athirat, one that shall drain the breast(s) of the

27) G. Contenau, *Everyday Life in Babylon and Assyria* (London 1954), 17. He notes that the four breasts of Ishtar are a prefiguration of the many-breasted Artemis of the Ephesians.

28) S. N. Kramer, *History Begins at Sumer* (London 1958), 57.

29) A. Falkenstein and W. von Soden, *Sumerische und Akkadische Hymnen und Gebete* (Zürich/Stuttgart 1953), 122.

30) B. L. Goff, *Symbols of Prehistoric Mesopotamia* (New Haven 1963), 226ff.

Virgin (Anat), the suckling nurse(s) of (the gods)". On the divine plane Shachar and Shalim are called "the gracious gods, twin figures born in (one) day, sucking the teats of the breast of Athirat..."³¹⁾

The significance of this theme of the goddess who gives suck in the religions of the Near East has often been discussed. In Egypt it was chiefly Isis and the cow-goddess Hathor who assumed this role,³²⁾ in Canaan it was Athirat and Anat,³³⁾ and in Mesopotamia it was, for example, Ishtar and Nisaba. In Egypt Pharaoh was revered as a god during his lifetime, and we could imagine that this divine suckling was either the means of his divinization or else the proof of his divinity. In Mesopotamia, however, despite the monarchs' grandiose claims of being divinely fathered and nourished on divine milk their actual standing before their god was often that of servant rather than son. The annual humbling before the statue of the deity was a perpetual necessity. In this ritual the king was obliged to remove his regalia and submit to reinstallation at the hands of the god.³⁴⁾ There is therefore a sharp difference between the divine sonship of the Mesopotamian king and that of the Egyptian pharaoh. It would appear that the aim of the Mesopotamian kings who applied such exalted titles to themselves was not to recount a legend about their supposed miraculous birth but to appeal to the love of the gods for them in an endeavour to secure divine support and protection.³⁵⁾ In other words, their statements were intended more for divine ears than human ears. Thus the plea of King Gudea of Lagash to the goddess Gatumdag, "I have no mother, you are my mother; I have no father, you are my father", is an impassioned assertion of utter dependence.³⁶⁾

Looking in particular at the question of the divine mother and nurse we should observe that Ashurbanipal, for example, at various times claimed as his mother the goddess Ninlil, Belit of Nineveh, and Ishtar of Arbela. Furthermore G. Contenau connects the suckling of kings

31) G. R. Driver, *Canaanite Myths and Legends* (Edinburgh 1956), 37, 123.

32) Frankfort, 43f., 171-174.

33) F. Løkkegaard, "The Canaanite Divine Wetnurses", *Studia Theologica*, 10 (1956), 53-64. Cf. the plaque from Ugarit depicting two standing youths being suckled by a goddess.

34) E. O. James, *Myth and Ritual in the Ancient Near East* (London 1958), 92-97.

35) Goff, 226-228.

36) S. Mowinckel, *Han som kommer* (Copenhagen 1951), 32f.

by goddesses with the imparting of two preeminent royal qualities, namely *strength* and *wisdom*.³⁷⁾ Following this clue we may turn to the case of *Gilgamesh* as typical. Gilgamesh's mother was the goddess *Ninsun*, "the wise one who is versed in all knowledge",³⁸⁾ and his father *Lugalbanda* was a mortal; thus "two thirds of him is god, (one third of him is human)",³⁹⁾ and, what is more, strength and wisdom are among his characteristics, as his friend Enkidu was told:

Mightier strength has he than thou,
Never resting by day or by night...
Gilgamesh, of him Shamash is fond;
Anu, Enlil, and Ea have broadened his wisdom.⁴⁰⁾

The mention of Shamash and other male deities leads us on to the question of father-gods and the teaching or imparting of wisdom to men. *Shamash* is portrayed as god of oracles, teacher, and judge. His interest in law and justice is evidenced by his appearance on the Stele of Hammurabi, though it needs to be remembered that he is not depicted as presenting the law-code to the king but as investing him with the regalia of ring and staff. With regard to teaching it is said of Shamash:

By the cup of the diviner, by the bundle of cedar wood, you teach the priest of the oracle, the interpreter of dreams, the sorcerer.⁴¹⁾

Enmeduranki, the first priest-king of Sippar is said to have walked with Shamash and Adad and learned divination from them.⁴²⁾

The connection between wisdom and divination is in evidence here. In the wisdom literature the divine origin of wisdom is asserted, as in the Counsels of Ahiqar:

Two things are pleasing to Shamash, and the third is most pleasing to him: one who drinks wine and gives to drink, one who guards wisdom, and one who hears a word and does not tell it. That is what is precious to

37) Contenau, 117.

38) *ANET*, 76, 81.

39) *ANET*, 73.

40) *ANET*, 75. Gilgamesh's companion Enkidu, *mirabile dictu*, acquired his wisdom through the agency of a female human, a "harlot-lass" who was sent to civilize him and who informed him at the end of his course: "Thou art wise, Enkidu, art become like a god".

41) Cited by N. K. Sandars, *The Epic of Gilgamesh* (Harmondsworth 1960), 25f.

42) Y. Kaufmann, *The Religion of Israel* (London 1961), 44f.

Shamash... Mankind is favoured by heaven, for wisdom comes from the gods. To the gods too she is precious. For ever the kingship is hers. She is established in the heavens, for the lord of holiness has exalted her.⁴³⁾

Divine wisdom is associated primarily with knowledge of the future and the power to determine the things that are to be. An ancient Mesopotamian myth written in Sumerian tells of a gardener named Shukallituda who acquired divine wisdom after lifting his eyes to the stars, whereby he was able to make a success of horticulture :

I gazed at the auspicious inscribed heaven;
From the inscribed heaven learned the omens;
Saw there how to carry out the divine laws;
Studied the decrees of the gods.⁴⁴⁾

Here we encounter the paradox of pagan mythology, as against the religion of Israel. Yahweh the god of the Israelites was the absolute and transcendent god who was in control of history; accordingly the Hebrew Prophets denigrated "those who divide the heavens, who gaze at the stars, who at the new moons prognosticate what shall befall you" (Isaiah 47 : 13), and denounced astrological portents and pagan idols as empty and impotent (Jeremiah 10 : 1ff.). There is no metadivine sphere beyond the knowledge or control of Yahweh, but in pagan mythology the gods were sprung from the same world-stuff as mankind and were subject to its nature. Accordingly, while we find a significant role assigned to the will of the gods in the cosmological myths, it is ultimately the power of fate which dominates the universe, and even the gods are subservient to its inexorable decrees. In Mesopotamia, at any rate, we find a contradiction in the beliefs concerning destiny, in that on the one hand the pattern of all things had been fixed and inscribed on the tablets of fate from of old, and on the other hand the New Year Festival implied an annual determination of fates. The wisdom of any god in the Babylonian pantheon was not so much a self-knowledge, that is to say an awareness of his own dynamic will at work in the world of men, but rather a special knowledge of an

43) P. Grelot, "Les proverbes araméens d'Ahiqar", *Revue Biblique*, 68 (1961), 178-194 (Proverbs 12 and 13 in Grelot's numbering). Cf. the Hebrew figure of Wisdom as a divine lady, discussed in my "Dio la Patrino" (The Motherhood of God), *Biblia Revuo* (Esperanto), 7 (1966), 11-27.

44) S. N. Kramer (see n. 28), 110-114. C. J. Gadd (see n. 9), 9f., suggests that divination is a more characteristically Akkadian than Sumerian practice.

order of which all the gods were a dependent part. The connection of water with wisdom is one expression of this dependence, water being necessary in the incantations of gods as well as of men.

It also needs to be remembered that wisdom was not the automatic prerogative of every single god; rather a select few of the members of the pantheon were the possessors of special wisdom or special knowledge in magic, divination, healing, arts, or crafts.

In Mesopotamia we find *Ea* as *bel nemeqi*, "the lord of wisdom" par excellence, although the same title is also accorded to *Marduk* in the wisdom composition entitled *Ludlul bel nemeqi*, "I will praise the lord of wisdom".⁴⁵⁾ Marduk's wisdom and strength were acquired in the usual manner, at the breasts of the suckling goddess

Ea and Damkina his wife dwelt in splendour.
 In the chamber of fates, the abode of destinies,
 A god was engendered, ablest and wisest of gods.
 In the heart of Apsu the Deep) was Marduk created,
 In the heart of holy Apsu was Marduk created.
 He who begot him was Ea his father;
 She who bore him was Damkina his mother.
 The breast of goddesses he did suck.
 The nurse that nursed him filled him with awesomeness.⁴⁶⁾

Ea, Sumerian *Enki*, is intimately associated with the Deep, water being the first principle and the abode of wisdom. Both Ea and Marduk were imagined as co-operating in the working of spells or incantations, and in many incantation texts we find Marduk consulting his father Ea and receiving the reply: "O my son, what dost thou not know, what more can I give thee? O Marduk, what dost thou not know, what can I add to thy knowledge? What I know, thou knowest also".⁴⁷⁾ Ea also taught the arts and crafts of civilization to men and he it was who provided the *deus ex machina* in the story of the Great Flood.

Marduk eventually supplanted his father as the god who possessed creative power and wisdom, and at various times and places he was worshipped as head of the pantheon. The same thing happened in Canaan where Baal took the place of El as king of the gods. By the same process *Nabu*, the son of Marduk, began to assume a dominant place in the Mesopotamian pantheon. Nabu's wisdom was especially

45) W. G. Lambert (see n. 15), 21-62.

46) *Enuma Elish*, in *ANET*, 62.

47) S. H. Hooke, *Babylonian and Assyrian Religion* (Oxford 1962), 17.

connected with the art of writing, he being regarded as the scribe of the gods and the curator of the Tablets of Fate. Nabu was therefore the patron deity of scribes and scribal academies. The Assyrian king Ashurbanipal thanked Nabu for his scribal ability: Nabu had opened the king's ear, made him into a proficient scribe, and empowered him to write down "the secrets of Nabu".⁴⁸⁾

This introduces us to the idea that when the gods impart wisdom they are said to open the ears of their suppliants or to give them an open ear. The idea of opening the eyes is also used in this connection, as in the Psalmist's request to Yahweh, "Open my eyes so that I may behold wondrous things out of thy *torah*" (Psalm 119 : 18) and in a proverb concerning the Sumerian school (*edubba*): "He whose eyes are not open enters it; he whose eyes are open comes out of it".⁴⁹⁾ The Sumerian word *geshtug*, it should be noted, means both "ear, hearing" and "mind, intelligence".⁵⁰⁾ Similarly, when it is said of certain Mesopotamian deities that their ears are open, the meaning is that they possess wisdom and understanding. Thus Ea, "the knowing one", is said to have "excelled among the gods his fathers, with ears wide open, wise, mighty in strength".⁵¹⁾ Again, in a remarkable description of the god Ninurta various deities are represented as being the several members of Ninurta's body, with Ea the god of wisdom as one of his ears.⁵²⁾ To say that a god had an open ear might also mean that he was keenly responsive to the prayers of his worshippers. In Babylonia Marduk was credited with four ears, while in Egypt steles consecrated to Ptah and other gods have two or more ears engraved on them. One such Egyptian monument bears the words "Ptah... the god who hears prayers".⁵³⁾

Thoth, the ibis-headed deity of Hermopolis, was the ancient Egyptian god of writing and wisdom. Scholars and scribes recognized him as their patron deity. He is depicted in the famous vignettes of the Book of the Dead acting in his capacity of divine scribe, recording the court

48) A. H. Sayce, *The Religion of the Ancient Babylonians*, 5th Edn (London 1898), 114f.

49) E. I. Gordon, "A New Look at the Wisdom of Sumer and Akkad", *Bibliotheca Orientalis*, 17 (1960), (122-152), 142.

50) Gordon, 123.

51) H. Frankfort et al., *Before Philosophy* (1949), 185.

52) Frankfort et al., 145f.

53) Bleeker, *The Sacred Bridge*, 57f.

proceedings of "the judgement of the soul". According to the Onomasticon of Amenemope Thoth was supposed to have written down the encyclopedic list of "all things that Ptah created".⁵⁴⁾ Because Pharaoh was also a god, it could be said of him by one of his chief ministers: "Now his majesty knows what takes place. There is nothing at all he does not know. He is Thoth in everything; there is no subject which he has not comprehended".⁵⁵⁾

El, the chief god of the Canaanite pantheon, was thought to be the venerable possessor of the highest wisdom, as shown by the following statements of the Lady Asherah: "Thou art great, El; surely the hoar hairs of thy beard are united to wisdom"; "Thy bidding, El, is wise, thy wisdom everlasting".⁵⁶⁾ El is favourably disposed towards mankind and in this respect he resembles the Sumero-Akkadian Enki-Ea. M. Pope has brought to light a number of similarities of this kind, pointing out that Ea and El are implicitly identified in Berossus' account of the Deluge, since Kronos (Ei) takes the place of Ea. Pope also argues for the identification of "the Deep" of El with that of Ea, namely *hršn* and *apsu* respectively.⁵⁷⁾ Proceeding to the Bible he suggests that the fallen god in the Prince of Tyre oracle of Ezekiel 28 is El, and that the phrase "wisdom of El" should be restored in Proverbs 30 : 3 on the basis of the Septuagint Greek version.⁵⁸⁾ While there is only one instance in the Old Testament of Yahweh being called "wise" (Isaiah 31 : 2), there is no doubt that wisdom is intimately associated with him.⁵⁹⁾ Thus in Job 12 : 13, 16 we find the two cardinal qualities of strength and wisdom attributed to God, while in the Quran Allah is likewise "the mighty, the wise one". In the religion of Israel, however, wisdom was the possession of Yahweh: no watery deeps or seas held it in their power (Job 28 : 14), but God graciously vouchsafes it to man:

54) A. Gardiner, *Ancient Egyptian Onomastica* (Oxford 1947).

55) Frankfort et al., 86.

56) Driver (see n. 31), 96f.

57) M. Pope, *El in the Ugaritic Texts* (Leiden 1955), 69-72.

58) Pope, 14, 97ff. Driver, 74f. renders *hršn* as "cosmic mountain". El was said to dwell "at the source of the two rivers amid the channels of the two oceans" (*thmtm*, "deeps"). Driver, 97, 109. Cf. Proverbs 8 : 24, where the deeps (*thmwat*) are mentioned, but here it is said that Yahweh brought forth wisdom before the deeps existed.

59) See further B. E. Colless, "Dio la Saġulo" (The Sageship of God), *Biblia Revuo*, 4, 3 (1968), 5-13.

Yahweh gives wisdom;
from his mouth come knowledge and understanding (Prov. 2 : 6).

The mention of divine knowledge leads us to our next section.

C. DIVINE KNOWLEDGE

In the mythologies of the ancient Orient we encounter all manner of benefactors of mankind *θειοι δωτηρες εαων*, who in primeval days imparted the concepts of civilized life to humanity. Such beings were either themselves divine or else endowed with divine knowledge, and even stormers of heaven were found in their number, such as Prometheus, who was the instructor of mankind in all the arts and sciences and who stole fire from Zeus. We should note at the outset that "when the Egyptians claim that Osiris, and the Babylonians that Oannes, gave them the elements of their culture, they include among those elements the crafts and agriculture as well as ritual usages. These two groups of activities possess the same degree of reality".⁶⁰) The divine educators imparted knowledge of all the arts of peace and war as well as the rituals of religion.

Oannes has already appeared in our survey, and it has been pointed out that this name, which goes back to the Greek writings of the Babylonian priest Berossus of the third century B.C., is now known to be equivalent to Sumerian *Uman* or *Umanna*. In the Berossus fragment relating to Oannes we read that he "taught them the use of letters, sciences, and arts of all kinds, the rules for the founding of cities and the construction of temples, the principles of law and of surveying; he showed them how to sow and reap; he gave them all that contributes to the comforts of life".⁶¹) Berossus describes Oannes as having the form of a fish but at the same time having a human head and feet under his fish's head and tail. This is the very guise assumed by the *apkallu*-priest in the incantation scenes depicted by the Assyrians. A connection between Oannes and Enki-Ea is evident. Oannes having reportedly risen daily from the water of the Persian Gulf and taught upon the seashore, doubtless in the vicinity of Eridu, the city devoted to Ea. Oannes-Uman-na-Adapa should be understood as the teaching assistant of Ea.

60) Frankfort et al., 22.

61) S. G. F. Brandon, *Creation Legends of the Ancient Near East* (London 1963), 111f.

In one Sumerian myth, which S. N. Kramer has entitled "Enki and the World Order: The Organization of the Earth and its Cultural Processes", *Enki* himself makes a world-tour in the course of which he institutes every important function of civilized life. Thus he appoints the brick-god *Kabta* to his allotted task and places *Mushdama* the master-builder in charge of building works. He also directs the plough and the yoke and makes the grain grow.⁶²) In another myth, in which the chief antagonists are *Enki* and *Inanna* (or *Innin*), subtitled by Kramer as "The Transfer of the Arts of Civilization from Eridu to Erech", the idea of divine instruction is not so manifest; rather *Enki* is cajoled, while under the effects of alcohol, into presenting more than one hundred of the divine decrees (*me*) to *Inanna*; the goddess quickly loads them into her "boat of heaven" and sets off in haste to make her city *Erech* a thriving centre of Sumerian culture. These *me* were the fundamental essences, the divine norms that governed the universe from its inception and kept each essential entity of nature and society functioning in accordance with the original plans of its creator. A list of these "culture traits and complexes", as Kramer calls them, occurs several times in this myth, and Kramer characterizes the contents as "various institutions, priestly offices, ritualistic paraphernalia, mental and emotional attitudes, and sundry beliefs and dogmas".⁶³) As an instance of *Enki*'s handing over an aspect of civilization we may note his presentation of the *me* of the healing arts to the goddess *Ninisinna*, who taught them to her son *Damu* (*Tammuz*), as stated in a hymn to *Ninisinna* as "great Physician of the Black-headed people" (the Sumerians).⁶⁴) The *me* are closely associated with the Tablets of Destiny, for when the Anzu bird stole the Tablets from *Enlil* every *me* became inoperative.⁶⁵)

In Egypt destiny was personified as the goddess *Ma'at*, "Truth" or "Justice".⁶⁶) It was the principle of *ma'at* that maintained the order and regularity of the universe. *Ptah* was the craftsman god and fashioner of gods and men: "He had formed the gods, he had made cities, he had founded nomes, he had put the gods in their shrines, he had

62) Kramer, 145-147.

63) Kramer, 147-152.

64) Kramer, 328.

65) *ANET*, 111-113.

66) Frankfort et al., 22, 119f.

established their offerings, he had founded their shrines, he had made their bodies like that (with which) their hearts were satisfied". So runs in part the Theology om Memphis, in which the Memphite god is made out to be the first principle and creator.⁶⁷⁾ It is interesting to note that the Canaanite divine craftsman was said to come from Memphis. This was *Kathir-wa-Khasis*, "the skilful and percipient", the builder of the divine mansions and the maker of Aqhat's wondrous bow, which was coveted by Anat.⁶⁸⁾ Perhaps the most important item in this regard is found in the Wen-Amon papyrus, where Prince Zakar-Baal of Byblos is represented as declaring that the God Amon instructed Egypt in craftsmanship and learning, and these were carried by the Egyptians to Phoenicia.⁶⁹⁾

For the remainder of our study we shall illustrate, with examples from ancient Mesopotamian texts and later Jewish-Hellenistic writings, the various aspects of Oannes' instruction, namely *arts* ("the use of letters, sciences, and arts of all kinds, ... the principles of law and surveying"), *crafts* ("the rules for the founding of cities and the construction of temples"), and *agriculture* ("how to sow and reap").

Some idea of the *arts and crafts* of early Mesopotamia can be gained from the list of *me*: between such ideas as "falsehood" and "justice" on the one hand and "wisdom" and "fear" on the other, we find "art of metalworking, scribal art, craft of the smith, craft of the leatherworker, craft of the mason, craft of the basket weaver". In Babylonia the scribal art was considered to be the most difficult of all the arts that Enki had devised and taught to humanity.⁷⁰⁾ According to Plato's *Phaedrus* the art of writing was an elixir (*pharmakon*) for memory and wisdom, which was supposed to have been passed on to the Egyptians by the god Thoth, who was credited with the invention of numbers, computation, geometry, astronomy, dice and draughts, "and most important of all Letters". This legend had echoes in the Greek works of the Jewish writers Eupolemus and Artapanus, who depicted *Moses* as the first sage and mediator of writing. Artapanus claimed that Moses corresponded to the Greek Musaeus, the Egyptian Hermes-Thoth, and also claimed that Moses was the teacher

67) *ANET*, 4-6.

68) Driver, 52f., 74f., 90-93.

69) *ANET*, 27.

70) S. N. Kramer, *The Sumerians* (Chicago 1963), 244.

of navigation, architecture, military science, and philosophy.⁷¹⁾

Enoch and *Abraham* were also credited with this role. In Jewish literature of the Hellenistic period the figure of Enoch the heavenly scribe has some features in common with Babylonian and Egyptian types. B. Z. Wacholder has even suggested that these Jewish historiographers saw a connection between Enoch and Oannes. At any rate Enoch is presented in the pseudepigraphical literature as a recipient of heavenly revelations, and if not the inventor, the discoverer and transmitter of arts and sciences.⁷²⁾ It was presumed by the traditionists that because Enoch was one who "walked with God", "God took him" (Genesis 5 : 24) in order to reveal celestial secrets to him. We find therefore that a major part of the apocalyptic Book of Enoch is concerned with his divine revelations and in the Book of Jubilees and in the Midrashic literature he is connected with astronomical and astrological matters: "He was the first among men born on earth who learnt writing and knowledge and wisdom and who wrote down the signs of heaven according to the order of their months in a book, that men might know the seasons of the years according to the order of their separate. months. And he was the first to write a testimony, ... what was and what will be he saw in a vision of his sleep..." (Jubilees 4 : 17-19).

One of the fragments of Pseudo-Eupolemus preserved by Eusebius illustrates further the theme under discussion:

The Greeks say that Atlas discovered astrology. Atlas is the same as Enoch, and Enoch had a son Methuselah, who learned all things through the angels of God, and thus we gained our knowledge.

And Abraham lived with the Egyptian priests in Heliopolis, teaching them many things. And he introduced astrology and other sciences to them saying that the Babylonians and he himself had discovered them, but he traced the discovery to Enoch, and he (Enoch) was the first to discover astrology, not the Egyptians.

Here Abraham is also credited with civilizing and teaching activities in Egypt, and in Phoenicia too, as we learn elsewhere.⁷³⁾ The emergent tradition is that Enoch had access to the heavenly tablets and received direct instruction from the angels; this divine knowledge was

⁷¹⁾ See n. 6 above.

⁷²⁾ B. Z. Wacholder, "Pseudo-Eupolemus' Two Greek Fragments on Abraham", *Hebrew Union College Annual*, XXXIV (83-113), 96.

⁷³⁾ Wacholder, 95f.; Schürer (see n. 6), III, 482.

transmitted to succeeding generations through his son Methusaleh. ⁷⁴⁾

Among the items in the curriculum implemented by Oannes we find "the rules for the founding of cities and the construction of temples". In the Babylonian creation myth the gods themselves are said to have built a temple in gratitude for their deliverance by Marduk. ⁷⁵⁾ This was Esagila, where the gods assembled at each New Year Festival for the purpose of fixing the destinies for the ensuing year. In the cylinders of Gudea of Lagash we read how this ruler, by the technique of incubation, received visions relating to the building of a new temple and including a plan of the proposed edifice. The goddess Nidaba appeared in his dream with a stylus of gold and a clay tablet depicting constellations of stars, which she studied in order to determine the most propitious circumstances for the task. Eventually the work was completed and, like Wotan and his company crossing the rainbow-bridge to the new Walhalla, the gods joyfully entered the new temple Eninna. ⁷⁶⁾

There are many comparable instances of building-plans being handed down from heaven. In the Bible we read of the pattern (*tabnith*) of the Tabernacle and all its furnishings being shown to Moses on the mountain of God (Exodus 25 : 9, 40). Ezekiel was likewise shown the outline of a new temple on a high mountain (Ezekiel 41 : 1-4; 43 : 10ff.). Similarly David is said to have had a plan of divine origin for the Jerusalem temple (1 Chronicles, 28 : 11f., 19). A striking parallel from more recent times is the revelation Birgitta of Sweden received concerning the Vadstena Nunnery, including detailed plans and descriptions of the church with its altars and furnishings, the garments of the nuns, the holy ceremonies and so forth. ⁷⁷⁾

There are a number of instances of divine instruction in *agriculture* which now invite our attention. The most ancient example is the Instruction of the god Ninurta, which takes the form of a "farmer's almanac". This Sumerian forerunner of the *Georgica* and the *Works and Days* purports to be a farmer's instructions to his son concerning the annual agricultural activities from the inundation of the fields in May-June to the cleaning and winnowing of the crops in April-May.

74) Wacholder, 97f. Cf. Genesis Apocryphon, II: 19-21.

75) *ANET*, 68f.

76) Frankfort et al, 205f. Goff (see n. 30), 253f.

77) J. Lindblom, *Prophecy in Ancient Israel* (London 1962), 34, 147.

The colophon to the tablet of some 100 lines shows that this is a case of divine education

The instructions of the god Ninurta, the son of Enlil. O Ninurta, trustworthy farmer of Enlil, your praise is good.⁷⁸⁾

In the Bible we find Yahweh presented as having an interest in agriculture, and in one passage (Isaiah 28 : 23-29) God is said to be "wonderful in counsel and excellent in (practical) wisdom (*tushiyah*)" and to instruct the farmer in the right way to do his work. In the later Jewish literature the theme of God imparting wisdom to Adam is a frequent one, and special instruction in agriculture is also found, sometimes said to be given by God but more often by the angels:

And in the first week of the first Jubilee, Adam and his wife were in the Garden of Eden for seven years tilling and keeping it, and we gave him work and we instructed him to do everything that is suitable for tillage (Jubilees 3 : 15).

In Bereshith Rabba 24 this instructional role is incumbent on angels, and in the Life of Adam and Eve 22 : 2 it is the Archangel Michael who shows Adam how to use "divers seeds" and "how to work and till the ground, that they might have fruit by which they and all their generations might live". In a Coptic legend of similar character the sanctity of grain is highlighted by the belief that it was made from God's own body. The precious wheat was passed from "our Lord" to Michael, who was to give it to Adam and teach him how to cultivate it. In the Syriac work known as *The Cave of Treasures*, Adam and Eve dwelt in a cave after their expulsion from Paradise, and God instructed them in some of the essentials of civilization, such as washing and clothing their bodies, the right things to eat and drink, and the use of wheat.⁷⁹⁾

Finally we turn to the subject of *warfare*. We have already stated that Athena was a goddess who gave instruction in this matter. The Great Mother is usually regarded as a goddess of the chase and of war, but Athena is somewhat unique in her use of strategy rather than blind fury. We have also noted the idea of the Jewish historian Arta-

⁷⁸⁾ Kramer, *The Sumerians*, 105-109, 340-342.

⁷⁹⁾ E. A. W. Budge, *The Book of the Cave of Treasures* (London 1927), 17-19, for this and the Coptic legend mentioned.

panus that Moses was the teacher of military science. This should be compared with the Dead Sea "War Scroll", where God is said to have instructed the "Sons of Light" in the manner of their battle against the "Sons of Darkness":

Thou also art he who taught us from days of yore for all our generations, saying: "When ye draw near unto the battle, the priest is to stand and speak to the people thus..." (War Scroll, X: 2).

This passage goes on to recapitulate Moses' instructions in Deuteronomy 20 concerning the preparation for battle.

Yahweh is said to teach warfare to the Davidic King: "He teaches my hands for war, so that my arms can bend a bow of bronze (Psalm 18 : 35). Elsewhere the king speaks of "Yahweh, my Rock, who teaches my hands for war, and my fingers for battle" (Psalm 144 : 1). An illuminating parallel to this is to be seen in an Egyptian picture of the Egyptian god Seth teaching Pharaoh Thutmose to use the bow and arrow.⁸⁰ In Israel's hopes, however, there would be a time when peace alone would be taught to all nations and they would come to the mountain of the house of Yahweh to be taught his ways: "Nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more..." (Micah 4 : 1-4; Isaiah 2 : 2-4).

D. DIVINE EDUCATION

We have now seen that the idea of divine education, that is to say the imparting of divine instruction, wisdom, and knowledge, is a persistent theme in the major world religions. Nothing has been said about the religions of primitive cultures, and this requires further research, though one would expect that the idea of divine education would be most developed in societies where the institution of the school is found. Not enough has been said about the religions of India and the Far East in this survey, and this question will have to be taken up elsewhere. Something should have been said about Brahma as divine knowledge, for example. Here we can at least mention the goddess *Sarasvati*, who is connected with wisdom, learning, and the arts and who is worshipped annually at festivals throughout India, especially by students. Indeed, one English scholar of comparative religion has

⁸⁰ S. Mowinckel, *The Psalms in Israel's Worship* (English translation of *Offersang og Sangoffer*, 2 Vols, Oxford 1962), I, 54.

asked "Why is it that Indian students who visit this country may wear European clothes and attend lectures on biochemistry, and yet keep a compartment in their lives where they sacrifice marigolds and rice to the image of a goddess? This goddess, Sarasvati, is consort of Brahma the creator, and though originally a river-deity, is now associated with wisdom and learning".⁸¹) More could have been said of angelic pedagogy, the instruction of men by angels, an idea associated particularly with Judaism, Christianity, and Islam; the angel Gabriel, for example, plays this role in all three of these religions.

It would appear, however, that the idea of divine education is more consistently presented in the Bible than in any other set of religious writings. Though all the Biblical evidence has not been discussed here, an analysis of the material shows that God is represented as giving instruction on the basis of a set programme of education, which involved formulated aims and practical methods of instruction and which was implemented with the help of specially selected teaching assistants.⁸²) Israel believed herself to be a people specially chosen to be schooled by God, so that she in turn might carry light to the rest of the nations, while the Church, the new Israel, the disciples of the Son of God, similarly saw their role as that of being a light to the world (Matthew 5 : 14) and making disciples of all nations (Matthew 28 : 19f.).

Egypt and Mesopotamia had their teaching deities, but in the literature available to us it is difficult to find them carrying out a coherent plan in the history of their peoples. The ancient Egyptians and Mesopotamians had a sense of the past and a desire to maintain the status quo, but Israel had the idea of history and the hope of the consummation of God's programme. The gods were themselves subservient to decrees of fate to a greater or lesser degree, but Yahweh worked out his own sovereign will in history. The gods gave spasmodic instruction to men at various times, but Yahweh undertook a continuous unfolding of an integrated plan of education by means of a complex of word, personality, and event. The gods showed their favour or disfavour towards men, often capriciously or arbitrarily, but Yahweh acted as a patient educator, instructing and correcting, showing his wrath when the pupils were refractory in their behaviour, yet always ready to restore a right relationship so that the education process could continue.

81) A. C. Bouquet, *Comparative Religion* (Harmondsworth 1956), 5th Edn, 55f.

82) See n. 5 above.

That Yahweh disciplined Israel needs no demonstration here, and it may be said that the Story of Aḥiqar and his delinquent son Nadan reads like an allegory of the history of Israel, with the servant Nabuel (who records all the teaching of Aḥiqar) corresponding to Yahweh's servant Moses.

The importance of the theme of divine education in Biblical theology is underlined by the fact that it occurs and recurs in all streams of Biblical literature, that is to say the Psalms, the Priestly literature, the Prophetic writings, the History books, and the Wisdom books, while in the New Testament all three Persons of the Trinity, Father (John 6 : 45), Son (John 3 : 2), and Spirit (John 14 : 26) are seen acting in the role of Divine Teacher.

In later Judaism the idea of the Heavenly Academy is found, corresponding to the college of scholars meeting on earth, and on one occasion Rabbi b. Nahmani was supposed to have been summoned up by the Angel of Death to settle a difference of opinion between the Almighty and his angels, as recounted in the Talmud (Bab Mez. 85b, 86a).

The idea of divine education has been built into various Western Christian theologies, such as that of Irenaeus or the Great Cappadocians; and in the works of Lessing (*Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts*, 1780) and Bähr (*Symbolik des mosaischen Cultus*, 1837), for example, we find various elaborations of the concept. Thus for Lessing "Education is revelation coming to the individual man; and revelation is education which has come, and is yet coming, to the human race", and for Bähr "According to the Divine decree and plan of education this people (Israel) was meant to become the bearer of the Divine revelations and the mediator of the true religion for the whole human race, and from it light and life was meant to come for all nations (John 4 : 22)".

The concept of divine education was not peculiar to Western theology. The Syriac-speaking churches of the East believed that this process was still in operation in their own day and age. Thus the seventh-century Nestorian author Barḥadbeshabba produced a book with an obscure title (*Cause of the Foundation of the Schools*), in which he declared that from the beginning of time God has imparted

83) Edited by A. Scher in *Patrologia Orientalis*, IV (1907), 319-404 (320f. and 325 for the meaning of the title).

knowledge of the truth to angels and men by setting up schools.⁸³) The first school said to have been instituted by God was for the instruction of *the angels*, then came consecutively schools for *Adam*, for *Cain and Abel*, for *Noah*, for *Abraham*, and for *the Israelites* in the time of *Moses*; then followed the schools of *Solomon*, of the *Prophets*, of the *Greek Philosophers*, where, however, some erroneous teaching was given, *the school of Jesus*, which was opened with the invitation "Take my yoke upon you and learn of me", in the manner of Jesus ben Sira it may be noted (Ecclesiasticus 51 : 23, 26), *the school of the Apostles*, and the *Academies of Antioch and Alexandria*; finally the author dwells at great length on the *Schools of Edessa and Nisibis* and compares the flight of Nestorian teachers from persecution in Edessa with the dispersion of the Apostles from Jerusalem, asserting that in both cases the result was the founding of more schools for the advancement of God's programme of education. Certainly the Jacobite and Nestorian educational systems were admirably organized and their Christian universities included in their curriculum not only religious studies but science subjects also. The teaching of Oannes was now imparted under the aegis of Jesus Christ, and the missionary expansion of Syrian Christianity into Central Asia and the Far East on the one hand and the preservation of Greek science in the Syrian Christian schools and monasteries during the Middle Ages on the other, seem to confirm Barhadbeshabba's belief in divine education.⁸⁴)

The question that arises out of all this is whether divine education is a viable concept in a modern religious world-view. There is no doubt about the fact that education is now a universally understood concept and one that is universally desired. It could therefore play a meaningful role as a category in religion, and this would not be a matter of forcing a foreign or anachronistic category onto the subject, but rather of highlighting the idea of divine education that is already there.

84) Cf. B. E. Colless, "Education in the Ancient Syrian Church", *Milla wa-Milla* (The Australian Bulletin of Comparative Religion), 7 (1967), 21-30: "The Legacy of the Ancient Syrian Church", *The Evangelical Quarterly*, XL (1968), 83-96; "The Place of Syrian Christian Mysticism in Religious History", *Journal of Religious History*, 5 (1968), 1-15.

ANIMAL-SACRIFICE IN THE BRĀHMAṆATEXTS

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Introduction

The animal-sacrifice ¹⁾ is a part of the Soma-sacrifice and is performed on the day of the soma pressing and -offering. Among the seven haviryajñas the animal sacrifice is also separately mentioned as a kind of haviryajñas and is named as Paśubandha (cf. GB I.5.7). ŚB XI.7.1.1 ff., we get a short description of the Paśubandha. The animal-sacrifice as a part of the Soma-sacrifice is, however, described in details by ŚB III.6.4.1 ff. ŚB XI.7.2.1 explains the distinctive nature of the Paśubandha by mentioning the two kinds of the animal-sacrifice as follows: "One animal-sacrifice is of the haviryajña order and the other of the soma-sacrifice. Of the haviryajña order is that at which he (the adhvaryu) brings him (the sacrificer) the fast food, leads water forward and pours out a jarful of water and at which (the sacrificer) strides the Viṣṇu-strides. The animal-sacrifice of the order of the Soma-sacrifice is that at which these rites are not performed". In the Brāhmaṇa-texts we do not get detailed description of the Paśubandha. Therefore, we shall see the description of the animal-sacrifice included in the soma-sacrifice only. The significance and allied problems of both of the animal-sacrifices are the same. Therefore they will be seen together.

Performance of the animal-sacrifice in the Soma-Sacrifice

The performance of the animal-sacrifice begins with the cutting and erecting of the sacrificial Post (*yūpa*) (ŚB III.6.4.1 ff.). The adhvaryu takes a straw and drives the animal up (ŚB III.7.3.8). Having made

1) For the description of the animal-sacrifice see A. WEBER, *Indische Studien*, X (1867 f) p. 344 ff. J. SCHWAB, *Das altindische Thieropfer*, Erlangen, 1866; A. HILLEBRANDT, *Rituallitteratur Vedische Opfer und Zauber*, Strassburg, 1897, p. 121; J. GONDA, *Die Religionen Indiens*, I, Stuttgart, 1960, p. 147 ff. My description of the animal-sacrifice is based upon the translation of ŚB by EGGELE in *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. 26.

a noose he throws it over the victim and binds it (ŚB III.7.4.1-3). Water is sprinkled upon the victim (ŚB III.7.4.4). The hotṛ having sat down upon the hotṛ's seat, urges and thus urged the adhvaryu takes the two spoons (ŚB III.8.1.1). Then the hotṛ recites the eleven āprī-verses (AB II.4; cp. ŚB III.8.1.2). These are the eleven fore-offerings (prayājas) (ŚB III.8.1.3). The adhvaryu takes the chip of the sacrificial post and after anointing both the slaughtering knife and the chip at the top with ghee from the juhū-spoon, he touches the sacrificial victim. Then he conceals the chip of the post (ŚB III.8.1.5). The adhvaryu orders the hotṛ to recite to Agni circumbient; then the agnīdh priest taking a firebrand carries fire around (the victim). He carries it around the place where the victim is cooked (ŚB III.8.1.6). Taking a new firebrand he walks in front of the animal. The animal is led to the slaughtering place. The pratiprasthātṛ holds on to it from behind by means of the two spits (*vapāśrapāṇī*); the adhvaryu holds on the pratiprasthātṛ and the sacrificer to the adhvaryu (ŚB III.8.1.9). In front of the place where the animal is cut up, the adhvaryu throws down a stalk of grass (ŚB III.8.1.14). They then step back (to the altar) and sit down turning towards the āhavanīya. The animal is smothered to death (ŚB III.8.1.15). Before strangling it the adhvaryu makes an offering (ŚB III.8.1.16). When the animal is quieted the sacrificer's wife is called. There she cleanses with the water the openings of the vital airs of the victim (ŚB III.8.2.1 ff.). With one half or the whole of the water that is left, the adhvaryu and the sacrificer sprinkle the animal (ŚB III.8.2.7 ff.). They turn the victim over so that it lies on its back. The adhvaryu puts a stalk of grass thereon (ŚB III.8.2.12). The animal is then cut (ŚB III.8.2.13 ff.) and when the omentum is pulled out (ŚB III.8.2.16 ff.) it is heated on the cooking-fire (ŚB III.8.2.18 ff.). The pratiprasthātṛ then roasts it (ŚB III.8.2.20). The offering of omentum is made in five layers: the melted butter, then a piece of gold, then the omentum, then again a piece of gold and then again the melted butter (AB II.14; cp. ŚB III.8.2.17 ff.). The priests then cleanse themselves over the pit (*cātvāla*) (ŚB III.8.2.30). A sacrificial cake for the same deities to which the animal is offered is to be prepared and offered (ŚB III.8.3.1-2). Then the animal is cut (ŚB III.8.3.3). The adhvaryu tells the śamitṛ (the slaughterer) how to answer the question about whether the sacrificial food is cooked and then asks that question and gets the expected answer (ŚB III.8.4.1 ff.).

Then after the basting of the heart of the animal with clotted ghee, the animal is taken between the sacrificial post and the āhavaniya fire (ŚB III.8.3.10). The adhvaryu tells the hotṛ to recite for the offering to the Manotā deity (AB II.10; ŚB III.8.3.14). Then the portions are made from the various parts of the body of the animal (ŚB III.8.3.15 ff.). Then the offering is made to Agni and Soma (ŚB III.8.3.29). In the interval between the two half-verses of the offering-verses an oblation of grass is made to the Viśvedevas (ŚB III.8.3.30). Then follows the offerings to the Lord of Forest (Vanaspati), Agni swiṣṭakṛt and the quarters (*dīśaḥ*) (ŚB III.8.3.31-35). The adhvaryu touches what remains of the victim (ŚB III.8.3.36-37). Then he makes the after-offerings (anuyājas) (ŚB III.8.4.7 ff.) and the pratiprasthātṛ the by-offerings (upayājas) (ŚB III.8.4.10 ff.) which are followed by additional by-offerings (*atyupayājas*) (ŚB III.8.4.18-5.5). Then the pat-nīsaṁyājas are offered with the tail (ŚB III.8.5.6). Then the avabhṛtha is symbolically done with the heart-spit (ŚB III.8.5.8 ff.).

This is the normal animal sacrifice in the normal soma-sacrifice viz. Agniṣṭoma. Variations about the number of the victims, colours of them, the deities to which they are offered etc. occur according to the desire with which those animal-sacrifices are performed. But the normal procedure is always the same in essence.

Significance of the Vapā-offering

The significance of the vapā (omentum) offering is connected with the generation and immortality of the sacrificer. Before giving details of that significance, let us see the importance and use of the vapā-offering. In the animal-sacrifice the offering of the vapā is very important. The importance of this offering is told as follows:

The gods obtained the heaven only after the offering of the omentum. The seers and men searching the place where the gods had performed the sacrifice saw the victim lying without entrails. Then they exclaimed, "The victim is just so much as the omentum". Thus importance of the omentum is maintained (AB II.13). The use of this offering according to ŚB III.8.2.29 is as follows — "Now as to why the omentum is offered. For whatever deity the victim is seized by him that same deity he pleases by means of the sacrificial essence (*medha*). Thus pleased with that sacrificial essence (*medha*) it waits patiently for the other sacrificial dishes being cooked". Thus the offering of omentum is a

small quantity of food given to the deities so that they may wait for the further food which is under preparation.

Now let us turn to the significance of the omentum-offering. AB II.14 connects this offering with generation and says, "The omentum is seed. Seed disappears, as it were; the omentum also disappears as it were. Seed is white; the omentum is white. Seed is incorporeal; the omentum is incorporeal . . .". Further we know how the generation takes place. The omentum is offered in five layers. "The man is also fivefold and disposed in five parts: hair, skin, flesh, bone, marrow. Having made ready the sacrifice in the same extent as is man, he offers in Agni as the birth-place of gods. Having come into being from Agni as the birth place of gods, from the libation with a body of gold, he goes aloft to the world of heaven." Not only the sacrificer is regenerated by means of the omentum-offering in the animal-sacrifice and obtainment of heaven is possible for him, he is also told to obtain immortality. "The libation of omentum is a libation of ambrosia (*amṛta*). The libation of butter is a libation of ambrosia. The libation of soma is a libation of ambrosia. These are the incorporeal libations; with these incorporeal libations the sacrificer conquers immortality". (AB II.14). Thus the omentum-offering serves to regenerate the sacrificer, helps to obtain heaven for him and confers immortality upon him. The importance of this significance of the offering of the omentum will be properly understood when we shall see the identification of the victim and the sacrificer and that the victim is also in some another context is said to be generated, goes to gods and obtains immortality when it is killed. This will be seen afterwards.

Establishment and elevation of the animal-sacrifice

In the Brāhmaṇa-texts themselves the problem of the nature and status of the Paśubandha was felt. Thus it is asked by the Brahmvādins "Is the animal-sacrifice an *īṣṭi* or a great (*mahā*-) sacrifice?" (ŚB XI.7.2.2) and it seems that the authors of the Brāhmaṇa-texts had to give to the animal-sacrifice a separate place in the form of the Paśubandha and in the form of animal-sacrifice included in the soma-sacrifice. In both the ways they established and elevated it.

The animal sacrifice was in the first stage as G. VAN DER LEEUW has observed, a sacrifice of the sacrificer himself, of a human being and then successively of other animals and finally of the sacrificial cake

which represents the animal (see further).²⁾ The animal-sacrifice was duly adopted and established in the Śrauta-ritual and was elevated. The fact that it was admitted in the soma-sacrifice itself is a kind of elevation as is often done by the Brāhmaṇa-texts. Secondly, the victim is connected with the soma in the following manner. "The victim, obviously is the soma (*soma evaiṣa pratyakṣam yat paśuḥ*). For if it were not offered it would be as it were a water-drinking. By means of it (the victim) the (soma-) pressings are made firm. In that they proceed with the omentum, thereby the morning pressing is made firm. In that they cook, in that they proceed with the cake at the animal sacrifice thereby the midday pressing is made firm. In that they proceed with the victim at the third pressing, thereby the third pressing is made firm." (KB XII.6). TB I.4.7.6 identifies the victims with the king soma (*paśavaḥ somo rājā*); cp. also ŚB XII.7.2.2 *paśavo hi soma iti*. The Paśubandha which is a distinct non-soma-sacrifice is also possible to have mystical connection with the soma if at the time of its performance the sacrificial post made of palāśa wood is used (ŚB XI.7.2.8). Further the prayājas of it are said to be identical with the morning pressing of the soma-sacrifice, the anuyājas with the third pressing and the cake with the midday pressing (ŚB XI.7.2.3). Thus the Paśubandha is mystically a soma-sacrifice. The symbolic avabhṛtha (sacrificial bath) which is a characteristic of a soma-sacrifice and is performed symbolically in the Paśubandha, is also for the sake of showing the connection of the Paśubandha with the soma-sacrifice and elevating it (ŚB XI.7.2.6-7).

The victim and the deity

The victim is sometimes connected with the deity to which it is offered.³⁾ Efforts are made to maintain similarity between the God and the animal in colour etc.⁴⁾ Thus the seventeen victims which are to be slaughtered for Prajāpati in the Vājapeya sacrifice should be

2) Cf. G. VAN DER LEEUW, *Religion in Essence and Manifestation*, London, 1938, p. 355.

3) For the idea of God himself as the offering material see e.g. J. J. MEYER, *Trilogie altindischer Mächte und Feste der Vegetation*. Zürich-Leipzig, 1937, III, 249; see also A. B. KEITH, *The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upaniṣads*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1925, p. 274.

4) Cf. HILLEBRANDT, *Rituallitteratur*, p. 121 (RAJENDRA-LAL-MITRA, *JASB*, Vol. 41, p. 178 referred to by HILLEBRANDT). H. OLDENBERG, *Die Religion des Veda*, Berlin, 1896, p. 357.

horn-less (*tūpara*), dark-grey (*śyāma*) and uncastrated males (*muṣkara*). These characteristics of the victims as well as the number seventeen have a direct relation with Prajāpati to whom they are offered (TB I.3.4.3-4; ŚB V.1.3.7 ff.). In the Sautrāmaṇī there is a reddish-white he-goat as a victim for Aśvins. The reason given for this prescription is that Aśvins are also reddish-white (ŚB V.5.4.1). Here also some similarity is expected. The victim for Agni and Soma in the Agniṣṭoma is to be of two colours; for it is to be offered to two deities (AB II.3). Here a numerical similarity is expected.

Though the Brāhmaṇa-texts do not mention directly, here it is indirectly implied that there is an identity of the victim and the deity. There is also another identity and that is of the victim and the sacrificer and we shall now turn to their identity.

Puruṣa as the victim (paśu)

The Brāhmaṇa-texts explicitly mention not only that man is a victim (*ṣuṣaḥ paśuḥ* JB II.42) but they also mention that man is the first victim (ŚB VI.2.1.18 — *puruṣo hi prathamah paśūnām*). ŚB VII.5.2.6 has this sentence with the following explanation — “Prajāpati created the animals from his vital-airs (*prāṇas*); a man from his mind, a horse from his eye, a cow from his breath, a sheep from his ear, a goat from his voice... The mind is the first of the vital airs; and in as much as he fashioned man from his mind, they say that he is the first of the victims and the strongest one (*vīryavattama*)”. For the *puruṣa* as the strongest victim see also AB IV.3.

Sacrificer as the sacrificial victim

The idea of sacrificer as a sacrificial victim is involved in the animal-sacrifice.⁵⁾ AB II. 11 gives the identification of sacrificer and the victim. “The sacrificial victim is in essence the sacrificer (*yajamāno vā eṣa nidānena yat paśuḥ*).” The animal-sacrifice then seems to be a substitute of the self-sacrifice.⁶⁾ The sacrifice is often conceived as a

5) Cf. G. VAN DER LEEUW, *REM*, p. 355; J. C. HEESTERMAN, *Ancient Indian Royal Consecration*, 's-Gravenhage, 1957, p. 161.

6) G. VAN DER LEEUW, *REM*, p. 355; KEITH, *RPV*, p. 273 f.

redemption (*niṣkraya*)⁷) of oneself and this theory is connected with the animal sacrifice as we are now going to see this.

Redemption (niṣkraya) theory

AB II.3 says, "One who consecrates himself, offers himself to all the deities. All deities are Agni. All the deities are Soma. In that he offers a victim to Agni and Soma, verily thus the sacrificer redeems himself from all the deities." Quite analogous is KB X.3. "He who is consecrated enters the jaws of Agni and Soma. In that on the fast-day he offers a victim to Agni and Soma this is the self-redemption (*ātmaniṣkrayaṇa*)"; cf. also ŚB III.3.4.21: "Offering-material (*havis*) is he himself who is consecrated. They (Agni and Soma) seize him in the jaws and by means of the victim he redeems himself." In the context of the Paśubandha which is an independent animal-sacrifice also we read: "When he performs an animal-offering he thereby redeems himself" (ŚB XI.7.1.3).

The victim is not only useful for redeeming oneself, it is also useful for prolonging the life of the sacrificer and even to have "immortality (*amṛtatva*)". Thus in ŚB XI.7.1.2-3 in connection of the Paśubandha it is said, "*Beneficial to life (āyusya) indeed is that redemption of his own self.* For when he is offering, the sacrificer's fires long for flesh; they set their minds on the sacrificer and harbour designs on him. In other fires, people indeed cook any kind of meat but these (sacrificial fires) have no desires for any other flesh but for this (sacrificial animal) and for him (i.e. the sacrificer) to whom they belong. Now when he performs the animal-sacrifice he thereby redeems himself... This flesh is the best kind of food. Let not an year pass by for him without this sacrifice. For, the year means life; *it is thus immortal life he thereby confers upon himself.*"

Application of the āprīverses is also significant from the *niṣkraya* point of view. The etymology of the word āprī is given sometimes from the root *pri* with the prefix *ā* or — incorrectly — from *pyai* with *ā*. Thus KB X.3. "With the whole mind, he (the sacrificer) gathers

7) For the *niṣkraya* theory see WEBER, *Indische Streifen* I, Berlin, 1868, p. 72 (ZDMG, Vol. 18 (1864), p. 275), S. LÉVI, *La doctrine du sacrifice dans les Brāhmaṇas*, Paris, 1898, p. 130 ff. SCHWAB, *Das altindische Thieropfer*, p. XIX. HUBERT, MAUSS, *L'Année Sociologique*, vol. 2, p. 134. KEITH, *Veda of the Black Yajus School Translated*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1914; p. CVI.

together the sacrifice. His self becomes empty as it were. The hotṛ fills it up for him (the sacrificer) with these verses. In that he fills it up (*ā-prīṇāti*), therefore, they are called āprīs.” ŚB III.8.1.2 has the same to say, but it uses the verb *āpyāyati* and the etymology slightly differs. There is, however, no difference in the significance of the āprīs. It is further (ŚB III.8.1.13) said that the prayājas at the time of which the āprī-verses are used are eleven.” There are ten vital airs in a man and the self (*ātman*) is the eleventh, upon whom these vital airs based. This much is the man and he is filled up completely.” (For a somewhat different but detailed account of the “filling” see AB II.4).

The redemption theory and the identification of the sacrificer and the victim can be seen in the eating of the flesh of the victim also. There was a controversy among the ritualists in connection with whether to eat the flesh of the victim or not. AB II.3 mentions the opinion of those according to whom the flesh of the victim offered to Agni and Soma is not to be eaten. The reason given by them is “Of a man he eats who eats of the victim for Agni and Soma; for thereby the sacrificer redeems himself”. This view is, however, to be rejected. The victim for Agni and Soma is an oblation connected with the slaying of Vṛtra (*vārtraghna*). By means of Agni and Soma, Indra killed Vṛtra. They said to him “By means of us you killed Vṛtra. Let us choose a boon from you.” “They chose the victim as the boon. It is regularly offered to these two for it is chosen as a boon. Therefore one should eat of the victim and should be fain to take it.” KB X.3 gives the same opinion of others with the same reason for not eating the animal; the answer is given to this view by showing the difficulty if this view is accepted. “Every oblation is buying off of oneself; he would not eat of any oblation, if he were not willing to eat because it is a buying off of oneself. Therefore at will one should eat.” According to ŚB III.8.3.11 some part belonging to the head only of the victim is not to be eaten and the reason given for maintaining this view is as follows. When the Gods, at first, seized an animal, Tvaṣṭṛ first spat upon its head; thinking “Surely, thus they will not touch it.” For animals belong to Tvaṣṭṛ. That (spittle) became the brain in the head and marrow in the neckbone... Let him therefore not eat that since it was spitten by Tvaṣṭṛ. Thus some part of the head of the victim is not to be eaten; but there is no objection of the ŚB for eating other parts of the animal.

The above discussion will lead us to conclude that the sacrificer was conceived as the first victim and then he was substituted by animals; but still the conscience that the animal is the sacrificer himself was not totally removed and therefore there were some thinkers according to whom the flesh of the victim was not to be eaten. Ultimately, however, concession seems to have been given for eating the flesh of the victim.

Significance of the sacrificial cake (Puroḍāśa)

We have above referred to that man as the first sacrificial animal was substituted by animals. It seems that there was some evolution in the use of these animals also which ended in offering the *puroḍāśa*. This evolution is mentioned in a story given by the Brāhmaṇa-texts. Thus AB II.8 tells us — The Gods first slew the man (*puruṣa*) as the victim. But when he had been slain, the sacrificial essence in him went to the horse. Then from the horse it similarly went to the ox; then from it to sheep; then from it to the goat. It remained in the goat for a very long time. Then it entered into the earth and through the earth it entered into the rice of which the sacrificial cake is made. Thus the sacrificial cake (*puroḍāśa*) contains the sacrificial essence (*medha*). There is then the explanation of the use of *puroḍāśa* in the animal-sacrifice. “They offer a cake in the animal-sacrifice thinking ‘Let our sacrifice be with the sacrificial essence; Let our sacrifice be with a victim whole’”. ŚB I.2.3.6-9 has the same story⁸) of the evolution of the offering material. KB X.5 says that the sacrificial cake is the sacrificial essence of the victims (*medho vā eṣa paśūnām yat puroḍāśaḥ*); cp. also AB II.9; 11; ŚB III.8.3.1). ŚB I.2.3.5 identifies the victim with the sacrificial cake by saying “It is an animal-sacrifice that this sacrificial cake is offered.” The details of the similarity between the victim and the cake are supplied by ŚB I.2.3.8 — When the cake still consists of flour it is the hair; when water is poured on it, it becomes skin. When water is mixed, it becomes flesh... When it is baked, it becomes bone... When butter is sprinkled, it becomes marrow... AB II.9 gives the details of the similarity between the sacrificial cake and the animal differently. “The chaff (*kimśārūṇi*) of it is the hairs, the

8) For the Story cf. WEBER, *Indische Studien*, IX.246; F. MAX MÜLLER, *A History of ancient sanskrit Literature*, Varanasi, 1968, p. 420; LÉVI, *La doctrine du sacrifice*, p. 136; KEITH, *RPV*, p. 459.

husks (*tuṣāḥ*) the skin, the polishing (*phalīkaraṇāḥ*) the blood, the pounded grains (*piṣṭa*) and fragments (*kiknasāra*) the flesh. Whatever the substantial, the bone." At the time of preparation of the sacrificial cake also it is shown to be a victim. Thus it is said to the sacrificial cake, "Have the skin (*tvacāṁ gṛhṇīṣva*)." Water is sprinkled upon the cake and then the flesh becomes covered as it were with the skin (TB III.2.8.4; see also 5). Then the remark — "Puroḍāśa is the image of the victim" (TB III.2.8.8) is very aptly made.

Thus it will be seen that the puroḍāśa (sacrificial cake) is the substitute of the animal itself.⁹) It is offered in the animal-sacrifice after the offerings of the animal are made. The puroḍāśa has a great scope in the haviryajñas or iṣṭis which except the Paśubandha in them are performed by means of the cake and without any animal. The sacrificial cake in the animal-sacrifice is an intermediate stage between the animal-sacrifice and the haviryajñas or iṣṭis (like Darśa and Pūrṇamāsa) in which no animal is offered. The puroḍāśa there substitutes the animal. The iṣṭis represent the last stage of the evolution of the animal-sacrifices and they also represent the well-developed sophisticated ritualism including no killing (*himsā*).

Another significance of the Puroḍāśa is mentioned at the AB II.11: The victim is not offered in the fire completely. Much of it such as hair, skin, blood, dewclaws (*kuṣṭikāḥ*) hooves (*śaphāḥ*), the two horns, the raw flesh falls away. This is made up by the cake. Thus the puroḍāśa has a compensatory nature, but this compensation is also made in connection with the victim and this shows that here also the puroḍāśa is supposed to be as much as the victim.

Attitude towards the animal-killing

While reading the explanations of the various acts given in the Brāhmaṇa-texts we notice that these texts are trying to sophisticate euphemistically the "killing" element involved in the animal-sacrifice. Though eating of the flesh was common in the Brāhmaṇa-period, the actual process of killing the animal was rather troublesome to some of the sensitive minds among the ritualists. The first signs of civilized man and sophisticated, euphemistic attitude are seen in the case of the

9) For puroḍāśa as the substitute of the animal cf. HUBERT, MAUSS, *L'Année Sociologique*, vol. 2, p. 40. G. VAN DER LEEUW, *REM*, p. 355. K. RÖNNOW, *MO* 23 (1929), p. 133.

Puruṣamedha where the puruṣa or the man is directly used as an animal but not killed. We are told in connection with the Puruṣamedha that those Puruṣas who are bound to the sacrificial post are to be set free after some ritual actions have been finished. While giving the etymology of the word Puruṣamedha it is said (ŚB XIII.6.2.1) “In as much as at this (sacrifice) puruṣas, worthy of sacrificing are killed, it is called Puruṣamedha (*yad asmin medhyān puruṣān ālabhate tasmādeva puruṣamedah*)” and thus killing of the men is implied in the etymology of the word Puruṣamedha. But further it is said — when Nārāyaṇa was sacrificing, at the time of the slaughtering the puruṣas, a voice said to him “Puruṣa, do not consummate these human victims; if thou wert to consummate them, man would eat man”. Then the Puruṣa set free the human victims (ŚB XIII.6.2.12-13). TB III.9.8.3 says “After the fire is carried around, the man and the savage animals are set free for the sake of *ahimsā*”.

Thus the doctrine of *ahimsā* which became prominent in the later Hinduism as well as in the Buddhism and Jainism has its scope even in the explanations of the animal-sacrifice given by the Brāhmaṇa-texts. In the sophisticated and euphemistic expressions of *himsā* the latent forces of *ahimsā* are not too difficult to grasp.

a) “cruelty” felt

It is very interesting, then to see how the Brāhmaṇa-texts indulge themselves in the euphemistic sophistication of the *himsā* or “killing” element in the animal-sacrifice. The Brāhmaṇa-texts reflect the sense of “cruelty” in the animal-killing. The significance of sprinkling with water upon the animal which is killed is to pacify that whatever “cruel (*krūra*)” has been done (ŚB III.8.2.8 ff). The significance of washing hands after the vapāhoma is also similarly told. “They do something “cruel” when they kill or cut the animal. The water is a means of pacifying. By means of it they pacify” (ŚB III.8.2.30).

b) no *himsā* in the animal sacrifice

At the time of carrying the victim, according to the opinion of the Brahmvādins, the victim must not be held on by the sacrificer; “For they lead it unto *death*”. But the Brāhmaṇa-text refutes this objection by saying, “Let him (the sacrificer) nevertheless hold on to it. For they *do not* lead the victim to the *death* but to the sacrifice” (ŚB III.

8.1.10). Thus here we find an obvious attempt to sophisticate euphemistically the killing, death etc. by putting the fact in somewhat different manner. Here also we find that the Brāhmaṇa-texts are trying to show that there is no killing, no “*himsā*”, no death; there is merely “sacrifice”. Here we get the origin of the later doctrine regarding the animal-sacrifice that the killing in the sacrifice is not killing at all (cf. Manusmṛti, V.39 *yajñārtham paśavaḥ sṛṣṭāḥ svayameva svayambhuvā. Yajñasya bhūtyai sarvasya tasmād yajñe vadho’vadhah;* see also Vasiṣṭhasmṛti, IV.7).

c) *not to see the animal being killed*

Further we see that according to ŚB III.8.1.15 even looking at the animal being killed was also to be avoided. At the time when the animal is being killed, the priests step back (to the altar) and sit down turning towards the āhavanīya-fire, “Lest they should be eyewitnesses to its being killed (*nedasya samjñāpyamānasya adhyakṣā asāma*)”. Thus even looking towards the animal being killed is avoided and this shows the hesitating attitude towards the *himsā* in the sacrifice.

d) *animal mystically protected*

From this point of view it is interesting to see how (even though the animal is ultimately to be killed) efforts are made for mystical “protection” of the animal. The adhvaryu takes the chip of the sacrificial post (*yūpa*) and having anointed the chip and the slaughtering knife at the top (with ghee) he touches the forehead of the victim with them. At that time he utters the words, “Anointed with ghee protect you the animals” (VS VI.11). For the chip of the post is a thunderbolt; the knife is a thunderbolt; and ghee is a thunderbolt. These three together he makes a protector of the victim; lest the evil spirits should injure the victim (ŚB III.8.1.5). Similarly the paryagnikaraṇa (carrying fire around) is for the protection, safety of the animal. “The reason why he (agnīdh) carries the fire around is that he encircles it (the victim) by means of the fire with an unbroken fence; lest the evil spirits should seize upon it. Agni is the repeller of the Rakṣas” ŚB III.8.1.6; cp. KB X.3). The same reason is given for the agnīdh’s walking in front of the animal with a fire-brand while the animal is being led (ŚB III.8.1.9). At the time of cutting the various parts of the animal, the adhvaryu puts a stalk of grass on it and says, “O plant, protect (*oṣadhe*

trāyasva)” (VS VI.15). For the knife is a thunderbolt, and thus that thunderbolt, the knife does not injure the victim. He then applies the edge of the knife to it (the plant) and cuts with “Injure not a blade! (*svadhite mainam himsīh*). For the knife is a thunderbolt and thus the knife, the thunderbolt does not injure it (ŚB III.8.2.12). Thus here we find efforts for protecting mystically the animal and these efforts are for the sake of euphemistic sophistication of the animal-killing.

e) *blood to the evil beings*

In the animal-sacrifice the blood of the animal is given to the evil beings.¹⁰) Thus ŚB III.8.2.14-15 it is said, “Where he skins (the victim) and whence the blood spirts out, there he smears it (the bottom part with blood) on both ends with the words (VS VI.16) ‘Thou art the share of evil beings!’ For that blood indeed is the share of evil beings. Then having thrown it away (on the *utkara*), he treads on it with ‘Herewith I tread down the evil being; herewith I drive away the evil being; Herewith I consign the evil being to the nethermost darkness!’” (VS VI.16). Thus here also in giving the share viz. blood to the evil beings protection (from those evil beings) of the animal, is intended. Now it is well-known that the idea of protection, removing away the evil spirits etc. is very closely connected with the idea of generation.¹¹) The significance of *yūpa* is also protection, removing away the evil spirits etc. (cf. KB X.1, ŚB XIII.6.1.4, III.7.1.2 etc.) as well as generation. (cf. the identification *yūpa* and *vajra* and the use of *yūpa* in the *Vājapeya*). In the process of euphemistic sophistication of the “killing” element in the animal-sacrifice, the Brāhmaṇa-texts are going to maintain that the animal is not “killed” at all; it is generated; life is put in it etc. This we shall see afterwards; before it let us see how in the process of euphemistic sophistication the Brāhmaṇa-texts try to change the words and express the idea of killing in an euphemistic manner.

10) SCHWAB, *Das altindische Thieropfer*, p. 132; OLDENBERG, *Religion des Veda*, j. 363; HILLEBRANDT, *Ritualliteratur*, p. 173, 176 etc. KEITH, *VBYT*, p. CVI mentions that this practice of assigning blood to the evil spirits is also found in the Greek ritual and refers to FARNELL, *Greece and Babylon*, p. 246; cf. also MEYER, *Trilogie*, III. 237.

11) Cf. MEYER, *Trilogie*, I. 136.

f) *euphemism in the use of the words*

Thus the Brāhmaṇa-texts avoid the use of the direct expression of “killing” and use some other words. The words like “Slay! kill! (*jahi māraya*)” are not to be used. “For it is a human manner.” The words to be used are “Quiet him! He has gone near! (*saṁjñāpaya anvagan*)”. For that is after the manner of the gods. For when it is said, “It has gone near” then the animal goes near to the gods.” (ŚB III.8.1.15).¹² Thus the change of word is notable for the euphemism in it. Again, the animal is not “killed”; it is “quieted”; it is not “dead”; it has “gone to the gods”.

g) *process of killing somewhat different*

The process of actual killing is also not without any euphemistic sophistication. “They do not slay it on the frontal bone (*kūṭa*); for that is a human practice; nor behind the ear; for that is after the manner of fathers. They either *choke it by merely keeping its mouth closed*¹³ or they make a noose” (ŚB III.8.1.15). Thus the way of killing is not the normal or profane one. It is a sacred one. The way prescribed would not allow any crying or noise of the victim for its mouth is closed. The reason behind this may be that the crying would perhaps disturb the sensitive minds the priests — who are sitting with the heads turned away and are not seeing the animal being killed. Because of choking, the possibility of hearing the noise of the animal is also removed to some extent. We see here also a kind euphemistic sophistication in the attitude towards the animal-killing.

h) *animal is made sacrificially pure (medhya)*

In the animal-sacrifice efforts are made for the sake of sacrificial purification of the animal i.e. making it *medhya*. AB II.6 identifies the victim with the *medha* (sacrificial essence) itself. But putting *medha* is so important that ŚB III.8.4.5 gives a general rule — “He alone may slay an animal who can supply it with the sacrificial essence (*sa ha tveva aśum ālabheta ya enaṁ medham āpnuyāt*)”. The significance of sprinkling water upon the victim is making it *medhya* (sacrificially pure) (ŚB III.7.4.4). By connecting the sacrificial essence (*medha*) purifica-

¹²) Cf. MEYER, *Trilogie*, III. 120, n. 1.

¹³) Cf. MEYER, *Trilogie*, III. 237, n. 1.

tion is made and the animal becomes fit for the sacrificial sacred plane where it is going to be killed and mystically revived.

i) *life is given to the animal*

As we have indicated above the next stage of the euphemistic sophistication process of the “killing” element in the animal-sacrifice is that sometimes we find that life is put in a mystical manner in the animal according to the Brāhmaṇa-texts. While the animal is being killed some oblations are made with the words “*Prāṇāya svāhā! apānāya svāhā! vyānāya svāhā!*” (VS XXII.18). Explaining this the Brāhmaṇa-text says “When they quiet a victim they kill it. Whilst it is being quieted he (the adhvaryu) offers (three) oblations with *prāṇāya svāhā* . . .; he thereby lays the vital airs (*prāṇān*) into it and thus offering is made by him with this victim as a living one”; (ŚB XIII.2.8.3). Similar significance of sprinkling water is given by ŚB III.8.2.7 viz. by means of sprinkling, *prāṇas* (vital airs) are put in the victim and it is revived (of course in the mystical manner). ŚB IV.2.5.16 says “When he kills the animal, he puts sap (*rasa*) in it”.

j) *animal becomes immortal*

Not only the killed animal mystically gets new life, it also obtains immortality. This is the significance of the use of golden pieces along with the omentum. “The reason why there is a golden piece on each side is this — when they offer the victim in the fire, they slay it. Gold is identical with the immortal life. Thereby it (the victim) gets firm foundation in the immortal life; so it rises from hence and so it lives” (ŚB III.8.3.26).

In this manner we find that the Brāhmaṇa-texts are interested in euphemistically sophisticating the “killing” element and this shows that the thoughts of *ahimsā* are very remotely appearing in the attitude towards the animal-sacrifice. We have mentioned above how the sacrificer and the animal which represents the sacrificer are ultimately identical. Therefore when it is said that life is put in the animal or it has gone to the gods or it has obtained immortality, it is indirectly connected with the sacrificer’s obtainment of life, heaven and immortality.

Conclusion

i) The animal-sacrifice has been connected with the soma-sacrifice and is elevated to some extent.

ii) The animal-sacrifice is a substitute of the self-sacrifice and the offering of the sacrificial cake (*puroḍāśa*) is a representative of the animal-sacrifice itself and forms an important stage between the animal-sacrifices and the haviryajñas which contain no *hiṃsā*.

iii) Even in the animal sacrifice remote traces of *ahimsā* are seen when we find the sophistication and euphemism done by the Brāhmaṇa-texts. The victim gets life, heaven and immortality and the sacrificer also gets the same results.

ABBREVIATIONS: — AB = Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa; GB = Gopatha-Brāhmaṇa; KB = Kauṣītaki-Brahmaṇa; ŚB = Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa; TB = Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa; VS = Vājasaneyī-Saṃhitā.

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THE ANDEAN CREATOR GOD

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The contemporary specialized literature relative to andean deities is not very numerous. On the other hand we have at our disposal a series of versions written by spaniards and indians between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; besides them we find other texts conserved by oral tradition, that have been collected especially in the last years ¹). However it must be taken into consideration that not all the chronicles of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are derived from original testimonies and their texts can be reduced to a few initial versions, gathered from direct conversations, that were later resumed or copied by other writers ²). It is through the study of the earlier chronicles (considering also the place where the author gathered his information) that we can achieve a representation of the oldest andean cosmogonic myth and of the creative deities prior to the organization of the Inca state in the fifteenth century. In the same sources we can find information that allows us to observe changes in the creative deities (and naturally in the origin myth) occurred at the same time that the state was formed. Finally, after 1532 when the process of european invasion and colonization started, we note a new modification of the myth of creation and of the deity, that presents itself roughly after the seventeenth century and lasts up to our days, in a new representation associated with messianic elements originated by the european presence. This last case can be seen in still extant oral versions that are in process of extinction.

In order to analyze the andean creative god, it is necessary to restrict

1) On the chroniclers of Perú in general see Raúl Porras Barrenechea, *Los cronistas del Perú*, Lima, 1962; Carlos Aranibar, *Algunos problemas heurísticos de las crónicas de los siglos XVI-XVII*, Nueva crónica, I, Lima, 1963; Ake Wedin, *El concepto de lo incaico y las fuentes*, Uppsala, 1966.

2) On this point see Aranibar, Wedin, Franklin Pease, *El mito de origen cuzqueño y la creación solar*, Amaru, 8, Lima, 1968.

ourselves initially to Cuzco, the sacred city of the Incas, for the main information which we possess is referred to it.

If it is true that the versions gathered by the chroniclers are many, even among those related directly to Cuzco that of Betanzos captures our attention especially. He is the author of a *Summa y Narración de los Incas* (1551) that interests us because it allows us to establish, in accordance with the writings of Pedro Cieza de León (1550), Cristóbal de Molina (1575, although we know of the existence of a lost previous work) and Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa (1572), the initial version of the cosmogonic myth known in the area of Cuzco that was found by the europeans. It furthermore allows us to establish, in accordance with other sources, the modifications of the myth since the beginning of the Inca state. Also, the chronicles that have been mentioned appear to be the least contaminated (with european elements) of the writings of the time³).

It is necessary to call attention to the fact that the versions of andean myths that we have in our possession are always of an only relative accuracy, for the spaniards that wrote them had serious difficulties — cultural and linguistic — in transcribing the oral versions existing at the moment of the european invasion. When those that prepared a written version were indians (as with Felipe Guamán Poma de Ayala or Juan Santa Cruz Pachacuti Yamqui Salcamayhua for example) we note an extremely strong influence of the recent christian and european mentality, and a notorious “conversion psychology” that unites to the social pressure exerted by the conquistadores to produce in them a speedy if incomplete process of acculturation.

THE CREATIVE GOD IN CUZCO

The oldest andean creative deity, that appears with different names in its ample area of diffusion is Wiraqocha, whose cult can be localized in the area that extends from the “altiplano” of Perú and Bolivia to the central regions of actual Perú, branching off to the north of Chile and Argentina and the south of Ecuador. To analyze this divinity it is necessary to restrict ourselves, as we have said, to Cuzco and refer to the

3) Juan Diez de Betanzos, *Summa y narración de los Incas*, Lima, 1924; Pedro Cieza de Leon, *El señorío de los Incas*, Lima, 1967; Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa, *Segunda parte de la Historia General llamada Indica*, Buenos Aires, 1947; Cristóbal Molina, *de Relación de las fábulas y ritos de los Incas*, Lima, 1943.

four versions that we have indicated, considering the early date in which these authors gathered their information.

The chroniclers from Cuzco describe a primordial creation by Wiraqocha who first created the sky, the earth and a generation of men ⁴). This first creative apparition is already related to lake Titicaca, from which the god emerged. In a later period the creator disappears (returns to the sky?) and the men — that still lived in darkness — sinned against him. This “fall” provokes a new apparition of Wiraqocha who again emerges from lake Titicaca and destroys the original human race, turning it into stone, and moulds with the same material the statues with human form that are found in Tiahuanaco. These statues are the “models” of the new humanity that is made to emerge from beneath the earth (from rivers, streams, hills, trees, etc.) by Wiraqocha in the four directions of space. Along with the new men Wiraqocha creates light, making the sun and the moon go up into the sky ⁵). After creating the new humanity Wiraqocha directs himself to Cuzco, approximatively to the north of lake Titicaca; on the road a forest is destroyed by fire ⁶). In Cuzco Wiraqocha “made a Lord to whom he gave the name of Alcaviza and likewise gave a name to this place in which he had created the Lord, Cuzco” ⁷). After this, leaving the world in a state of order, the god directed himself to the north and later to the west until he reached the sea into which he introduced himself along with his helpers, for they could all walk on water ⁸).

It is necessary to indicate that in the andean area a cyclic conception of time prevailed. It distinguished four ages, named in different ways depending on the places where the chroniclers gathered their information. Between these different ages periods of chaos must have functioned, that can be assimilated to the various destructions accomplished by the deities, apart from the primordial darkness. We find several

4) Betanzos, I; Cieza de Leon, V; Sarmiento de Gamboa, VI.

5) Betanzos, I, II; Cieza de Leon V (states that the sun emerged resplendently from lake Titicaca, with Wiraqocha); Molina, I, 13; Sarmiento de Gamboa, VII, 105.

6) Betanzos, II, 87; This chronicler states that the destruction was made to terrify the men, that did not want recognize the divinity.

7) Betanzos, II, 89.

8) *Loc. cit.*

kinds of destruction: by conversion into stone (earthquake?), water (deluge, flood) and fire. These are extended throughout the region of the central and southern Andes 9).

The chronicles of Cuzco allow us to establish an immediate relation between the creation accomplished by Wiraqocha in primordial times and the myth of the solar origin of the Inca state. In the oral versions collected by the earlier chroniclers mentioned above we can observe a continuity between the first creation and the apparition of the founders of Cuzco, recognized by traditional historiography as the first Incas: Manco Cápac and Mama Ocllo. However we must note that in these versions we cannot clearly appreciate the solar origin of the state (of the world) until the moment that Pachacútec, the great reformer remembered in the tradition of Cuzco, "orders" the world by solar disposition.

The Wiraqocha of Cuzco is presented in a human form (some chroniclers even suppose an identification between an apostle of Christ who would have arrived to America and the both peaceful and terrible image of the, occasionally bearded, old man with a staff or rod). He appears as a fertilizing god; his name and some of the interpretations that have been offered of it allow us to identify it with sea foam (foam of the water of life, fertilizing seed) 10). In the hymns dedicated by the colla chronicler Santa Cruz Pachacuti to Tonapa Wiraqocha, he is called "Lord of heat and generation" 11). However we should have to question if the fertilizing quality ascribed to the cuzquean creator god could not be a consequence of the transformation of the old creative deity into a fertilizing one, a fact that is evident in the substitution of Wiraqocha by the Sun in the Cuzco of the Incas, as we shall later see. Wiraqocha appears with solar attributes; some referred to him make him appear with the sun as a tiara on his brow. In some regions (as in Huarochiri) it is said that he follows the route of the sun, a fact that we have seen mentioned in Cuzco. Finally, as we shall later see, Wiraqocha must battle with the sun and is overcome by this dynamic new deity.

9) Franklin Pease, *Cosmovisión andina*, Humanidades, II, Lima, 1968.

10) Cieza, V, 12.

11) Juan de Santa Cruz Pachacuti, *Relación de antigüedades deste reyno del Perú* in Jimenez de la Espada, *Tres relaciones de antigüedades peruanas*, Buenos Aires, 1950, 220 and 306.

VERSIONS DERIVED FROM THAT OF CUZCO

John H. Rowe had already stated, basing himself on linguistic evidence for example, the cuzquean nature of Wiraqocha, as this name has no signification whatsoever in aymara, the dialect of the collas¹²). The *Tonapa Wiraqocha* mentioned by Santa Cruz Pachacuti can be considered a projection of the cuzquean divinity without implying *a priori* that Wiraqocha is an incaic term as Rowe believes. The well-known Ludovico Bertonio, author of the first aymara dictionary states that it means 'a wise man' "according to the incas"¹³); this can be interpreted as meaning "according to the quechua usage" as quechua is mentioned in the chronicles and documents of the first epoch after the conquest as equivalent to: the language "of the Inca" or "of the Incas". It has not been proven that quechua is a creation of the state and rather, on the contrary, we must accept the fact of its far greater antiquity. I furthermore think that the identification of Cuzco with the Inca state is an extended prejudice. It is only its last known occupant and the one that monopolized the references of the modified oral tradition a hundred years before the european invasion.

The *Relación* of Santa Cruz Pachacuti was written between 1613 and 1615. Tonapa Wiraqocha appears in it as the colla image of the cuzquean Wiraqocha as we have said. As he was not well received by Man, he provoked a deluge and destroyed humanity. He also destroyed an old deity in a cliff (by fire) and, as in the myths of Cuzco, converted some men into statues of stone at Tiahuanaco¹⁴), later proceeding to the north and then to the west into the sea, as in the previous versions. The text of the chronicle is full of christian influence. Santa Cruz Pachacuti appears to have been submitted to the authority of Francisco de Avila, a clergyman and extirpator of idolatries of the seventeenth century who also wrote marginal notes in his manuscript. It is important to emphasize, as Rowe did, that in modern Bolivia Tonapa is related to thunder and lightning and is the source of curative magic powers. Rowe states that although the cult of thunder and lightning is very old, this is not a sufficient basis for considering this cult

12) John Rowland Rowe, *The origins of the Creator Worship among the Incas*, Essays in honor of Paul Radin (Ed. by Stanley Diamond), 1960, 412, 416 *passim*.

13) Ludovico Bertonio, *Vocabulario de la lengua aymara* (1612), quoted by Rowe, 412.

14) Santa Cruz Pachacuti, 213.

of Tonapa as equally ancient; but this does not prove the contrary either ¹⁵). This contemporary relation makes us think that what has reached our days is only one of the attributes of Wiraqocha, that does not permit us to discuss its date.

Another version, different from that of Cuzco, but undoubtedly associated with it, is that which is presented by the clergyman Francisco de Avila in versions gathered to the north of Cuzco and the east of Lima, in the Huarochirí zone. In Avila's documents, the creator god of the last age of the world is called *Cuniraya Uiracocha*, creator of a new humanity and also he who has fixed the characteristics of animals. He creates by his word, as the cuzquean deity, and finishes his peregrination in the sea. A detailed analysis of the material found in Avila's documents leads us to conclude that we find in it a divinity similar to Wiraqocha that probably resulted from a diffusion of the cuzquean god. We even find information that allows for a relation to be established with the substitution of the creative god by the Sun, as can be appraised in the Cuzco of the Incas ¹⁶).

Pachacámac, god of the central coast of Perú, is considered to be a "son of the sun". At the beginning of the world there was no food for the couple that Pachacámac had created: the man died of hunger and the woman begged the sun ("Beloved creator of all things") to alleviate her troubles. The sun makes her conceive a child that is born after the fourth day of pregnancy, but Pachacámac tears his "brother" to bits. He does, however, occupy himself in creating nourishment: "But Pachacámac so that no one should complain of the providence of his father the sun he did not produce maintenance nor should necessity force that other than he should be given supreme adoration. He sowed the teeth of the corpse and maize was born, whose seed resembles teeth; he sowed his ribs and bones and yuccas (mandioca) were born, a round root that has proportion in its width and whiteness with bones, and the rest of the fruits of this land that are roots. Of the flesh, cucumbers, "pacayes" and the rest of fruits and trees proceeded; and since they neither knew hunger or grieved about necessities, being it owed to the

15) Rowe, 412.

16) Francisco de Avila, *Dioses y hombres de Huarochirí*, Lima, 1966. Avila presents four ages of the world and four gods that correspond to each one of them. Cf. Franklin Pease, *Religión andina en Francisco de Avila*, Revista del Museo Nacional, XXXV, Lima, 1970.

god Pachacámac that there should be sustenance and abundance; continuing in such a way the fertility of the land that never has the posterity of the Incas suffered extreme hunger" 17). With the penis and the navel of the dead child, the Sun created another son: *Vichama* or *Villama*. In imitation of the Sun Vichama desired to travel, and when he was at a distance, Pachacámac killed the mother and made the vultures and condors eat her remains, keeping her hair and bones on the seashore. Afterwards Pachacámac created man and woman and named authorities (*curacas*) to rule them. When Villama returned he searched for, and found, his mothers' bones, reunited them and made her come to life. He then planned a vengeance against Pachacámac, but the later, not desiring to kill yet another brother, sank into the sea, before what is now his temple. Vichama, furious, turned against Man and made the sun turn all the men into stones; after this had been done he repented and converted the previous rulers into *wakas* (sacred places, sanctuaries).

Vichama asked the Sun to create new men and the latter sent him three eggs of gold, silver and copper. Of the first the curacas (rulers) and the nobles (called second persons and principals) were born. Of the silver one emerged the women and of the third, the plebeians and their families. The chronicler Calancha, writer of this report that appears to reunite several earlier myths, then states that the indians of Carabaillo and Pachacámac down to Arica (in the north of present Chile) say that "the men that were later raised to populate this world and adore the gods and *wakas* with sacrifices, were raised by the god Pachacámac, who sent four stars to the earth, two male and two female, from which were generated both the noble and generous kings and the poor and compliant plebeians. Commanding the supreme god Pachacámac that these stars that he had sent and had returned to heaven, and that the chieftains and curacas turned into stone (previously) should be adored as huacas with offerings of drink and silver plate." 18)

In this manner we find in the coast a superior, fertilizing, and food-producing god that is perfectly delineated. The confusion with Wiraqocha that chroniclers such as Garcilaso de la Vega fall into, that has

17) Fray Antonio de la Calancha, *Crónica moralizada de la Orden de San Agustín en el Perú*, Barcelona, 1639, I, 412-413.

18) *Loc. cit.*

been pointed out by Karsten and Duviols¹⁹), cannot be set aside. This chronicler (Garcilaso de la Vega) has "christianized" the problem, within his general design of assimilating andean religion to christianity. Not only Garcilaso, but other chroniclers, attribute to the Incas the knowledge, reached by philosophical reflection, of the "real god" (the christian one); with that criterion they established an identification between Pachacámac and Wiraqocha. It cannot be forgotten that "Pachacámac" is a quechua word, as is "Wiraqocha"; the predominance of the former word in the central coast is ascribed to the moment of the incaic expansion of Cuzco²⁰). There is no discussion, however, about the quechua origin his name. His denomination before the cuzquean influence was "Irma" or "Illma", related to "Con" (or "Cons") another name of a superior coastal god that is not, unfortunately, as well described as the former in the chronicles. Raphael Karsten had already reached the conclusion that both words could be two different names of the same deity, Wiraqocha in the mountain region and Pachacámac in the plains of the coast of the Pacific²¹). The question could be asked as to whether both names of the creative divinity could not indicate the opposition between the world of the mountains and that of the coast, since we have to point out the "celestial" nature of Wiraqocha and the "chthonic" character of Pachacámac. The latter is referred to by some chroniclers as "lord of the earth" and of the "insides" of the earth, author of earthquakes, etc.²²).

The different names that the creator god of the cuzquean model has are related then to the different places from which the information was gathered. We have *Tonapa Wiraqocha* in the area of Collao, next to lake Titicaca (Santa Cruz Pachacuti), *Cuniraya Wiraqocha* in the area extending from Huarochirí to Huánuco, visited by Francisco de Avila;

19) Raphael Karsten, *La civilization de l'empire Inca*, Paris, 1957, XII; Pierre Duviols, *The Inca Garcilaso de la Vega Humanist Interpreter of the Inca Religion*, Diogenes, 47; Garcilaso de la Vega, Inca, *Comentarios Reales de los Incas*, Madrid, 1960, II, chapter 2.

20) Fernando de Santillan, *Relación* in Jimenez de la Espada, 58.

21) Karsten, 157 for example.

22) Santillan, 59; Garcilaso, II, chapter 2, 43; Sebastián Barranca, *La raíz Kam y sus derivados en el Kichua, como medio de investigación de la historia antigua del Perú*, Revista Histórica, I, Lima, 1906, 60 ff. It can be added that Pachacámac seems to fit into the type of "dema" deities described by A. E. Jensen (*Mito y Culto entre pueblos primitivos*, México, 1966).

we can yet add the coastal deity *Pachacámac*, with a name of notoriously quechua origin, to which some writers (Carcilazo, Karsten) assimilate Wiraqocha. On the other hand we find a series of places of residence, sanctuaries or sacred places (*wakas*) in which the deity "is" or is adored; these places are in some way or another related to Cuzco. In one of the prayers of Cristóbal de Molina (apart from other chroniclers) we find a mention of several Wiraqochas in Amaybamba, Urcos, Chuquisaca, Cacha, etc. ²³). These different names could correspond to localizations of the same deity throughout its area of diffusion: they are its "residences". The same can be said of the cuzquean Wiraqocha who is both multiple and ubiquitous ²⁴).

The andean deity creates from himself, by his word. There are indications that allow us to infer his androgyny, for a well-known hymn (or prayer) that appears in Santa Cruz Pachacuti says: "Oh Wiraqocha, Lord of the Universe / be thou male / be thou female" ²⁵). However we lack an appropriate version of this hymn in quechua ²⁶). The sexual duality appears in sculptoric representations that have been referred to Wiraqocha; a Chavín monolith described by Julio C. Tello shows two equal images of different sexes. "Insofar as it is an exemplary expression of creative power, bisexuality is numbered among the attributes of divinity" ²⁷).

Apart from this we can clearly discern the dualism of the andean divinity. Wiraqocha has both a beneficial and a terrible nature. Campbell noted that he is also a "Sun-god of the storm" ²⁸).

23) Molina; 39-40; Cieza, V, 10. The problems derived from the several translations from quechua can be revised in Teodoro Meneses, *Nueva traducción de preces a himnos quechuas del cronista Cristóbal de Molina el cuzqueño*, Documenta, IV, Lima, 1965, 80-111. There are also oracles in several places and the deities that occupy them correspond to the cuzquean "model" as for example in Pachacámac, where the god of the same name resided (Cf. Calancha, Santillán, etc.) and in Huamachuco where Catequil was revered (Religiosos Agustinos, *Relación* in Colección Loayza, Lima, 1951, 57 ff.

24) Rowe, 417 is of the opinion that these "Wiraqocha" localized in several places correspond to a "class of gods" that were called in that manner.

25) Santa Cruz Pachacuti, 220. Mircea Eliade, *Mefistófeles y el Andrógino*, Madrid, 1969, 136.

26) Joseph Campbell, *El héroe de las mil caras*, México, 1959, 142, 150 etc.

27) Julio C. Tello, *Wira Kocha*, Inca, 1-3, Lima, 1923, p. 188; Antúnez de Mayolo, Santiago *La divinidad en las culturas Chavín y Tiahuanaco*, Boletín de la Sociedad Geográfica de Lima, LXXXV (1966); Eliade, 137.

28) Campbell, 136.

THE CREATION BY THE SUN

On writing about the origin of the empire of the Incas the myth of solar origin, that appears in Inca Garcilaso de la Vega's *Comentarios Reales de los Incas* has always been mentioned. It is however important to remember that the four chronicles that we have mentioned at the beginning of this paper (Betanzos, Cieza, Sarmiento and Molina) were written thirty and forty years before Garcilaso's work. These same chroniclers describe the primordial creation as done by Wiraqocha and the foundation of Cuzco with a much lesser participation of the Sun, who in Garcilaso's version is the author of a "creation of the world" as he is the one who establishes a "centre" and founds the sacred city.

Betanzos offers a version according to which Cuzco before the Incas was a small village ruled by Alcaviza²⁹), surrounded by swamps (chaos). Once, four pairs of brothers emerged from within the earth: Ayar Manco (Manco Cápac)-Mama Ocllo, Ayar Auca-Mama Guaco, Ayar Cache-Mama Ipacura, Ayar Uchu-Mama Raua³⁰). Sarmiento de Gamboa even tells us that they were "children of Viracocha Pachayachachi, their creator"³¹). The four couples direct themselves to Cuzco in a long journey in which the males are selected in such a manner that after a series of prodigies Ayar Manco (Manco Cápac) reaches Cuzco and imposes himself over Alcaviza³²). Attention must be called on the fact that these versions — the oldest — only recognize in an isolated and secondary manner within the text the solar paternity of the founding heroes (we excuse, for reasons of space, a detailed comparative analysis of the texts at the present time).

On the other hand we can oppose to this version of Betanzos the well-known passage of Inca Garcilaso, in which the Sun makes a couple (Manco Cápac — Mama Ocllo) be born from the waters of lake Titicaca. He carries a staff of gold in his hand (the Sun in a mineral state). They journey towards the north trying to sink the staff in the soil and only achieve it at Cuzco, that is converted into the *centre of the world*³³). The chronicler describes in detail the foundation of Cuzco

²⁹) Betanzos, III, 90.

³⁰) Betanzos, III, 91; Cieza de León, VI, 15; Sarmiento de Gamboa, X, 116; XI, 117.

³¹) Sarmiento de Gamboa, XI, 117.

³²) Betanzos IV, 95-96; Sarmiento de Gamboa, XIV, 131.

³³) Garcilaso, I, chapter XV.

and tipifies the founders as civilizing heroes that incorporate maize to agriculture and organize mankind. It is convenient to note, however, that the chronicler notes — although in a perfunctory fashion — another two versions of the origin of Cuzco, one of them related to that of the Ayar which we have just seen. At the same time he states that the solar version belonged to the cuzquean elite, a fact that confirms the aristocratic nature of the cult of the sun and its novelty, factors that account for its rapid extinction after the european invasion ³⁴).

That the myth of solar origin presented by Garcilaso reunites elements belonging to the previous ones, can clearly be seen, as in the case of the origin in lake Titicaca and the settling in Cuzco. It modified the earlier versions by presenting the solar character of creation, that had barely been insinuated before, emphasizing the presence of the gilt solar symbol (staff of gold) that signals the *centre of the world*. This change in the myth and in the image of the god must be related to a process of solarization that is faintly perceived in the initial versions (especially in the coastal version of the myth of Pachacámac) and is coincident with the appearance of Inca civilization and the elaboration of a new world view by the priestly elite ³⁵). In the initial versions from Cuzco, that we have already seen, the founding heroes are confused as offspring of both the Sun and Wiraqocha. On the other hand we find clear indications in the chronicles in general of the substitution of Wiraqocha by the Sun at the time that tradition ascribes to the Inca Pachacútec in the list of kings of Cuzco, that is to say, at the time that undoubtedly corresponds to the apparition of the state, and the establishment, by it of a cult of the sun ³⁶).

The relationship with the sun appears then at a later date, at the moment that chroniclers identify with the Chanca invasion of Cuzco ³⁷). Traditionally the ascent of Inca Pachakuti as successor or Wiraqocha has been ascribed to the god synonymous with the latter. The reality is quite different: Pachakuti fights with Wiraqocha (priest of the god Wiraqocha) and is a solar hero. The battle is really between the

34) Franklin Pease, *En torno al culto solar andino*, Humanidades I Lima, 1967, 10 ff.

35) *Ibidem*.

36) John Howland Rowe, *Inca culture at the time of the Spanish Conquest*, Handbook of South American Indians II, New York, 1963, 104, *passim*; Maria Rostworowski de Diez Canseco, *Pachacútec* Lima, 1953, 101, 156, *passim*.

37) Pease, *En torno al culto solar*, 17 ff.

celestial deity (Wiraqocha) and the fertilizing god (the Sun). If we consider Pachakuti as the real initiator of the state, and note his quality as a solar hero, we can better appreciate the fact that the cuzquean myth of solar origin is more recent than that of Wiraqocha and not otherwise. In the oral tradition collected in the chronicles we can see a battle between the inhabitants of Cuzco, ruled by Inca Wiraqocha and the Chancas that lived to the northwest of the city, between Andahuaylas and Ayacucho. During the war Inca Wiraqocha declares himself vanquished and abandons Cuzco, that falls into the hands of the Chancas and is later recaptured by Pachakuti, a son of Wiraqocha that had been banished (the hero always starts from a situation of exile, ostracism or "from the other world"). Pachakuti re-founds Cuzco, for the *centre of the world* had been profanated and turned to chaos, and this foundation is equivalent to a new creation by solar influence for it is the sun that helps Pachakuti against the Chancas and, besides, this Inca is presented as a solar hero³⁸). After newly founding Cuzco (creating the world), Pachakuti displaces Inca Wiraqocha, who does not enter Cuzco³⁹). This can be interpreted as a displacement of the old ouranian deity by the sun, a new and dynamic fertilizer.

In this replacement of Wiraqocha by the sun, conserved by the oral memory of Cuzco, the first trace of the modification of the cosmogonic myth is found; a possibility that leads us to the myth of solar origin and is also related to the image of a fertilizing Wiraqocha that chronicles have also offered. It is as a result of the Chanca victory over Cuzco that we observe a rapid diffusion of the solar cult, accomplished by Pachakuti, and that the image of a solar state cult, that the spaniards found, is produced.

THE MYTH OF INKARRÍ

After the european invasion we shall note certain changes in the most important divinity. The conquistadores imposed christianity in the area of the andes, displacing the sun (it is not the first time in history that the sun is displaced by Christ), and during a long period of time, up to the last few years, it was thought that the evangelization that had

38) *Loc. cit.*

39) Sarmiento de Gamboa, XVI to XXX Betanzos, X, 137 ff.

started in the sixteenth century had been successful, barring some "idolatric" outbursts detected during the colonial period. However, new studies and information gathered in peasant zones have led to modify this view entirely, discovering an active native religious life in the andean area, even in our own days.

In 1956 José María Arguedas published for the first time the text of the myth of Inkarrí, gathered in an accultured indian community of the department of Ayacucho. That the origin of this myth could be traced back into the seventeenth century can be inferred from the references that appear in it that can be confronted with those of Guamán Poma de Ayala, for example, and some paintings of the cuzquean school of that century⁴⁰). The wamani (mountains) are second gods, from them is born the water that makes life possible. The first god is Inkarrí, offspring of the Sun and a savage woman. He is the maker of everything that exists on earth. He tied the Sun to the summit of mount Osquonta and locked up the wind in order to conclude his creation. He then decided to found the city of Cuzco and threw a staff of gold from the peak, intending to found the city in the place where the staff fell (they say that the staff fell in the plain of Quellcata that "could have been Cuzco". Inkarrí was captured by the spanish king ("The Inka of the spaniards captured Inkarrí, his equal"); he was later decapitated. The head of the god was taken to Cuzco and his body is slowly growing under the earth. As he has no power his laws are not obeyed and his will is not accomplished. When the body of Inkarrí is complete he will return, and that day will be the Day of Judgment. As proof that Inkarrí is in Cuzco the birds of the coast sing "In Cuzco the King" or "Go to Cuzco"⁴¹).

A series of elements connected to previous versions can be appraised in this narrative. The identification of the *centre of the world* persists as also the archetypical image of the Inca, (In Canas, in our days, *Inca*

40) Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala, *Nueva coronica y buen gobierno*, Paris, 1936 indicates that Atahualpa, the last Inca could have been decapitated cf. for example, p. 391; Cf. Luis E. Valcárcel, *Final de Tawantinsuyo*, Revista del Museo Nacional, II 2, Lima, 1933.

41) José María Arguedas, *Puquio una cultura en proceso de cambio* in L. E. Valcárcel, et al., *Estudios sobre la cultura actual del Perú*, Lima, 1964, 299 ff. In this study three different versions of the myth in Puquio are presented. There are similar ones in other places.

has the meaning of *original model of all things* ⁴²) that turns into a creator (Inkarri is the first god). The symbolic image of the sun represented in the staff of gold that signals Cuzco also appears. Inkarri is the Inca (any Inca, although in the myth he is identified with Atahualpa, the last ruler, executed by the spaniards); he is the son of the Sun (of the sky?) and a savage woman (the earth before "being ordered") and because of this Inkarri is perfect and immutable, the archetype of all that has been created, he is the "ordered" world, where he is found, cosmos is established. From this we can easily infer that as his body is recomposing itself *under the earth*, the cosmos is underneath the world in the andean world of today, while what exists upon the earth (our historical life) is chaos. The inhabitant of the andean world is awaiting a future messianic redemption that will make him live in a cosmos again when Inkarri returns to the surface and to life ⁴³). Undoubtedly related to this is the fact that all religious life being underground (actual residence of Inkarri) the wamani, mentioned in the myth, is a chthonic deity. This myth apparently confirms the fact that, historically, andean divinities have evolved from a celestial nature to a chthonic one. We observe firstly, that the god Wiraqocha appeared as clearly celestial and as a superior god, evolving later into the distinct nature of a fertilizing god. Pachacámac, coastal god assimilated to Wiraqocha, in which the fertilizing quality is more evident than in the later, is already a chthonic deity, and this feature is strongly stressed in Inkarri.

The brief evaluation of existing material that we have just presented, only attempts to offer a clearer image of the andean superior deity, endeavouring to precise changes in the image of the god, originated simultaneously with the cuzquean state and to trace them subsequently to the european invasion of the Andes. It is necessary to prepare a far larger study that should consider with more detail the structure of the andean cosmogonic myth. It will be urgent to work a great deal more in the recollection of contemporary oral traditions that could complete the information given to us by the chroniclers. Unfortunately we cannot count on, or even hope to count for the future, with "documents"; texts

42) José María Arguedas "*Taki Parwa*" y la poesía quechua de la República, Letras Peruanas, IV, 12, Lima, august 1965.

43) Onorio Ferrero, *Significado e implicaciones universales de un mito peruano*, Sociología, I, Lima, 1967, 3 ff.

written in the moments prior to the european invasion. We will then always have to depend on the unreliable information of the chroniclers and try to reach, through them and oral texts, the understanding of the cosmogonic myth and the image of the deity as a step towards later studying the religious life of the central Andes.

CONSCIENCE IN GREEK STOICISM

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It has often been assumed, uncritically, that the concept of conscience was developed by the Stoics or that it played an important role in their thinking ¹). This paper will examine the development of the concept of conscience in Greek culture with particular attention to the role of conscience in Stoic thought. Primarily, this will be a study of use of the term *syneidesis* and cognate forms. Whether there are literary expressions of the notion of conscience before the use of *syneidesis* for this purpose depends on the definition of conscience which one is using. In assessing the significance of ancient myths, especially the myth of the Erinyes or Furies, Friedrich Zucker interprets conscience as an internal conflict. Consequently, he does not find the fact of conscience expressed before the Hellenistic period ²). Zucker sees the beginnings of the concept of conscience in the early fifth century when recognition of intention became important in judging an act, but only in the popular ethics of the fourth century with its stress on shame and deliberate willing does he recognize the developed notion of conscience ³). Bruno Snell thinks of conscience mainly as reflexive thinking about one's moral life, so he finds signs of conscience in the fifth century ⁴). Others find expressions of conscience in the earliest expressions of moral awareness and shame for evil deeds ⁵). It is with

1) Geddes MacGregor, *Introduction to Religious Philosophy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959), p. 132; William Sanday and Arthur C. Headlam, *The Epistle to the Romans* (New York: Scribner's, 1903), p. 61; T. R. Glover, *Paul of Tarsus* (New York: George H Doran, 1925), p. 21f; *et al.*

2) Friedrich Zucker, *Syneidēsis-Conscientia: Ein Versuch zur Geschichte des sittlichen Bewusstseins im griechen-romischen Altertum* (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1928), p. 5.

3) Zucker, p. 12f.

4) Bruno Snell, Review of *Syneidēsis-Conscientia* by F. Zucker, *Gnomon* VI (1930), pp. 21-30.

5) C. Spicq, „La conscience dans le Nouveau Testament”, *Revue Biblique*, XLVII (1938), p. 53; also Hans Böhlig, „Das Gewissen bei Seneka und Paulus”, *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, LXXXVII (1914), p. 12.

the development of the terms *syneidesis* and *syneidos* that a concept of conscience is given clear literary expression; therefore it is to the examination of these items that we must turn our attention.

I

Syneidēsis is derived from the verb *synoida*, a compound of *oida* (*eidenai*), which means to know immediately or intuitively, as opposed to acquiring knowledge through reasoning (*noein*)⁶). This sense of the verb continues to be basic to the meaning of the nouns *syneidēsis*, *synesis*, and *syneidos*. Conscience is a form of knowing.

The prefix *syn*-meant at first community of knowledge, such as a witness, confidant, or accomplice would have⁷). There are examples of this meaning of *synoida* in Sophocles, Xenophon, and Plutarch. From this use developed the meaning "to know with oneself," which is expressed with or without use of a reflexive pronoun. The basic meaning of the noun and of the verbal phrase is "consciousness" (of any fact, including one with moral import.). *Synoida* meaning simply to be aware, is found in Euripides, Aristophanes, Xenophon and Plato. The peculiarly moral significance of *syneidēsis* and cognate terms developed gradually, and was never the only use. Even when *syneidēsis* meant the moral consciousness, the original meaning of consciousness or awareness was basic to the meaning of the term.

The verb *synoida* is used to express awareness of evil deeds in Euripides (*Orestes* 395f) and of innocence in Antiphanes ap. Stobaeus (*Florilegium* iii.24) and in Isocrates (*Nicocles* 59 and *To Philip* 79).

In *Apology* 24, Xenophon pictures Socrates as using the reflexive construction of *synoida* for awareness of evil, and Stobaeus (*Florilegium* iii.24) quotes him as using *syneidos* for consciousness of innocence. In *Apology* 21B, Xenophon has Socrates using the reflexive construction of the verb for knowledge of a non-moral matter, viz. that he is not wise. In Plato the verb is used with the reflexive pronoun for knowledge of both moral and non-moral matters. It is clear that

6) Gertrud Jung, „*Syneidēsis, Conscientia, Bewusstsein*“, *Archiv für die Gesamte Psychologie*, LXXXIX (1933), p. 526; H. A. P. Ewald, *De Vocis Syneidēsis apud Scriptores Novi Testamenti VI ac Potestate* (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1883), p. 2f; H. Osborne, „*Syneidēsis*“, *The Journal of Theological Studies*, XXXII (1931), p. 170; Spicq, p. 56, n. 1.

7) C. A. Pierce, *Conscience in the New Testament* (London: SCM Press, 1955), p. 18, Snell, p. 25f; Osborne, p. 170; Spicq, p. 56, n. 1; Jung, p. 526.

the moral consciousness is expressed in *Symposium* 216B and *Republic* 331A, but there is no distinctive word for it, and knowledge of morally significant matters does not seem to be sharply distinguished from consciousness of other matters. Aristotle uses *synoida* with non-moral reference, and he does not use the term in the few places in which he speaks of moral shame and subjective judgment of character.

The first definite literary use of *syneidēsis* was by Democritus (fragment 297 Diels) and Chrysippus (Diogenes Laertius vii.85) who do not use the term in an ethical sense. Uses of *syneidēsis* attributed to earlier writers are spurious or come from the Hellenistic era. After these non-moral uses of *syneidēsis* in the fifth and fourth centuries, the term dropped from sight until near the beginning of the Christian era.

Syneidēsis reappeared in literature of the Hellenistic period, and now with an ethical connotation. My study indicates that *syneidēsis* and *syneidos* had the same meaning, but more style conscious writers such as Josephus, Philo, Simplicius, and Plutarch prefer *syneidos*, while *Wisdom of Solomon*, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Diodorus Siculus use *syneidēsis*.

The Hellenistic concern for ethics and the individual's inner attitudes fostered the development of the concept of conscience. The term *syneidēsis* and its cognates were used in reference to both ethical and non-ethical matters. The Greeks did not distinguish between conscience and consciousness as speakers of English do. The ethical and non-ethical aspects (which are distinguished by the English word "conscience") were conveyed by the same word, and only the context indicated the moral quality of the object of the consciousness. This shows that *syneidēsis* was basically a form of awareness or knowing.

II

The nature of *syneidēsis* and *syneidos* was indicated by various metaphors and similes, most of them related to the law court, e.g. judge, witness, accuser, and punisher. Other metaphors were inner watcher and child's nurse.

Especially in Philo, who uses the full range of metaphors from the law court, with the exception of the metaphor of punisher, do we find rich suggestions as to the nature and working of *syneidēsis*. He speaks of standing convicted in the law court (*dikastērion*) of the *syneidos*

(*In Flaccum* 7). *Syneidos* is compared to a judge (*dikastes*) in *De Opificio Mundi* 128. In *Quod Deus Immutabilis Sit* 128, voluntary sins are "convicted by a judge within the soul" ⁸).

Philo employs the metaphor of accuser (*kategoros*) in the passage just cited and in *De Decalogo* 87. He uses the metaphor of the witness (*martys*) in *Quod Deterior Potiori Insidiari Soleat* 23. Polybius xviii. 43.13 refers to knowledge (*synesis*) as both accuser and witness, and Josephus (*Against Apion* ii.218) used the metaphor of the witness.

Philo's most common metaphor is that of the scrutinizer, reprover or convicter (perhaps the prosecuting attorney). Almost half of his uses of *syneidos* relate it to *elegchos* or *elegchō*. Examples are *De Ebrietate* 125, *De Confusione Linguarum* 121, and *De Specialibus Legibus* iii.54. Clearly, Philo saw the *syneidos* as that within man which convicts him of his evil.

The *syneidēsis* is seen as the punisher in Diodorus Siculus iv.65.7, who substitutes it for the punishing Erinyes.

Isocrates pictures the *syneidēsis* as an observer of man's inner life (*To Demonicus* 16).

The fragment (Schweighäuser 97) incorrectly attributed to Epictetus compares the *syneidēsis* to a child's nurse (*paidagōgos*) :

When we are children our parents deliver us to a paedagogue to take care on all occasions that we suffer no harm. But when we are become men, God delivers us to our innate conscience (*syneidēsis*) to take care of us. This guardianship we must in no way despise, for we shall displease God and be enemies of our own conscience. ⁹)

The picture we get from these metaphors is of a part of man's make-up which is aware of his deeds, and even more, is aware that they are ethically significant. I cannot agree with Osborne, who holds that *syneidēsis* is never used for the "abstract faculty" of conscience, but always for some concrete example of moral awareness ¹⁰). The pseudo-Epictetus passage quoted above clearly suggests a permanent faculty. Numerous other passages refer to *syneidēsis* as a faculty within man,

8) Trans. F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker, "The Loeb Classical Library", Vol. II (London: William Heinemann, 1924-1941), p. 74f.

9) Epictetus, *The Discourses*, with the *Encheiridion* and Fragments, translated George Long (New York: T.Y. Crowell, 1885), p. 433f.

10) Osborne, pp. 171, 174.

e.g. Dionysius of Halicarnassus *De Thucydide* viii.3¹¹) (which Kähler cites in this connection),¹²) *Wisdom of Solomon* 17:10 and the *Orphic Hymn* 62. Very clear evidence that *syneidos* was a faculty is found in Philo *De Opificio Mundi* 128, which speaks of conscience as “established in the soul like a judge,”¹³) and *Quod Deterius Potiori Insidiari Soleat* 23, in which Philo calls conscience “the man” (*o anthrōpos*) dwelling in each soul. Josephus (*Antiquities* xvi.4.2) tells of two boys who knew of their innocence in the *syneidos* (*eidon ev tō syneidoti*).

We find *syneidos* used in reference to the acts of another person¹⁴) in Demosthenes *De Corona* 110 (for shared knowledge of a man’s conduct of public office) and in Plutarch *Publicola* iv.4 (for knowledge which the slave Vindicius had of a plot in which he was not involved). It may be argued on sound grounds that in these passages *syneidos* means simply shared knowledge. In both cases, however, the conduct involved has ethical import, and especially in *De Corona* 110 the conduct is both known and evaluated. We must remember that the Greeks made no sharp distinction between the ethical and non-ethical uses of *syneidos*. In all cases it was a form of knowing.

The most frequent use of *syneidēsis* was in reference to a bad or reproving conscience, but *syneidēsis* occasionally referred to a good or approving conscience¹⁵). Josephus (*Against Apion* 11.218) tells of the witness of the *syneidos* to those who have kept the law. Philo (*Quis*

11) *kratiston de pantōn to mēden ekousiōs pseudesthai mēde miainein tēn autou syneidēsin*.

12) Martin Kähler, *Das Gewissen*, Pt. 1 (Holle: Julius Frick, 1878), p. 33.

13) “The Loeb Classical Library.” Vol. I. p. 100.

14) Osborne holds that *syneidēsis* “always refers to the ethical reactions of the subject to himself” (p. 174). Pierce denies that *syneidēsis* judged the conduct or character of other persons. Pierce holds that when *syneidēsis* has an ethical connotation, it represents *synoida emauto* (the verb and reflexive pronoun) and that its meaning is governed by the implied reflexive construction (pp. 32f, 42f). Pierce does not demonstrate that the reflexive construction is implied in every moral use of *syneidēsis*, and he recognizes that this is not the case with non-moral uses of the word (pp. 29, 143). There is no basis for holding that *syneidēsis* has a distinctly different use when the object of awareness has moral significance. It is clear from Plato *Apology* 21B and *Symposium* 216A that *synoida emauto* has no special ethical connotation.

15) Pierce ignores the evidence in Josephus and Philo passages cited in this paper. He rejects other references to a good conscience on the grounds that they are negative statements about moral badness, therefore the “content” of conscience is badness p. 25f). This seems to me quite irrelevant and misleading.

Rerum Divinarum Heres 7) tells of the *syneidos* judging a servant of God to have been loyal. A clear instance of good conscience is seen in Epictetus iii.22.94, in which the approving *syneidos* of the Cynic is considered the source of his power. In Josephus *Antiquities* xvi.4.2, innocence is known in the *syneidos*. The phrase "good conscience" (*agathē syneidēsis* or *agathon syneidos*) is found in Herodian *History* vi.3.4 and Pausanias *Description of Greece* vii.10.10. Philo uses the phrase *ek* (or *apo*) *katharou tou syneidotou* (from clean heart) in *De Specialibus Legibus* i.203, *Quod Omnis Probus Liber Sit* 99, *De Praemiis et Poenis* 84, and *Legatio ad Gaium* 166. Josephus uses *katharou to syneidotou* in *The Jewish War* i.453.

The *syneidos* usually judged past actions, but there are several passages in which it judged contemplated action. Philo *De Opificio Mundi* 128 describes the *syniedos* as employing admonition ¹⁶). In *De Decalogo* 87 Philo uses *elenchos* for the conscience which instruct and admonishes (*didaskei, nouthetei*) ¹⁷). Other passages picture the conscience as affecting future action by preventing, provoking or enabling a course of conduct. In some cases what is described is not the conscience judging a proposed action to be wrong, but rather it is the fear or shame of the conscience-stricken man which determines his conduct. On the other hand, when conscience prevents a wrong doer from looking the wronged person in the face (Philo *De Josepho* 47) or prevents a false show of repentance (Philo *De Fuga et Inventione* 159), a judgment that such action is shameful seems to be implied. It should be understood, however, that conscience is not described as a repository of ethical norms or as an infallible inner oracle.

The *syneidēsis* was seen by Hellenistic moralists as a part of man's natural endowment, and as such it was of divine origin or was closely related to God. This was expressed within the pantheistic world-view by Epictetus (*Discourses* ii.3.10-23), who considers man a part of God; and God is nature, the divine reason which pervades and governs the world. "A man has received from Nature measures and standards for

16) Pierce (p. 32f, 43f) denies that *syneidēsis* can have future reference. He ignores this passage in Philo. He holds that the moral use of *syneidēsis* implies a participle in the past tense as the "content" of the implied *synoida emauto*.

17) Pierce (p. 46, n. 2) and Ralph Marcus consider this use of *elenchos* equivalent to *syneidos*. See Ralph Marcus, Philo Supplement, II, "The Loeb Classical Library" (London: William Heinemann), p. 50, n. 1.

the discovery of truth . . ." (*Discourses* ii.20.21) ¹⁸). Philo employs *elenchos* for conscience ¹⁹) in *De Decalogo* 87 and in *Questions and Answers on Exodus*, describing it as implanted in man at birth. Philo speaks of God as witness for the *syneidos* (*De Decalogo* 91) and of calling upon God in clean *syneidos* (*De praemiis et Poenis* 84). The Menander *Monostichoi* 597 and 654 refer to conscience as divine (*he syneidēsis theos*). In Xenophon *Cyropaedia* i.6.4 consciousness of not having neglected the gods gives confidence in prayer.

III

There are several distinct questions which may be asked regarding the Stoic use of *syneidēsis*. As the ethical use of the term was being developed during the Hellenistic era, what part did the Stoics have in shaping this use? Did they originate the concept of conscience or contribute to its formation? Or did they simply employ a word already in common use and accept a moral notion which was part of their intellectual culture? Scholarship is sharply divided on the answers to these questions. Some writers consider conscience a Stoic concept, or one at least strongly colored by Stoicism ²⁰). Others deny that the conscience played a significant role in Stoic thought ²¹).

There seem to be three main arguments against Stoic use of *syneidēsis*. I will examine each of these.

1. There are few extant literary sources of Stoic use of *syneidēsis* or *syneidos*. Opposition to attributing the ethical use of *syneidēsis* to Stoicism rests mainly upon the research of Adolf Bonhöffer, who bases his case on the lack of evidence for Stoic use of the term ²²). There are only two known Stoic uses of *syneidēsis*, viz. Chrysippus ap. Diogenes Laertius vii.85 and an Epictetus fragment (97 Schweighäuser). Chry-

18) Whitney J. Oates, *The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers* (New York: Modern Library, 1940), p. 326.

19) Marcus, p. 50, n. 1.

20) E.g. W. D. Davies. *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism* (London: SPCK, 1948), p. 116; C. H. Dodd, *The Bible and the Greeks* (London: Hodder and Stroughton, 1934), p. 36.

21) E.g. Zucker, p. 18f; C. Clemen, "Gewissen", in *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, ed. H. Gunkel and L. Zscharnack, 2nd rev. ed., Vol. II (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1928), p. 1164.

22) Adolf Bonhöffer, *Epiktet und das Neue Testament* (Giesen: Alfred Topelmann, 1911), p. 156.

sippus uses the word for consciousness, with no moral reference, and the Epictetus fragment is not considered authentic ²³). Bonhöffer holds that Epictetus' use of *syneidos* (Discourses iii.22.94) is not employed in the sense of conscience. He does not recognize Marcus Aurelius' use of *eusyneidēsis* (good conscience) ²⁴). Pierce acknowledges this use of *eusyneidēsis*, but does not think it significant because of its late date ²⁵).

How significant is this argument from silence? In light of the paucity of literary remains of Greek Stoicism, ²⁶) an argument from silence seems to prove nothing. Even if no use of *syneidos* remained among the scanty extant Greek Stoic sources, the question would not be settled. There is, however, the one extant example of Epictetus' use of *syneidos* which Bonhöffer does not consider a reference to conscience. Bonhöffer held that the Stoics could not have had a concept of conscience because they did not believe in a personal God to whom man knows himself to be responsible. He does not explain why the pre-supposition of a personal God is necessary to a concept of conscience ²⁷). If we look at the passage in question without Bonhöffer's restricted definition in mind, we see that Epictetus is talking about the moral consciousness.

To the kings and tyrants of this world their bodyguards and their arms used to afford the privilege of censuring certain persons, and the power also to punish those who do wrong, no matter how guilty they themselves were; whereas to the Cynic it is his conscience which affords him this power ... When he sees that he has watched over men, and toiled in their behalf; and that he has slept in purity ...; and that every thought which he thinks is that of a friend and servant to the gods ... Why should he not have courage to speak freely ... ²⁸)

The use of *eusyneidēsis* by Marcus Aurelius is too late to indicate much about Greek Stoicism. It does have the value of showing that the concept of conscience is compatible with Stoic thought, which is important in connection with another argument.

23) *Ibid.*; Zucker, pp. 18, 20; Pierce, p. 15; Spicq, p. 52; *et al.*

24) Bonhöffer, p. 156.

25) Pierce, p. 14.

26) E. Zeller, *Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1962), pp. 40, 53; R. D. Hicks, *Stoic and Epicurean* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1962), p. 14.

27) Bonhöffer, p. 157.

28) Trans. W. A. Oldfather, "The Loeb Classical Library", Vol. II (London: William Heinemann, 1928), p. 163, 165.

In the absence of plentiful Greek sources, can we draw any conclusions from the frequent use of *conscientia* by Roman Stoics, especially Seneca and Cicero? Certainly we cannot assume that the eclectic Roman Stoics²⁹⁾ derived their use of *conscientia* from Greek Stoic sources. Yet Greek Stoicism is a very likely source of their moral philosophy. There seems to have been a popular Hellenistic moral philosophy which would have influenced Greek and Roman moralists alike. The Latin moralists who use *conscientia* most often, Cicero and Seneca, are known to have been influenced by Greek thought³⁰⁾. The Roman Stoics use *conscientia* to refer to a guide or judge of moral conduct and to a bad (accusing) and good (without remorse) conscience³¹⁾. *Conscientia* (like its Greek sister or parent, *syneidēsis*) had as its basic meaning shared knowledge and consciousness. Cicero uses the word in a non-ethical sense as well as the ethical use³²⁾. It seems likely that Latin Stoic use of *conscientia* reflects the popular use of *syneidēsis*. It is not established that there is anything distinctively Stoic about this use. Stoic influence was widespread, however, and traveling Stoic orators may have had a significant influence in shaping the use of *syneidēsis* and *conscientia*. Seneca (*De Tranquillitate Animi* iii.4) reports one use of "good conscience" by Athenodorus, a pupil of Poseidonius. While this does not attest to use of *syneidēsis*, it does show that a concept of conscience is not foreign to Stoicism³³⁾.

An aspect of Stoic thought which has probably contributed to the common notion that the concept of conscience originated in Stoicism is the Stoic belief that man has by his nature the ability to know what is good and what is evil. St. Paul in Romans 2: 14f may reflect a Stoic View³⁴⁾. Philo's use of *elenchos* in *De Decalogo* 87 and in *Questions*

29) Zeller. p. 53; Hicks, p. vi.

30) J. Dupont, "*syneidēsis aux origines de la notion chrétienne de conscience morale*," *Studia Hellenistica*, V (1948), pp. 126, 130, n. 2, 136. See also Jung, p. 530, and Böhlig, p. 10.

31) Seneca *Epistles* xii.9, xiii.5, xxiii.7, xcvi.12, et alibi; Cicero *Ad Atticum* xiii.20, *De Finibus*, ii.71, et alibi.

32) *Harper's Latin Dictionary*, rev. ed., Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short (New York: American Book Co., 1907), p. 426; Jung, p. 530.

33) Hans Böhlig, *Die Geisteskultur von Tarsos im augusteischen zeitalter mit Berücksichtigung der paulinischen Schriften* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1913), pp. 108-113, 122-125.

34) Dodd, p. 36; also Max Pohlenz, Review of *Epiktet und das Neue Testament*, by Adolf Bonhöffer, *Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen*, CLXXV (1913), p. 664.

and *Answers on Exodus* reflects a similar view. Actually the presence of these ideas in St. Paul and Philo indicates to me that the notion was a commonly held view in the Hellenistic era. Its most philosophical development, however, seems to have been in Stoicism. The Stoics recognized that Reason governs the world, and the moral demands of reason are known by men as the law of nature. Any man who is rational will feel himself "pledged to be moral" ³⁵). This is not a view that knowledge of moral laws is innate. All knowledge is from perception, but the man who exercises his rational powers can know the *koinai ennoiai*, those conceptions which all men may deduce from experience, including moral truths ³⁶). Is this native ability to discover the moral law by use of reason to be called conscience? It is not so identified in the extant literature. We have seen that in Hellenistic usage conscience was *inter alia* a faculty for making moral judgments, though not a repository of knowledge of moral laws. Even though the Stoics may never have used the term *syneidēsis* for the natural ability of every man to reason morally, their concept of this natural endowment well might have influenced the popular notion of the conscience.

2. C. A. Pierce gives another argument against Stoic use of *syneidēsis*, holding it is inherently improbable because of Stoic opposition to emotions ³⁷). There are two objections to Pierce's thesis. Considering *syneidēsis* an emotion is questionable, and Pierce's interpretation of Stoicism is superficial.

A main theme of Pierce's work on conscience is his view that *syneidēsis* is primarily a painful emotion ³⁸). I find Pierce mistaken on this point. The passages which he cites do not justify his interpretation. At most, they show that conscience can be painful. The vast majority of extant sources support the interpretation of *syneidēsis* as a form of awareness.

The second objection to Pierce is more important. Even though *syneidēsis* is not an emotion, it is often accompanied by or causes strong feelings. This is not, however, a bar to its use in Stoic moral philosophy. Certainly *syneidēsis* is no more emotion laden than *en-*

35) Zeller, p. 240f.

36) Zeller pp. 80-83.

37) Pierce, p. 13f.

38) Pierce, pp. 45f, 50f, 81, 117.

treptikon, which Epictetus used, and *aidēmōn*, which he and Marcus Aurelius used ³⁹). In this connection, we should note Marcus Aurelius' use of *eusyneidēsis* and Seneca's report of Athenodorus' use of "good conscience." While the Stoics sought to avoid violent emotions, they did recognize the value of certain rational dispositions (*eupatheiai*). Joy, good will, affection and love, even shame, can be rational emotions ⁴⁰). These are not denied the Stoic sage.

3. Friedrich Zucker argues that the lack of a definition of conscience in Stoic literature shows that the concept had little significance in Stoicism ⁴¹). This is not a convincing argument. There may have been such a definition, repeated many times, which was lost with most of the Greek Stoic literature. More importantly, the lack of a definition probably indicates that none was thought necessary. The Stoics would have needed a definition if their readers were not familiar with the term, or if they were using the term in an unusual or technical way. Probably neither need was present. *Syneidēsis* seems to have been part of the syncretistic religious and ethical thought which permeated the Graeco-Roman world ⁴²). Rather than originating as a technical philosophical term, *syneidēsis* as a term for moral consciousness developed in the common speech of the people. On this point, scholarship is in substantial agreement ⁴³).

I see no conflict between the view that *syneidēsis* was used by the Stoics and the strongly supported thesis that the term originated in the common speech, growing out of the experience of the people. If the term was popularly used, it would be surprising if Stoic orators never used the word. Its rather rare use in the philosophical literature is not strange. *Syneidēsis* appears to have been a common and popular word, never carefully defined, never made a philosophical technicality, but simply taken for granted and used to express an important but little analyzed experience of the ordinary man. A popular moral philosophy,

39) Bonhöffer, p. 156; cf. Pierce, p. 15; also Osborne, p. 169.

40) Zeller, p. 291.

41) Zucker, p. 18f.

42) Böhlig, *Die Geisteskultur*, p. 120 Böhlig, „Das Gewissen bei Seneka und Paulus”, pp. 2, 11f.

43) Eduard Norden, *Agnostos Theos: Untersuchungen zur Vorgeschichte Religiöser Rede* (Leipzig and Berlin: B. C. Teubner, 1929), p. 136, n. 1; Spicq, p. 52; Osborne, p. 169; Pierce, pp. 13-17; Böhlig, *Die Geisteskultur*, p. 82; Kähler, p. 29.

such as Stoicism, could use the term giving it part of its significance and contributing to its currency without ever making it a major issue or giving it a technical definition. If Stoicism did make a distinctive contribution to the overall meaning of *syneidēsis*, it was probably through an unconscious identification with conscience of the ability of every man to know the law of reason.

AFTER THE CRUCIFIXION OR 'THE GREAT FORTY DAYS'

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Apart from studies of the resurrection itself i.e. an examination of the supposed facts which it is claimed gave birth to the belief in the resurrection very little attention has been given to what may be called the pre-natal period of the church's history i.e. the movements and dispositions of those who first believed in the resurrection from the time of the crucifixion of Jesus to the conversion of Paul on the road to Damascus, a period which is reckoned to have been one of about eighteen months.¹⁾ This is partly due to lack of explicit evidence but much more so, because of the difficulties thrown up by such evidence as there is to hand, if it is assumed that the belief in the resurrection originated in a supernatural phenomenon intercalated into the natural order of events consisting of regular sequences. We are going to be content with the psychological explanation of the origin and development of the belief in the resurrection. 'Whatever theological value primitive Christianity attributed to the empty tomb, it is certain that the faith in the resurrection emerged from the appearances'.²⁾

The appearances may be described psychologically as visions. Some visions, as we shall see, are the product of a belief which has originated in the depths of the unconscious; others create or strengthen a belief of which the recipient is already aware in an intellectual formulation.

The further back we go in the history of the birth of the church the less the records have to tell us. To estimate therefore what happened during 'the great forty days' it seems best to begin with the composition of the church in Jerusalem on Paul's arrival for what proved to be his last visit as described by the compiler of Acts. Paul on arrival meets

1) Goguel, *La Naissance du Christianisme*, English Trans.; *The Birth of Christianity* p. 26; *La vie de Jésus*, English Trans.; *Life of Jesus*, pp. 228 ff.

Also, Goguel, *La Foi à la Résurrection de Jésus*, p. 263

2) Goguel, *The Birth of Christianity*, p. 41.

James, the brother of Jesus, and consults with him as the leading figure of the church. James tells him that the church, now apparently a large community of Pharisees [Jews which have believed and are all zealous for the law (Acts XXI 20)] entertain grave suspicions of Paul as a renegade Jew which he should dispel by an act of Jewish piety. Paul, it will be remembered, in a speech to the Sanhedrin after the riot asserts that his orthodoxy is being called in question because of his belief in the resurrection of the dead. Those members of the Sanhedrin who are Pharisees and inclined to favour Paul suggest that a spirit or an angel may have spoken to him. Later on at the appearance before Felix, Tertullus, the advocate for the Sanhedrin, states that Paul is a ring-leader of the sect of the Nazarenes (*Nazaraiōn*). This is the only place in the New Testament where Christians are so described, although Jesus himself is so described six times in Acts and twice in Mark. Although Epiphanius tells of a pre-Christian Jewish sect called Nazaraioi it may be reasonably assumed that this was a popular and figurative term for the Christians in Jerusalem coined from the association of their founder with Nazareth in Galilee. St. John's Gospel which on so many points shows an acquaintance with the traditions of Palestinian Christianity supports this. 'Can any good thing come out of Nazareth?' asks Nathaniel of Philip (John I 46), while John's version of the *titulus* on the cross is 'Jesus of Nazareth, King of the Jews' (John XIX 19). Paul in his defence describes the distinctive feature of the Way called a sect to be an expectation of a resurrection both of the just and the unjust. (Acts XXIV 15). It is usually assumed with the compiler of Acts that Paul asserted that his orthodoxy was being called in question on account of his belief in the resurrection of the dead in order to set the Pharisees in the Sanhedrin at variance with the Saducees. I would suggest that he did so rather to secure the support of the church in Jerusalem and the Pharisees in general against attack from the Sadducean aristocracy. The church in Jerusalem was composed of Pharisees who were only to be distinguished from other members of the party by the belief that Jesus of Nazareth had risen from the dead so that his resurrection confirmed the Pharisaic belief. Paul himself, they thought, had received a private revelation 'What if a Spirit hath spoken to him'.

As we learn however from earlier passages in Acts James had not been the original leader of the church in Jerusalem and its members

had not been originally confined to the ranks of Jewish Pharisees. The compiler of Acts presents the church in its earliest days as a monochrome community, a united fellowship sharing goods with each other in perfect and ideal harmony. Sometime however between the crucifixion and the conversion of Paul, it is recorded that a dispute had arisen within the church between what the compiler terms the Hellenists and the Hebraists. Scholars have long argued as to the significance of these terms. For the latest exposition I would refer to the first chapter of 'St. Stephen and the Hellenists' by Professor M. Simon. Goguel (*The Birth of Christianity* p. 168) supposes that the only difference between them was one of language; Simon (op. cit. p. 13) argues that, while that may be true of the way in which the compiler uses the terms, for those who applied the label 'Hellenist' to Stephen it implied some sort of accusation. It is difficult to understand how the terms could only imply a linguistic distinction, since Paul could speak Aramaic as is stated in Acts XXII 2, and Peter could speak Greek as he must have done on his visit to Antioch. I would suggest that the compiler purposely uses the vague term Hebraioi to describe those Christians in Jerusalem who were Pharisees and cherished not only the Mosaic tradition but also the temple-cult.

When the Hellenists leave Jerusalem after the death of Stephen and Peter miraculously escapes from prison James appears without explanation as the leader of the church in Jerusalem, presumably because the 'Hebrew' faction alone remains. According to Josephus (*Jewish Antiquities* Book XX, 9.1) in 62 A.D. when James was brought by Annas the high priest before the Sanhedrin on a charge of breaking the law, 'all who were reputed the most reasonable of the citizens and strict observers of the law were angered at this and reported Annas' conduct to the king', i.e. Herod Agrippa II. It can hardly be supposed that such men would have acted in the interest of James unless James had been himself devoted both to the Law of Moses and the Temple-cult.

Much more attention has been given to the significance of the term 'Hellenists' than that of the term 'Hebrews'. *Hellenizein* means sometimes 'to speak Greek' e.g. in Josephus' *Antiquities* I, 6.1. and at other times 'to behave like a Greek'. '*Hellēnismos*' is used in II Maccabees IV.10. to describe the process of introducing Greek fashions and usages in Jerusalem. Hellenist would thus appear to be a term of disparage-

ment used by the 'Hebrews' i.e. the strict Christian Pharisees to describe those who sat loose to the Law and the Temple-cult, i.e. proselytes who only spoke Greek and had been circumcised in order to become members of the Christian sect within the Jewish church. This would explain the use of the term in Acts IX 26 ff where it is narrated that Paul after being accepted by the Church and the Apostles disputed against the Hellenists but they were about to slay him. I have argued elsewhere³⁾ that the epistle to the Romans is addressed to Christian proselytes i.e. Gentiles who had become members of the Christian Church through the rite of circumcision. As is the way of converts to a religion they would be stricter in their observances and more zealous in maintaining the Mosaic tradition than those who were of the circumcision by birth and training. Paul in their eyes was throwing away what they had gained at cost to themselves. Such may well have been those who instituted proceedings against Stephen.

I wish to suggest Luke used the term Hellenists for outward looking Jews of the dispersion, Christian proselytes, and in addition those Galileans who were Christians. It has been suggested that the tradition locating the Resurrection Appearances in Galilee indicates that Galilee was the seat of a strong independent Galilean Christianity (Brandon, *Jesus and the Zealots* p. 205 n. 3). But it is stated that the Twelve were in Jerusalem after the resurrection in obedience to Jesus' command, doubtless because the coming of the Messiah was to be expected in Jerusalem and Jerusalem was after all the holy city, the centre of Judaism. Galilee possessed a mixed population. Peter apparently could speak Greek as well as Aramaic to judge from the fact that he was at home with Gentile Christians. Peter was thought of as the apostle with oversight over the communities of Jewish and Gentile Christians founded by Judaeans among Jews of the dispersion (Gal. I 7). Peter, Andrew, and Philip had Greek names from the outset. 'Anyone brought up in Bethsaida in Galilee would not only have understood Greek but would also have been polished by intercourse with foreigners and have had some Greek culture' writes G. Dalman. It may be objected that after all the Twelve presided over the whole church at Jerusalem. The Twelve seem however to have been originally appointed by Jesus

3) *Modern Churchman*, Vol. XIII, No. 3, pp. 230-233.

to preside over the people of God at the coming of the Messiah and after the resurrection were accepted by the church as those who had been with Jesus and therefore witnesses to his teaching and the resurrection. Later on by the time the early chapters of Acts were compiled the Twelve have become the 'Apostles', the ordained heads of the new society, the church, by the conferment of the gift of the Holy Spirit. But, as is obvious from the early chapters of Acts, in fact Peter alone with James and John, the sons of Zebedee, as assistants, was the leader of the movement which led to the birth of the Church. When the Hellenists had to leave Jerusalem because of Herod's persecution Herod had Peter arrested and killed James. At the same time we are told the apostles remained in Jerusalem. The apostles may henceforth have been a council who presided over the church now that it was a purely Jewish body. Otherwise this would seem to imply that it might have been expected that they would have fled with the general body of Hellenists as leading Hellenists themselves. It may very well be that the compiler believed that they must have stayed behind in Jerusalem because they were supposed to have been ordered by the Lord there to remain and from there to govern the Church. There grew up the tradition that the Lord ordered the Apostles to remain in Jerusalem twelve years and accordingly Luke argued that they stayed in Jerusalem when all the other Hellenists fled to Antioch.

Thus it may be stated that about 43 A.D. the church in Jerusalem was divided into two parties (1) the 'Hebrews' i.e. Pharisees, who regarded the resurrection of Jesus as an event which supported their belief in a general resurrection and remained devoted to observance of the Mosaic law and the temple-cult. Among them would be the great company of the priests who were obedient to the faith, mentioned in Acts VI 7, (2) the 'Hellenists' who consisted of Greek-speaking Jews both from the dispersion *and from Galilee*, some of whom had been intimate with Jesus and claimed that they had seen Jesus risen, while others had been caught up in a ferment of enthusiastic expectation that Jesus would shortly return as the Messiah. In the meanwhile they sat loose to the observances of the Mosaic law and the temple-cult. It is obvious that to account for this internally divided group in Jerusalem something has to be said about the rapidly developing process of events which took place following the crucifixion in the great forty days i.e. the resurrection. Goguel primarily analyses the creation and evolution of the belief in the

resurrection. Our concern however is to piece together the movements of the participants in those events and the motives behind them.

Any discussion of the great forty days is bound to centre round the classic expression of the most primitive tradition in I Cor. XV 3-8, partly because Paul is writing in 55 A.D. and had recently been in Jerusalem while the earliest gospel was written about 71 A.D. in Rome, partly also because Paul links the earliest resurrection appearances with the one given to him at his conversion. 'For I delivered unto you first of all that which I also received, how that Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures and he was buried. He rose again on the third day according to the scriptures. And he appeared to Cephas, then to the twelve, then he appeared to above 500 brethren at once, of whom the greater part remain until now, but some are fallen asleep; then he appeared to James; then to all the apostles and last of all to me as an *ektrōma* i.e. an abortion'.

'He was buried'. The tradition affirmed this fact probably because Enoch, Moses, and Elijah were taken up to heaven by God body and all. Goguel distinguishes two traditions concerning the burial of Jesus (1) that of a burial which was merely done to fulfil the ritual requirements of the Mosaic law and (2) that of a burial with such rites and embellishments as would be done to show respect and devotion to the deceased. In Paul's sermon at Pisidian Antioch it is stated 'For they that dwell at Jerusalem and their rulers desired Pilate that he should be slain and when they had fulfilled all that was written of him they took him down from the tree and laid him in a sepulchre'. (Acts XIII 27-29). This affirms a burial by the Jews which was carried out in order to comply with the directions of Deuteronomy XXI 23, 'If a man be put to death and thou hang him on a tree his body shall not remain all night upon the tree but thou shalt surely bury him the same day: for he that is hanged is accursed of God'. The story of the breaking of the legs, and the application of the Jews to Pilate for permission to do so in John XIX 31-37 shows traces of this tradition as well as the declaration of Herod in the gospel of Peter that, if Joseph of Arimathea had not asked for the body of Jesus, the Jews would have buried him to prevent the violation of the Deuteronomic injunction.

A burial with such rites as show respect and devotion to the deceased is recorded in all the four canonical gospels. It is to be noted that the

later the gospel the greater the detail and the more precise the story becomes. For our purpose here it is sufficient to examine the earliest version i.e. Mark's. 'And when even was now come because it was the preparation i.e. the day before the sabbath there came Joseph of Arimathea 'a leading respectable Jew', who was also himself looking for the kingdom of God; and he boldly went in unto Pilate and asked for the body of Jesus'. 'And Pilate marvelled if he were already dead: and calling unto him the centurion he asked whether he had been any while dead. And when he learned it of the centurion he granted the corpse to Joseph. And he bought a linen cloth etc.' The description of Joseph of Arimathea amounts to a statement that he was a notable Pharisee who had messianic expectations i.e. the kind of Pharisee who later became a member of the Christian church and shared the outlook of James the brother of the Lord. May it not be more likely that he took charge of the burial of Jesus not because he was a member of Jesus' circle but because he wanted the Deuteronomic precept to be obeyed? It can hardly be thought that he could have himself undertaken the burial without assistance or that he would have gained admission to Pilate's presence and obtained his request as a solitary friend and admirer of an agitator. On the other hand as the leader of a deputation from the Sanhedrin who were concerned about the observance of their peculiar scruples Pilate could not very well have ignored him. It is also most unlikely that a devout respected Pharisee unless he had known Jesus as intimately as Peter, James and John, would have been ready to have undertaken the burial of an agitator, cursed by being crucified, except as a necessity to meet the requirements of the Mosaic law, certainly not as a tribute of respect to the memory of the deceased. The bodies of the other two agitators would also have had to be disposed of in the same way. It may well be therefore that the record of Joseph of Arimathea taking charge of the burial for ritual purity is changed into the record of a burial undertaken as a token of respect. The earliest gospel records that he bought a linen cloth (could he have done so on the evening previous to the Sabbath?), wrapped the body in it, and laid it in a rock-hewn tomb. Nothing is said as to who owned the tomb or as to whether it was new. The women came to the tomb two days later to anoint the body i.e. to complete the burial as a tribute of respect to the deceased. As has been pointed out it was impossible in the climate of Palestine for a body to remain for two and a half days

in a condition fit for being anointed with unguents. Also nothing is known of embalmment with unguents as a Jewish custom. The corpse was washed with water.⁴⁾ It can hardly be supposed that the record of a burial undertaken as a tribute of respect became that of a burial undertaken as a ritual necessity to comply with the Mosaic law. The reverse rather appears to have happened, especially when we note that the story of a burial as an act of respect gains greater detail in the later gospels. It is sufficient to note that there was a tradition received by St. Paul and prevalent in the Asian churches that Jesus received nothing more than a hasty burial in a natural cavity undertaken as a necessary ritual act, while there came to Rome from the church in Jerusalem in 71 A.D. a tradition that Joseph of Arimathea, a devout and respected Jew, undertook this office. But said the Jews in Rome with whom the Christians were engaged in acute controversy 'You say that Jesus was raised up by God. If so his tomb must have been empty'. 'Yes' said the Church in Rome, 'the tomb was empty: some women found it so'. No-one in Rome in 70 A.D. could contradict this as a happening in Jerusalem in 29 A.D.

According to the gospels Peter and the other intimate friends of Jesus were not in Jerusalem and therefore knew nothing of the burial. It would appear that there was a tradition that they fled to Galilee. As Galilee is 60 miles distant from Jerusalem it has been suggested that they withdrew to Bethany. In support of this suggestion it may be noted that Jesus appears to have made Bethany his retreat during his last days. Sometime after — perhaps later than the third day — Christ appeared to Cephas, then to the twelve. A psychological analysis of the appearances has been given by others including Goguel himself. Suffice it to say that the psychological mechanism for all the appearances was the same and followed a general law. A conflict between one orientation of faith and a new one goes on below the threshold of consciousness until there is a psychical explosion objectified in a vision with the new conviction taking possession of consciousness. But the initial appearance i.e. Peter's would differ from the others in this respect. Whereas Paul had unconsciously become attracted to a conviction of Jesus' continuing life through others, Peter's con-

4) Bousset, *Kyr. Chr.* p. 64. Preuschen, *Die Salbung Jesus in Bethanien*, Z.N.T.W. III, 1902, p. 252, quoted by Goguel, *La Foi à la Rés.*, p. 144.

victions about Jesus had been formed while he had lived with him, were repressed by the darkness of the passion and crucifixion and only came alive again because not even the cross could kill them. Their resurrection is the occasion for the resurrection appearance of Jesus as the heavenly Christ. Following a psychological law the appearance of an individual with the accompanying ecstasy and enthusiasm creates an epidemic of appearances. Jesus appeared to the twelve i.e. the rest of the intimate circle all of whom however were Galileans. Then it is said that Jesus appeared to more than 500 brethren at once of whom the greater part remain until now but some are fallen asleep. It may be suggested that this appearance took place after a considerable interval during which there had been certain important happenings. May it not be that Peter and the Twelve with friends of Jesus, convinced that Jesus was alive as Spirit of Power and of God, as the Messiah who would shortly return to consummate the Kingdom of God, now returned from Bethany to Jerusalem, and, while entering the Temple to proclaim their conviction, healed a lame beggar in the name of Jesus, Messiah, of Nazareth? Everyone who knew of it was profoundly disturbed. The Jewish authorities recognised that they had not finished with Jesus and clapped Peter with the sons of Zebedee into prison from which they escaped, probably with the connivance of their jailers. The lower clergy, Pharisees, and the crowd began to think that Jesus after all might still be the expected deliverer. The Jewish nation had long been living in that state of tension with which Europe in these last years has become all too familiar, the tension caused by the oppression of a nation by an alien power, creating a revolutionary temper, stimulating the imagination with apocalyptic hopes and fears. It is not fanciful to suppose that a crowd gathered on the Mount of Olives infected by the enthusiasm of the Galileans led by Peter and there experienced the collective appearance recorded in Paul's catalogue. Maurice Goguel ⁵⁾ refers to the collective visions which occurred in 1931 at Ezquioga in the Basque country in Spain, where the anti-clerical movement let loose by the revolution in Spain was creating tensions, fears, and anxiety. Two children of seven and eleven years old had a vision of the Virgin Mary several days running at the same hour each day. Following this crowds of three to eight thousand people were said to

5) Goguel, *La Foi à la Rés.* pp. 415 sq.

have gathered at the spot and claimed that they had the same vision. Gaétan Bernoville who was present reported the occurrence in Ezquioga on 20th November 1931. He tells how the crowd were gripped, silent, but at intervals the silence was broken by the singing of Basque hymns and *Ave Marias*. Bernoville speaks of an apocalyptic atmosphere created by the fear of religious persecution and an apprehension of punishment from heaven dealt out to the Spanish people for its submission to an anti-clerical regime. Goguel considers that this explains both the initial visions of the children and the contagious epidemic of collective visions which followed. And he reckons that their psychological mechanism differs from that of the appearance of Jesus to Paul on the road to Damascus or that of Sundar Singh in the Punjab or that of the Jew Ratisbon in Rome in 1842 with which he compares Paul's. All these are concomitant with the appearance on the threshold of consciousness of a conviction which had for a long time been brewing in the subliminal self. But the collective visions at Ezquioga did not create any change of conviction and were experienced by people who were already believers. The same is true in large measure of both the appearances of the risen Christ to Peter and the Galileans as well as the collective appearance — most probably there was more than one — to the crowd of Jerusalemites perhaps on the mount of Olives. Peter and the other friends of Jesus did not change their fundamental conviction that Jesus was the Messiah. Suppressed momentarily below the level of consciousness into the unconscious by Jesus' apparent failure and crucifixion it re-appears strengthened and re-interpreted in the framework of the changed circumstances arising out of Jesus' death. Jesus is now the heavenly Messiah whose name is endowed with power and who will shortly be sent as appointed for Israel. The Jerusalemites like the Basques at Ezquioga were living in an atmosphere of apocalyptic, frightened of coming war and disaster, apprehensive of a divine visitation and believing that the Messiah was shortly coming. Victims of a psychical epidemic after hearing from the Galileans how Jesus had appeared to them as Messiah, they also had a vision of the Messiah in the form of Jesus. Their expectations were heightened and their convictions re-inforced. But there was this profound difference between the experience of the Galileans and that of the Jerusalemites. The Galileans had a vision of one whom they had known intimately, who had impressed upon them his massive personality to such a degree that his

apparent failure was unable to destroy their loyalty. The Jerusalemites, caught up by the enthusiastic convictions of the Galileans that they had seen Jesus alive as the Messiah in the heavens and that they were possessed by his spirit, consciously and mentally but with no sense of passing through a crisis, became firmly convinced of what before they had wildly hoped for and feared, viz. that the Messiah was all but come as Jehovah's agent of salvation for his people and of punishment for sinners. They had a vision not so much of Jesus, whom they had only known as a public figure, as the Messiah, but a vision of the Messiah as Jesus. What of the appearances to James and the apostles? The historicity of the former has been called in question on the grounds, first that, if the appearances are catalogued in the order in which they happen, an epidemic of visions usually begins with an individual and spreads in an ever widening circle, while here there is a reversion to the vision given to an individual. Secondly it has been asserted that the appearance to James was inserted to balance that granted to Peter. The appearance to all the apostles may well have been granted to a larger circle than the twelve. It is questionable whether in fact the apostles are to be identified with the twelve chosen by Jesus and did not in fact consist of a council of twelve or even fifteen, some of whom belonged to the twelve who were with Jesus, who were the rulers of the Jerusalem church. If we accept that the appearances to the Jerusalemites followed from contact with the Galileans it may well be that the appearances are catalogued in the order in which they happened and that all are authentic. It is psychologically probable that James after hearing of the appearances to the Galileans and that to the Jerusalemite crowd was thrown into a crisis. According to St. Mark (III 21 and 31-35) Jesus' brothers did not believe in his mission. Hearing of the appearances and perhaps even being present at the appearance of Jesus to the Jerusalemite crowd his attitude unconsciously began to change; also in the depths below his consciousness he began to realise that if Jesus was Messiah as Jesus' brother he had a claim to take his place provisionally. At the moment this new orientation became explicit in consciousness Jesus perhaps appeared to him as Messiah.

For the time being the Galileans and the Jerusalemites appeared to be united in their enthusiastic acknowledgement of Jesus as alive with God and the Messiah who shortly would come again with the end of all things. Peter was the leader because he was the first to whom Jesus

appeared. But the forces beneath the surface which brought them to share a faith in the resurrection of Jesus differed. Peter and his associates had known Jesus as the Galilean prophet who sat loose to the strict observance of the law and the temple-cult, and while a loyal Jew was ready to keep company with the impure and even with Gentiles. They had been so intimate with him that they believed he was by their side. James and the Jerusalemites on the other hand had been converted by contact with the Galileans to believe that Jesus absent for the time being was alive in heaven as the Messiah who would shortly come to earth on the day of the Lord. This had always been their hope and fear; therefore as before it was their duty to keep themselves pure and prepared by a strict observance of the Law and practise of the temple-cult. For James and the Jerusalemites the Jesus-Messiah was at present passive while for the Galileans Jesus was the Messiah active now in whose name and spirit men could be baptised into a purified Israel. This distinction came out into the open first in 36 A.D. when as we have seen differences arose between those Christians who were strict Pharisees (the Hebrews) and those who either because they were of the dispersion or were Galileans sat loose to the law and had a Hellenistic outlook (the Hellenists). The distinction became more evident still when (1) the church at Jerusalem found that the church at Antioch admitted Gentiles without demanding circumcision (2) Agrippa persecuted the 'Hellenist' faction in the church at Jerusalem and (3) Peter left Jerusalem and was replaced by James as the church's leader. Consequently the outsider and extremist Paul arrives in Jerusalem in 58 A.D. to find himself regarded as a renegade Jew, set upon by the Jewish crowd and only able to defend himself as a loyal Jew by claiming that as a Christian he was a Pharisee who with others believed that Jesus had by his resurrection provided verification for the Pharisaic belief in the resurrection of the dead. The faith in the resurrection which survived and marched through the centuries was that of Peter the Galilean and Paul the Hellenistic Jew, those for whom Jesus was the risen Messiah, while that which became extinct with the fall of Jerusalem was that of James and the Jerusalemites, those for whom the heavenly Messiah had turned out to be Jesus of Nazareth.

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE I CHING

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The origin of the *I Ching* or the Book of Changes is uncertain. Its authorship has become under debate throughout centuries in the past. In *Shuo Kua*, the Discussion of the Trigrams, the authors of the book are identified with the holy sages: "In ancient times the holy sages made the Book of Changes" ¹⁾. The much same idea is also expressed in *Ta Chuan* or the Great Treatise: "The holy sages instituted the hexagrams, so that phenomena might be perceived therein. They appended the judgments in order to indicate good fortune and misfortune" ²⁾. According to the original version of Chinese texts, we do not know whether the term "*shen jen*" (聖人) was intended to signify the "holy sage" or the "holy sages." Since there is no distinction between the singular and plural nouns in Chinese, it is difficult to say whether it meant plural or singular. However, the translation of *shen jen* as the holy sages seems to be correct, because the multiple authorship of the *I Ching* has been accepted by Chinese tradition. According to the tradition the *I Ching* was originated from the practice of divination and was attributed to the legendary king, Fu Hsi (2953-2838 B.C.). Later King Wen, the founder of Chou dynasty (1150-249 B.C.), rearranged the sixty-four hexagrams and gave them the Judgments (*kua tz'u*). His son, Tan, who was Chou Kung or Duke of Chou, composed the texts on the lines of hexagrams (*hsiao tz'u*) to supplement and to expound the *kua tz'u*. The Ten Wings, which are the Commentaries attached to the *I Ching*, were traditionally attributed to Confucius. The traditionally accepted authorship of the Ten Wings came to subject to much severe criticisms by recent scholars. It is not my intention here to deal with the authorship of this controversial area. The intention of my immediate concern is to examine the authorship of the main texts of the *I Ching*.

1) *Shuo Kua*, 1 : 2.

2) *Ta Chuan*, Sec. I, Ch. 2.

The *I Ching* went through four states of formation in Chinese history. At first there was the stage of divination practice without reference to cosmology. The second stage was the creation of eight trigrams, which were meaningfully correlated with the primitive cosmology. The third stage was the formulation of 64 hexagrams and the Judgments. Finally, the fourth stage was the elaboration and explanation of lines of hexagrams. We may take each stage of formation separately for a detailed examination.

The *I Ching* has its origin in the practice of divination. Thus it is most of all the book of divination. According to the Book of Rites, "The ancient kings made use of the stalks of the divining plant and the tortoise shell; arranged their sacrifices; burned their offerings of silk" ³⁾. The sacrifices were offered to them because they brought knowledge of the future. As it was written again in the Book of Rites, "In the various articles of tribute the tortoises were placed in front of all other offerings, because the shell gave knowledge of the future" ⁴⁾. The use of both the stalks of the divining plant and the tortoise shells for divination was evident in early Chinese history. Nevertheless, it seemed to suggest that the divination by means of the tortoise shell could be much older than that of the stalks of the divining plant. As Legge has pointed out, "In the *Shu King*, in a document that purports to be of the twenty-third century B.C. (The *Shu* II, ii, 18), divination by means of the tortoise-shell is mentioned; and somewhat later we find that method continuing, and also divination by the lineal figures, manipulated by means of the stalks of a plant (The *Shu* V, iv, 20, 31)" ⁵⁾. It was uncertain why the tortoise shell was first used for divination. It presumes that the tortoise was thought to have more mysterious and oracular powers than all other living creatures. These mysterious and oracular powers were thought having derived from the tortoise because it survived longer than any other living creatures they knew. For the primitive mind the life of tortoise was so long that it was recognized as the symbol of immortality. Because of its immoral life, it became the object of divination. In the method of divination, the belly surface of the tortoise shell was incised with a red-hot stylus, so that the shell was to be cracked and to form lines of cracks. The diviner

3) *Li Chi* 7 : 2, 1.

4) *Ibid.*, 9 : 7.

5) James Legge, Tr., *I Ching*, p. 40.

then read the oracles from the cracks formed by the insertion of a hot stylus. Since it became rather difficult to read and understand the cracks of the tortoise shell, a somewhat new process of divining was developed. The later development was the divination by means of the stalks of the divining plant. For some time in Chinese history the method of both tortoise shell and stalks of a plant had continued. The use of both methods is well illustrated in the following story of a faithful wife who is waiting for her husband to come home: "The transport waggons did not come. Great was the distress of my sorrowing heart. For he did not arrive when the time was due, so that I am full of grief. Yet I have divined by tortoise shell and by the stalks; and they agree in saying that he is near. My soldier (husband) is at hand" 6). The co-existence of both divinations by tortoise shell and by stalks for a long time is evident. However, because of the complexity of reading oracles from the cracks of a tortoise shell, divination by the stalks seems to become more popular and finally replaced the tortoise shell with the stalks. It is not certain when the real transition took place. However, it is clear that the *I Ching* has its origin in the use of a fixed number of milfoil stalks. Because the use of the stalks for divination was easier than the use of tortoise shells, the name of the *I Ching*, the Book of Easy (or easy divination), might be derived. Perhaps this explains why the *I Ching* has been the alternative name of *Chou I* (易周). It was named "Chou" from the fact that it was composed by the people of Chou dynasty, and "I" because its method of divination was an easy one 7).

The second stage in the formation of the *I Ching* has to do with the correlation of cosmic process with the oracles in terms of the trinity of world principles. The three principles are the subject (man), object having form (earth), and content (heaven) 8). These three principles constitute the eight trigrams which are the basic constituents for everything that exists in the world. According to the tradition in China, there was a map or scheme found from the Yellow River. This map, which is called *Ho T'u* (the River Map), is described in *Ta Chuan*.

6) D. Howard Smith, *Chinese Religions* (N. Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968), p. 26.

7) Fung Yu-Lan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, Vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), p. 380.

8) Richard Wilhelm, Tr., *The I Ching or Book of Changes* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), third ed., p. 265.

Since James Legge's translation is much closer to the original text than other translations in English, let us quote a passage from his translation:

Therefore heaven produced the spirit-like things, and the sages took advantage of them. (The operations of) heaven and earth are marked (so many) changes and transformations; and the sages imitated them (by means of the Yi [I]). Heaven changes out its (brilliant) figures from which are seen good fortune and bad, and the sages made their emblematic interpretations accordingly. The Ho gave forth the map, and the Lo the writing of (both of) which the sages took advantage.⁹⁾

The word "*ho*" literally means a river. It is commonly believed that the *Ho* here meant the Yellow River, which gave the map. Thus it is often called *Ho T'u*, the River Map. It is believed that this River Map became the basis for the formation of the *I Ching*. This map was believed to be containing a certain scheme which gave a model to Fu Hsi, the legendary king, in making the eight trigrams. According to a popular belief this map was drawn on the back of a dragon-horse coming out from the Yellow River. Confucius himself seemed to believe in the map, for he mentioned it in his *Analects*¹⁰⁾. The evidence of this belief is also recorded in the *Book of Rites*: "the map was borne by a horse"¹¹⁾. There is no way to prove or disprove this belief. However, the importance of this map cannot be denied. Furthermore, the real issue in relation to this map is not so much with the fact of its existence but with the way of its acquisition. As Chu Chun-Sheng (1788-1858) pointed out in his *Liu-shih-ssu kua ching chieh* or the *Texts of the sixty-four Hexagrams Explained*, there were three persons who thought to possess the map. According to the people of Hsia dynasty (2205-1766 B.C.), Lien Shan (山連) got hold of the map, so that it was named *Lien Shan*. According to the people of Shang era (1766-1150 B.C.) Kuei Ts'ang (歸藏) possessed the map, and it was therefore called *Kuei Ts'ang*. According to the people of the Chou dynasty, Fu Hsi (伏羲) got hold of the map and called it *Chou I*, which is the present book of the *I Ching*¹²⁾. We do not know what had happened with both *Lien Shan* and *Kuei Ts'ang* in the past. Except these titles

9) *Ta Chuan*, Sec. I, par. 73.


10) *Analects*, IX, viii.

11) *Li Chi*, VIII, iv. 16.

12) Chu Chun-Shen, *Liu-shih-ssu kua ching chieh*, 解朱駿聲六十四卦經 (Peking: KC, 1958), p. 2.

there is nothing trustworthy on the books today. The only book that survived till today is the *Chou I or I Ching*. Thus we should pay our attention to the River Map which was at the hand of Fu Hsi, the legendary emperor.

The original map which Fu Hsi received from the Yellow River was thought to be lost in the eleventh century B.C. However, there was a speculation that the map was reconstructed at the time of the restoration of the ancient classics during the Han dynasty. If this was the case, it is questionable whether the reconstructed map was identical with the original one or not. However, the most reliable map was thought to be developed out of the so-called "Five Elements" or "Five Stages of Change" (*Wu hsing* 五行) school in the Han era. Following map is commonly accepted as the identical map of *Ho T'u* which Fu Hsi got hold of from the Yellow River:



Since there is no way to verify the authenticity of this map, let us suppose that it was the authentic map with which Fu Hsi was acquainted and formed the eight trigrams. In the map there is a distinction between the black and white circles. Furthermore all the dark circles are even numbers such as 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10; while all the light circles are odd numbers, 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9. According to *Ta Chuan*, "To heaven belongs (the number) 1; to earth, 2; to heaven, 3; to earth, 4; to heaven, 5; to earth, 6; to heaven, 7; to earth, 8; to heaven, 9; to earth, 10" ¹³). Here earth represents even numbers or yin numbers, while

13) *Ta Chuan*, Sec. I, par. 49, or Sec. I, Ch. 9.

heaven the odd numbers or yang numbers. It goes on to say, "The numbers belonging to heaven are five, and those belonging to earth are (also) five. The numbers of these two series correspond to each other (in their fixed positions), and each one has another that may be considered its mate. The heavenly numbers amount to 25, and the earthly to 30. The numbers of heaven and earth together amount to 55. It is by these that the changes and transformations are effected, and the spirit-like agencies kept in movement" ¹⁴). The total numbers of heaven, the addition of 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9, amount to 25, while those of earth, the addition of 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10, amount to 30. Thus the total numbers of both heaven and earth amount to 55, which represent all the spirit-like agencies in heaven and earth. Heaven represents the Great Yang or Great Brightness, and Earth the Great Darkness or Great Yin. Everything in the universe is the production of the interaction of both heaven and earth. This idea concerning the prototype of yin and yang is implicit in the word "I" (易). It is the combination of two words "日" and "勿." The former implies the "sun," while the latter could be the old word of "月" which means the "moon" ¹⁵). From the analysis of the word "I" it is possible that later the Great Yang came to be symbolized by the sun and the Great Yin by the moon, because heaven and earth were governed by the sun and moon. The correlation of heaven and earth with the sun and moon is evident: "There are no greater primal images than heaven and earth. There is nothing that has more movement or greater cohesion than the four seasons. Of the images suspended in the heavens, there is no more light-giving than the sun and moon" ¹⁶). Thus the title of the *I Ching* is in harmony with the basic principle of *Ho T'u*, the River Map, which became the basis of the eight trigrams.

The question is then how could the eight trigrams be formed out of this map? First of all, it is an hypothesis that Fu Hsi, if he was really the author of the eight trigrams, failed to construct the trigrams with the circles of the map. He then decided to replace the circles with lines for convenience. The whole line (—) is used for the light circle, and the divided line (— —) for the dark. Then, all odd numbers became whole lines which signify yang, and all even numbers became

14) *Ta Chuan*, Sec. I, Ch. 9.

15) Legge, *op. cit.*, p. 38, note 1.

16) *Ta Chuan*, Sec. I, Ch. 9 : 7.

divided lines which signify yin. The transition of circles with lines was the initial stage of the development of the trigrams. If we observe the map carefully, we will get some idea how the trigrams were formed out of the map. We see that the circles of outer sides of the map are divided into four groups; two groups of dark circles and two groups of light circles. The group of the dark circles which represents the water is number 6, because of 6 circles. The group of dark circles which represents the wood has number 8, because of 8 dark circles. Thus both 6 and 8 are even numbers and represent yin forces. The number 6 is assigned to the "old yin," which is symbolized with two broken lines (\equiv), while the number 8 is assigned to the "young yin," which is symbolized with a broken line above and whole line below (\equiv). In a similar manner we have two groups of light circles which represent fire and metal. The group which represents fire has 7 light circles, and thus it has number 7. The group which represents the metal has 9 light circles, and therefore it has number 9. Both 7 and 9 are odd numbers and represent the yang forces. The number 7 is assigned to the "young yang" which is symbolized by the unbroken line above and the broken line below (\equiv), and 9 the "old yang" symbolized by the two unbroken lines (\equiv). These four symbols represent not only the four seasons of the year but the foundations of the 8 trigrams. By adding another line to these basic symbols the 8 trigrams are formed. The process of the evolvement of lines to the 8 trigrams is stated as follows: "Therefore there is in the Changes the Great Primal Beginning. The two primary forces generate the four images. The four images generate the eight trigrams" ¹⁷). The Great Primal Beginning is identical with the Tao, the source of all things. The two primary forces, which are the products of the Tao, are yin and yang forces. Through the interaction of yin and yang forces the four images are produced. The four images imply the old yang, young yang, old yin and young yin. And these four symbols again produce the eight trigrams. They are Ch'ien (\equiv), K'un (\equiv), Chen (\equiv), Li (\equiv), Tui (\equiv), Sun (\equiv), K'an (\equiv), and Ken (\equiv). The addition of one more line of either yin or yang, which represents man, to the two primordial lines of heaven and earth completes the cosmic principle, because man together with heaven and earth form the trinity of world

¹⁷) *Ta Chuan*, Sec. I, Ch. 11.

principles. Thus the trigrams are complete symbols of universe. They are arranged also according to the seasons to rule the universe: "Heaven and earth determine the direction. The forces of mountain and lake are united. Thunder and wind arouse each other. Water and fire do not combat each other. Thus are the eight trigrams intermingled" 18). The trigram Ch'ien, heaven, and K'un, earth, determine the north and south axis. Ken, mountain, and Tui, lake attract each other. Chen, thunder, and Sun, wind work together for rain. And K'an, water, and Li, fire, do not go together. In this way the 8 trigrams are correlated with the cosmic principles of universe.

The third stage deals with the creation of hexagrams and the composition of the Appended Judgments (*kua tz'u*). According to the tradition, the authorship of the hexagrams is attributed to Fu Hsi, Shen Nung (神農), Hsia Yu (夏禹) or King Wen (文王) 19). Was Fu Hsi, who formulated the 8 trigrams out of the *Ho T'u*, responsible also for the creation of the 64 hexagrams? It is probable that Fu Hsi could construct the hexagrams through the combination of the trigrams, even though the present form of arrangement of the hexagrams in the *I Ching* is commonly attributed to King Wen. The existence of different arrangement of hexagrams was evident even prior to King Wen, who was, as a great diviner, acquainted with some forms of divining system. James Legge believes also the existence of hexagrams prior to the time of King Wen. Out of these existing forms of hexagrams, Legge says, "King Wen takes them up, one after another, in the order that suits himself, determined, evidently, by the contrast in the lines of each successive pair of hexagrams, and gives their significance" 20). Even though there is not enough evidence to prove whether Fu Hsi or someone else was responsible for the formation of the hexagram, it is quite clear that King Wen had something to do with the present arrangement of hexagrams and the addition of the Appended Judgments. As Chai eloquently puts it, there is no recent scholar considered that King Wen had anything to do with the *I Ching* 21). It is, of course,

18) *Shuo Kua* 2 : 3.

19) See Chu Chu-Sheng, *op cit.*, p. 2: "重卦者或言以羲或言神農夏禹文王有四說"

20) Legge, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

21) Ch'u Chai with Winberg Chai, ed., *I Ching: Book of Changes*, Tr. by James Legge New York: University Books, 1964), pp. xxviii-xxix.

perfectly possible that the *I Ching* might be attributed to King Wen, since it used to bear the name of *Chou I*. There is some evidence to support that the Appended Judgments were somehow responsible by the King Wen: "The time at which the Changes came to the fore was that in which the house of Yin came to an end and the way of the house of Chou was rising, that is, the time when King Wen and the tyrant Chou Hsin were pitted against each other. This is why the Judgments of the book so frequently warn against danger" 22). It is commonly held view that the Judgments were composed to the hexagrams by King Wen when he was held captive by the last ruler of the Yin dynasty. According to a popular belief in China, King Wen was in captivity for seven years. During this time he was able to arrange the 64 hexagrams and prescribed the Judgments to them. There is an interesting story which attempts to illustrate the tragedy of the great diviner, King Wen, in the prison. According to the story, his power of divining was tested by the tyrant Chou Hsin while he was in the prison. In order to test his ability of divining, Chou Hsin brought him a bowl of soup which was made of the flesh of his son who was murdered. Realizing this he took the soup in order to spare his life. While he was held captive, he was deeply occupied himself with the lineal figures. The arrangement of hexagrams and the composition of the Judgments came to him, according to the tradition, not in a manner of logical analysis but more or less like the visions which many prophets have experienced in the past. In both the Old and the New Testaments, especially in the Book of Daniel and Revelation, we see many visions appearing to the prophets to embody the divine truth. If this was the case to King Wen, the hexagrams and the Judgments in the *I Ching* could be more than a mere product of human wisdom but the gift of the divine. From the psychological point of view, they could be said the revelations of cosmic unconsciousness which are not available to an ordinal condition of human situation. Some modern scholars, who are scientifically inclined, may say that the *I Ching* is nothing but the product of hallucination, which came to him at the devastating condition of his imprisonment. Whatever the mental condition of King Wen was at the time of his study, the *I Ching* has been regarded in the past centuries as the supreme product of Chinese mentality. The greatness of

22) *Ta Chuan*, Sec. II, ch. 11.

Chinese mentality is not in the logical system of thought but the intuitive insight which perceives directly the nature of spiritual reality. Perhaps the visions expressed in the hexagrams can be the creation of such mentality.

The final form of the *I Ching* which we have today was thought to be completed by the Duke of Chou, the son of King Wen, who was responsible for the formulation of the texts for individual lines of hexagrams (*hsiao tz'u*). The Duke of Chou, Tan, succeeded the regency for his nephew when his brother King Wu died. The brilliance of his leadership was not questioned. He was not only the great ruler but the great philosopher who could succeed his father's work and complete it as a tribute of his filial piety. Even though this tradition was often questioned by modern scholarship, it is certain that this textual stratum belongs to the early Chou period²³). Furthermore, the text for individual lines of hexagrams are done in harmony with the Judgments, so that the author of the texts for individual lines (*hsiao tz'u*) must be informed with the Judgments on the hexagrams as a whole (*kua tz'u*). Even though it is questionable whether Tan had enough time to go through every line of hexagrams and formulate the texts, it is reasonable to believe that the whole work of the *I Ching* might be done in the Chou court under the leadership of the Duke. It is also worthless to argue upon the authorship of *hsiao tz'u*, for we do not have any provable evidence to affirm or deny the traditional assertion that the Duke of Chou was responsible for the texts. As we have already stated, from our observation on the symbolism and the situations depicted in the texts on individual lines of hexagrams, we do not need to question that the final form of the *I Ching*, not the Ten Wings, must come from the early Chou period. The traditional name of this book, *Chou I*, also suggests that it was originally a Chou manual on divination. Therefore, we can safely conclude that the final form of the *I Ching* was completed sometime in the early Chou dynasty, about three thousand years ago.

What I have attempted so far is to reconstruct somehow the authorship of the *I Ching* according to the Chinese tradition. As we have observed, there is no way to make any conclusive statement about the

23) Hellmut Wilhelm, *Change: Eight Lectures on the I Ching* (New York: Harper and Row, 1960). p. 11.

authorship of this book. I rather like to look at the *I Ching*, not as the product of specific individuals in history, but the unique creation of Chinese civilization. It is a natural treasure which belongs to the very expressions of Chinese culture. Even though the tradition has attributed the authorship of this book to particular persons, like Fu Hsi, King Wen, and the Duke of Chou, we must not think that they alone were responsible for it. Fu Hsi, for example, was a legendary figure who represents the very foundation of Chinese civilization. He is the symbol of the beginning of Chinese culture. Just like *Tang-Kun*, who was the legendary figure representing the beginning of Korean civilization, and *Ama-terasu Ohmi-kami*, who was the legendary emperor of Japanese civilization, Fu Hsi became the symbol for the birth of Chinese civilization. Thus we can say that the origin of the *I Ching* was in the origin of Chinese civilization. The authorship of the *I Ching* might be compared with that of the five books of Moses (Pentateuch) in the Old Testament, which went through many years of oral transmission and of revisions until they were finally written down and canonized. Just like the Pentateuch was attributed to a great person like Moses, so the *I Ching* was attributed to great figures like Fu Hsi, King Wen and Tan. Much like any other great national epics, the *I Ching* perhaps went through various revisions and refinements through the centuries of experiments in divination until it was finally completed and written down about the early part of the Chou dynasty. Thus in final analysis the authorship of the *I Ching* belongs not to several individuals whom we have mentioned, but to the corporal community of early Chinese people. Certainly, the men like King Wen and the Duke of Chou are much credited for the formulation of this book but they are not in any way separated from the community of those who shared the tradition of Chinese civilization, which is the real source of this book. It is not only the product of Chinese history but also has been a part of Chinese life. For this reason, even though it became the first book of Confucian classics, it never identified itself with the property of Confucian schools only. It has become the source of inspiration and challenge to all people in the history of Chinese civilization.

VERSUCH EINER SOZIOLOGISCHEN VERORTUNG DES ANTIKEN GNOTIZISMUS*

VON

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Eine soziologische Betrachtung des Gnostizismus¹⁾ ist bis heute nicht durchgeführt worden, obgleich die Notwendigkeit hierfür immer wieder betont wird²⁾. Man wird für diesen Mangel mehrere Gründe

*) Der Verfasser dieses Aufsatzes behandelt ein interessantes Problem der Struktur des Gnostizismus, das auch auf dem Symposium in Messina in der Diskussion erwähnt wurde. Der Schriftleiter möchte die Sachverständigen einladen zu den Thesen von Herrn Kippenberg in Numen Stellung zu nehmen.

1) Wird im folgenden von Gnostizismus gesprochen, so ist damit eine Bewegung gemeint, deren zentrales Theologumenon die geoffenbarte Identität des in der bösen Welt gefangenen Selbst mit seinem jenseitigen göttlichen Teil ist (so C. Colpe, Art. Gnosis RGG 3. A. II 1650). Der antike Gnostizismus war eine Weltreligion, die sich räumlich bis China und zeitlich über 1000 Jahre erstreckte. Eine soziologische Analyse wird sich auf ein begrenztes Stück dieses Komplexes beschränken müssen. Als eine vertretbare Begrenzung kann räumlich das Imperium Romanum, zeitlich das 1.-3. Jh. nChr gelten. Das Textmaterial ist durch Zitate der christlichen Kirchenväter sowie durch die Bibliothek von Nag Hamadi überliefert. Ausserhalb der so markierten Grenzen stehen Mandäismus und Manichäismus.

2) Hans Jonas äussert sich in der Einleitung zu seinem epochemachenden Werk 'Gnosis und spätantiker Geist' Teil 1. Die mythologische Gnosis, FRLANT 51, 3. A. Göttingen 1964 „zur Frage des Realgrundes (Psychologie, Soziologie)“ S. 58-73. Er bezieht sich auf höchst vage und verschwommene Ausführungen Reitzensteins, der vom „Druck entsetzlicher Zeiten“ im Zusammenhang mit dem gnostischen Fatalismus sprach. Hans Jonas wendet sich gegen jede Kausalzurechnung, weil ja das menschliche Subjekt überhaupt motivierbar sein müsse und somit die Funktionsweise des Sozialen von der jeweiligen Seinsart des existenzialen Subjekts abhängig sei (S. 62). Dieser Einwand von Jonas hat nachhaltig gewirkt und einer „soziologischen“ Interpretation des antiken Gnostizismus nur eine so eingeschränkte Bedeutung zugebilligt, dass in der Folgezeit solche Wege nicht begangen wurden. Deshalb enthalten zB die Vorschläge des Gnosis-Kolloquiums von Messina in einem Schlusssatz den Wunsch, die Kenntnis der soziologischen Aspekte des Gnostizismus zu vertiefen (Le Origini dello Gnosticismo. Studies in the History of Religions XII, Leiden 1967, S. XXXII). Eben das verlangte zB auch K. Rudolph (Stand und Aufgaben in der Erforschung des Gnostizismus. Tagung für allgemeine Religionsgeschichte 1963. Sonderheft der wissenschaftlichen Zeitschrift der Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, S. 98). Ein höchst unbefriedigender, positivistischer Versuch, den Manichäismus auf gesellschaftliche Bezüge zu untersuchen, ist das Buch von O. Klíma, Manis Zeit und Leben, Prag 1962. Eine Überwindung des Einwandes von Hans Jonas kann nur durch Reflexion auf

nennen können. Einmal fehlt für jede sich mit religiösen Texten beschäftigende Wissenschaft eine religionswissenschaftliche Methode, die es möglich macht, einzelne Aussagen und Anweisungen als sinnvolle Momente in einem bestimmten historisch-sozialen Kontext zu verstehen. Überwiegend arbeitet man traditionsgeschichtlich, sucht bestimmte Überlieferungen und deren Trägergruppen zu erkennen, wobei der Akzent ganz auf das erstere fällt.

Gerade in der Erforschung des antiken Gnostizismus gibt es viele gelehrte Ausführungen über die Herkunft und ursprüngliche Bedeutung dieser oder jener Überlieferung. Die Frage, in welcher geschichtlichen Situation welche Menschen solche Systeme erdachten, bleibt dem Leser zur Beantwortung überlassen. Nun ist solche Antwort wahrlich nicht leicht zu geben. Denn als zweiten Grund für das Fehlen einer soziologischen Analyse der Gnosis wird man anführen müssen, dass eine religionssoziologische Analyse literarischer Werke auf Schwierigkeiten stößt, die jedes Reden von „Soziologie“ zweifelhaft machen. Soziologische Methode steht und fällt mit der Rückfrage. Ein Zusammenhang zB zwischen Religion und sozialer Schichtung ist nur durch Befragung bestimmter Bevölkerungsteile zu erkennen.³⁾ Tauchen bereits hier beträchtliche Unterschiede bei der Beurteilung und Ausdeutung des empirischen Materials auf, dann scheint eine religionssoziologische Analyse von Texten, die keinerlei Rückfragen dieser Art gestatten, vollends in guess-work zu enden. Und doch scheint mir solch Resignation nicht angebracht. Religiöse Texte erlauben natür-

das erkenntnisleitende Interesse seiner Hermeneutik geschehen (Begriff und Sache übernehme ich von J. Habermas, Erkenntnis und Interesse. In: Technik und Wissenschaft als 'Ideologie', 2. A. Frankfurt 1969, S. 155). Auf sie trifft zu, was Habermas vom Ansatz der historisch-hermeneutischen Wissenschaften ausführt: Sinnverstehen richtet sich auf den möglichen Konsensus von Handelnden im Rahmen eines tradierten Selbstverständnisses. Dies ist das praktische Erkenntnisinteresse (158). Es ist mE an der Zeit, auch in der religionsgeschichtlichen Forschung dem Gegenstand jene kritischen Fragen zu stellen, die es möglich machen, bestimmte Ideen als Rechtfertigung im Prinzip veränderlicher Abhängigkeitsverhältnisse und als Ausdruck der Entfremdung des Menschen zu verstehen. Erst eine reflektierte Anwendung des Ideologiebegriffes kann mE eine fruchtbare Religionssoziologie und Religionsgeschichte begründen. Ein noch unzureichender Schritt in diese Richtung ist der Aufsatz von Norman Birnbaum, Ideologiebegriff und Religionssoziologie. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie. Sonderheft 6. Probleme der Religionssoziologie hg. von D. Goldschmidt und J. Matthes. Köln/Opladen 1962, 78-86.

3) Vgl. G. Kehrer, Religionssoziologie, Göschen 1228, Berlin 1968, S. 80-92.

lich keine direkte Rückfrage nach Erziehung, Bildung, Schichtzugehörigkeit, politischer Einstellung des Autors. Aber dieser Sachverhalt schliesst ja doch nicht aus, Kriterien zu entwickeln, mit deren Hilfe man religiöse Aussagen dechiffriert, man sie in ihren historisch-sozialen Standort zurückstuft.

Soziologische Analyse religiöser Texte muß mE von einer Position ausgehen: man muß die Aussagen über Gott und Welt als Projektion menschlicher Vorstellungen verstehen, mit deren Hilfe der Mensch das Fremde und Bedrohliche nach Analogie des ihm Bekannten und Vertrauten deutet. Diese These Ludwig Feuerbachs hat Ernst Topitsch zum Programm erhoben. Er versucht nachzuweisen, wie Dinge und Vorgänge der täglichen Lebenswirklichkeit zu Modellvorstellungen für die mythischen und philosophischen Weltauffassungen werden. Als solche Modellvorstellungen kommen biologische Vorgänge in Betracht (biomorphe Modelle) sowie das planmässige, absichtsgeleitete Wollen und Handeln (intentionale Modelle). „Die letztere Gruppe entstammt vor allem entweder den sozialen Beziehungen und Ordnungen von der Familie bis zum Staat oder der künstlerisch-handwerklichen Tätigkeit, der Techné, und ist daher in die Untergruppen der soziomorphen und technomorphen Analogien einzuteilen“⁴⁾. Der Mensch legt mit Hilfe solcher, ihm vertrauter Bezüge das Weltganze aus, um in ihm selbst wieder bestimmte Normen des Handelns zu begründen. „Die Metaphysik rezitiert, was ihr das Werten diktiert“⁵⁾. In einem Zirkel projiziert der Mensch seine Welt, um sie auf diese Weise in einer kosmischen Ordnung zu sichern. Topitsch dekliniert diesen Gedanken an allen Hochreligionen durch, wobei ihm überraschende Einsichten gelingen. Darüberhinaus versucht er auch die abendländische Philosophie bis hin zu Karl Marx als eine einzige Leerformel zu erweisen: die normative Rückanwendung intentionaler Modelle besagt gar nichts, da das Modell selbst erst durch Projektion zum Weltgesetz wurde. An dieser Stelle wird man Topitsch kritisch fragen müssen, ob es denn keine Einheit der Geschichte gibt. Seine Ausführungen zu den Religionen jedoch stellen ein Werkzeug dar, mit dessen Hilfe der gesellschaftliche Standort des Verfassers religiöser Texte bestimmt werden kann, befragt man die Texte nur auf das in ihnen enthaltene Modell.

4) Vom Ursprung und Ende der Metaphysik, Wien 1958, 3.

5) AaO 177.

Gedanklich steht diese Einsicht Topitschs der Wissenssoziologie Karl Mannheims nahe. Alles Wissen ist nach Mannheim in einen gesellschaftlichen Kontext verflochten, ist notwendigerweise von dem historisch-sozialen Ort des Reflektierenden bedingt. Die Wissenssoziologie durchdenkt diese Bedeutung aussertheoretischer Bedingungen des Wissens ⁶⁾).

Topitschs methodischer Ausgangspunkt muß allerdings modifiziert werden. Wenn in den Religionen der Mensch die ihm vertrauten Modelle von Leben in ein Jenseits projiziert, dann findet also zwischen religiösen Bewegungen ein Kampf um soziale Werte bzw. Wertungen statt. Es geht ihnen — sofern sie sich gegen andere richten — um die Durchsetzung einer anderen Lebensordnung, eines anderen sozialen Modells.

Diese Überlegungen kann man als Schlüssel für eine soziologische Interpretation des antiken Gnostizismus benutzen ⁷⁾). Man muss den Texten nur mit einer gewissen Hartnäckigkeit die entsprechenden Fragen stellen. Welche Lebenswirklichkeit und Lebenserfahrung setzt der Gnostiker als Modell seiner Weltauffassung voraus? Welche Dinge und Vorgänge seiner täglichen Lebenswirklichkeit werden ihm Interpretationsmittel bei der Deutung von Welt, Mensch und Gott? Und *via negationis* gefragt: welche damals gängigen Modelle lehnt er als Deutung von Welt ab?

Ich möchte von dieser zweiten Frage ausgehen, obwohl gerade sie auf den ersten Blick unbeantwortbar erscheint. Was wissen wir denn schon von dem, was einen Gnostiker angesichts der philosophischen Strömungen seiner Zeit bewegte? Von welchem Gnostiker können wir mit Sicherheit behaupten, er habe zB stoische Philosophie gekannt, aber abgelehnt? Dennoch ist eine Überlegung, von welchen Weltdeutungen sich der Gnostizismus unterscheidet, durch diese Wissenslücke

6) Ideologie und Utopie, Kap. 5, Wissenssoziologie, 4. A. Frankfurt 1965, 227f.

7) E. Topitsch hat sich in einem Aufsatz programmatisch zur Gnosis geäußert: Marxismus und Gnosis. In: Sozialphilosophie zwischen Ideologie und Wissenschaft. Soziologische Texte 10, 2. A. Neuwied 1966, 261-296. In der Gnosis setze sich der Mensch mit der Faktizität des Übels, mit der Wertirrationalität der Lebenswirklichkeit auseinander (265), weshalb die Gnosis Erlösung durch Weltflucht anstrebe, während die Apokalyptik die endzeitliche Umgestaltung der Welt erwarte (270). Topitsch nimmt hier die gnostische Aussage für bare Münze, ohne nach ihren ideologischen (Herrschaftsverhältnisse begründenden) Implikationen zu fragen. Gerade an den antiken Gnostizismus ist die Frage nach den vorausgesetzten sozialen Wertungen zu stellen.

nicht überflüssig gemacht. Wenn Denken prinzipiell vom historisch-sozialen Ort des Nachdenkenden bedingt ist, dann ist es ganz egal, ob der Gnostiker zeitgenössische Denker kannte oder nicht. Dann sind diese Denker eben auch nicht als spontan schaffende Subjekte interessant, sondern als Transformatoren bestimmter gesellschaftlicher Werte in Weltauffassungen. Wir können und müssen also die gnostischen Systeme im Kontext anderer Weltinterpretationen lesen. Wir müssen es, weil wir nur so die andere soziale Verflechtung und andere soziale Wertorientierung des antiken Gnostizismus herausbekommen können. Damit soll dieser Gnostizismus nicht auf politische Aussagen reduziert, verkleinert werden. Seine direkte Intention ist keine politische, wie schon Ernst Troeltsch⁸⁾ gesehen hat. Aber gerade diese Distanz vom Politischen fällt aus dem Rahmen antiker Philosophie völlig heraus, wenn man von den Epikuräern und Kynikern absieht⁹⁾. Im Bereich orientalischer Religionen hat sie erst recht keine Parallele. Differentia specifica zwischen Gnostizismus und den damals gängigen Weltinterpretationen scheint mir gerade die unterschiedliche Wertung politischer Macht zu sein. Um das zu zeigen, möchte ich als komplementäre Alternative die Schrift *περὶ κόσμου*, *De mundo*, *Über die Welt* heranziehen¹⁰⁾.

Diese Schrift wird unter dem Namen des Aristoteles überliefert. Diese Autorschaft wurde schon in der Antike bezweifelt und ist heute zwingend widerlegt. Man hat alle möglichen antiken Philosophen als Autoren erwogen, doch ist keine Lösung gefunden worden. Zu erwähnen ist, dass die Schrift an sehr vielen Stellen Berührungspunkte mit den Fragmenten des Poseidonios bietet¹¹⁾. Sie gehört zeitlich daher nach Poseidonios eingeordnet, die Grenzen der Entsteh-

8) Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen, Tübingen 1912, 18-21.

9) Einen knappen Überblick über die Staatsauffassungen und Staatsmythen des Altertums gibt R. Stanka, *Die politische Philosophie des Altertums*, Wien-Köln 1951, 11-59.

10) Text: W. L. Lorimer, *Nouvelle Collection des Textes et Documents*, Paris 1933. Ferner J. Tricot, *Aristote, Traité du Ciel suivi du traité pseudo-aristotélicien Du Monde*, Paris 1949, 179-204. Übersetzungen: W. Capelle, *Die Schrift von der Welt*, Jena 1907. A.-J. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, II, *Le Dieu Cosmique*, 3. A. Paris 1949, 460-477 (übersetzt 391a-393a), P. Gohlke, Paderborn 1949.

11) Wie das Verhältnis beider zueinander zu denken ist, ist nicht eindeutig entschieden. H. Strohm, *Studien zur Schrift von der Welt*. *Museum Helveticum* 9 (1952) 137-175 führt S. 137 mit knappen Angaben in die Diskussion ein.

ungszeit sind das Ende des 1.Jh.vChr und die Mitte des 2.Jh.nChr¹²⁾).

Philosophiegeschichtlich ist sie ein Dokument des Eklektizismus. Ihr Verfasser rechnet sich zu den Peripatetikern, weist Gott daher absolute Transzendenz gegenüber der Welt zu. Er versucht aber, die stoischen Lehren mit den aristotelischen zu verbinden, indem er von Gott dessen Dynamis unterscheidet, die das All durchdringt und erhält. So ist Gott — gut stoisch — das Gesetz des Alls. Endet etwa Eduard Zellers Besprechung dieser Schrift mit der Charakterisierung: „ein merkwürdiges Denkmal des Eklekticismus“¹³⁾, so erscheint mir diese doxographische Perspektive geradezu ein Prokrustesbett für die Schrift. Das, was an ihr Beachtung erfordert, wird geflissentlich übersehen¹⁴⁾.

Die Schrift ist einem Alexander gewidmet, wahrscheinlich dem grossen Makedonier¹⁵⁾. Ihm stellt sie in den cap. 2 bis 4 das *σύστημα* des Kosmos vor — ein wirkliches Welt-Gebäude, dessen einzelne Teile vom göttlichen Äther bis herunter zur vom Wasser umgebenen Erde in seinen Funktionszusammenhängen beschrieben werden. Lebendig und bewegt wird die Ausführung erst in den cap. 5 und 6. Wie kommt es — so fragt der Verfasser —, dass die aus entgegengesetzten Prinzipien bestehende Welt nicht längst zugrundegegangen ist? „Ebenso gut könnte man — so schreibt der Verfasser — darüber staunen, dass ein Staat bestehen bleibt, obgleich er aus höchst verschiedenen *ἔθνη* (Klassen) besteht, nämlich aus Armen und Reichen, Jungen und Alten, Schwachen und Starken, Guten und Bösen“ (396 b Z.1-4). Die Lösung des Verfassers: das Wunderbare an der *πολιτικὴ ὁμόνοια* ist gerade, dass die eine Ordnung aus Vielen und Ungleichen erwächst. „In gleicher Weise liebt die Natur die Gegensätze und wirkt gerade aus ihnen den Einklang (*τὸ σύμφωνον*)“ (396 b Z.7f). Die Einheit des Kosmos wird in gesellschaftlichen Kategorien gedacht, der Kosmos wird als Staat verstanden¹⁶⁾. Dass bei dieser Vorstellung die monar-

12) Festugière begründet aaO S. 478 diese Daten.

13) Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung. 3. Teil, 1. Abteilung, 5. A. Leipzig 1923, 670. Eine Untersuchung von Aufbau und Inhalt der Schrift bei Festugière 501ff.

14) Das beurteilt Strohm (s.o. Anm. 11) ähnlich, nur dass er sehr sorgfältig das Kompositionsprinzip des Verfassers herausarbeitet, also gerade dessen persönliche Leistung höher gewertet wissen will.

15) Zu dieser Frage siehe E. Zeller, Über den Ursprung der Schrift von der Welt, Kleine Schriften I, Berlin 1910, S. 333-341.

16) Weitere Parallelen für den Vergleich des Kosmos mit dem Staat notiert

chische Staatsform eine Rolle spielt, zeigt cap. 6, wo das persische Grosskönigtum das Modell für die Regierung des Höchsten abgibt. Die Gottheit ist nicht in der gesamten Welt gegenwärtig. Nein, wie auch menschliche Führer niedrige Arbeit nicht selbst tun sondern durch Sklaven tun lassen, so wirkt auch Gott nur durch seine Dynamis. Und nun folgt ein detaillierter Vergleich Gottes mit dem persischen Grosskönig, der unsichtbar in einem wunderbaren Palast thront und mittels seiner Beamten die Herrschaft über Asien ausübt. Sowenig, wie dieser König alles eigenhändig verrichtete, tut es Gott.

Man könnte und muss natürlich fragen, ob wir hier nicht einfach ein Gleichnis vor uns haben, dessen eine Seite: „die staatliche Ordnung“ keineswegs gerechtfertigt werden soll. Jesus von Nazareth rechtfertigt im Gleichnis vom ungerechten Haushalter ja auch nicht den Betrug. Doch liegt hier mehr als nur ein wertneutraler Vergleich vor. Die politische Ordnung des Grosskönigtums wird nicht ohne Wertung beschrieben: es war eine grossartige Ordnung (*κόσμος*). Auch fehlt nicht der Hinweis, dass der König *δεσπότης* und *θεός* genannt wird. So scheint mir der Schluss zwingend, dass hier eine positiv bewertete politische Ordnung zum Interpretament des grösseren Staates, nämlich des Kosmos, wird.

Die Schrift ‚Über die Welt‘ ist meines Erachtens keine merkwürdige Kompilation aristotelischer und stoischer Gedanken, wie es sich einer doxographischen Betrachtung darstellt. Sie ist vielmehr antike Philosophie unter den politischen Bedingungen der Kaiserzeit. Diese Bedingungen würde ich im Telegrammstil so formulieren: Im 2. und 1. Jh.vChr klafften in Italien die sozialen Gegensätze zwischen Senat, Rittern und Volkspartei soweit auseinander, dass allein ein vom Heer getragener Führer die Einheit des römischen Reiches garantieren konnte¹⁷⁾. Mit Augustus begann diese neue politische Führung¹⁸⁾. Ihr Prinzip war nicht die Selbstverwaltung des Imperium von unten,

P. Wendland, *Philos Schrift über die Vorsehung*, Berlin 1892, 10 Anm. 1. Zu Philo selbst siehe das 1. Kap. bei U. Früchtel, *Die kosmologischen Vorstellungen bei Philo von Alexandrien*, Arbeiten zur Literatur und Geschichte des Hellenistischen Judentums II, Leiden 1968.

17) Eine Darstellung der Klassen und ihrer Kämpfe gibt L. Bloch, *Soziale Kämpfe im alten Rom*. Aus *Natur und Geisteswelt*, 22. Band, 2. A. Leipzig 1908. S. 146ff schildert die monarchische Lösung der sozialen Probleme, wobei man Lösung doch wohl in Anführungsstriche setzen muss.

18) R. Stanka (s.o. Anm. 9): „Praktisch war Roms Kaisertum eine militärische Despotie, kaschiert allerdings durch den nominellen Einfluss des Senates“ (261).

sondern die zentrale Verwaltung mittels Beamtenschaft, vom princeps ausgehend, von oben¹⁹⁾. Dieses autoritäre System war bereits von den hellenistischen Königen bei der Verwaltung ihrer Territorien entwickelt worden²⁰⁾. Rom verband wiederum auch von sich aus mit solch Verwaltungsschema ideologische Momente: weil Griechen und Barbaren nicht fähig waren, eine gerechte Ordnung zu realisieren, war es ewiger Auftrag an das Imperium Romanum, den Völkern Recht und Frieden zu bringen. Roms Kriege waren *bella iusta* im Dienste der *pax romana*²¹⁾.

Dieser politische Zentralismus zog im religiösen Bereich eine Zentrierung von Göttern und Mächten um eine höchste Gottheit nach sich. Erik Peterson hat diese politische Implikation des Monotheismus erkannt und detailliert beschrieben: die Nationalgötter der römischen Provinzen werden zu Beamten des obersten Gottes²²⁾. Wie nur konsequent, üben diese Nationalgötter die faktische Regierung aus, während der göttliche Monarch herrscht²³⁾. Peterson verweist treffend auf den Satz: „Le roi règne mais il ne gouverne pas“²⁴⁾. Die kleine Schrift *De mundo* steht ganz im Banne dieser Weltauffassung.

19) Der bürokratische Charakter der hellenistischen und kaiserzeitlichen Gesellschaft hängt direkt mit der Arbeitsteilung zusammen. Diese legitimierte ein eigenständiges Staatsbeamtentum, was schon Platon intendierte. Diesen Zusammenhang hat J. Kaerst herausgearbeitet: *Geschichte des Hellenismus*, Band II 2. A. 1926. S. 146-167: Der rationalistisch-technische Charakter der hellenistischen Kultur.

20) V. Ehrenberg hat diesen Zusammenhang zwischen orientalischer Königs-ideologie (die im Gegensatz zur makedonischen nicht volksmonarchisch, sondern absolutistisch war) und der Verwaltung grosser Territorien herausgearbeitet (*Der Staat der Griechen*, Bibliothek der Alten Welt, Zürich 1965, 191-230). Als erster hat Xenophon (430 - ca 354 vChr) ihn entwickelt, der mit seiner *Kyropädie* einen historischen Tendenzroman schuf, der den persischen König Kyros als Helden eines idealen Staates schildert. In Xenophons Sprung von der Konzeption der demokratischen Polis zum monarchischen Flächenstaat sieht Stanka Xenophons Bedeutung, die in dieser Hinsicht noch Plato und Aristoteles überrage (s.o. Anm. 9 S. 132f).

21) Olof Gigon, *Die antike Kultur und das Christentum*, Gütersloh 1966, 25ff.

22) E. Peterson, *Der Monotheismus als politisches Problem*, Leipzig 1935 S. 60-62 (so Celsus).

23) Peterson aaO S. 98f. Max Pohlenz zieht zum Vergleich Philo heran, der — genauso wie *De Mundo* — zwischen Gottes οὐσία und seiner δυνάμεις, die allein in die sichtbare Welt hineinreicht, scheidet (Philon von Alexandria. *Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Phil.-histor. Klasse* 1942 S. 400-487: S. 483). Auch Philo vergleicht die Stellung Gottes zu diesen δυνάμεις mit der des Grosskönigs zu seinen Satrapen (*De Decal.* 61).

24) Peterson aaO S. 19.

Sie deutet den Kosmos in Analogie zur politischen Struktur des Imperium Romanum. Herrschaft und faktisch ausgeübte Macht werden unterschieden, eine Differenzierung, die wir auch bei Philo verfolgen können. „In Wahrheit ist Gott ein Herrscher des Friedens, seine Diener aber sind die Führer der Kriege“ ist der letzte Satz seiner Schrift über den Dekalog. Gott selbst — das besagt der Satz im Kontext — straft nicht selbst Menschen für die Übertretung seiner Gebote, vielmehr sind dafür seine ὑποδίακονοι zuständig.

Wir haben einen grossen Umweg gemacht. Er hatte den Sinn, uns vor Augen zu führen, wie ausserhalb der gnostischen Bewegung der Kosmos gedeutet wird, und wie diese Deutung von der Bewertung des autoritären römischen Verwaltungsstaates mit bestimmt ist. Will man daran gehen, den historisch-sozialen Ort der gnostischen Systeme zu erschliessen, dann muss man ihnen die Frage stellen, wie denn sie gesellschaftliche Herrschaftsverhältnisse deuten und zur Interpretation von Welt benutzen. Die Antwort hierauf kann nicht schwer fallen: Ist in der Schrift *De mundo* die Relation Bürger — Monarch Vorbild für die von Mensch zu Gott, so ist in den gnostischen Systemen ein Herrschaftsverhältnis geradezu *das* Kennzeichen für die Beziehung des Demiurgen zum Menschen. Ist in dem Verwaltungsmodell der Schrift ‚Über die Welt‘ alle Macht abgeleitete, von Gott legitimierte Macht, die der Mensch als Wohltat empfindet, so ist in den gnostischen Systemen die Macht des Weltgottes usurpierte, böse Macht, die den Menschen versklavt. Der antike Gnostizismus kennt keine legitime Ordnung und Macht. Eben deshalb reflektiert er allein darauf, den Zwang, dem der Mensch ausgesetzt ist, zu zerbrechen. Dass das Verhältnis des Demiurgen zum Menschen ein Herrschaftsverhältnis ist, hinter dem die Struktur des Imperium Romanum durchschimmert, sei an ein paar Systemen verifiziert. Archon, König und Herr nennt der Gnostiker Basilides den Demiurgen, das oberste Sein dagegen den Nichtseienden²⁵⁾. Im Apokryphon des Johannes ist Jaldabaoth, grässliche Missgeburt der Sophia, der erste Archon, der erste Herrscher. Er vereinigte sich mit der Unvernunft und erzeugte die Gewalten, die unter ihm stehen²⁶⁾. Der oberste Gott trägt hier unter anderem das Prädikat Pneuma. Im simonianischen System, wie Irenaeus es überliefert, er-

25) Nach dem Referat bei Hippolyt ref. VII 25, 3f.

26) 38,1-39,1. Übersetzung: R. Haardt, *Die Gnosis. Wesen und Zeugnisse*, Salzburg 1967, 161f.

zeugte die Ennoia des Vaters Engel und Mächte. Diese hielten wiederum die Ennoia fest und schlossen sie in den menschlichen Körper ein ²⁷⁾).

Es ist meines Erachtens zu simpel, alle solche Ausführungen über Archonten, über Engel, Mächte und Gewalten einfach unter Dämonologie abzuheften. Schon sprachlich stecken in solchen Sätzen Anklänge an den römischen Staat. August Strobel hat in einem Aufsatz zum 13. Kapitel des Römerbriefes nachgewiesen, dass der Doppelausdruck *ἀρχαὶ καὶ ἐξουσίαι*, dessen zweite Hälfte ja in Römer 13 eine gewichtige Stellung hat, die Version einer lateinischen Wendung *imperia et potestates* bzw. *magistratus* darstellt, welche in der Verwaltungssprache beheimatet ist. *Imperia* bezeichnet eine ausserordentliche obrigkeitliche Stellung, wie etwa die militärische, während *potestates* resp. *magistratus* (griech. *ἐξουσίαι*) die gewöhnlichen Behörden meint. Ebenfalls profane Bedeutung kann der Begriff *ἀρχόντες* haben ²⁸⁾. In den gnostischen Systemen, die die bösen Mächte u.a. mit *ἀρχαί*, *ἐξουσίαι* und *ἀρχόντες* bezeichnen, sind natürlich transzendente Mächte gemeint. Aber die gewählte Terminologie hat politische Bezüge und beinhaltet ein Urteil über die Herrschaftsverhältnisse des Staates, in dem der Gnostiker lebt.

Die politischen Spiegelungen im Bild des Demiurgen zeigen sich noch an anderen Stellen. Der Herrscher dieser Welt ist ein Gott, dem nach Kriegen verlangt, wie Markion ²⁹⁾ und Basilides ³⁰⁾ wissen. Und der Gnostiker Justin sagt von den 12 Engeln der Eden, sie hätten die *σατραπικὴ ἐξουσία* über den Kosmos, und ihre Herrschaft sei durch böse Zeit und Krankheiten (zB Hungersnot, Bedrückung und Not) gekennzeichnet ³¹⁾.

Der Mensch, der unter dieser Macht lebt, ist zur Rebellion aufgerufen. Es genügt, hier auf eine einzige gnostische Allegorie hinzuweisen: die Verehrung der alttestamentlichen Paradiesesschlange als Erretterin ³²⁾. Der Gnostiker gewinnt seine Freiheit, indem er dem Gesetz des Weltschöpfers den Gehorsam aufsagt. Begründet ist solch

27) Adv. haer. I 23,2.

28) Zum Verständnis von Rm 13, ZNW 47 (1956) 67-93. Nachweis für die genannten Termini S. 75-79.

29) Irenaeus, adv. haer. I 27,2.

30) Irenaeus, adv. haer. I 24,4.

31) Hippolyt, refutatio V 26,11-13.

32) Irenaeus, adv. haer. I 30,15.

Akt in der Illegitimität des Demiurgen. Eben weil diese Herrschaft nicht durch die Vernunft legitimiert ist, hat der Gnostiker Macht, die Archonten zu beherrschen, wie Karpokrates es formulierte³³). Als ich die überlieferten gnostischen Systeme nach den in ihnen enthaltenen Herrschafts- und Machtbegriffen durchlas, fielen mir natürlich besonders solche Stellen auf, in denen die oberste Gottheit der Gnostiker mit solchen Begriffen tituliert wird. Diese Fälle — so selten sie sind — beziehen sich nicht auf das Verhältnis des Gnostikers zur obersten Gottheit, sondern auf die letztgültige Überlegenheit dieser Gottheit über den Demiurgen³⁴).

Wir hatten uns überlegt, in welcher Weise der antike Gnostizismus die soziale Wirklichkeit des Imperium Romanum deutet und zur Interpretation von Gott, Mensch und Welt benutzt. Die Antwort kann nur sein: Macht und Herrschaft sind Leitbegriffe, um ein kosmisches Zwangssystem darzustellen. Das Wesen des Demiurgen ist geradezu, dass er den Menschen in Abhängigkeit hält. Gerade die dem Weltgott zugeschriebene Schöpfertätigkeit, im Judentum konstitutiv für die Relation Mensch — Gott, wird negativ bewertet. Der Gnostiker kann den rettenden und erlösenden Gott nicht mit sozialen Termini definieren, sondern nur durch anthropologische Geistbegriffe. Die Rolle dieser Begriffe, von Carsten Colpe erkannt³⁵), stützt unsere These, dass das grosse Thema der Gnosis die Freiheit von der Herrschaft ist. Das kosmische Modell, das der Gnostiker entwirft, scheint mir die Projektion einer bestimmten sozialen Wertung zu sein: der Ablehnung des autoritären römischen Verwaltungsstaates.

Man wird darauf hinweisen müssen, dass der antike Gnostizismus in den östlichen Randländern des Imperium Romanum blühte, in Ländern, die mit Waffengewalt in das römische Friedensreich eingegliedert worden waren. Kleinasien, Syrien, Ägypten sind nicht nur die Stationen römischer Eroberungen, sondern auch die Heimatstätten der gnostischen Denker. Da sie in den grossen hellenistischen Städten

33) Hippolyt, ref. VII 32,3 (identisch mit Irenaeus, adv. haer. I 25,3).

34) Im Perlenlied heisst der aussendende Vater 'König' (zur Diskussion um den gnostischen oder enkratitisch-christlichen Ursprung des Liedes vgl. K. Rudolph, ThR 34 (1969) 214-220). Vgl. Irenaeus adv. haer. I 25,2.

35) Die religionsgeschichtliche Schule. Darstellung und Kritik ihres Bildes vom gnostischen Erlösermythus, FRLANT 78, Göttingen 1961, 207f; Art. Gnosis. RGG 3. A. Band II, 1648-1652; ungedruckte Vorlesung: Die Grundlagen des gnostischen Erlösermythus. Diese Vorlesung sieht die Grundlagen in iranischen, griech. und jüd. Geist-bzw. Wissensbegriffen.

lebten (wie Antiochia, Alexandria)³⁶⁾, waren diese Denker Angehörige einer entmündigten Intelligenz, welche nach Max Weber immer am ehesten als Träger einer Erlösungsreligion in Frage kommt. Das hatte der grosse Heidelberger Soziologe gerade auch im Hinblick auf den antiken Gnostizismus festgestellt. „Ebenso aber sind die vorderasiatischen Erlösungslehren des Manichäismus und der Gnosis beide ganz spezifische Intellektuellenreligionen, sowohl was ihre Schöpfer wie was ihre wesentlichen Träger und auch was den Charakter ihrer Erlösungslehre angeht“. „Eine Erlösungsreligiosität entwickeln sozial privilegierte Schichten eines Volkes normalerweise dann am nachhaltigsten, wenn sie entmilitarisiert und von der Möglichkeit oder vom Interesse an politischer Betätigung ausgeschlossen sind. Daher tritt sie typisch dann auf, wenn die, sei es adligen, sei es bürgerlichen herrschenden Schichten entweder durch eine bürokratisch-militaristische Einheitsstaatsgewalt entpolitisiert worden sind oder sich selbst aus irgendwelchen Gründen von der Politik zurückgezogen haben“³⁷⁾. Die vorderasiatischen Erlösungslehren — so schreibt Max Weber ein wenig später — sind „fast ausnahmslos Folgeerscheinungen der erzwungenen oder freiwilligen Abwendung der Bildungsschichten von politischem Einfluss und politischer Betätigung“³⁸⁾. Diese sehr thetischen und intuitiven Feststellungen Max Webers treffen sich in überraschender Weise mit unseren Überlegungen, in welcher Weise der

36) Marcion stammte aus Sinope in Kleinasien und war von Beruf vermögender Reeder. Menander, Schüler Simons, lehrte in Antiochia, wo Saturninus (und Basilides) seine Lehre übernahmen. In Alexandrien wirkten Basilides, Valentinus. Die Sprache dieser Gnostiker ist griechisch.

37) Ich entnehme das Zitat dem § 7 (Stände, Klassen und Religion) des Kapitels Religionssoziologie in Webers Hauptwerk *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Köln/Berlin 1964, S. 393f. Erstaunlicherweise sind die zahlreichen Einsichten in die soziale Formungen der Religionen, die Weber hier gewonnen und in eindrucklicher Kürze dargelegt hatte, in der Folgezeit nicht wirksam geworden. Überhaupt vergass man über Webers Kapitalismuserarbeiten diesen Abschnitt fast ganz. Dabei stellt er doch den ersten Schritt in Richtung auf eine wirkliche Religionsgeschichte dar, wenn man unter dieser die Darstellung von Religion als Ideologie im sozialen und psychologischen Prozess menschlichen Zusammenlebens versteht. Die antimarxistische Frontstellung ist hier nicht mehr so aufdringlich wie in den früheren Arbeiten Webers. Dafür tauchen dann andere Fragen auf, die am besten Hans Bosse formuliert hat: *Marx-Weber-Troeltsch. Religionssoziologie und marxistische Ideologiekritik*. München 1970, 63-67. Vor allem Webers Ansicht, die Verkündigung der Stifter von Weltreligionen sei nicht mehr weiter kausal ableitbar, ist zu problematisieren.

38) AaO S. 395.

Gnostiker die ihm vertraute soziale Wirklichkeit zur Interpretation von Kosmos verwendet. Eine sozial privilegierte Schicht hellenistischer Intellektueller wird im bürokratisch-militaristischen Verwaltungsstaat von Mitverantwortung ausgeschlossen³⁹⁾ und deutet den Menschen als Objekt vernunftwidriger Mächte.

Max Weber hat von solcher Art Religion die Erlösungsreligion negativ privilegierter Schichten unterschieden. Das Würdegefühl der höchstprivilegierten Schichten ruht „auf dem Bewusstsein der ‚Vollendung‘ ihrer Lebensführung als eines Ausdrucks ihres qualitativen, in sich beruhenden, nicht über sich hinausweisenden ‚Seins‘ ..., jedes Würdegefühl negativ Privilegierter dagegen auf einer ihnen verbürgten ‚Verheissung‘, die an eine ihnen zugewiesene ‚Funktion‘, ‚Mission‘, ‚Beruf‘ geknüpft ist“⁴⁰⁾. Die immer wieder als typisch jüdisch oder als typisch griechisch beschriebene Differenz von gnostischer Geistespekulation und messianischer Erwartung könnte so als ein soziologisch zu interpretierender Unterschied verstanden werden. Dafür spricht, dass Prodigien und Orakel die Aufstände der italienischen Sklaven (die zumeist aus Syrien kamen) gegen ihre Herren einleiteten⁴¹⁾, während die gnostischen Spekulationen keinerlei Zünd-

39) Die Folgen dieser Ohnmacht zeigen sich zB in Kleinasien an einem eigenartigen Phänomen: die griech. Rhetorik, deren Lebenselement die öffentliche Rede auf dem Markt der Polis war, entartete zu Prunkreden, Plüschgefasel ohne Relevanz. Über politisch wichtige Dinge entschied der Kaiser, das Consilium des Prokonsuls oder der Prokurator (H. Dessau, Geschichte der römischen Kaiserzeit, 2. Band, 2. Abt, Berlin 1930, 590f). Das heisst jedoch nicht, dass die Römer die vorgefundenen politischen Strukturen zerstörten. Die Römer liessen zB den Städten der Provinz Asia ihre Selbstverwaltung, die wesentlich von den Grundbesitzern getragen wurde (Dessau aaO 594). Wesentlich fester in das Gerüst römischer Herrschaft war Syrien integriert, das Augustus zum hauptsächlichen Stützpunkt seiner Macht im Osten machte. Die griechische Oberschicht war hier zahlenmässig viel geringer als etwa in Kleinasien (Dessau aaO 622ff).

40) AaO S 385.

41) Das hat sehr gut dargelegt R. Günther, Der politisch-ideologische Kampf in der römischen Religion in den letzten zwei Jahrhunderten v.u.Z. Klio 42 (1964) 209-297. Dieser recht umfangreiche Aufsatz ist eine überarbeitete Habilitationsschrift des in der DDR lebenden Historikers. Sie führt über das dickleibige Werk von F. Bömer, Untersuchungen über die Religion der Sklaven in Griechenland und Rom (Akademie der Wiss. u. Lit. Mainz, Geistes- u. sozialwiss. Klasse 1957,7; 1960,1; 1961,4; 1963,10) weit hinaus, insofern Bömer auch die klarsten Zusammenhänge zwischen Sklavenstand und religiösen Äusserungen nicht zur Kenntnis nimmt, resp. bewusst negiert. Im Werk Günthers kann man den Wert einer undogmatischen marxistischen Religionsgeschichte ermesen, die sich nicht auf Wiederholung des von den Vätern Gesagten beschränkt, wie es zB E. Chr. Wels-

stoff für den Aufstand unterdrückter Schichten enthielten ⁴²⁾).

In diesem Zusammenhang soll noch kurz auf die gnostische Allegorie hingewiesen werden ⁴³⁾. In der Naassenerpredigt wird ein Lied interpretiert, das Attis als den Gott feiert, der in der gesamten Ökumene unter verschiedenen Namen verehrt wird. Der, der im Theater bei der Zither diese Worte vorträgt, weiss jedoch gar nicht, was er sagt. Denn was Attis oder Adonis genannt wird, ist in Wahrheit die Seele ⁴⁴⁾. Hinter solchen Ausführungen steckt auch die Überheblichkeit des Intellektuellen gegenüber einem diffusen und wortlosen Mysterienkult. Die antiken Mysterienkulte sind ja primär Lokalkulte, die auf Grund der starken horizontalen Mobilität von Einheimischen im Imperium Romanum verbreitet wurden ⁴⁵⁾. Die oft infame Art, in der Gnostiker religiöse Traditionen, die von Einheimischen gepflegt wurden, umdrehen und verfälschen, ist u.a. auch der Reflex sozialer Schichtung ⁴⁶⁾. Die radikale Umwertung orientalischer religiöser Traditionen im Gnostizismus macht wahrscheinlich, dass die Gnostiker keine Vertreter orientalischer Kultur waren (wie etwa die Magier,

kopf tut: Die Produktionsverhältnisse im Alten Orient und in der Griechisch-Römischen Antike. Ein Diskussionsbeitrag. Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Schriften der Sektion für Altertumswissenschaft 5, Berlin 1957. Das Problem der Sklaven und ihrer Religion muss neu durchdacht werden.

42) Es ist das Verdienst R. M. Grants, die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von jüd. Apokalyptik und Gnostizismus gestellt zu haben (*Gnosticism and Early Christianity*. New York 1959). Die Niederschlagung der von utopischen Vorstellungen genährten Freiheitsbewegungen durch die römische Staatsmacht habe den Impetus für gnostisches Denken geliefert (27ff). Die traditionsgeschichtlichen Nachweise Grants für solchen Zusammenhang betreffen aber nicht wirklich zentrale Theologumena beider Bewegungen. Dazu kommt, dass gerade bei den frühen Gnostikern des ersten und beginnenden zweiten Jahrhunderts nChr jeder Zusammenhang fehlt.

43) Die beste Darstellung und die präziseste Charakterisierung ihrer Eigenart noch immer bei H. Jonas (s.o. Anm. 2 S. 214-223).

44) Hippolyt, ref. V 7, 11.

45) Kehrer (s.o. Anm. 3) S. 60.

46) Man denke nur an Marcion, nach welchem Christus nicht die at. Gerechten sondern Kain, die Sodomiter, die Ägypter und überhaupt die Heiden erlöste (Irenaeus, adv. haer. I 27,3). Eben das lehrten auch die sog. Kainiten. Als Beispiel ausser dem genannten ist die Verkündigung des Judengottes als Weltgott bei Saturnil, Basilides, Marcion zu nennen. Biographisch gehören diese drei Männer der hellenistischen Kultur von Antiochia, Alexandria und Kleinasien an. Eine Stütze für unsere Überlegungen sind die Karpokratianer, welche ein Christusbild zusammen mit Bildern antiker Philosophen (Pythagoras, Platon, Aristoteles) verehren (Irenaeus, adv. haer. I 25,6).

die Mysterienpriester, die jüdischen Priester und Theologen) sondern Angehörige hellenistischer Kultur.

Soziologisch *interpretieren* würde ich den antiken Gnostizismus als die Reaktion einer Schicht Intellektueller auf eine politische Entmündigung. Macht und Herrschaft werden als Zwang erfahren, die menschliche Vernunft als ohnmächtig begriffen. Vernunft und Macht werden als Gegensätze gedeutet und in ihrer Antithetik Leitlinien bei der Interpretation von Kosmos. Eben weil der Gnostiker Herrschaft negativ wertet, ist das Verhältnis Gottes zum Menschen ein herrschaftsfreies Seinsverhältnis. Die Absicht des Gnostikers ist es, sich durch Rekurs auf seine Vernunft ausserhalb des irrationalen Macht-systems zu begeben.

Soziologisch *lokalisieren* würde ich den Gnostizismus in der hellenistischen Intellektuellenschicht der östlichen Randländer des Imperium Romanum, die im 2. und 1. Jh.vChr unter die Stiefel römischer Legionen geraten waren.

Noch bleibt allerdings eine ganz wesentliche Frage zu beantworten: welche Genese die gnostischen Systeme mit ihren Geistbegriffen hatten. In den gnostischen Systemen fehlt ja jeder direkte Hinweis auf die politische Ordnung des Imperium Romanum. Eben dieser Mangel verleiht ihnen einen ahistorischen Schein. Gerade aber die Leugnung einer Verbindung von faktischer weltlicher Macht mit dem höchsten Prinzip des Nous ist ein historischer, politischer Akt. Er ist Antwort auf eine Deutung des römischen Reiches, die Herrschaft und Geist bzw Vernunft miteinander verband. Schärfer formuliert: die gnostische Auseinanderreissung von Herrschaft und Geist ist Protest gegen eine Ideologie, die die bestehenden Herrschaftsverhältnisse als die wahre Vernunftordnung legitimierte. Mit diesen Sätzen haben wir einen Übergang vollzogen zu einem verwickelten Problem: dem Verhältnis von Gnosis und mittlerem Platonismus.

Der sog. mittlere Platonismus wurde von Theiler in seiner Schrift „Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus“ behandelt⁴⁷⁾. Er fasste ihn unter der Überschrift zusammen: „Die vorneuplatonische Schuldtradition“. Der Gesichtspunkt, unter dem er sich ihm näherte, war die Transformation platonischen Denkens bei Plotin, die eben hier schon vorbereitet worden war. Die platonische Kosmosreligion sieht in der

47) Nachdruck der 1.A. (1934) Berlin/Zürich 1964.

Seele und im Geist den Erweis der Götter, während etwa bei Philo die Tendenz sichtbar wird, den obersten Gott unendlich weit über das Werden und den Kosmos zu heben — eine Tendenz, die eben auch andere platonische Denker dieser Zeit charakterisiert⁴⁸⁾. Numenios von Apamea vollzog dabei eine Trennung von oberstem Gott und Demiurg, der allerdings Abbild des ersten Gottes und somit gut ist⁴⁹⁾. Entsprechend dieser Differenzierung treten nun auch — in unterschiedlicher Begrifflichkeit — Seele und Geist auseinander.

H. Dörrie hat in dem Artikel Platonismus in der RGG⁵⁰⁾ sehr übersichtlich die Stätten des Mittelplatonismus dargestellt. Er fällt zeitlich in die Jahre zwischen ca 50 vChr und 250 nChr, entfaltete sich in der Exegese von Platons Timaios und war an wesentlich drei Orten lokalisiert: in Alexandria, wo Eudorius, Philo und Celsus ihn bezeugen, in Athen, wo Plutarch ihn vertrat, sowie in Pergamon, wo Gaius und Albinus lehrten. Der Mittelplatonismus hatte eine Breitenwirkung, die ihn über die genannten Stätten hinausgreifen liess.

Dass gerade die gnostischen Denker zentrale Termini ihrer Weltinterpretation ihm verdanken, ist längst erkannt und soll hier nicht weiter verfolgt werden⁵¹⁾. Wir wenden uns vielmehr jenem — in diesem Zusammenhang entscheidenden — Punkt zu, in welcher Weise die platonisierenden Denker im östlichen Teil des Imperium Romanum die politische Ordnung deuten.

Es war E. R. Goodenough, der erkannt hat, dass die Gedanken von Philo Judaeus über das Königtum von älteren hellenistischen Vorstellungen bestimmt waren⁵²⁾. Diese Vorstellungen sind am besten in

48) So zeigt es W. Theiler in dem Aufsatz „Gott und Seele im kaiserzeitlichen Denken“. In: *Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus. Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie* 10, Berlin 1966, S. 104-123.

49) Theiler aaO 110f; Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, Teil III, Abtlg. 2,2, S. 238f.

50) 3.A. Band 5. Tübingen 1961 Sp. 412f.

51) Ich verweise noch einmal auf den genannten Aufsatz von W. Theiler sowie auf die — leider höchst kompilatorische — Arbeit von J. Zandee, *The Terminology of Plotinus and of some Gnostic Writings, mainly the Fourth Treatise of the Jung Codex*, Istanbul 1961. Ein materialreiches Kapitel findet sich bei A.-J. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, IV, *Le Dieu Inconnu et la Gnose*, Paris 1954, 92-140. Eine Textsammlung der vor-neuplatonischen Philosophen mit knappen Erläuterungen bei C. J. de Vogel, *Greek Philosophy III, The Hellenistic-Roman Period*, 2. A. Leiden 1964.

52) *The Politics of Philo Judaeus*, New Haven 1938 (Nachdruck Hildesheim 1967) 90ff.

neupythagoreischen Fragmenten über das Königtum erhalten, die Goodenough in dem wichtigen Aufsatz "The political philosophy of hellenistic kingship" untersucht hat ⁵³). Als Verfasser gelten Archytas von Tarent, Diotogenes, Ecphantus und andere. Sie alle stellen den König als *ἐμψυχος νόμος* (das lebendige Gesetz) dar. Dieser Begriff hat als Antithese den des geschriebenen Gesetzes. Der wahre König richtet sich in seinem Tun nicht nach kodifiziertem Gesetz, sondern ist selbst Quelle des Gesetzes. Das Gesetz ist die Quelle der Gerechtigkeit, der König aber der *νόμος ἐμψυχος*, heisst es in einem Fragment des Diotogenes. So gibt es keine Norm der Gerechtigkeit ausserhalb des Königs, vielmehr ist dieser selbst Quelle der Gerechtigkeit.

Dieser Gedanke wird mit der Bedingung verbunden, dass er selbst vom Nous regiert wird ⁵⁴). So gilt der König als Abbild Gottes, der durch den Nous den Kosmos ordnet und bewahrt. Ebenso wie dieser Nous rettende Funktion gegenüber der Welt hat, so hat sie der König gegenüber seinen Untertanen. Und ebenso wie der König dem Staat die vernünftige Ordnung gibt, so muss ein jeder Bürger in seinem Leben dem Nous folgen. Der König ist in seiner Person die Verfassung seines Reiches und der Retter für seine Untertanen. Goodenough hat herausgearbeitet, dass diese Fragmente keineswegs abseitige philosophische Gedankengänge darstellen, sondern die offizielle Staatsphilosophie der hellenistischen Zeit überliefern.

Philo Judaeus (1. Jh. nChr) ist mit dieser Staatsphilosophie vertraut. So sehr der jüdische Philosoph auch den jüdischen Hass gegen römische Unterdrückung verstand ⁵⁵), er kannte nicht nur die neupythagoreische Königsideologie ⁵⁶), sondern befand sich mit seiner Wertung der römischen Monarchie ganz in ihrem Bann ⁵⁷). Dabei darf man sich nicht von Philos Terminologie irreleiten lassen. Denn wenn er von Demokratie spricht, ist die monarchische Staatsform gemeint, die zu seiner Zeit als *res publica* (griech. *δημοκρατία*) firmierte ⁵⁸). Auch für Philo ist der König ausgezeichnet durch Weisheit ⁵⁹), die Gabe

53) Yale Classical Studies 1 (1928) 53-102.

54) Goodenough aaO 67.

55) Vgl. Goodenough, The Politics of Philo Judaeus, cap 2.

56) AaO 44-46; 90.

57) Cap. 5 Kingship.

58) AaO 87-90.

59) Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesim IV 76.

Gottes ist, und durch die die heilbringende Herrschaft der Vernunft sich realisiert ⁶⁰). So bildet sich in der Relation König — Untertan die von Gott — Welt ab. Eben deshalb kann vom Kosmos als *πῶλος θεοῦ* gesprochen werden ⁶¹), in dem die Herrschaft des Weltlenkers durch Statthalter ausgeübt wird, welche die Philosophen Dämonen, die heilige Schrift aber Engel nennt. Die hinfälligen Menschen müssen sich der Logoi als Mittler bedienen, weil Gottes Macht Bestürzung und Entsetzen erregt ⁶²).

Ganz ähnliche Gedanken finden wir bei anderen Mittelplatonikern. Dass der Nous Ordnungsprinzip ist, auf das die Materie gewiesen ist, betont Plutarch ⁶³). Aus der Gottheit trat die Weltseele hervor, um die Welt zusammenzuhalten ⁶⁴), wobei diese Seele selbst in ein höheres und niederes Prinzip gegliedert ist ⁶⁵). Der König aber dient zur *ἐπιμέλεια καὶ σωτηρία* der Menschen ⁶⁶). „Gerechtigkeit ist nun zwar der Zweck des Gesetzes, das Gesetz aber ist Werk des Herrschers, der Herrscher aber Abbild Gottes, der alles ordnet“ ⁶⁷). Abbild ist der Herrscher, sofern er Gottes Logos hat.

Die kritischen Möglichkeiten, die in einem solchen Gedanken liegen, werden nicht entfaltet, was nur den ideologischen Sinn solcher Sätze zeigt. Auch die Reflektion der übrigen Mittelplatoniker liegt auf dieser Linie ⁶⁸). Sie sind der Überzeugung, dass aus der Materie das Böse stamme, Gott als Herrscher aber nicht nur die Welt geschaffen habe, sondern zur Erhaltung des Kosmos Mittelwesen (Beamte und Diener) eingesetzt habe. Seinem Wesen nach Nous, kann er auch nur durch den menschlichen Nous erkannt werden. ⁶⁹). In diesem Erkenntnisakt

60) De Somniis II 152-154.

61) Das hat U. Früchtel herausgearbeitet s.o. Anm. 16.

62) De Somniis I 140-142.

63) De Iside 53f. 56-59. Zu Plutarch: E. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, 3. Teil, 2. Abteilung, 2. Hälfte, 5. A. Leipzig 1923, 175-218.

64) De Iside 62; Plat. qu. 2, 1, 5.

65) Zu diesem Punkte vgl. Zeller 191f.

66) Ad Principem ineruditum 3.

67) AaO.

68) Maximus von Tyrus (vgl. Zeller aaO 223 sowie Festugière IV 109-115), Albinus (Zeller 228f), Celsus (Zeller 233f) sowie Festugière 115-123), Numenius von Apamea (Zeller 236-238), ein Teil der hermetischen Schriften (Zeller 245f. 250).

69) Das Problem, ob dieser Nous eigenständige Erkenntnis darstellt oder lediglich die Möglichkeit von Intuition, ist von Festugière dargestellt worden (IV S. 138f).

wird aber zugleich die Herrschaft des menschlichen Nous über die Triebe etabliert. Wir haben hier eine Philosophie vor uns, die sich explizit an der Herrscherfunktion des Nous orientiert. Welt, Staat und Menschen werden dementsprechend interpretiert. Dabei teilen alle diese Philosophen den unbedingten Glauben an die rettende d.h. bewahrende Potenz des Nous. Inhaltlich kann natürlich nichts über den Nous ausgesagt werden. Hier aber zeigt sich die ideologische Struktur des ganzen Gedankenganges. ‚Herrschaft des Nous‘ ist Rationalisierung von ‚Herrschaft einer philosophisch gebildeten Elite‘. Schärfer formuliert: ‚Herrschaft derer, die die Bildung für sich monopolisiert haben‘. Das wird überdeutlich, wenn vom irdischen Monarchen gesprochen wird. Er muss ein Philosophenkönig sein. Ist er so legitimiert, dann vollzieht er kraft Amtes die Rettung der Welt von dem Bösen, den destruktiven Trieben. So entwickeln die sog. Mittelplatoniker die von Goodenough geschilderte Ideologie der hellenistischen Könige in der Kaiserzeit fort.

Erst wenn diese ideologische Funktion mittelplatonischer Philosophie erkannt ist, versteht man den Sinn jener Transformation, die die platonisierenden Gedankengänge jener Zeit im Gnostizismus erhalten haben. Der Nous ist nicht mehr ordnendes und gestaltendes Prinzip im chaotischen Getriebe von Welt, Staat und Mensch. Ganz im Gegenteil; er ist gefangen und verloren an die diese Welt beherrschende Macht: an den Demiurgen⁷⁰⁾, an Jaldabaoth, an die Engel und Mächte, oder was sonst immer für Begriffe verwandt werden. Damit ist eine Legitimation des römischen Kaisertums durch den Nous-Begriff unmöglich gemacht.

Die Geistbegriffe stellen ein sicheres Kontinuum zwischen Gnostizismus und Mittelplatonismus dar, wobei die Trennung des zeitlichen Nous von seinem jenseitigen Teil und damit seine Erlösungsbedürftigkeit die gnostische Differenz markiert⁷¹⁾. C. Colpe möchte jene gnostischen Begriffe, die die geistige Wesenheit im Menschen und im ‚Kosmos‘ bezeichnen und deren es eine ganze Reihe gibt, mit ‚Selbst‘ interpretieren⁷²⁾. Mir scheint dieser Vorschlag erhellend. Denn die

70) Die gerade am Demiurg-Begriff gut ablesbare Verschiebung vom mittleren Platonismus zur Gnosis ist dargestellt von W. Theiler, *Art. Demiurgos*, RAC III, 1957, 694-711.

71) Das hat C. Colpe nachgewiesen. Siehe die Anm. 35 genannten Arbeiten.

72) RGG 3. A. Band II, Sp. 1650.

verschiedene Begrifflichkeit der gnostischen Systeme, die den Gnosisforscher geradezu zwangsläufig in traditionsgeschichtliche Sackgassen treibt, ist hier auf einen Generalnenner gebracht, der die ganze Inhaltsleere der gnostischen Begriffe bestens wiedergibt. Wenn der Gnostiker vom Fall und Leiden des Geistes spricht, dann spricht er von sich selbst. Wenn er vom Demiurgen redet, dann redet er von der politischen Macht, die ihm als fremde entgegentritt. So ist denn auch die gnostische Deutung von Welt, Staat und Mensch ganz und gar von den Interessen einer Gruppe geleitet, die sich nach Verlust der politischen Mitverantwortung als Elite neu legitimiert. Im Unterschied zu den sog. Mittelplatonikern geschieht dies nicht durch philosophische Begründung der Monarchie, sondern durch eine Verkündung von der prinzipiellen Verwerflichkeit der Herrschaft.

Einen auf ähnliche Ergebnisse hinauslaufenden Gedankengang entwickelte E. Fromm⁷³⁾. Nach Fromm ist die ursprüngliche christliche Vorstellung, dass ein wirklicher Mensch zum Gott wird, vaterfeindlich und revolutionär. Die arme ungebildete Masse befriedigt ihren Hass gegen die gesellschaftlichen Autoritäten und den mit diesen verbündeten Gott in einer Phantasie, die einen leidenden Menschen zum Gott werden lässt⁷⁴⁾. Die Transformation der Christologie in der Gnosis offenbart nun nach Fromm deren unrevolutionären und bürgerlichen Charakter⁷⁵⁾. Die Gnostiker, intellektuelle Vertreter des wohlhabenden Bürgertums (so Fromm), leugnen die Menschheit Christi. Sie tun dies, weil sie jede Hoffnung auf eine sich real, historisch vollziehende Befreiung und Erlösung der Menschen ablehnen. Ihren Ausdruck findet diese Ablehnung in der Lehre vom widergöttlichen Welterschöpfer. Die den Gnostizismus produzierende Gesellschaftsschicht wollte und musste beweisen, dass die urchristlich-eschatologischen Hoffnungen falsch und unbegründet seien. Die Kirche bekämpfte den Gnostizismus nur, „weil er das Geheimnis der kommenden christlichen Entwicklung rascher aussprach, als es das Bewusstsein der Massen schon ertragen konnte“⁷⁶⁾. „Nur ein langsamer, allmählicher Weg konnte die Masse von der Hoffnung auf

73) *Das Christusdogma und andere Essays*, München 1965, S. 9-91: Die Entwicklung des Christusdogmas.

74) AaO 49-51.

75) 71-76.

76) 73.

einen revolutionären Jesus zum Glauben an einen staatsbejahenden führen" 77).

Ich würde einen Teil dieser Sätze auf Grund des gebrochenen Verhältnisses des Gnostikers zur politischen Ordnung anders formulieren. Aber in dem zentralen Punkt hat Fromm recht: die Gnostiker verkünden die Unwandelbarkeit der Welt und der Gesellschaft. Sie etablieren sich als eine meta-politische Elite, die allein den Weg zur Erlösung weiss. Ihr Ziel ist nicht die revolutionäre Verwandlung gesellschaftlicher Verhältnisse, sondern die Zerstörung des falschen Scheines, der die politische Ordnung als Vernunftordnung ausgibt. So hat die gnostische Botschaft ideologiekritische Implikationen. Zugleich aber zeigt sich in ihr das Elend einer Elite, die auf den Verlust der Herrschaft nicht handelnd reagiert, sondern durch Transformation der sie legitimierenden Ideologie. Sie stellt sich als Führer auf dem Weg zum wahren Heil vor — und leistet damit Königen und Kaisern nur den besten Dienst. Die Entfremdung, das totale Ausgeliefertsein an irrationale Mächte, wird hier auf einen geradezu suggestiven Nenner gebracht, dem sich keiner zu entziehen vermag. Einsicht und Ohnmacht verbinden sich zu einem lähmenden Ganzen. „Da sprach Jesus: ‚Siehe Vater! Von Übeln heimgesucht wandert die Seele auf Erden, ferne von deinem Hauch irrt sie umher. Sie will dem bitt’ren Chaos entfliehen und weiss nicht, wie sie entrinnen soll. Deshalb, o Vater, entsende mich’ ” 78).

77) 72.

78) So spricht der Christus des Naassener-Psalms: Hippolyt, ref. V, 10, 2. Übersetzung: Haardt (s.o. Anm. 26) S. 90f.

THE SACRED GEOGRAPHY OF THE TAMIL SHAIVITE HYMNS*

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Revitalization movements, past and present, have become subjects of special interest to both historians and social scientists. Nativistic, millennial, messianic, and other kind of revitalization movements have provided scholars with useful data for the study of political, social and religious change, as well as what might be called "cultural crises"¹). Hinduism has experienced many such revitalization movements, in response to the internal development of Indian society or to the external challenges of invading peoples and alien faiths. We need only remind ourselves of the many syncretic Hindu cults which have developed as a result of challenges posed to the Hindu social order by Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity, in order to recognize the remarkable capacity of Hinduism for self-renewal.

Among the most interesting revitalization movements to have developed within Hinduism are the various cults of *bhakti* devotionism, with their simple but impassioned messages and their implied egalitarian bias. In particular, Tamil devotionism has long been a subject of interest to students of Indian religious history. But the recent development of scholarly interest in modern Indian regionalism and its historic roots has added new urgency to the task of studying those movements which, like Tamil devotionism, have important implications for the cultivation and dissemination of religious and literary symbols, values, and themes which are shared by the inhabitants of a particular linguistic region. One conclusion which emerges from a series

*) The author wishes to express his gratitude to Mr. N. Kumaraswami Raja, Reader in Linguistics at Annamalai University, without whose generous assistance over a period of three years, this study would not have been possible.

1) A classification scheme for such movements has been suggested by A. F. P. Wallace in "Revitalization Movements: Some Theoretical Considerations for Their Comparative Study," *American Anthropologist*; XVIII (June, 1956), 264-81.

of papers presented at a recent symposium on Indian regions and regionalism is that modern regional pride and self-awareness have deeper historical roots in some parts of India than in others, and that this is partly a function of the uneven literary development of India's regional languages ²⁾. Thus, it is generally acknowledged that the early maturing of Tamil as a creative literary medium, partly under the stimulus of Tamil *bhakti*, facilitated the dissemination of regional symbols in Tamilnad, a process which in turn helped to lay the groundwork for the emergence of a more strident regional consciousness in recent years.

Hence it is curious that no scholar has bothered to closely examine the literary evidence in order to determine more precisely the geographical and ecological orbit within which the saint-singers of Tamil devotionalism developed their themes. The surviving devotional literature is rich in specific geographical references, most of which can be precisely identified on modern maps. It is therefore possible to abstract from the hymns a "sacred geography" of Tamil devotionalism, or what Eric Isaac calls "the landscape of myth" ³⁾.

The following paragraphs are designed to briefly illustrate how the major collection of Śaivite devotional hymns, the *Dēvāram* (Songs of God) ⁴⁾ can be used in reconstructing this sacred geography and in exploring the significance of the dissemination of these regional symbols via traditional channels of social communications. Although this study is confined to Tamil Śaivism and utilizes only the most important collection of Śaivite hymns, a study of Vaishnavite sacred geography, utilizing the same techniques, is obviously feasible. Similarly, certain other texts of the Śaivite tradition, such as the *Periyapurāṇam*, readily lend themselves to this kind of treatment.

2) Robert I Crane, ed. *Regions and Regionalism in South Asian Studies* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1966). See especially the contributions of professors Bernard Cohn, Burton Stein, and Eugene Irschick.

3) Erich Isaac, "Religion, Landscape, and Space," *Landscape*; IX (Winter, 1960), 14-18. See also David E. Sopher, *Geography of Religions* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Foundations of Cultural Geography Series, 1967), espec. pp. 50-55.

4) The edition of the *Dēvāram* used in this study was published in seven volumes by the Dharmapuram Adhinam, Dharmapuram, from 1953 to 1964. Volumes I-III contain hymns of Sambandar; IV-VI, those of Appar; VII, those of Sundaramūrtti.

I

In several major spheres of human activity—political, social, and religious—the period of Pallava political ascendancy in the Tamil country, from roughly the sixth through the ninth centuries A.D., saw the crystallization of many forms of thought and action which would prevail in the Tamil country in later centuries. The emergence of articulate dynastic regimes, expressing themselves through inscriptional records; the appearance of stone Hindu temples as special “ritual arenas” for devotional purposes; and the displacing, first in the royal courts and subsequently in the countryside, of rival religious élites of the Buddhist and Jaina persuasion by a new, passionate, and aggressive breed of Hindu devotees, were all notable features of the Pallava period. The new advocates of devotionism, of Hindu *bhakti* (in Tamil, *patti*), are referred to in the Tamil Śaivite tradition as Nāyanmārs (or “leaders”), of whom there were sixty-three, and in the Vaishnavite tradition as Alṽars (“divers,” i.e. devotees who “plunge” into the Divine), of whom there were twelve.

If we thread our way carefully through the fanciful lore which has come to surround the lives of these *bhakti* saints, we find that the authentic core of these sectarian traditions preserves memories of a period of spiritual crisis. This crisis centered upon the Pallava and Pāṇḍyan royal courts, where rivalries among religious élites for royal patronage were most intense. The principal source for biographical information about the Śaivite saints is a 12th century hagiographic text, the *Periyapurāṇam*, written by another saint named Sekkiḷār.

Sekkiḷār’s version of the life of one of the most famous saints, Tirunāvukkarasu—or Appar (“Father”), as he is more commonly known—is typical of these stories, and is worth a brief retelling here. Appar was born into the Vellala peasant caste to parents who were devout worshippers of Śiva. Following their death, Appar lavished his wordly goods upon charitable projects, renounced the world, and became an ascetic. Converted to Jainism, he became renowned for his knowledge of Jaina lore. But when he fell deathly ill and Jaina medicines proved useless, he turned once more to praise of Śiva, and thereby regained his health. The Pallava king, under the influence of the Jains, summoned Appar and subjected him to a trial by ordeal: poison, fire, trampling by elephants, and drowning. Saved from destruction by his devotion to Śiva, Appar convinced the Pallava king to exclusively em-

brace Śaivism. Thereafter, Appar devoted himself to travelling from one Śaivite shrine to another, composing a ten-stanza hymn (*pathikam*) in praise of each ⁵). Many of these shrines were visited in company with another famous saint, Tiruñānasambandar, his younger contemporary. Appar is said to have composed 49,000 hymns in this way, although only 315 survive. The surviving hymns of these two saints, plus those of a third, Sundaramūrtti, comprise the sacred text known as *Dēvāram*.

Other Śaivite saints, although less renowned than these three (some, in fact, possibly entirely apocryphal), are similarly praised by Sekkīlār. Appearances of the capricious god before his devotees, miracles performed by the saints through devotion, travels and hymn-singing, and conflicts and disputations with Jaina and Buddhist monks, are among the common threads which run through their biographies. In effect, these biographies constitute allegories on the eclipse of Buddhism and the decline of Jainism in south India during the Pallava period in the face of a resurgent Hindu devotionism.

The revitalized form of Hinduism which the saints proclaimed emphasized salvation through simple but impassioned devotion to the god. Professor Raghavan has characterized the saints as "mystics who spoke the language of experience and poetry and not of argument and logic" ⁶). The movement toward doctrinal simplicity which is reflected in the hymns is matched by the social eclecticism of the saints themselves. While some of the saints were Brahmans, others were not. Appar, as we have seen, was a Vellala. Among the lesser Śaivite saints were an untouchable and a woman. Thus, the *bhakti* effervescence may have represented, at least in part, a reaction against the ritual exclusiveness of Brahmanical Hinduism. It certainly constituted a redefinition of Hinduism in more popular, but increasingly sectarian, terms.

As the Śaivite saints travelled through the countryside, they sang the praises of the god and of the temples and shrines believed to be sacred to him. Each hymn is said to have been composed at a particular place, and either the name of that place or the name under which the

5) Strictly speaking, we do not know whether the saints sang these hymns or merely composed poems which were sung as hymns in later times. The term *pathikam* means only "ten-line stanza."

6) V. Raghavan, *The Great Integrators: The Saint-Singers of India* (Delhi and Faridabad: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1966), p. 37.

god was worshipped there was usually mentioned in the text of the hymn. It is the detailed study of these references which allows us to reconstruct the sacred geography of Tamil Śaivism.

II

What do we discover when we proceed to extract from the *Dēvāram* hymns all references to sacred places, and to locate these places on maps? First, we note that their distribution by district is very uneven⁷). (See Fig. 1). At first glance, it would appear that the peninsula-wide distribution of sacred places is very extensive. Yet if we ignore the districts which contain only one or two sacred places, we see that the overwhelming majority of such places are located in districts within the state of Tamilnadu. Some 229, or 88% of the 260 identifiable places in south India and Ceylon, are located in the four districts of Chingleput, South Arcot, Trichinopoly (Tiruchchirappalli), and Tanjore (Thanjavur)⁸). Indeed, Tanjore district alone contains some 160 places, or 62% of the total for the peninsula and Ceylon⁹).

This concentration of sacred places within Tanjore district is scarcely surprising, since that district contains the fertile Cauvery delta, which was one of the earliest regions of settled agriculture in south India, and even today is one of the most densely populated¹⁰). The close connection between the sacred geography of Tamil Śaivism and the early agricultural development of Tamilnad is evident if we consider the rather uneven distribution of sacred places *within* Tanjore district. (See Fig. 2). The greatest concentration is in the northeastern portion of the district, chiefly in modern Shiyali, Mayuram, Kumba-

7) The ancient subdivision was not, of course, the district, but the *nāḍu*, of which seven are specified in the hymns. For a discussion of these *nāḍu* divisions and a statistical table indicating the distribution of both Śaivite and Vaiṣṇavite sacred places by *nāḍu*, see C. M. Ramachandra Chettiar, "Geographical Distribution of Religious Places in Tamil Nad," *Indian Geographical Journal*; XVI (1941), 42-50. Familiar, Anglicized forms of certain district names and other place-names have been adopted in the present article (e.g., "Tanjore," rather than "Thanjavūr"). Similarly, "Brahman" has been used in preference to "Brāhmaṇa," "Chola" in preference to "Cōla" and so on.

8) It should be noted that a single place is often referred to in the hymns by more than one name.

9) Another four places can be attributed to North India. Of a grand total of 276 sacred places, only twelve cannot be located with accuracy.

10) Consult F. R. Hemingway, *Madras District Gazetteers: Tanjore* (Madras, 1906).




Fig. 1. District-Wise Distribution of Saivite Sacred Places Mentioned in the *Dēvāram* Hymns.

konam, Papanasam, Nannilam, and Nagapattinam taluks. The most important sacred places in the district, then, as measured by the number of references in the hymns, can be enclosed by an imaginary triangle bounded on one side by that portion of the Coromandel coast from the mouth of the Coleroon River on the north to Point Calimere on the south, with the other two sides extending westward to a point located around Tiruvaiyāru (Tiruvadi). This triangular area corresponds almost exactly to the Cauvery delta, and encompasses not only the most fertile, but also traditionally the most densely populated part of Tamil-




Fig. 2.

nad ¹¹). This close correspondence is partly a reflection of the significant role played by temples in the control and utilization of land, as well as in the organization and maintenance of tanks and irrigation systems.

A particular temple or sacred place was not necessarily equally popular with all of the saint-singers. Some sacred places were eulogized by only one of the saints. Others were praised by two or all of the *Dēvāram* trio. By far the most frequently-mentioned place is Piramapuram (i.e. Brahmapuram), in Shiyali taluk of Tanjore district. Piramapuram is repeatedly referred to in the hymns under a dozen synonymous names. Yet Piramapuram is mentioned only in the hymns of Sambandar, and not in the hymns of the other saints. By contrast, the famous sacred center of Tiruvārūr, located only about eight miles south of Piramapuram, is repeatedly eulogized in the hymns of all three saints.

Both the devotional zeal of the saints and the "publicity" value of their hymns had a profound influence upon styles of religious devotion in later times, especially in the Cauvery delta, where *Dēvāram* symbolism was omnipresent. The program of temple-construction which was encouraged by the imperial Cholas, who dominated the Cauvery delta from the ninth through the twelfth centuries, drew much of its inspiration from the earlier *bhakti* movement of the Pallava period. The great temple at Tanjore, constructed at the instance of the Chola king Rājarāja I in the late tenth and early eleventh centuries, contained images of the *Dēvāram* trio ¹²). Moreover, there is a tradition among the priests of that temple that before it was constructed, Rājarāja was an admirer of the Tiruvārūr temple, and that when the Tanjore temple

11) See T. B. Ranganatha Davey, "The Historical Geography of the Cauvery Delta with special Reference to the Tanjore District," *Journal of the Madras Geographical Assn.*; Vol. 12, No. 2 (July, 1937), 83-94; also K. S. Chandrasekharan, "The Physical Geography of the Tanjore District," *ibid.*, 114-119. Brief descriptions of some sacred places are included in Chapter XV of the 1906 Tanjore District gazetteer. Since any attempt to include a complete list of all sacred place-names would render the present article unreadable, an elaborate, 39-page table which specifies each sacred place, its alternative names, the passages in the *Dēvāram* in which the references are found, and the author of that passage, has been prepared by Mr. N. Kumaraswami Raja. Photocopies of this table are available from the author upon request.

12) E. Hultzsch, ed. and tr., *South-Indian Inscriptions* (Madras: Archaeological Survey of India, Govt. Press, 1895), Vol. II. Inscription No. 38.

was completed, many of the ritual practices which were followed there were borrowed directly from Tiruvārūr, as indeed were some of the temple servants themselves¹³).

Today, the historical association of one or more of the saints with a particular temple constitutes a significant segment of the institution's collective vision of its own past. Thus, the fact that all three of the *Dēvāram* saints sang the glories of the Naṭarāja temple at Chidambaram is a matter of local pride. In some hymns, it is referred to simply as "the Temple" (*kōyil*), evidently in the sense of "Temple of Temples." Sambandar is even said to have considered the entire city of Chidambaram as a temple¹⁴). It is also in the Chidambaram temple that Nambi Āṇḍār Nambi, in the time of Rājarāja I, is said to have discovered the complete texts of nearly 800 hymns and to have preserved them for posterity as the *Dēvāram*.

Thus, it is understandable that the process of growth and proliferation of temples in the Tamil country and the travels of the saints and singing of their hymns reinforced one another. The hymns spread the fame of certain temples, while the priests serving those temples which were eulogized by the saints came to have a special interest in preserving and disseminating the hymns.

At this juncture, we should remember that temples came to prominence by their contact with saints and their being recognised and consecrated in their songs. The mere visit by a saint exalted the sacredness of the place in the eyes of devotees. The temples which had the honour of being sung by saints were known as 'Padal Petra Sthalam' in Saivite lore and 'Mangala Sasanam Petra Sthalam' in Vaishnavite Literature. The other minor temples which were merely mentioned casually in the songs were dubbed by the name 'Vaippu Sthalam' in Saivite literature. The importance of a temple which was Padal Petra Sthalam can be easily understood from the fact that even in modern days a rich and pious moneylender of Nagarathar Community would never consider to renovate any other temple than that which was sanctified in the songs of a saint.¹⁵)

If we think of our collection of sacred places as being connected, not only by virtue of their immortalization in the hymns, but also by virtue

13) Cf. T. G. Aravamuthan, "The Authors of the Holy Canon of Tamil Saivism," *Quarterly Journal of the Mythic Society*; XXV (July-Oct. 1934/January 1935), 143-60, espec. pp. 154-55. See also *South-Indian Inscriptions*, II, No. 66.

14) G. M. Muthuswami Pillai, "The Glory of Chidambaram," *Saiva Siddhanta*; I, No. 2 (April-June, 1966). 115-20.

15) C. M. Ramachandra Chettiar, "Geographical Distribution," p. 45.

of the movement of the saints and subsequent devotees from one place to another, then it is reasonable to refer to these connections, in the terminology of professors Cohn and Marriott, as a kind of religious "network," with the sacred places constituting nodal points or "centers" ¹⁶). Moreover, it is a network with a clearly defined heartland, *viz.* the lower Cauvery basin—or "Chola country" (Cōḷa nāḍu), as it is referred to in the hymns themselves—and a series of decreasingly significant peripheral zones. It should be evident that, whereas the regional symbolism inherent in this sacred geography may have helped to stimulate the development of modern Tamil regionalism as an ideology, the very vagueness of this sacred geography in its peripheral areas militates against its use by present-day ideologists as a way of defining "traditional" Tamilnad in any precise fashion.

III

Anthropologists have commented upon India's complex cultural, as well as social, stratification. Within the loosely-articulated framework of India's Great Tradition there coexist many regional and local sub-cultures, all related directly or indirectly to one another and to the Sanskritic culture of the pan-Indian Brahmanic tradition. Over the centuries, these multiple cultural levels have been linked through the activities of many "cultural mediators" who have translated ideas, themes, and symbols from one level to another. The saint-singers of Tamilnad provide an excellent example of such cultural mediators. Their activities vividly illustrate how significant ideas and symbols of the "greater" Indic tradition could be translated and transformed into themes which were more directly reflective of local or regional practices. As McKim Marriott has noted, the existence of such chains of cultural specialists, translating themes from one level to another, helped to preserve cultural variety at each level ¹⁷). A recent popular book by Professor V. Raghavan refers explicitly to the "integrative" function of the devotees relative to the Sanskritic Great Tradition. The

16) Cf. Bernard Cohn and McKim Marriott, "Networks and Centres in the Integration of Indian Civilisation," *Journal of Social Research*; Vol. I, No. 1 (September, 1958), 1-9. On informal circulation networks in Hinduism, see Sopher, *Geography of Religions*, p. 57.

17) See his "Changing Channels of Cultural Transmission in Indian Civilization," *Journal of Social Research*; Vol. IV, No. 1-2 (March-Sept. 1961). 13-25.

author views the saints primarily as interpreters of Great Tradition themes to the unlettered many¹⁸). A contrary view was taken several years ago by Selig Harrison in his *India: The Most Dangerous Decades*, in which only the presumed centrifugal implications of regional *bhakti* were emphasized¹⁹). But surely it is the very ambiguity of the saints' cultural role, the fact that they simultaneously drew inspiration from both "higher" and "lower" traditions, which makes them objects of interest.

Several years ago, Milton Singer demonstrated the utility of exploring the several dimensions of Indian civilization through an examination of its "cultural media," i.e. the modes of communicating significant cultural themes and values; and its "cultural performances," i.e. structured events ranging from religious rituals to plays, concerts, and lectures.²⁰) A study of these cultural media and cultural performances, he suggested, would reveal them to be links in a cultural continuum "which includes village and town, Brahman and non-Brahman, north and south, the modern mass-media culture and the traditional folk and classic cultures, the little and the great traditions."²¹) As Professor Singer was well aware, the thorough exploration of this theme, not only across the subcontinent, but also backward and forward in time, would require the cooperation of historians and linguists as well as anthropologists. It is therefore unfortunate that historians have not been as prompt as have some anthropologists and Sanskritists in utilizing the "cultural media" approach to the study of Indian civilization.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of oral tradition as a medium for the dissemination of ideas in traditional India. As Professor Raghavan has noted, it is significant that the words for "knowledge" in Sanskrit (*śruta*) and in Tamil (*kēḷvi*) both mean literally "that which is heard."²²) Public recitations or expositions

18) *The Great Integrators*, *op. cit.*

19) Selig S. Harrison, *India: The Most Dangerous Decades* (Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 48-54.

20) Milton Singer, "The Cultural Pattern of Indian Civilization," *Far Eastern Quarterly*; XV, No. 1 (November, 1955), 23-36.

21) *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

22) V. Raghavan, "Methods of Popular Religious Instruction in South India," in *The Cultural Heritage of India*, Vol. IV, ed. by Haridas Bhattacharyya (Calcutta: R. K. M. Institute of Culture, 1956), pp. 503-14.

of Vedic and Epic literature have for centuries constituted an important vehicle for the dissemination of Great Tradition themes and values. Land grants were often made to temples as endowments to provide for Epic recitations.²³⁾ Public singing of devotional hymns, by specialists or laymen, has developed directly out of this oral tradition.

By the tenth and eleventh centuries, the great Chola kings Rājarāja I and Rājendra I were providing endowments for recitations and devotional singing in Tamil. Like other forms of temple patronage, this was intended partly as a visible and audible demonstration of royal piety, but partly also as an attempt to utilize religious media of communications for the simultaneous dissemination of political propaganda.²⁴⁾ The illuminating studies of heroic themes in early Tamil poetic tradition undertaken by K. Kailasapathy have established the development in ancient times of a close relationship between bardic poets and their patrons, *viz.* kings and chieftains, for the composition and dissemination of poems and songs on heroic themes.²⁵⁾ It is therefore scarcely surprising that the development of *bhakti* devotionism and the practice of endowing temples to provide for hymn-singing should also have attracted royal patronage. Under the Cholas, some major temples, such as the Ādhipuriśvara temple at Tiruvoṟṟiyūr, are known to have maintained professional performers to recite the eulogy of the king, as well as to praise the god.²⁶⁾ Under Rājarāja I, provision was made in the great temple at Tanjore both for installation of images of the Śaivite saints and for recitation of the *Dēvāram* hymns.²⁷⁾ It became a common practice for devotees to recite selected hymns before the images of the saints who had composed them. Other Chola inscriptions are rich in references to royal and private endowments for the recitation of the hymns in specified temples.²⁸⁾ Many of these temples are the very ones mentioned in the text of the hymns.

Recent studies by social scientists of contemporary patterns of

23) See, for example, inscription no. 163 of 1909 in the Chief Epigraphist's collection, Mysore City.

24) George W. Spencer, "Religious Networks and Royal Influence in Eleventh Century South India," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*; Vol. XII, Part I (1969), 42-56.

25) K. Kailasapathy, *Tamil Heroic Poetry* (Oxford University Press, 1968).

26) Archaeological Survey of India, *Annual Report of Epigraphy, 1913*, 86-87.

27) *South-Indian Inscriptions*, II, Nos. 40, 41, and 65.

28) See, for example, nos. 414 and 454 of 1908.

Hindu devotionism, especially in Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra, have also emphasized the importance of hymn-singing and analogous cultural performances in the communication of ideas. The studies of Milton Singer on religious performances in the city of Madras, of Father Deleury on the pilgrimage center of Pandharpur, and of Y. B. Damle on the Harikatha, are particularly illuminating in this respect.²⁹⁾ It is clear that, just as Tamil devotionism has its roots in the activities of the *bhakti* saints of the Pallava period, so also Vaishnavite devotionism in Maharashtra received its strongest impetus from the later activities of the seventeenth century saint-singers Tukārām and Rāmdās. It is surely no accident that Tukārām has joined the Maratha leader Shivāji (who, incidentally, is generally believed to have been a patron and admirer of Tukārām) as one of the principal objects of Maharashtrian regional pride. Thus, it is not solely in Tamilnad, but also in other parts of India, that the development of *bhakti* devotionism and the emphasis upon regional languages as vehicles for the communication of religious themes provided a significant medium for the dissemination of regional symbols and thereby helped to sow the seeds of regional pride.³⁰⁾

29) Milton Singer, "The Great Tradition in a Metropolitan Center: Madras," in *Traditional India: Structure and Change*, ed. by Milton Singer. *Journal of American Folklore*, Vol. 71, No. 281, pp. 246-76; G. A. Deleury, *The Cult of Viṭhobā* (Poona: Deccan College, Postgraduate and Research Institute, 1960); D. B. Damle, "Harikathā—A Study in Communication," *Bulletin of the Deccan College Research Institute*, 1960, 63-107.

30) For a discussion of analogous movements in other linguistic regions of India, see Raghavan, *Integrators*, pp. 26-31.

SHORT NOTES

HERA AND HERAKLES

BY

A. J. RUTGERS, Ghent.

§ 1 There is a beautiful symmetry between the figures of Apollo and Artemis: they are brother and sister, they are archers (i.e. they shoot arrows, i.e. light rays) and they represent the Sun and the Moon.

At first sight such a symmetry is lacking for the figures of Zeus and Hera; Zeus represents the sky by day; let us, in order to restore the symmetry, assume that Hera represents the sky by night. The following arguments present themselves:

- 1) Hera bo-opis, Hera the cow-eyed; however, this may also mean Hera with the great shining eye; and is not the full moon the great shining eye of the night sky?
- 2) Zeus, in order to ensure immortality to Herakles, had laid him to the breast of the sleeping Hera; she awakes, flies into passion, and hurls the infant into space; a jet of milk spouts from her breast, and forms the Milky Way. Let us ask: Where can we expect the divine milk to come down? Of course on the immense body of the Goddess; then the body of the Goddess must be the night sky, the seat of the Milky Way.
- 3) Finally, one etymology of Hera ¹⁾ is the old-indian svarga, which means sky; the word still exists in Dutch: zwerk. This interpretation has met the objection, that svarga denotes the shining sky, hence cannot denote the night sky; but it cannot be denied that also the night sky shines, the night sky shines with the light of thousands of stars.

§2 The foregoing argument throws also light on the name and figure of Herakles. We read that his etymology is difficult ²⁾: the

1) Pauly-Wissowa, Real Enz.d.class.Alt. Art Hera.

2) Pauly-Wissowa, l.c.Art.Herakles: „Diese letztere Etymologie, Herakles = der Heraberühmte, hat sich als die relativ noch immer richtigste seit dem Altertum bis in unsre Zeit erhalten. Man beruhigte sich bei ihr, obwohl auf dem ersten Blick klar war, dass die Deutung Herakles = der durch die Göttin Hera berühmte unhaltbar ist. Denn Herakles ist nicht durch Hera berühmt geworden, sondern durch seine Taten.“

name might mean: Famous by Hera, but this seems irreconcilable with everything we know about their relations, which are very strained. Moreover, it is said, Herakles is not famous by Hera, he is famous by his deeds. We want to show that these apparent contradictions are readily reconciled.

If we agree that Herakles, who has among his attributes the lion's skin and the arch, who represents the sun, the enmity between Hera (the night sky) and Herakles (the morning sun) becomes at once evident; of course, the morning sun is the deadly enemy of the night sky, he murders her every morning. But what about his fame, based on his twelve deeds? One is tempted to think of the sun's path through the sky; this path is the Zodiac; in the course of a year, the sun passes through the twelve constellations of the Zodiac; we can also say, in the course of a year the morning sun overpowers successively, one by one, the twelve constellations of the Zodiac; on the other hand a considerable part of the deeds of Herakles consists in the overpowering of monstrous animals; thus it becomes clear that Herakles is famous by his deeds, the scene of which is the night sky; in this sense he is at the same time famous by Hera, and her deadly enemy.

Finally we may ask: Is it possible to establish a one-one-correspondence between Herakles' deeds and the Zodiacal constellations?

We read that Herakles overpowers the Nemeïdic lion, the bull of Crete, the cancer coming out of the cave of the hydra and the Virgin-Queen of the Amazones; these three animals, and the Virgin are also found in the Zodiac; however, here the correspondence ends, and we have not been able, by considering older descriptions of the Zodiacal constellations, to improve it.

SUMMARY

For reasons of symmetry between Zeus and Hera, Hera is identified with the night sky; further arguments in favour of this interpretation are the myth about the origin of the Milky Way, Hera's epitheton *bo-opis* (with the great shining eye, the Moon) and the etymological argument, that old-indian *svarga* means the sky. A further result of this interpretation is not only that the enmity between Hera and Herakles, the night sky and the morning sun, becomes intelligible, but also the etymology Herakles = "he who is famous

by Hera"; for Herakles' deeds, which have made him famous, are performed on the twelve constellations of the Zodiac, which ornate the night sky. However, if it is tried to set the twelve deeds of Herakles in parallel to the successive overpowering of the twelve constellations of the Zodiac by the morning sun, it is seen that this correspondence holds only for 4 out of 12 cases.

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